A Practical Approach to a Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Sustained Nuclear Energy
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Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Collins, Emory D.
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The focus of this report is the evaluation of various co-precipitation processes for use in the synthesis of mixed oxide feedstock powders for the Ceramic Fuels Technology Area within the Fuels Cycle R&D (FCR&D) Program's Advanced Fuels Campaign. The evaluation will include a comparison with standard mechanical mixing of dry powders and as well as other co-conversion methods. The end result will be the down selection of a preferred sequence of co-precipitation process for the preparation of nuclear fuel feedstock materials to be used for comparison with other feedstock preparation methods. A review of the literature was done to identify potential nitrate-to-oxide co-conversion processes which have been applied to mixtures of uranium and plutonium to achieve recycle fuel homogeneity. Recent studies have begun to study the options for co-converting all of the plutonium and neptunium recovered from used nuclear fuels, together with appropriate portions of recovered uranium to produce the desired mixed oxide recycle fuel. The addition of recycled uranium will help reduce the safeguard attractiveness level and improve proliferation resistance of the recycled fuel. The inclusion of neptunium is primarily driven by its chemical similarity to plutonium, thus enabling a simple quick path to recycle. For recycle fuel to thermal-spectrum light water reactors (LWRs), the uranium concentration can be {approx}90% (wt.), and for fast spectrum reactors, the uranium concentration can typically exceed 70% (wt.). However, some of the co-conversion/recycle fuel fabrication processes being developed utilize a two-step process to reach the desired uranium concentration. In these processes, a 50-50 'master-mix' MOX powder is produced by the co-conversion process, and the uranium concentration is adjusted to the desired level for MOX fuel recycle by powder blending (milling) the 'master-mix' with depleted uranium oxide. In general, parameters that must be controlled for co-precipitation processes include (1) feed solution concentration adjustment, (2) precipitant concentration and addition methods, (3) pH, temperature, mixing method and time, (4) valence adjustment, (5) solid precipitate separation from the filtrate 'mother liquor,' generally by means of centrifugation or filtration, and (6) temperatures and times for drying, calcination, and reduction of the MOX product powder. Also a recovery step is necessary because of low, but finite solubility of the U/TRU metals in the mother liquor. The recovery step usually involves destruction of the residual precipitant and disposal of by-product wastes. Direct denitrations of U/TRU require fewer steps, but must utilize various methods to enable production of MOX with product characteristics that are acceptable for recycle fuel fabrication. The three co-precipitation processes considered for evaluation are (1) the ammonia co-precipitation process being developed in Russia, (2) the oxalate co-precipitation process, being developed in France, and (3) the ammonium-uranyl-plutonyl-carbonate (AUPuC) process being developed in Germany. Two direct denitration processes are presented for comparison: (1) the 'Microwave Heating (MH)' automated multi-batch process developed in Japan and (2) the 'Modified Direct Denitration (MDD)' continuous process being developed in the USA. Brief comparative descriptions of the U/TRU co-conversion processes are described. More complete details are provided in the references.
