Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “underground nuclear testing”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

The distinct conditions of atmospheric and underground nuclear tests revealed by Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples

We analyzed the Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples from atmospheric and underground nuclear tests. Samples from the site of atmospheric tests exhibit a range of Zn isotopic fractionation (δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon = 0.23–0.86 ‰) while samples from underground tests exhibit Zn isotopic compositions with minimal variation among samples and from terrestrial igneous rock standards (δ 66 ZnJMC-Lyon = 0.28–0.39 ‰). In conclusion, the larger range of δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon observed in atmospheric test samples relative to underground test samples is likely the result of the open system characteristics of atmospheric nuclear tests and the closed system characteristics of underground nuclear tests.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2012

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Salut Underground Nuclear Test in U20ak, Nevada National Security Site, and the Impact of Stability of the Ground Surface

At the request of Jerry Sweeney, the LLNL Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Salut underground nuclear test in U20ak to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Review of the Salut site is complicated because the test experienced a subsurface, rather than surface, collapse. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Salut detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeologogy due to the nuclear detonation. Sweeney's proposal requires physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site), and focuses on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow, and deep geophysical surveys.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2011, Part 2

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done to support several different programs that desire access to the ground surface above expended underground nuclear tests. The programs include: the Borehole Management Program, the Environmental Restoration Program, and the National Center for Nuclear Security Gas-Migration Experiment. Safety decisions must be made before a crater area, or potential crater area, can be reentered for any work. Evaluation of cavity collapse and crater formation is input into the safety decisions. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who participated in weapons testing activities perform these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, ground motion, and radiological release information. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. The evaluations do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2011 was published on March 2, 2011. This report, considered Part 2 of work undertaken in calendar year 2011, compiles evaluations requested after the March report. The following unclassified summary statements describe collapse evolution and crater stability in response to a recent request to review 6 LLNL test locations in Yucca Flat, Rainier Mesa, and Pahute Mesa. They include: Baneberry in U8d; Clearwater in U12q; Wineskin in U12r, Buteo in U20a and Duryea in nearby U20a1; and Barnwell in U20az.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Hydrothermal Alteration of Glass from Underground Nuclear Tests: Formation and Transport of Pu-clay Colloids at the Nevada National Security Site

The testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), has led to the deposition of substantial quantities of plutonium into the environment. Approximately 2.8 metric tons (3.1×10 4 TBq) of Pu were deposited in the NNSS subsurface as a result of underground nuclear testing. While 3 H is the most abundant anthropogenic radionuclide deposited in the NNSS subsurface (4.7×10 6 TBq), plutonium is the most abundant from a molar standpoint. The only radioactive elements in greater molar abundance are the naturally occurring K, Th, and U isotopes. 239 Pu and 240 Pu represent the majority of alpha-emitting Pu isotopes. The extreme temperatures associated with underground nuclear tests and the refractory nature of Pu results in most of the Pu (98%) being sequestered in melted rock, referred to as nuclear melt glass (Iaea, 1998). As a result, Pu release to groundwater is controlled, in large part, by the leaching (or dissolution) of nuclear melt glass over time. The factors affecting glass dissolution rates have been studied extensively. The dissolution of Pu-containing borosilicate nuclear waste glasses at 90ºC has been shown to lead to the formation of dioctahedral smectite colloids. Colloid-facilitated transport of Pu at the NNSS has been observed. Recent groundwater samples collected from a number of contaminated wells have yielded a wide range of Pu concentrations from 0.00022 to 2.0 Bq/L. While Pu concentrations tend to fall below the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for drinking water (0.56 Bq/L), we do not yet understand what factors limit the Pu concentration or its transport behavior. To quantify the upper limit of Pu concentrations produced as a result of melt glass dissolution and determine the nature of colloids and Pu associations, we performed a 3 year nuclear melt glass dissolution experiment across a range of temperatures (25-200 °C) that represent hydrothermal conditions representative of the underground nuclear test cavities (when groundwater has re-saturated the nuclear melt glass and glass dissolution occurs). Colloid loads and Pu concentrations were monitored along with the mineralogy of both the colloids and the secondary mineral phases. The intent was to establish an upper limit for Pu concentrations at the NNSS, provide context regarding the Pu concentrations observed at the NNSS to date and the Pu concentrations that may be observed in the future. The results provide a conceptual model for the risks posed by Pu migration at the NNSS.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2012

