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Immanuel Barshi

Publications and source records attributed to Immanuel Barshi.

35 records · Page 2

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP

Learning From What Goes Well

NASA’s System Wide Safey (SWS) project under the Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) of the Aeronautical Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) supports work demonstrating the human contribution to safety (HC2S) and the benefits of learning from all operations including learning from what goes well. Some of this work is being done in collaboration with the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF). The presentation provides the rationale for this work, its expected benefits, and its methodology.

rsilience

People are the Weak Link in the System.

People are often considered the "weak link" in every system. It is assumed that there is a causal "chain" of events, and each link in the chain provides some protection against failure. In this notion, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link and people are often blamed for failures. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are only the source of error and failure.

operations

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP

To Create Safety Is Human

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations, are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations

Why Learning From All Operations Is Imperative

Learning from All Operations – Panel Discussion Introduction: Tzvetomir Blajev, Flight Safety Foundation Why Learning from All Operations is Imperative: Jon Holbrook, NASA Implemented Approaches to Learning from All Operations American Airlines Japan Airlines Southwest Airlines Delta Air Lines Why Learning from All Operations is Imperative (Summary): Immanuel Barshi, NASA

Jon Holbrook

Operational Guidance

Procedures and checklists form the backbone of all operations. But a given procedure does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of a large system, and it must fit well within it. For all procedures to fit well, we must take a comprehensive approach to their design. We present such an approach and the results we got when we applied it.

procedures

How Humans Contribute to Safety

We have all heard, and much too often, how human error is the leading cause of accidents. What we haven’t been hearing is how humans produce safety far more often than reduce safety. Before we embark on developing technologies to replace the error-prone human, it behooves us to understand how humans produce safety lest we lose that primary source of resilience in our aviation system.

safety

Changing the Narrative About the Human Role in Accidents

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations

What Do People Do?

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations

Thinking About Procedures

Procedures and checklists form the backbone of all operations. But a given procedure does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of a large system, and it must fit well within it. For all procedures to fit well, we must take a comprehensive approach to their design. We present such an approach and the results we got when we applied it.

procedures

Extracting Lessons of Human Performance and Resilience Management from a Study of Weather-Related Safety Risks and Incidents Reported to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

We present a study of weather-related incident reports submitted to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by air carrier pilots and air traffic controllers in the US. Using specific examples, we examine the weather-related risks reported and the relevant aspects of human performance and resilience management exhibited during these incidents. We describe our methods of lesson extraction to maximize learning, including the use of advance algorithms, and we conclude with a review of the weather-related risks encountered and the resilient practices employed to mitigate them.

resilience

Gathering Safety Intelligence from Relevant Safety Events

The notion of Safety II grew out of the realization that people are the source of resilience in any given socio-technical system and that people, in fact, produce safety far more often than reduce safety. The talk will highlight some of the key differences between Safety I and Safety II in their assumptions about the nature of operations and the nature of safety as well as some of the limitations of each approach and the ways in which they complement each other. Because we all want to make data-informed decisions and because we already collect a lot of Safety I-type data, the talk will also describe the Flight Safety Foundation’s Learning from All Operations effort which is designed to collect Safety II-type data.

resilience

So What Do People Actually Do?

I is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

safety

Models of Human-Automation Systems: Initial Analysis of the Boeing 737MAX Design

We describe a formal approach to identifying human factors design vulnerabilities and usability concerns in the context of automated control systems. We present an initial analysis of the design of the B737MAX that has suffered two fatal accidents. We highlight two main design vulnerabilities and one usability concern. Key formal generic properties used to identify these vulnerabilities and usability concerns are defined. These generic properties, and others referenced in the paper, can be applied to the analysis of any human-automation system.

HSI

Resilience, ASRS, and the Narrative about Human Error

We present a study of weather-related incident reports submitted to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by air carrier pilots in the US. Using specific examples, we examine the relevant aspects of human performance and resilience management exhibited during these incidents. We describe the common narrative about human error and how ASRS data can be used to change it.

resilience

Why Didn't They Just Follow the Procedure?

It is often said that to err is human and that procedures are in place to prevent people from making mistakes. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. And while it's true that good procedures can help avoid error, it's also the case that procedures have their own limitations. This talk highlights the limits of procedures and the resilience people bring to operations. It discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure, and it proposes an approach to the design of procedures that supports the human operator.

operations