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Plutonium-244 (244 Pu) is an extremely rare and long-lived isotope of plutonium with a half-life of 80 million years. Measureable amounts of 244 Pu are found in neither reactor-grade nor weapons-grade plutonium. Production of this isotope requires a very high thermal flux to permit the two successive neutron captures that convert 242 Pu to 243 Pu to 244 Pu, particularly given the short (about 5 hour) half-life of 243 Pu. Such conditions simply do not exist in plutonium production processes. Therefore, 244 Pu is ideal for precise radiochemical analyses measuring plutonium material properties and isotopic concentrations in items containing plutonium. Isotope dilution mass spectrometry is about ten times more sensitive when using 244 Pu rather than 242 Pu for determining plutonium isotopic content. The isotope can also be irradiated in small quantities to produce superheavy elements. The majority of the existing global inventory of 244 Pu is contained in the outer housing of Mark-18A targets at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The total inventory is about 20 grams of 244 Pu in about 400 grams of plutonium distributed among the 65 targets. Currently, there are no specific plans to preserve these targets. Although the cost of separating and preserving this material would be considerable, it is trivial in comparison to new production costs. For all practical purposes, the material is irreplaceable, because new production would cost billions of dollars and require a series of irradiation and chemical separation cycles spanning up to 50 years. This paper will discuss a set of options for overcoming the significant challenges to preserve the 244 Pu as a National Asset: (1) the need to relocate the material from SRS in a timely manner, (2) the need to reduce the volume of material to the extent possible for storage, and (3) the need to establish an operational capability to enrich the 244 Pu in significant quantities. This paper suggests that if all the Mark-18A plutonium is separated, it would occupy a small volume and would be inexpensive to store while an enrichment capability is developed. Very small quantities could be enriched in existing mass separators to support critical needs.
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A study and comparison of the goals and understandings of nonproliferation authorities with those of used nuclear fuel (UNF) recycle advocates have uncovered (1) some of the basic reasons for the creation of uncertainties by each of the parties, (2) why these uncertainties have become a major barrier to a decision to recycle UNF components in the United States, and (3) what steps can be taken to clarify these uncertainties. Recent papers and viewpoints expressed by nonproliferation authorities and technical consultants were reviewed, summarized, and compared with results of recent fuel cycle systems analyses made at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1 Similarities and differences were identified, including both technical and policy factors. Nonproliferation authorities and a few UNF recycle advocates have recognized that the reprocessing technologies used for UNF component recycle do not offer significant nonproliferation differences; thus, the methods used can be chosen on some other basis, such as process efficiency, maturity, and/or economics. This paper reviews the safeguards implications beyond the simple assessment of UNF recycle technology selection. Differences in understanding that led to uncertainty barriers to UNF recycle include (1) the vulnerability of unseparated UNF, (2) the effects of time factors on production and accumulation of fissile plutonium isotopes and decay of the ?self-protecting radiation barrier,? (3) the chemistry of UNF components and relative ease of separation, and (4) the significant differences in commercialscale ?safeguards-by-design? UNF recycle facilities and smaller-scale covert operations. Application of safeguards-by-design and engineered safeguards can provide the defense-in-depth necessary for sufficient safeguards. Establishing these requirements for governing acceptable commercial UNF component recycle is essential.
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Feasibility tests were initiated to determine if the zirconium in commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) cladding can be recovered in sufficient purity to permit re-use, and if the recovery process can be operated economically. Initial tests are being performed with unirradiated, non-radioactive samples of various types of Zircaloy materials that are used in UNF cladding to develop the recovery process and determine the degree of purification that can be obtained. Early results indicate that quantitative recovery can be accomplished and product contamination with alloy constituents can be controlled sufficiently to meet purification requirements. Future tests with actual radioactive UNF cladding are planned. The objective of current research is to determine the feasibility of recovery and recycle of zirconium from used fuel cladding wastes. Zircaloy cladding, which contains 98+% of hafnium-free zirconium, is the second largest mass, on average {approx}25 wt %, of the components in used U.S. light-water-reactor fuel assemblies. Therefore, recovery and recycle of the zirconium would enable a large reduction in geologic waste disposal for advanced fuel cycles. Current practice is to compact or grout the cladding waste and store it for subsequent disposal in a geologic repository. This paper describes results of initial tests being performed with unirradiated, non-radioactive samples of various types of Zircaloy materials that are used in UNF cladding to develop the recovery process and determine the degree of purification that can be obtained. Future tests with actual radioactive UNF cladding are planned.