Approaches to Quantify Potential Contaminant Transport in the Lower Carbonate Aquifer from Underground Nuclear Testing at Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada - 12434

Quantitative modeling of the potential for contaminant transport from sources associated with underground nuclear testing at Yucca Flat is an important part of the strategy to develop closure plans for the residual contamination. At Yucca Flat, the most significant groundwater resource that could potentially be impacted is the Lower Carbonate Aquifer (LCA), a regionally extensive aquifer that supplies a significant portion of the water demand at the Nevada National Security Site, formerly the Nevada Test Site. Developing and testing reasonable models of groundwater flow in this aquifer is an important precursor to performing subsequent contaminant transport modeling used to forecast contaminant boundaries at Yucca Flat that are used to identify potential use restriction and regulatory boundaries. A model of groundwater flow in the LCA at Yucca Flat has been developed. Uncertainty in this model, as well as other transport and source uncertainties, is being evaluated as part of the Underground Testing Area closure process. Several alternative flow models of the LCA in the Yucca Flat/Climax Mine CAU have been developed. These flow models are used in conjunction with contaminant transport models and source term models and models of contaminant transport from underground nuclear tests conducted in the overlying unsaturated and saturated alluvial and volcanic tuff rocks to evaluate possible contaminant migration in the LCA for the next 1,000 years. Assuming the flow and transport models are found adequate by NNSA/NSO and NDEP, the models will undergo a peer review. If the model is approved by NNSA/NSO and NDEP, it will be used to identify use restriction and regulatory boundaries at the start of the Corrective Action Decision Document Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) phase of the Corrective Action Strategy. These initial boundaries may be revised at the time of the Closure Report phase of the Corrective Action Strategy. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Approximating Dose and Risk for Contaminants in Groundwater from the Underground Nuclear Test Areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

