Engineering topics

Wiener, Earl L.

Publications and source records attributed to Wiener, Earl L..

17 records

NASA NTRS1999

Transition to Glass: Pilot Training for High-Technology Transport Aircraft

This report examines the activities of a major commercial air carrier between 1993 and late 1996 as it acquired an advanced fleet of high-technology aircraft (Boeing 757). Previously, the airline's fleet consisted of traditional (non-glass) aircraft, and this report examines the transition from a traditional fleet to a glass one. A total of 150 pilots who were entering the B-757 transition training volunteered for the study, which consisted of three query phases: (1) first day of transition training, (2) 3 to 4 months after transition training, and (3) 12 to 14 months after initial operating experience. Of these initial 150 pilots, 99 completed all three phases of the study, with each phase consisting of probes on attitudes and experiences associated with their training and eventual transition to flying the line. In addition to the three questionnaires, 20 in-depth interviews were conducted. Although the primary focus of this study was on the flight training program, additional factors such as technical support, documentation, and training aids were investigated as well. The findings generally indicate that the pilot volunteers were highly motivated and very enthusiastic about their training program. In addition, the group had low levels of apprehension toward automation and expressed a high degree of satisfaction toward their training. However, there were some concerns expressed regarding the deficiencies in some of the training aids and lack of a free-play flight management system training device.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Differences Training for the Glass Cockpit

This study followed two groups of pilots from a major US air carrier as they went through a transition to advanced technology aircraft. Specifically, these were pilots were no previous automation experience undergoing Differences training from the 737-100/200 aircraft to the 737-300/500 aircraft. Each were given a different curriculum and data were collected on the efficacy of each training model and the pilots' attitudes toward automation. Results of the analyses performed and guidelines for training are included.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1994

On the design of flight-deck procedures

In complex human-machine systems, operations, training, and standardization depend on a elaborate set of procedures which are specified and mandated by the operational management of the organization. The intent is to provide guidance to the pilots, to ensure a logical, efficient, safe, and predictable means of carrying out the mission objectives. In this report the authors examine the issue of procedure use and design from a broad viewpoint. The authors recommend a process which we call 'The Four P's:' philosophy, policies, procedures, and practices. We believe that if an organization commits to this process, it can create a set of procedures that are more internally consistent, less confusing, better respected by the flight crews, and that will lead to greater conformity. The 'Four-P' model, and the guidelines for procedural development in appendix 1, resulted from cockpit observations, extensive interviews with airline management and pilots, interviews and discussion at one major airframe manufacturer, and an examination of accident and incident reports. Although this report is based on airline operations, we believe that the principles may be applicable to other complex, high-risk systems, such as nuclear power production, manufacturing process control, space flight, and military operations.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1993

Intervention strategies for the management of human error

This report examines the management of human error in the cockpit. The principles probably apply as well to other applications in the aviation realm (e.g. air traffic control, dispatch, weather, etc.) as well as other high-risk systems outside of aviation (e.g. shipping, high-technology medical procedures, military operations, nuclear power production). Management of human error is distinguished from error prevention. It is a more encompassing term, which includes not only the prevention of error, but also a means of disallowing an error, once made, from adversely affecting system output. Such techniques include: traditional human factors engineering, improvement of feedback and feedforward of information from system to crew, 'error-evident' displays which make erroneous input more obvious to the crew, trapping of errors within a system, goal-sharing between humans and machines (also called 'intent-driven' systems), paperwork management, and behaviorally based approaches, including procedures, standardization, checklist design, training, cockpit resource management, etc. Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of intervention strategies are included.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Cockpit checklists - Concepts, design, and use

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as a foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or nonuse, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as a major contributing factor to aircraft accidents. This paper reports the results of a field study of flight deck checklists and examines this seemingly mundane yet critical device from several perspectives: its functions, format, design, length, and usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. Certain sociotechnical factors, such as the airline 'culture', cockpit resource management, and production pressures that influence the design and use of this device, are also discussed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided. Although the focus of this paper is on the air transport industry, most of the principles discussed apply equally well to other high-risk industries, such as maritime transportation, power production, weapons systems, space flight, and medical care.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1992

Human Factors Of Flight-Deck Checklists

Report analyzes functions, formats, designs, lengths, and usage of normal cockpit checklists, as well as limitations of aircraft personnel who must interact with them. Checklist problems discussed in report also found in other high-risk industries such as: marine, nuclear, and chemical-process industries, as well as, civilian and military air transportation.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1991

The impact of cockpit automation on crew coordination and communication. Volume 1: Overview, LOFT evaluations, error severity, and questionnaire data

The purpose was to examine, jointly, cockpit automation and social processes. Automation was varied by the choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 series aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit derivative, the MD-88. Airline pilot volunteers flew a mission in the simulator for these aircraft. Results show that the performance differences between the crews of the two aircraft were generally small, but where there were differences, they favored the DC-9. There were no criteria on which the MD-88 crews performed better than the DC-9 crews. Furthermore, DC-9 crews rated their own workload as lower than did the MD-88 pilots. There were no significant differences between the two aircraft types with respect to the severity of errors committed during the Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) flight. The attitude questionnaires provided some interesting insights, but failed to distinguish between DC-9 and MD-88 crews.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. An attempt is made to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the checklist from the certification of a new model to its delivery and use by the customer are discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principle Operations Inspector, the manufacturer's philosophy, the airline's culture, and the end user, the pilot, influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between production pressures and checklist usage and checklist management are addressed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1991

