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17 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Characterizing the Experiment for Calibration with Uranium (Excalibur) neutron source for use in warhead verification

Neutron sources can play a variety of roles in warhead verification. For transmission radiography, a source of directed high energy neutrons is required, while for applications to detect fissile isotopes, sub-MeV neutrons are preferred. The Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source has been built and used in a variety of verification-related experiments. Excalibur is based on a commercial deuterium-tritium neutron generator specified and measured to be capable of producing 14 MeV neutrons at rates of up to 8.2 × 10 8 neutrons/s. Here, the generator is enclosed in a carbon-steel 32" diameter, 23.62" high carbon-steel cylinder that moderates the mean neutron energy to under 500 keV. This, in turn, is encased in 5%-borated polyethylene such that the entire assembly is a 48" x 48" box that is 30" tall. For radiographic applications, a narrow, tapered channel in the steel and polyethylene allows 14 MeV neutrons to stream directly from the generator to a test object. Its collimating capability is demonstrated by measuring the neutron flux profile. In the moderated mode of operation, the generator is fully enclosed in the steel, but a large section of the polyethylene is removed, providing a flux of sub-MeV neutrons from a wide range of angles. Neutron angular and spectral measurements using both a nested neutron spectrometer and a commercial liquid scintillator coupled with a 3 He detector show the expected softer neutron spectrum in moderated mode in good agreement with MCNP6 calculations. The gamma-ray spectrum from Excalibur is also in good agreement with MCNP modeling. Based on these findings, the future application of Excalibur in its two configurations is discussed.

Fissile material detection↗
DOE OSTI2020

Warhead verification concepts and technologies [Slides]

Weapons verification concepts and technologies are discussed related to Arms Control instrumentation, which is a three-part problem: measurement; certification, and authentication.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE FA4: Progress Update 2024

The Priority Research Objectives for Arms Control Technology Innovation, Verification, and Evaluation (PROACTIVE) venture’s overall goal is to address the technical challenges that will “enable the negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms limitation/reduction treaties with verification at the level of individual warheads by advancing the state of the art in verification and monitoring capabilities.” One of the four focus areas of the venture, Focus Area 4 (FA4), is a system-of-systems effort to establish methodologies for the integration of monitoring and verification (M&V) technologies into verification systems that support treaty objectives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Confirming the absence of nuclear warheads via passive gamma-ray measurements

Arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia negotiated after the end of the Cold War have imposed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Verification of these agreements has relied on onsite inspections, sometimes supported by radiation detection techniques to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead when ambiguities arise. So far, these measurements have sought to detect neutron emissions associated with the presence of plutonium, but they would be inadequate for uranium devices. In an effort to offer instruments that could be used to confirm the absence of both plutonium and uranium weapons, here we propose an inspection system that uses only passive gamma radiation detection techniques. Such a system would be particularly valuable for next-generation arms-control agreements that limit total numbers of weapons and would involve containerized items in storage. We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations to support the development of a verification protocol and detection algorithm. Here, we demonstrate the viability of the technique using standard laboratory check sources and MCNP simulations for simplified configurations of special nuclear material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS2013

Rocket Sled Propelled Testing of a Supersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic Decelerator

Decelerators (IADs) have traditionally been tested in wind tunnels. As the limitations of these test facilities are reached, other avenues must be pursued. The IAD being tested is a Supersonic IAD (SIAD), which attaches just aft of the heatshield around the perimeter of an entry body. This 'attached torus' SIAD is meant to improve the accuracy of landing for robotic class missions to Mars and allow for potentially increased payloads. The SIAD Design Verification (SDV) test aims to qualify the SIAD by applying a targeted aerodynamic load to the vehicle. While many test architectures were researched, a rocket sled track was ultimately chosen to be the most cost effective way to achieve the desired dynamic pressures. The Supersonic Naval Ordnance Research Track (SNORT) at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD) China Lake is a four mile test track, traditionally used for warhead and ejection seat testing. Prior to SDV, inflatable drag bodies have been tested on this particular track. Teams at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and NAWCWD collaborate together to design and fabricate one of the largest sleds ever built. The SDV sled is comprised of three individual sleds: a Pusher Sled which holds the solid booster rockets, an Item Sled which supports the test vehicle, and a Camera Sled that is pushed in front for in-situ footage and measurements. The JPL-designed Test Vehicle has a full-scale heatshield shape and contains all instrumentation and inflation systems necessary to inflate and test a SIAD. The first campaign that is run at SNORT tested all hardware and instrumentation before the SIAD was ready to be tested. For each of the three tests in this campaign, the number of rockets and top speed was increased and the data analyzed to ensure the hardware is safe at the necessary accelerations and aerodynamic loads.

Supersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic Decelerators (SI↗
DOE OSTI2024

Applied radiation tags for warhead dismantlement transparency

Here, this study explores the feasibility of applying radiation tags as a Chain of Custody tool to confirm the dismantlement of individual warheads by investigating time dependent emissions from special nuclear material. Precedents of photon and neutron sources that have been used to irradiate warhead components are presented. Measurements of irradiated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) are used to benchmark simulations with the CINDER90 library for MCNP. Delayed gamma emissions are simulated as a function of time since irradiation of moderated HEU and Weapons Grade Plutonium with photon and neutron sources. Models of commercial 9 MV and 15 MV linacs were found to induce ~10 9 fissions/g and ~10 11 fissions/g, respectively, creating 3 to 4 orders of magnitude more delayed gammas than neutron sources, modeled at 10 10 n/s. However, a DT neutron source was found to induce sufficient fissions, ~10 7 fissions/g, to create quantifiable signatures relative to intrinsic emissions. Applied radiation tagging is determined to be technically feasible, but its operational context and practical implementation requires significant development.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