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At least 19 records

Spatial Estimation of Populations at Risk from Radiological Dispersion Device Terrorism Incidents

Delineation of the location and size of the population potentially at risk of exposure to ionizing radiation is one of the key analytical challenges in estimating accurately the severity of the potential health effects associated with a radiological terrorism incident. Regardless of spatial scale, the geographical units for which population data commonly are collected rarely coincide with the geographical scale necessary for effective incident management and medical response. This paper identifies major government and commercial open sources of U.S. population data and presents a GIS-based approach for allocating publicly available population data, including age distributions, to geographical units appropriate for planning and implementing incident management and medical response strategies. In summary: The gravity model offers a straight-forward, empirical tool for estimating population flows, especially when geographical areas are relatively well-defined in terms of accessibility and spatial separation. This is particularly important for several reasons. First, the spatial scale for the area impacted by a RDD terrorism event is unlikely to match fully the spatial scale of available population data. That is, the plume spread typically will not uniformly overlay the impacted area. Second, the number of people within the impacted area varies as a function whether an attack occurs during the day or night. For example, the population of a central business district or industrial area typically is larger during the day while predominately residential areas have larger night time populations. As a result, interpolation techniques that link population data to geographical units and allocate those data based on time-frame at a spatial scale that is relevant to enhancing preparedness and response. The gravity model's main advantage is that it efficiently allocates readily available, open source population data to geographical units appropriate for planning and implementing incident management and medical monitoring strategies. The importance of being able to link population estimates to geographic areas during the course of an RDD incident can be understood intuitively: - The spatial distribution of actual total dose equivalents of ionizing radiation is likely to vary due to changes in meteorological parameters as an event evolves over time; - The size of the geographical area affected also is likely to vary as a function of the actual release scenario; - The ability to identify the location and size of the populations that may be exposed to doses of ionizing radiation is critical to carrying out appropriate treatment and post-event medical monitoring; - Once a spatial interaction model has been validated for a city or a region, it can then be used for simulation and prediction purposes to assess the possible human health consequences of different release scenarios. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

A Geographic Information Science (GISc) Approach to Characterizing Spatiotemporal Patterns of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004-2009

As terrorism on all scales continues, it is necessary to improve understanding of terrorist and insurgent activities. This article takes a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) approach to advance the understanding of spatial, social, political, and cultural triggers that influence terrorism incidents. Spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal patterns of terrorist attacks are examined to improve knowledge about terrorist systems of training, planning, and actions. The results of this study aim to provide a foundation for understanding attack patterns and tactics in emerging havens as well as inform the creation and implementation of various counterterrorism measures.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Filling Terrorism Gaps: VEOs, Evaluating Databases, and Applying Risk Terrain Modeling to Terrorism

This paper aims to address three issues: the lack of literature differentiating terrorism and violent extremist organizations (VEOs), terrorism incident databases, and the applicability of Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) to terrorism. Current open source literature and publicly available government sources do not differentiate between terrorism and VEOs; furthermore, they fail to define them. Addressing the lack of a comprehensive comparison of existing terrorism data sources, a matrix comparing a dozen terrorism databases is constructed, providing insight toward the array of data available. RTM, a method for spatial risk analysis at a micro level, has some applicability to terrorism research, particularly for studies looking at risk indicators of terrorism. Leveraging attack data from multiple databases, combined with RTM, offers one avenue for closing existing research gaps in terrorism literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Status Update on the NCRP Scientific Committee SC 5-1 Report: Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents - 13450