As part of the Environmental Management Program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity investigates the potential impacts of radionuclides that were introduced into groundwater from the underground nuclear tests conducted near or below the NNSS water table between 1951 and 1992. Groundwater models are being used to simulate contaminant transport and forecast contaminant boundaries that encompass areas where the groundwater has a five percent or greater probability of containing contaminants above the Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (SDWA MCLs) at any time during the next 1,000 years. Transport modeling conducted for the Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit (CAU) at the NNSS identified the beta/photon-emitting radionuclides tritium (3H), carbon-14 ( 14 C), chlorine-36 ( 36 Cl), technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), and iodine-129 ( 129 I) as having the greatest influence in defining the farthest extent of the modeled CAU contaminant boundary. These same radionuclides are assumed here as the contaminants of concern (COCs) for all underground nuclear tests at the NNSS because models are not yet complete for the other CAUs. Potential public exposure to the COCs will only occur and be of concern if the COCs migrate into the groundwater beneath public or private lands at levels that exceed either individual SDWA MCLs or dose and risk limits. Groundwater flow directions strongly suggest that any contaminant boundary predicted by contaminant fate and transport modeling to overlap public or private lands is more likely to occur to the west and/or southwest of the NNSS and the adjacent Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Well-established, rural communities exist in these directions. Estimates of representative activity concentrations at the applicable SDWA MCL were developed for the five COCs. It is assumed that these COC concentrations may collectively occur at some public or private location in the future, but that situation does not exist today. These representative activity concentrations are evaluated with respect to conforming collectively to a modern annual committed effective dose (CED) and lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk for a hypothetical reasonably maximally exposed individual (RMEI). This approach goes beyond the SDWA MCL focus of the contaminant boundary because individual COC concentrations may comply with the SDWA MCL but not collectively meet the modern health-protection metrics and the SDWA language, especially if future modeling studies or monitoring activities show multiple radionuclides from different SDWA MCL categories to be COCs. For the drinking water exposure pathway alone, the annual committed effective dose (CED) for the RMEI from all five COCs that are collectively at estimated activity concentrations equal to their SDWA MCL is well below the U.S. Department of Energy health-protective CED limit of 100 millirem (mrem)/yr. This is consistent using both the NNSS unclassified, 1992 decay-corrected radionuclide atom inventory and the atom inventory based on radionuclides measured in groundwater obtained from the ALMENDRO cavity in 2009 to calculate the SDWA MCL activity concentrations in groundwater. The RMEI’s total lifetime excess cancer risk from the drinking water exposure pathway for both atom inventories is within the range of 1 × 10 -4 to ≤ 1 × 10 -6 , which is considered health protective according to modern SDWA MCL regulatory language. The biosphere exposure pathways are drinking water, garden produce, animal products, inadvertent soil ingestion, and indoor and outdoor air inhalation. The exposure parameters for communities west and southwest of the NNSS were developed when the Yucca Mountain high-level, nuclear-waste disposal facility was under consideration. For all biosphere exposure pathways, calculations of the annual CED and lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk for the RMEI revealed that: 1) The annual CED is well within health-protective guidance (<< 100 mrem CED /yr) for the COC activity concentrations at the SDWA MCL, regardless of the atom inventory used. 2) The calculated 70-year lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk (6 x 10 -5 ) is within the health-protective range when the five COC activity concentrations are derived using the NNSS 1992 atom inventory, but it is at the upper limit of the acceptable range (1 x 10 -4 ) using the ALMENDRO 2009 atom inventory. 3) Tritium (3H) is the principal COC for producing annual dose and lifetime excess cancer risk, regardless of the atom inventory used. 4) Overall, the drinking water ingestion pathway is the dominant exposure pathway contributing to the total annual CED and lifetime excess cancer risk, followed by eating locally grown produce and animal products. 5) When tritium completely decays (after about 100 years), the RMEI’s lifetime risk will fall well within the health-protective range (i.e., 1 × 10-4 to ≤ 1 × 10 -6 ) and 36Cl will then become the most important contributor to the RMEI’s total annual CED and lifetime excess cancer morbidity risk from eating local produce and animal products. In the event that radionuclide concentrations begin to approach SDWA MCLs, a reasonable risk-management strategy for keeping lifetime risk more in compliance with regulatory guidance would be to use local sources of groundwater that are below SDWA MCLs or to limit the consumption of local produce and animal products that have ingested COC-contaminated groundwater. The viability of the latter strategy increases where the annual CED due to 36Cl approaches that of 3H.The dose and risk values calculated here for an RMEI are specific to the assumption that the five COCs occur in groundwater beneath public or private lands at concentrations that are collectively at the SDWA MCL. Currently, these COCs are essentially absent from groundwater beneath public or private lands beyond the boundaries of the NNSS and NTTR other than at very low, naturally occurring concentrations. The analyses presented here can be readily applied to determine dose and risk for COC concentrations actually measured in future monitoring samples.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Review of Cavity Radius and Chimney Height Information for Underground Nuclear Tests at Nevada National Security Site

Underground nuclear explosions release an immense amount of thermal and mechanical energy that alter the geologic materials surrounding the “working point” (WP = underground location) of the detonation. Explosion effects produce mechanically and thermally altered zones such as the “cavity,” “chimney,” and “melt glass puddle,”as well as concentric zones of crushed, compressed, and fractured rock extending away from the cavity wall.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Yields and Cavity Radii of Underground Nuclear Tests with Specified Yields Reported in DOE/NV -- 209-REV 15 (2000)

The letter report provides a compilation of yield and cavity radius information for all underground nuclear tests with specified yields reported in DOE/NV -- 209-REV 15 (2000). Yield data were taken directly from DON/NV -- 209-REV 15 (2000). Cavity radius information was taken from a personal computer based database resident at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This database is associated with the written report by Miller et al. (2002).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Recovery and Calibration of Legacy Underground Nuclear Test Seismic Data from the Leo Brady Seismic Network

The Leo Brady Seismic Network (LBSN, originally the Sandia Seismic Network) was established in 1960 by Sandia National Laboratories to monitor underground nuclear tests (UGTs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly named the Nevada Test Site). The LBSN has been in various configurations throughout its existence, but it has generally been comprised of four to six stations at regional distances (~150–400 km) from the NNSS with approximately evenly spaced azimuthal coverage. Between 1962 and the end of nuclear testing in 1992, the LBSN—and a sister network operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories—was the most comprehensive United States source of regional seismic data of UGTs. Approximately 75% of all UGTs performed by the United States occurred in the predigital era. At that time, LBSN data were transmitted as frequency-modulated (FM) audio over telephone lines to a central location and recorded as analog waveforms on high-fidelity magnetic audio tapes. These tapes have been in dry temperature-stable storage for decades and contain the sole record of this irreplaceable data; full waveforms of LBSN-recorded UGTs from this era were not routinely digitized or otherwise published. We have developed a process to recover and calibrate data from these tapes. First, we play back and digitize the tapes as audio. Next, we demodulate the FM “audio” into individual waveforms. We then estimate the various instrument constants through careful measurement of “weight-lift” tests performed prior to each UGT on each instrument. Finally, these coefficients allow us to scale and shape the derived instrument response of the seismographs and compute poles and zeros. Finally, the result of this process is a digital record of the recorded seismic ground motion in a modern data format, stored in a searchable database. To date, we have digitized tapes from 592 UGTs.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Full Moment Tensor Solutions of U.S. Underground Nuclear Tests for Event Screening and Yield Estimation

