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The updated and reformatted consumables flight planning worksheet is documented. An instruction set for applying the worksheet, and a sample application of the worksheet is disclosed. The particular application is for the STS interfacing with sortie payloads and typifies the interfacing of the delivery system and payloads.
Performance effectiveness evaluation scheme for EVA systems selection - worksheets
The updated consumables flight planning worksheet (CFPWS) is documented. The update includes: (1) additional consumables: ECLSS ammonia, APU propellant, HYD water; (2) additional on orbit activity for development flight instrumentation (DFI); (3) updated use factors for all consumables; and (4) sources and derivations of the use factors.
A collection of blank worksheets for use on each BRAVO problem to be analyzed is supplied, for the purposes of recording the inputs for the BRAVO analysis, working out the definition of mission equipment, recording inputs to the satellite synthesis computer program, estimating satellite earth station costs, costing terrestrial systems, and cost effectiveness calculations. The group of analysts working BRAVO will normally use a set of worksheets on each problem, however, the workbook pages are of sufficiently good quality that the user can duplicate them, if more worksheet blanks are required than supplied. For Vol. 1, see N74-12493; for Vol. 2, see N74-14530.
The consumables characteristic data associated with the performance of the mission activities required by the mission planning processor are defined to calculate the consumables requirements. The activity data is defined in terms of discrete time periods having a distinct rate for each consumable required to support the performance of a given operation. The data is structured in a series of consumable data worksheets for each activity that includes a profile of its operations and the rate of each consumable required to support the given activity. The data worksheets provide for the uniform specification of consumables data, allows for the ready identification of the consumables affected by a given activity, and facilitates the updating process. An activity and the data that must be included in the data worksheets are defined and an example of its use and application the consumables data requirements for the performance of the EVA are presented.
Activity consumables data specifications and data applications are presented. The data are structured in a series of "Consumable Data Worksheets" for each activity that includes a profile of its operations and the rate of each consumable required to support the given activity. The data worksheets provide for the uniform specification of consumables data, allows for the ready identification of the consumables affected by a given activity, and facilitates the updating process. An activity is defined and the data that must be included in the data worksheets are specified. An example of its use and application is given, i.e. consumables data requirements for the performance of the EVA. The consumables data for the activities currently identified for the shuttle spacecraft are included. The consumables data sources are identified and information to facilitate the maintenance process is detailed.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. The NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed is believed to be technically accurate and complete. No assessment issues remain that has safety implications. Volume 1 contain worksheets for the following sybsystems: Landing and Deceleration Subsystem; Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem; Active Thermal Control and Life Support Systems; Crew Equipment Subsystem; Instrumentation Subsystem; Data Processing Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem; Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler Subsystem; and Mechanical Actuation Subsystem.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes And Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. Volume 2 contains the worksheets for the following subsystems: Nose Wheel Steering Subsystem; Remote Manipulator Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem; Extravehicular Mobility Unit Subsystem; Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Subsystem; Main Propulsion Subsystem; and Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem.
Prices and profits of alternative designs compared. Objective of Land Mobile Satellite Service Finance Report (LMSS) program is to provide means for comparing alternative designs of LMSS systems. Program is Multiplan worksheet program. Labels used in worksheet chosen for satellite-based cellular communication service, but analysis not restricted to such cases. LMSS written for interactive execution with Multiplan (version 1.2) and implemented on IBM PC series computer operating under DOS (version 2.11).
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and NASA FMEA/CIL to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment workshets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue rsolution and rationale. Volume 3 contains the worksheets for the Reaction Control Subsystem and the Communications and Tracking Subsystem.
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 4 contains the IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA product for the Communication and Tracking consisted of 1,108 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 298 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consists of 697 FMEAs and 239 CIL items. The comparison determined if there were any results which had been found by IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but 407 FMEAs which caused differences in 294 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.