In August 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its final Protective Action Guide (PAG) for radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. This document specifies protective actions for public health during the early and intermediate phases and cleanup guidance for the late phase of RDD or IND incidents, and it discusses approaches to implementing the necessary actions. However, while the PAG provides specific guidance for the early and intermediate phases, it prescribes no equivalent guidance for the late-phase cleanup actions. Instead, the PAG offers a general description of a complex process using a site-specific optimization approach. This approach does not predetermine cleanup levels but approaches the problem from the factors that would bear on the final agreed-on cleanup levels. Based on this approach, the decision-making process involves multifaceted considerations including public health, the environment, and the economy, as well as socio-political factors. In an effort to fully define the process and approach to be used in optimizing late-phase recovery and site restoration following an RDD or IND incident, DHS has tasked the NCRP with preparing a comprehensive report addressing all aspects of the optimization process. Preparation of the NCRP report is a three-year (2010-2013) project assigned to a scientific committee, the Scientific Committee (SC) 5-1; the report was initially titled, Approach to Optimizing Decision Making for Late- Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. Members of SC 5-1 represent a broad range of expertise, including homeland security, health physics, risk and decision analysis, economics, environmental remediation and radioactive waste management, and communication. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, and guided by a recent process led by the White House through a Principal Level Exercise (PLE), the optimization approach has since been expanded to include off-site contamination from major nuclear power plant accidents as well as other nuclear or radiological incidents. The expanded application under the current guidance has thus led to a broadened scope of the report, which is reflected in its new title, Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The NCRP report, which is due for publication in 2013, will substantiate the current DHS guidance by clarifying and elaborating on the processes required for the development and implementation of procedures for optimizing decision making for late-phase recovery, enabling the establishment of cleanup goals on a site-specific basis. The report will contain a series of topics addressing important issues related to the long-term recovery from nuclear or radiological incidents. Special topics relevant to supporting the optimization of the decision-making process will include cost-benefit analysis, radioactive waste management, risk communication, stakeholder interaction, risk assessment, and decontamination approaches and techniques. The committee also evaluated past nuclear and radiological incidents for their relevance to the report, including the emerging issues associated with the Fukushima nuclear accident. Thus, due to the commonality of the late-phase issues (such as the potential widespread contamination following an event), the majority of the information pertaining to the response in the late-phase decision-making period, including site-specific optimization framework and approach, could be used or adapted for use in case of similar situations that are not due to terrorism, such as those that would be caused by major nuclear facility accidents or radiological incidents. To ensure that the report and the NCRP recommendations are current and relevant to the effective implementation of federal guidance, SC 5-1 has actively coordinated with the agencies of interest and other relevant stakeholders throughout the duration of the project. The resulting report will be an important resource to guide those involved in late-phase recovery efforts following a nuclear or radiological incident. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Key Recovery Planning Factors for a Biological Terrorism Event Draft: April 11, 2012 Key Planning Factors for Recovery from Biological Terrorism Event

If a biological terrorism incident were to occur in a major U.S. city, current response and recovery planning would not support a rapid regional recovery. Identifying issues that should be examined and planned ahead of time will save time, resources, and lives. We have identified Key Planning Factors that will lead to knowledge or planning efforts with the potential to substantially influence the recovery process. Their influence extends to increasing the rate of recovery, reducing recovery costs, improving public health and safety, or addressing major resource limitations or critical decisions that may impact overall recovery success. This document does not provide solutions but lists areas local planners in conjunction with local federal experts (such as EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs)) should consider in advance. Key Planning Factors describe some, but not all, areas where prior planning will significantly aid emergency operations in the event of an incident.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Information Technology and Community Restoration Studies/Task 1: Information Technology

Executive Summary The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration—a program jointly funded by the Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Science and Technology Directorate—is developing policies, methods, plans, and applied technologies to restore large urban areas, critical infrastructures, and Department of Defense installations following the intentional release of a biological agent (anthrax) by terrorists. There is a perception that there should be a common system that can share information both vertically and horizontally amongst participating organizations as well as support analyses. A key question is: "How far away from this are we?" As part of this program, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory conducted research to identify the current information technology tools that would be used by organizations in the greater Seattle urban area in such a scenario, to define criteria for use in evaluating information technology tools, and to identify current gaps. Researchers interviewed 28 individuals representing 25 agencies in civilian and military organizations to identify the tools they currently use to capture data needed to support operations and decision making. The organizations can be grouped into five broad categories: defense (Department of Defense), environmental/ecological (Environmental Protection Agency/Ecology), public health and medical services, emergency management, and critical infrastructure. The types of information that would be communicated in a biological terrorism incident include critical infrastructure and resource status, safety and protection information, laboratory test results, and general emergency information. The most commonly used tools are WebEOC (web-enabled crisis information management systems with real-time information sharing), mass notification software, resource tracking software, and NW WARN (web-based information to protect critical infrastructure systems). It appears that the current information management tools are used primarily for information gathering and sharing—not decision making. Respondents identified the following criteria for a future software system. It is easy to learn, updates information in real time, works with all agencies, is secure, uses a visualization or geographic information system feature, enables varying permission levels, flows information from one stage to another, works with other databases, feeds decision support tools, is compliant with appropriate standards, and is reasonably priced. Current tools have security issues, lack visual/mapping functions and critical infrastructure status, and do not integrate with other tools. It is clear that there is a need for an integrated, common operating system. The system would need to be accessible by all the organizations that would have a role in managing an anthrax incident to enable regional decision making. The most useful tool would feature a GIS visualization that would allow for a common operating picture that is updated in real time. To capitalize on information gained from the interviews, the following activities are recommended: • Rate emergency management decision tools against the criteria specified by the interviewees. • Identify and analyze other current activities focused on information sharing in the greater Seattle urban area. • Identify and analyze information sharing systems/tools used in other regions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Highly concentrated foam formulation for blast mitigation

A highly concentrated foam formulation for blast suppression and dispersion mitigation for use in responding to a terrorism incident involving a radiological dispersion device. The foam formulation is more concentrated and more stable than the current blast suppression foam (AFC-380), which reduces the logistics burden on the user.

