Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to LaBel, Kenneth A..
We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion-induced single-event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). This paper is a summary of test results.
This presentation contains test results for destructive failures in DC-DC converters. We have shown that Schottky diodes are susceptible to destructive single-event effects. Future work will be completed to identify parameter that determines diode susceptibility.
We present results for the single-event effect response of commercial production-level resistive random access memories. We found that the resistive memory arrays are immune to heavy ion-induced upsets. However, the devices were susceptible to single-event functional interrupts, due to upsets from the control circuits. The intrinsic radiation tolerant nature of resistive memory makes the technology an attractive consideration for future space applications.
This is an independent study to determine the single event destructive and transient susceptibility of the Xilinx Virtex-5QV (SIRF) device. A framework for evaluating complex digital systems targeted for harsh radiation environments such as space is presented.
Overview of NEPP Automotive Electronics Plans.
An overview of NEPP plans for small missions and electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts.
This presentation includes NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program FY14 task overview plans and recent highlights.
This presentation includes NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) considerations and FPGA radiation tasks overview.
NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging program-funded activities over the past year on single-event effects in silicon and silicon carbide power devices are presented, with focus on SiC device failure signatures.
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) is the process of ensuring space system performance in the presence of a space radiation environment. Herein, we present an updated NASA methodology for RHA focusing on content, deliverables and timeframes.
While we have been utilizing standard fluence levels such as those listed in the JESD57 document, we have begun revisiting what an appropriate test fluence is when it comes to qualifying a device for single events. Instead of a fixed fluence level or until a specific number of events occurs, a different thought process is required.
We present a framework for evaluating complex digital systems targeted for harsh radiation environments such as space. Focus is limited to analyzing the single event upset (SEU) susceptibility of designs implemented inside Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices. Tradeoffs are provided between application-specific versus test-specific test structures.
While standards and guidelines for performing SEE testing have existed for several decades, guidance for developing SEE test plans has not been as easy to find. In this presentation, the variety of areas that need to be considered ranging from resource issues (funds, personnel, schedule) to extremely technical challenges (particle interaction and circuit application), shall be discussed. Note: we consider the approach outlined here as a "living" document: Mission-specific constraints and new technology related issues always need to be taken into account.
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) is the process of ensuring space system performance in the presence of a space radiation environment. Herein, we present an updated NASA methodology for RHA focusing on content, deliverables and timeframes.
Single-event effect (SEE) and total ionizing dose (TID) test results are presented for various hardened and commercial power metal-oxide-semiconductor field effect transistors (MOSFETs), including vertical planar, trench, superjunction, and lateral process designs.
In this summary, we have shown that diodes are susceptible to destructive single-event effects, and that these failures occur along the guard ring. By determining the last passing voltages, a safe operating area can be derived. By derating off of those values, rather than by the rated voltage, like what is currently done with power MOSFETs, we can work to ensure the safety of future missions. However, there are still open questions about these failures. Are they limited to a single manufacturer, a small number, or all of them? Is there a threshold rated voltage that must be exceeded to see these failures? With future work, we hope to answer these questions. In the full paper, laser results will also be presented to verify that failures only occur along the guard ring.
No abstract available
Vulnerability of a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to total ionizing dose and displacement damage is studied. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, linear, and hybrid devices.