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At least 19 records

MER surface fault protection system

The Mars Exploration Rovers surface fault protection design was influenced by the fact that the solar-powered rovers must recharge their batteries during the day to survive the night. the rovers needed to autonomously maintain thermal stability, initiate safe and reliable communication with orbiting assets or directly to Earth, while maintaining energy balance. This paper will describe the system fault protection design for the surface phase of the mission.

system fault protection

Toward a Model-Based Approach to Flight System Fault Protection

Fault Protection (FP) is a distinct and separate systems engineering sub-discipline that is concerned with the off-nominal behavior of a system. Flight system fault protection is an important part of the overall flight system systems engineering effort, with its own products and processes. As with other aspects of systems engineering, the FP domain is highly amenable to expression and management in models. However, while there are standards and guidelines for performing FP related analyses, there are not standards or guidelines for formally relating the FP analyses to each other or to the system hardware and software design. As a result, the material generated for these analyses are effectively creating separate models that are only loosely-related to the system being designed. Development of approaches that enable modeling of FP concerns in the same model as the system hardware and software design enables establishment of formal relationships that has great potential for improving the efficiency, correctness, and verification of the implementation of flight system FP. This paper begins with an overview of the FP domain, and then continues with a presentation of a SysML/UML model of the FP domain and the particular analyses that it contains, by way of showing a potential model-based approach to flight system fault protection, and an exposition of the use of the FP models in FSW engineering. The analyses are small examples, inspired by current real-project examples of FP analyses.

Day, John

A Model-Based Architecture for a Small Flexible Fault Protection System

In this paper we will give a brief overview of how different missions implemented the fault protection application and the improvements along the way. We will then propose an architecture that supports the direct implementation of state-chart models into flight code. These state-chart models can be used to formally and naturally specify the behavior of all the major fault protection components - monitors, fault protection engine, and fault responses. The goal is a flexible, light-weight implementation of a traditional fault protection software system that is inexpensive to implement, reliable and understandable for both system and software developers.

Watney, Garth

System Fault Protection Design for the Cassini Spacecraft

Fault protection can include a wide range of topics, ranging from fault prevention to autonomous fault detection and recovery. This paper will address a portion of the autonomous fault detection and recovery implemented onboard the Cassini spacecraft. Specifically, the topic is system fault protection design, as opposed to subsystem fault protection design.

Cassini

Toward a Model-Based Approach for Flight System Fault Protection

Use SysML/UML to describe the physical structure of the system This part of the model would be shared with other teams - FS Systems Engineering, Planning & Execution, V&V, Operations, etc., in an integrated model-based engineering environment Use the UML Profile mechanism, defining Stereotypes to precisely express the concepts of the FP domain This extends the UML/SysML languages to contain our FP concepts Use UML/SysML, along with our profile, to capture FP concepts and relationships in the model Generate typical FP engineering products (the FMECA, Fault Tree, MRD, V&V Matrices)

fault protection

Advanced power system protection and incipient fault detection and protection of spaceborne power systems

This research concentrated on the application of advanced signal processing, expert system, and digital technologies for the detection and control of low grade, incipient faults on spaceborne power systems. The researchers have considerable experience in the application of advanced digital technologies and the protection of terrestrial power systems. This experience was used in the current contracts to develop new approaches for protecting the electrical distribution system in spaceborne applications. The project was divided into three distinct areas: (1) investigate the applicability of fault detection algorithms developed for terrestrial power systems to the detection of faults in spaceborne systems; (2) investigate the digital hardware and architectures required to monitor and control spaceborne power systems with full capability to implement new detection and diagnostic algorithms; and (3) develop a real-time expert operating system for implementing diagnostic and protection algorithms. Significant progress has been made in each of the above areas. Several terrestrial fault detection algorithms were modified to better adapt to spaceborne power system environments. Several digital architectures were developed and evaluated in light of the fault detection algorithms.