Moment tensor (MT) solutions are proving increasingly valuable in explosion monitoring, especially now that they are more routinely calculated for the unconstrained, full (six component) MT. In this study, we have calculated MTs for U.S. underground nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada National Security Site using seismic recordings primarily from the Livermore Nevada Network. We are able to determine them for 130 nuclear explosions from 1970 to 1996 for a range of yields and under a variety of material conditions, which we have supplemented with 10 additional chemical explosions at the test site. The result is an extensive database of MTs that can be used to assess the performance of important monitoring tasks such as event identification and yield determination. We test the explosion event screening on the fundamental lune of the MT eigensphere and find MT screening to be a robust discriminant between earthquakes and explosions. We then explore the estimation of moment-derived yield, in which we find that material properties are the largest contributor to differences in the estimated moment-to-yield ratio. Additionally, further research conducted on this dataset can be used to develop, test, and improve various explosion monitoring methodologies.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dense Seismic Array Study of a Legacy Underground Nuclear Test at the Nevada National Security Site

The complex postdetonation geologic structures that form after an underground nuclear explosion are difficult to constrain because increased heterogeneity around the damage zone affects seismic waves that propagate through the explosion site. Generally, a vertical rubble-filled structure known as a chimney is formed after an underground nuclear explosion that is composed of debris that falls into the subsurface cavity generated by the explosion. Compared with chimneys that collapse fully, leaving a surface crater, partially collapsed chimneys can have remnant subsurface cavities left in place above collapsed rubble. The 1964 nuclear test HADDOCK, conducted at the Nevada test site (now the Nevada National Security Site), formed a partially collapsed chimney with no surface crater. Understanding the subsurface structure of these features has significant national security applications, such as aiding the study of suspected underground nuclear explosions under a treaty verification. In this study, we investigated the subsurface architecture of the HADDOCK legacy nuclear test using hybrid 2D–3D active source seismic reflection and refraction data. The seismic data were acquired using 275 survey shots from the Seismic Hammer (a 13,000 kg weight drop) and 65 survey shots from a smaller accelerated weight drop, both recorded by ~1000 three-component 5 Hz geophones. First-arrival, P-wave tomographic modeling shows a low-velocity anomaly at ~200 m depth, likely an air-filled cavity caused by partial collapse of the rock column into the temporary postdetonation cavity. A high-velocity anomaly between 20 and 60 m depth represents spall-related compaction of the shallow alluvium. Hints of low velocities are also present near the burial depth (~364 m). The reflection seismic data show a prominent subhorizontal reflector at ~300 m depth, a short-curved reflector at ~200 m, and a high-amplitude reflector at ~50 m depth. Comparisons of the reflection sections to synthetic data and borehole stratigraphy suggest that these features correspond to the alluvium–tuff contact, the partial collapse cavity, and the spalled layer, respectively.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

On Magnitudes and Inferred Yields of the 39 Underground Nuclear Test Explosions at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site

ABSTRACT We review the previously compiled seismic magnitudes for underground nuclear explosions at the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Novaya Zemlya Test Site, and analyze these data in the context of published details about individual tests and official Russian reports of annual cumulative explosive energy release at the test site. We derive relationships between teleseismic body wave magnitude mb and explosive yield Y by predicting the yield of each test using mb and minimizing the difference between predicted and reported annual cumulative yield. A linear relationship between mb and logY with a slope of 0.82 provides a good fit to the annual total yield, with a root mean square (rms) misfit of 0.095 logY units. A spectral magnitude relationship based on the explosion source model of Mueller and Murphy (1971) with a single-free-parameter provides a slightly better fit. For the 10 tests for which individual yields can be directly deduced from the official reports, the rms misfit of reported yields is less than 0.1 logY units or about 25%. More complex relationships that differentiate between the northern and southern test areas, or take account of variations in the scaled depth of burial, do not provide substantially better fits to the reported yields.

