Engineering topics
Bryant, Larry W.
Publications and source records attributed to Bryant, Larry W..
Managing the Risk of Command File Errors
Command File Error (CFE), as defined by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) is, regardless of the consequence on the spacecraft, either: an error in a command file sent to the spacecraft, an error in the process for developing and delivering a command file to the spacecraft, or the omission of a command file that should have been sent to the spacecraft. The risk consequence of a CFE can be mission ending and thus a concern to space exploration projects during their mission operations. A CFE during space mission operations is often the symptom of some kind of imbalance or inadequacy within the system that comprises the hardware & software used for command generation and the human experts involved in this endeavour. As we move into an era of enhanced collaboration with other NASA centers and commercial partners, these systems become more and more complex and hence it is all the more important to formally model and analyze CFEs in order to manage the risk of CFEs. Here we will provide a summary of the ongoing efforts at JPL in this area and also explain some more recent developments in the area of developing quantitative models for the purpose of managing CFE's.
Does Commercial Space Really Need MOA?
The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. This has been the paradigm for robotic space exploration missions, but does the same apply to commercial space operations? This is the question which is the driver for this year's MOA track at the 18th Annual Improving Space Operations workshop in April at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the question we examine in this paper. Corollaries to this driving question are why shouldn't MOA apply and are there factors beyond mission success with acceptable risk which apply to commercial space operations that are not present in government scientific missions? To address these questions, areas we focus on include risk (both mission and profit) management for commercial space operations and the practical extension of robotic mission MOA to commercial space operations. Another key area to look at is command file errors which are a major concern for deep space robotic missions, but can we worry about them less with manned missions or unmanned supply mission? Further, with the growing concern about space debris, we delve into the role of MOA relative to End-of-Mission activities. This paper examines these topics and in particular the perspectives presented at the workshop to begin charting the appropriate course for MOA in the emerging sector of Commercial Space Operations.
Improving operations: Metrics to Results
As a result of the mission failure of the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) spacecraft in 1999, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) initiated the development of a Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) program to be implemented across all flight projects managed by JPL. One of the initiatives undertaken in 2001 was the collection of data on command file errors occurring in the operational phase of the mission. This paper defines command file errors and how and where they occur in the operations process. It also describes the problem reporting system (PRS) in use for mission operations at JPL. We examine the recent modifications to the PRS that enable the collection of metrics, specifically on command file errors. This paper discusses what the data show us since metrics have been collected for the operational missions conducted by JPL. We examine the evolution of an operational working group initiative to evaluate proximate, contributing, and root causes for the errors. As part of this discussion we see what the metrics have indicated over a decade. At the macro level, we can say that the aggregate command file error rate has been cut to roughly one third of the initial 2001 level by the end of 2011. Additionally, we explore efficient and innovative means to continually integrate the findings and recommendations from the working group back into the flight operations environment.
Risk Balance: A Key Tool for Mission Operations Assurance
The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager and Office of Safety and Mission Success staff. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. Quite often there are competing options for the project to select from in deciding how to execute the event. An example includes choices between proven but aging hardware components and unused but unproven components. Timing of the event with respect to visual or telecommunications visibility can be a consideration in the case of Earth reentry or hazardous maneuver events. It is in such situations that MOA is called upon for a risk balance assessment or risk trade study to support their recommendation to the Project Manager for a specific option to select. In the following paragraphs we consider two such assessments, one for the Stardust capsule Earth return and the other for the choice of telecommunications system configuration for the EPOXI flyby of the comet Hartley 2. We discuss the development of the trade space for each project's scenario and characterize the risks of each possible option. The risk characterization we consider includes a determination of the severity or consequence of each risk if realized and the likelihood of its occurrence. We then examine the assessment process to arrive at a MOA recommendation. Finally we review each flight project's decision process and the outcome of their decisions.
Dealing with ISAs in the Problem Reporting System (PRS)
No abstract available
We're Here to Help You
Air Force lore tells us that the two biggest lies you will ever hear on the tarmac are when the Inspector General steps off the plane and says to the Wing Commander, "We're here to help you," and the Wing Commander replies, "We're glad to see you." Not too surprisingly, a similar relationship is often perceived between a project manager and the mission assurance representative (especially for operations). This perception intensifies as budgets shrink and missions shorten, after all, where is the value added? That is the question we will examine for three small, short projects: Phoenix, WISE, and Grail (which is yet to launch). All have limited resources to devote to "niceties" and a very short mission to reap the benefits for their operations. We will examine how mission operations assurance evolved for each project, what worked well, what could have been improved, and how these lessons can be applied to ensure mission operations assurance is a value added function for Grail and future small missions.
Stardust Blazes MOA Trail
Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) started at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) with the Magellan and Galileo missions of the late 80's. It continued to develop and received a significant impetus with the failures of two successive missions to Mars in the late 90's. MOA continued to evolve with each successive project at JPL achieving its current maturity with the Stardust sample return to Earth.
Decision Making During Contingencies: Beyond Earth Orbit or It Ain't Your Grandpa's Explorer I Anymore
No abstract available
Revisiting Training and Verification Process Implementation for Risk Reduction on New Missions at NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory
In 2003 we proposed an effort to develop a core program of standardized training and verification practices and standards against which the implementation of these practices could be measured. The purpose was to provide another means of risk reduction for deep space missions to preclude the likelihood of a repeat of the tragedies of the 1998 Mars missions. We identified six areas where the application of standards and standardization would benefit the overall readiness process for flight projects at JPL. These are Individual Training, Team Training, Interface and Procedure Development, Personnel Certification, Interface and procedure Verification, and Operations Readiness Testing. In this paper we will discuss the progress that has been made in the tasks of developing the proposed infrastructure in each of these areas. Specifically we will address the Position Training and Certification Standards that are now available for each operational position found on our Flight Operations Teams (FOT). We will also discuss the MGSS Baseline Flight Operations Team Training Plan which can be tailored for each new flight project at JPL. As these tasks have been progressing, the climate and emphasis for Training and for V and V at JPL has changed, and we have learned about the expansion, growth, and limitations in the roles of traditional positions at JPL such as the Project's Training Engineer, V and V Engineer, and Operations Engineer. The need to keep a tight rein on budgets has led to a merging and/or reduction in these positions which pose challenges to individual capacities and capabilities. We examine the evolution of these processes and the roles involved while taking a look at the impact or potential impact of our proposed training related infrastructure tasks. As we conclude our examination of the changes taking place for new flight projects, we see that the importance of proceeding with our proposed tasks and adapting them to the changing climate remains an important element in reducing the risk in the challenging business of space exploration.