Philosophy, policies, and procedures - The three P's of flight-deck operations

Standard operating procedures are drafted and provided to flightcrews to dictate the manner in which tasks are carried out. Failure to conform to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is frequently listed as the cause of violations, incidents, and accidents. However, procedures are often designed piecemeal, rather than being based on a sound philosophy of operations and policies that follow from such a philosophy. A framework of philosophy, policies, and procedures is proposed.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS1990

Human factors of the high technology cockpit

The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency affecting their performance. On the positive side, the equipment works as advertized with high reliability, offering highly efficient, computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries, such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side. Viewgraphs are given.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Potential benefits and hazards of increased reliance on cockpit automation

A review is presented of the introduction of advanced technology into the modern aircraft cockpit, bringing a new era of cockpit automation, and the opportunity for safe, fuel-efficient, computer-directed flight. It is shown that this advanced technology has also brought a number of problems, not due to equipment failure, but due to problems at the human-automation interface. Consideration is given to the interface, the ATC system, and to company, regulatory, and economic environments, as well as to how they contribute to these new problems.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Human factors of advanced technology (glass cockpit) transport aircraft

A three-year study of airline crews at two U.S. airlines who were flying an advanced technology aircraft, the Boeing 757 is discussed. The opinions and experiences of these pilots as they view the advanced, automated features of this aircraft, and contrast them with previous models they have flown are discussed. Training for advanced automation; (2) cockpit errors and error reduction; (3) management of cockpit workload; and (4) general attitudes toward cockpit automation are emphasized. The limitations of the air traffic control (ATC) system on the ability to utilize the advanced features of the new aircraft are discussed. In general the pilots are enthusiastic about flying an advanced technology aircraft, but they express mixed feelings about the impact of automation on workload, crew errors, and ability to manage the flight.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Reflections on human error - Matters of life and death

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid growth in the introduction of automatic devices into aircraft cockpits, and eleswhere in human-machine systems. This was motivated in part by the assumption that when human functioning is replaced by machine functioning, human error is eliminated. Experience to date shows that this is far from true, and that automation does not replace humans, but changes their role in the system, as well as the types and severity of the errors they make. This altered role may lead to fewer, but more critical errors. Intervention strategies to prevent these errors, or ameliorate their consequences include basic human factors engineering of the interface, enhanced warning and alerting systems, and more intelligent interfaces that understand the strategic intent of the crew and can detect and trap inconsistent or erroneous input before it affects the system.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Human factors in aviation

The fundamental principles of human-factors (HF) analysis for aviation applications are examined in a collection of reviews by leading experts, with an emphasis on recent developments. The aim is to provide information and guidance to the aviation community outside the HF field itself. Topics addressed include the systems approach to HF, system safety considerations, the human senses in flight, information processing, aviation workloads, group interaction and crew performance, flight training and simulation, human error in aviation operations, and aircrew fatigue and circadian rhythms. Also discussed are pilot control; aviation displays; cockpit automation; HF aspects of software interfaces; the design and integration of cockpit-crew systems; and HF issues for airline pilots, general aviation, helicopters, and ATC.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Cockpit automation

The aims and methods of aircraft cockpit automation are reviewed from a human-factors perspective. Consideration is given to the mixed pilot reception of increased automation, government concern with the safety and reliability of highly automated aircraft, the formal definition of automation, and the ground-proximity warning system and accidents involving controlled flight into terrain. The factors motivating automation include technology availability; safety; economy, reliability, and maintenance; workload reduction and two-pilot certification; more accurate maneuvering and navigation; display flexibility; economy of cockpit space; and military requirements.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Application of vigilance research - Rare, medium, or well done?

In the years since Mackworth (1950) initiated research into problems of human vigilance, automated systems have become more complex and costly, with greater repercussions upon failure; this has led to a paradoxical enhancement of human monitoring's importance. Applications of vigilance research to well-designed systems that take human monitoring into account are rare, although the outlook for future systems is improving. Attention is presently given to problems encountered in considerations of signal rate, length of vigil, time decrements, and two examples of implementation from commercial aviation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Fallible humans and vulnerable systems - Lessons learned from aviation

It is suggested that the problems being experienced in complex automatic systems are essentially due to the failure of information management and communication. The failure covers the entire spectrum: display devices and techniques, coding information so as to reduce human error, and information economy, i.e., resisting the temptation to bombard the operator with unlimited information simply because the system possesses the capability to do so. Since there has been great progress in hardware engineering, it is suggested that further attention is needed in the 'soft' side of systems. The approach should focus on (1) preventing human cognitive slips and (2) making the systems less vulnerable to such slips when they do occur. Most of the examples are taken from studies of cockpit automation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