Tucker, Mark D↗

Blast mitigation foam concentrates and foams made therefrom

The present disclosure is directed to highly concentrated foam formulations for blast suppression and dispersion mitigation. for use in responding to a terrorism incident involving a blast dispersion device. The foam formulation is more concentrated and more stable than current blast suppression foams, which reduces the logistics burden on the user.

Burton, Patrick D.↗

Visually Exploring Worldwide Incidents Tracking System Data

This paper presents refinements of an existing analytic tool, Juxter, which was developed for the visualization of multi-dimensional categorical data, and explores its application to support exploration and interaction with open source Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) data. The volume and complexity of data available on terrorism makes it hard to analyze. Information systems that can efficiently and effectively collect, access, analyze, and report terrorist incidents can help in further studies focused on preventing, detecting, and responding to terrorist attacks. Existing interfaces to the WITS data support advanced search capabilities, and geolocation but lack functionality for identifying patterns and trends. To better support efficient browsing we have refined Juxter’s existing capabilities for filtering, selecting, and sorting elements and categories within the visualization.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

PAIRS, The GIS-Based Incident Response System for Pennsylvania, and NASA

Over the past several years the Pennsylvania Departments of Environmental Protection (DEP), Health (DOH), and Agriculture (PDA) built the GIs-based Pennsylvania West Nile Surveillance System. That system has become a model for collecting data that has a field component, laboratory component, reporting and mapping component, and a public information component. Given the success of the West Nile Virus System and the events of September 11, 2001, DEP then embarked on the development of the Pennsylvania Incident Response System, or PAIRS. PAIRS is an effective GIs-based approach to providing a system for response to incidents of any kind, including terrorism because it is building upon the existing experience, infrastructure and databases that were successfully developed to respond to the West Nile Virus by DEP, DOH, and PDA. The proposed system can be described as one that supports data acquisition, laboratory forensics, decision making/response, and communications. Decision makers will have tools to view and analyze data from various sources and, at the same time, to communicate with the large numbers of people responding to the same incident. Recent collaborations with NASA partners are creating mechanisms for the PAIRS system to incorporate space-based and other remote sensing geophysical parameters relevant to public health assessment and management, such as surface temperatures, precipitation, land cover/land use change, and humidity. This presentation will describe the PAIRS system and outline the Pennsylvania-NASA collaboration for integration of space-based data into the PAIRS system.

Conrad, Eric↗

EPA's Suite of Tools for Managing Waste Following a Large-Scale Incident - 19420

Large-scale disasters have the potential to generate a significant amount of waste. For example, Hurricane Katrina and the Joplin Missouri tornado resulted in 100 million and 1.5 million cubic yards of waste respectfully. Man-made chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents either by way of terrorism, war, or accidents have the potential to generate as much or more hazardous waste. Recovery is profoundly impacted by waste management issues. The quantification, segregation, transportation, and storage of waste can be an arduous and costly undertaking. Furthermore, these processes are intricately linked with decisions made throughout the recovery timeline. Therefore, the remediation, including waste management, must be holistically considered. Understanding these complex interactions can be facilitated by using models and tools that adhere to the 'system-of-systems' approach. To better understand and predict waste management issues the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Homeland Security Research Program (HSRP) is developing a suite of tools and resources for planning and recovery purposes. The waste management suite consists of four tools: - Incident Waste Decision Support Tool (I-WASTE): characterizes and produces order-of-magnitude estimates for the weight and volume of waste materials that may require management and/or disposal, as well as identifies and locates potential treatment and disposal facilities. - Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST): estimates waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities following a wide-area radiological or biological incident; - Waste Storage and Staging Tool: identifies and prioritizes potential locations for staging and storing waste; - Waste Logistics Tool: estimates optimal routes with consideration to cost, time, and logistical requirements (e.g., resource demand, transportation type, access limitations, etc.) associated with transporting large volumes of waste from disaster-stricken areas to intermediate waste staging/temporary storage/on-site processing sites to off-site waste management facilities; and This paper will present EPA's waste management suite of tools, their purpose and application to large-scale incidents, and a case study demonstrating their use in a hypothetical scenario. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiological Exposure Devices (RED) Technical Basis for Threat Profile