The DB Program monthly highlights report for September 2010, ORNL/TM-2010/252, was distributed to program participants by email on October 26. This report discusses: (1) Core and Fuel Analysis; (2) Spent Fuel Management; (3) Fuel Cycle Integration of the HTR (high temperature helium-cooled reactor); (4) TRU (transuranic elements) HTR Fuel Qualification; (5) HTR Spent Fuel Recycle - (a) TRU Kernel Development (ORNL), (b) Coating Development (ORNL), (c) Characterization Development and Support, (d) ZrC Properties and Handbook; and (6) HTR Fuel Recycle.
The DB Program monthly highlights report for August 2010, ORNL/TM-2010/184, was distributed to program participants by email on September 17. This report discusses: (1) Core and Fuel Analysis - (a) Core Design Optimization in the HTR (high temperature helium-cooled reactor) Prismatic Design (Logos), (b) Core Design Optimization in the HTR Pebble Bed Design (INL), (c) Microfuel analysis for the DB HTR (INL, GA, Logos); (2) Spent Fuel Management - (a) TRISO (tri-structural isotropic) repository behavior (UNLV), (b) Repository performance of TRISO fuel (UCB); (3) Fuel Cycle Integration of the HTR (high temperature helium-cooled reactor) - Synergy with other reactor fuel cycles (GA, Logos); (4) TRU (transuranic elements) HTR Fuel Qualification - (a) Thermochemical Modeling, (b) Actinide and Fission Product Transport, (c) Radiation Damage and Properties; (5) HTR Spent Fuel Recycle - (a) TRU Kernel Development (ORNL), (b) Coating Development (ORNL), (c) Characterization Development and Support, (d) ZrC Properties and Handbook; and (6) HTR Fuel Recycle - (a) Graphite Recycle (ORNL), (b) Aqueous Reprocessing, (c) Pyrochemical Reprocessing METROX (metal recovery from oxide fuel) Process Development (ANL).
The DB Program Quarterly Progress Report for April - June 2010, ORNL/TM/2010/140, was distributed to program participants on August 4. This report discusses the following: (1) TRU (transuranic elements) HTR (high temperature helium-cooled reactor) Fuel Modeling - (a) Thermochemical Modeling, (b) 5.3 Radiation Damage and Properties; (2) TRU HTR Fuel Qualification - (a) TRU Kernel Development, (b) Coating Development, (c) ZrC Properties and Handbook; and (3) HTR Fuel Recycle - (a) Recycle Processes, (b) Graphite Recycle, (c) Pyrochemical Reprocessing - METROX (metal recovery from oxide fuel) Process Development.
A systems analysis, based on previous in-depth studies, was made to develop an advanced used fuel recycling approach in which over 90% of the fuel components and cladding material are recovered and reused. This can minimize the waste requiring disposition to a geologic repository while enabling sustained nuclear energy and recovery of vital materials. The analysis assumed that: (1) continuing delays will occur in locating a site and licensing a geologic repository in the United States; (2) continued storage of used fuel at reactor sites or central storage locations is not a permanent solution; and (3) public perception is that the unresolved used fuel disposal problem is a deterrent to the continuation and expansion of the use of nuclear energy. The practical solution recommended is to move forward with a parallel approach to (1) deployment of industrialized recycling of used fuels which is a multi-decade process, and (2) focused R&D to recover the re-usable components and minimize residual waste. This approach would use concepts for proliferation resistant recycle facilities, processing oldest fuels first, and incorporating more-complete recycling of used fuel components. In addition to uranium and transuranic actinide recycle, the R&D would be focused on recovery and re-use of valuable components such as noble metals, lighter lanthanide elements, xenon gas, and zirconium from cladding. While the eventual need for a geologic repository will remain, the methods recommended can delay the need, minimize the capacity required, and significantly reduce the hazard of the wastes disposed. With no decision, the path forward for nuclear waste (used fuels) disposal remains uncertain, with many diverse technologies being considered. However, a decision to take advantage of proliferation resistant facility design, processing aged fuels, and incorporation of the concepts of nearcomplete recycling will provide the focus and path forward to a practical solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal.
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