Geochemistry & Geophysics↗
DOE OSTI2019

Evaluating the Importance of Barometric Pumping for Subsurface Gas Transport Near an Underground Nuclear Test Site

Core Ideas Gas transport modeling can estimate ground surface breakthrough after an underground nuclear explosion. Comparison tracer‐injection experimental and model results reveals parameter sensitivity. Barometric pumping may explain gas breakthrough following an underground nuclear explosion. Amplitude and period of barometric pressure signal are key in controlling breakthrough. An underground nuclear explosion (UNE) generates and distributes radioactive gases that can be transported to the ground surface though preexisting and explosion‐induced fractures over timescales of hours to months. If detected, the presence of short‐lived radionuclides in gas is evidence of a recent UNE. Numerical modeling can provide estimates of surface arrival times that can help inform gas monitoring strategies at suspected foreign test sites. Efforts are underway at historic US UNE sites to better understand subsurface gas‐transport processes following a UNE by geologic characterization of the near‐field damage structures, field‐scale tracer experiments, and subsurface air pressure monitoring. The development of numerical models using historical and experimental datasets from former UNE sites can improve predictions by testing conceptual models, highlighting key processes, and constraining parameter ranges. The models developed in this study represent the U20az site at the Nevada National Security Site where the Barnwell device was expended in December 1989. A two‐phase (water and air), dual‐permeability flow and transport model of the U20az site was built to investigate gas transport processes under recent experimental conditions and following the Barnwell nuclear event. Results indicate that the model can explain both the lack of arrival of radioactive gas tracers in a 2013 field experiment as well as the observed arrival of radioactive gases following the 1989 Barnwell event using barometric pressure records from the respective periods, even when additional advective processes associated with the Barnwell detonation are ignored. The results demonstrate that the character of the barometric records may be a key factor in explaining the differences in transport behavior.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2018

Underground Nuclear Testing [Slides]

Conducting a nuclear test was a major undertaking. It involves several hundred full time positions that have little to do with the actual test. In the 60’s Mercury was the second largest city in Nevada. On a average day in the 60’s, 70’s AND 80’s there were about 20,000 people on the site. One effects shot would require from 2 to 4 years to plan and execute. These were massive undertakings.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2014

Overview of Observed and Measured Physical and Geophysical Effects of Historic Underground Nuclear Tests at the Nevada National Security Site

As detailed in a variety of sources (e.g., Allen et al. [1997]; Grasso [2001]), underground explosions can leave visible evidence of their occurrence in the geologic medium. The appearance and extent of the effects visible at the surface depend on a variety of factors, including scaled depth of burial (SDOB; actual depth of burial divided by the cube root of the yield of the explosion) and geologic medium characteristics. Surface effects were routinely documented for most of the underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) conducted at the former Nevada Test Site (now Nevada National Nuclear Site) and spatial data for them are available to the public (Grasso, 2001). Other effects, including collapse chimneys, glass-lined surfaces indicative of the initial explosion cavity, and shock damage to the medium, have also been characterized in various ways. These studies were done for a variety of purposes such as determining how closely UNEs could safely be positioned to conserve testing “real estate,” as input for containment design, to obtain survivability data for various types of equipment and instrumentation, and to understand device performance. Here we present examples of various mapped and measured explosion effects for the two main types of historical UNEs conducted at the NNSS, those in vertical shafts and those in horizontal tunnels. We do not include here cratering tests, which were shots conducted at shallow SDOBs for the purpose of creating a surface excavation.

explosion effects, Nevada National Security Site↗
DOE OSTI2019

Yield-Weighting Approaches for Calculating Radiologic Inventories for Individual Underground Nuclear Tests at the Nevada National Security Site

This memo supplements a set of notes developed in 2011 that outline two processes to identify and calculate unclassified radionuclide inventories for individual underground detonations conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The calculations are meant to be based upon unclassified yield information listed in U.S. Department of Energy (2015) and the unclassified total radionuclide inventory data summarized in either Bowen et al. (2001) or Finnegan et al. (2016).

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