Russell, B. Don

Test plan. GCPS task 7, subtask 7.1: IHM development

The overall objective of Task 7 is to identify cost-effective life cycle integrated health management (IHM) approaches for a reusable launch vehicle's primary structure. Acceptable IHM approaches must: eliminate and accommodate faults through robust designs, identify optimum inspection/maintenance periods, automate ground and on-board test and check-out, and accommodate and detect structural faults by providing wide and localized area sensor and test coverage as required. These requirements are elements of our targeted primary structure low cost operations approach using airline-like maintenance by exception philosophies. This development plan will follow an evolutionary path paving the way to the ultimate development of flight-quality production, operations, and vehicle systems. This effort will be focused on maturing the recommended sensor technologies required for localized and wide area health monitoring to a technology readiness level (TRL) of 6 and to establish flight ready system design requirements. The following is a brief list of IHM program objectives: design out faults by analyzing material properties, structural geometry, and load and environment variables and identify failure modes and damage tolerance requirements; design in system robustness while meeting performance objectives (weight limitations) of the reusable launch vehicle primary structure; establish structural integrity margins to preclude the need for test and checkout and predict optimum inspection/maintenance periods through life prediction analysis; identify optimum fault protection system concept definitions combining system robustness and integrity margins established above with cost effective health monitoring technologies; and use coupons, panels, and integrated full scale primary structure test articles to identify, evaluate, and characterize the preferred NDE/NDI/IHM sensor technologies that will be a part of the fault protection system.

Greenberg, H. S.

The Soil Moisture Acttive Passive Mission: Fault Protection Performance and Lessons Learned

Fault protection as a discipline involves a collection of flight software logic and operational processes for detecting unacceptable anomalous behavior, responding prior to reaching criticality, restricting the propagation of a failure beyond a fault containment region, and recovering the vehicle back to full or degraded functionality if possible. The System Fault Protection (SFP) design for the SMAP Earth orbiter was put to the test during its 90-day vehicle commissioning activities. During this time, the SFP software autonomously protected the vehicle from multiple faults to critical hardware, and the operations team successfully returned the observatory to its science state. The SFP also performed well in the presence of anomalous behavior below true safety limits by not taking unnecessary response actions, instead allowing the operations team time to monitor the behavior. Certain aspects of the SFP design were modified during operations via both parameter updates and a full flight software update in order to better match the vehicle behavior in the flight environment. An evaluation of the SMAP SFP performance during vehicle Commissioning will be provided in this paper, as well as a set of lessons learned largely focused on visibility, SFP mutability in operations, responses to peripheral device faults, and Safe Mode recovery and design. By capturing some of the knowledge gained during SMAP Commissioning, it is intended that this paper provide guidance for making future System Fault Protection designs more robust and supportive of operations.

Clark, Jessica

Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Decision Making During Spacecraft Operations

Decisions made during the operational phase of a space mission often have significant and immediate consequences. Without the explicit consideration of the risks involved and their representation in a solid model, it is very likely that these risks are not considered systematically in trade studies. Wrong decisions during the operational phase of a space mission can lead to immediate system failure whereas correct decisions can help recover the system even from faulty conditions. A problem of special interest is the determination of the system fault protection strategies upon the occurrence of faults within the system. Decisions regarding the fault protection strategy also heavily rely on a correct understanding of the state of the system and an integrated risk model that represents the various possible scenarios and their respective likelihoods. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling is applicable to the full lifecycle of a space mission project, from concept development to preliminary design, detailed design, development and operations. The benefits and utilities of the model, however, depend on the phase of the mission for which it is used. This is because of the difference in the key strategic decisions that support each mission phase. The focus of this paper is on describing the particular methods used for PRA modeling during the operational phase of a spacecraft by gleaning insight from recently conducted case studies on two operational Mars orbiters. During operations, the key decisions relate to the commands sent to the spacecraft for any kind of diagnostics, anomaly resolution, trajectory changes, or planning. Often, faults and failures occur in the parts of the spacecraft but are contained or mitigated before they can cause serious damage. The failure behavior of the system during operations provides valuable data for updating and adjusting the related PRA models that are built primarily based on historical failure data. The PRA models, in turn, provide insight into the effect of various faults or failures on the risk and failure drivers of the system and the likelihood of possible end case scenarios, thereby facilitating the decision making process during operations. This paper describes the process of adjusting PRA models based on observed spacecraft data, on one hand, and utilizing the models for insight into the future system behavior on the other hand. While PRA models are typically used as a decision aid during the design phase of a space mission, we advocate adjusting them based on the observed behavior of the spacecraft and utilizing them for decision support during the operations phase.