Facilities that manufacture, store or transport significant quantities of radiological material must protect against the risk posed by sabotage events. Much of the analysis of this type of event has been focused on the threat from a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty bomb" scenario, in which a malicious assailant would, by explosives or other means, loft a significant quantity of radioactive material into a plume that would expose and contaminate people and property. Although the consequences in cost and psychological terror would be severe, no intentional RDD terrorism events are on record. Conversely, incidents in which a victim or victims were maliciously exposed to a Radiological Exposure Device (RED), without dispersal of radioactive material, are well documented. This paper represents a technical basis for the threat profile related to the risk of nefarious use of an RED, including assailant and material characterization. Radioactive materials of concern are detailed in Appendix A.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Planning a Resilient Power Sector: Ensuring Reliable, Secure, Safe, and Affordable Electricity

Decision makers around the globe are exploring strategies to ensure the reliable, secure, safe, and affordable supply of electricity to power economic growth and achieve development goals. Vulnerabilities of the power sector to natural hazards (e.g., acts of nature, severe weather, and climate variabilities), technological hazards (e.g., accidents and system or structure failures), and threats or human-caused incidents (e.g., intentional cyber-attacks or acts of terror) can impede the provision of the energy services necessary to achieve these goals. Although decision makers cannot prevent an act of nature such as an earthquake, they can anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to potential vulnerabilities through planning. The purpose of power sector resilience planning is to identify vulnerabilities and devise strategies to mitigate them. This document reviews some of the hazards that power sectors face and how decision makers can plan to increase resilience.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Planificacion de un Sector Energetico Resiliente: Como Asegurar Electricidad Confiable, Segura y Asequible (Spanish Translation)

This is the Spanish translation of 'Planning a Resilient Power Sector: Ensuring Reliable, Secure, Safe, and Affordable Electricity' (NREL/TP-7A40-71543). Decision makers around the globe are exploring strategies to ensure the reliable, secure, safe, and affordable supply of electricity to power economic growth and achieve development goals. Vulnerabilities of the power sector to natural hazards (e.g., acts of nature, severe weather, and climate variabilities), technological hazards (e.g., accidents and system or structure failures), and threats or human-caused incidents (e.g., intentional cyber-attacks or acts of terror) can impede the provision of the energy services necessary to achieve these goals. Although decision makers cannot prevent an act of nature such as an earthquake, they can anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to potential vulnerabilities through planning. The purpose of power sector resilience planning is to identify vulnerabilities and devise strategies to mitigate them. This document reviews some of the hazards that power sectors face and how decision makers can plan to increase resilience.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Power Sector Resilience Planning: To Ensure Reliable, Secure, Safe and Affordable Electricity Supplies (Lab Translation)

Decision makers around the globe are exploring strategies to ensure the reliable, secure, safe, and affordable supply of electricity to power economic growth and achieve development goals. Vulnerabilities of the power sector to natural hazards (e.g., acts of nature, severe weather, and climate variabilities), technological hazards (e.g., accidents and system or structure failures), and threats or human-caused incidents (e.g., intentional cyber-attacks or acts of terror) can impede the provision of the energy services necessary to achieve these goals. Although decision makers cannot prevent an act of nature such as an earthquake, they can anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to potential vulnerabilities through planning. The purpose of power sector resilience planning is to identify vulnerabilities and devise strategies to mitigate them. This document reviews some of the hazards that power sectors face and how decision makers can plan to increase resilience.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Planning a Resilient Power Sector: Ensuring Reliable, Secure, Safe, and Affordable Electricity

Decision makers around the globe are exploring strategies to ensure the reliable, secure, safe, and affordable supply of electricity to power economic growth and achieve development goals. Vulnerabilities of the power sector to natural hazards (e.g., acts of nature, severe weather, and climate variabilities), technological hazards (e.g., accidents and system or structure failures), and threats or human-caused incidents (e.g., intentional cyber-attacks or acts of terror) can impede the provision of the energy services necessary to achieve these goals. Although decision makers cannot prevent an act of nature such as an earthquake, they can anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to potential vulnerabilities through planning. The purpose of power sector resilience planning is to identify vulnerabilities and devise strategies to mitigate them. This document reviews some of the hazards that power sectors face and how decision makers can plan to increase resilience.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