dynamic fault trees

Formal Validation of Fault Management Design Solutions

The work presented in this paper describes an approach used to develop SysML modeling patterns to express the behavior of fault protection, test the model's logic by performing fault injection simulations, and verify the fault protection system's logical design via model checking. A representative example, using a subset of the fault protection design for the Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) system, was modeled with SysML State Machines and JavaScript as Action Language. The SysML model captures interactions between relevant system components and system behavior abstractions (mode managers, error monitors, fault protection engine, and devices/switches). Development of a method to implement verifiable and lightweight executable fault protection models enables future missions to have access to larger fault test domains and verifiable design patterns. A tool-chain to transform the SysML model to jpf-Statechart compliant Java code and then verify the generated code via model checking was established. Conclusions and lessons learned from this work are also described, as well as potential avenues for further research and development.

Statechart

Description of the SSF PMAD DC testbed control system data acquisition function

The NASA LeRC in Cleveland, Ohio has completed the development and integration of a Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) DC Testbed. This testbed is a reduced scale representation of the end to end, sources to loads, Space Station Freedom Electrical Power System (SSF EPS). This unique facility is being used to demonstrate DC power generation and distribution, power management and control, and system operation techniques considered to be prime candidates for the Space Station Freedom. A key capability of the testbed is its ability to be configured to address system level issues in support of critical SSF program design milestones. Electrical power system control and operation issues like source control, source regulation, system fault protection, end-to-end system stability, health monitoring, resource allocation, and resource management are being evaluated in the testbed. The SSF EPS control functional allocation between on-board computers and ground based systems is evolving. Initially, ground based systems will perform the bulk of power system control and operation. The EPS control system is required to continuously monitor and determine the current state of the power system. The DC Testbed Control System consists of standard controllers arranged in a hierarchical and distributed architecture. These controllers provide all the monitoring and control functions for the DC Testbed Electrical Power System. Higher level controllers include the Power Management Controller, Load Management Controller, Operator Interface System, and a network of computer systems that perform some of the SSF Ground based Control Center Operation. The lower level controllers include Main Bus Switch Controllers and Photovoltaic Controllers. Power system status information is periodically provided to the higher level controllers to perform system control and operation. The data acquisition function of the control system is distributed among the various levels of the hierarchy. Data requirements are dictated by the control system algorithms being implemented at each level. A functional description of the various levels of the testbed control system architecture, the data acquisition function, and the status of its implementationis presented.

Baez, Anastacio N.

The Curiosity Mars Rover's Fault Protection Engine

The Curiosity Rover, currently operating on Mars, contains flight software onboard to autonomously handle aspects of system fault protection. Over 1000 monitors and 39 responses are present in the flight software. Orchestrating these behaviors is the flight software's fault protection engine. In this paper, we discuss the engine's design, responsibilities, and present some lessons learned for future missions.

flight software

Subsystem testing of Galileo's attitude and articulation control fault protection

This paper discusses the fault protection tesing of the Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) of the Galileo spacecraft. The need for an autonomous fault protection system on an interplanetary spacecraft is discussed. Galileo requirements for the detection and response of specific hardware failures is discussed along with the fault protection software design and implementation. The test beds and test methods used for fault protection testing are described. The paper concludes with a presentation of the results of this testing with an emphasis on requirement and design changes that were made as a result of these tests.

Anderson, L. L.