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Report reviews plans to develop tests and standards to ensure that digital avionics systems in new civil aircraft immune to electromagnetic interference (EMI). Updated standards reflect more severe environment and vulnerabilities of modern avionics.
The proceedings of the fourth annual NASA Metrology and Calibration Workshop are presented. This workshop covered (1) review and assessment of NASA metrology and calibration activities by NASA Headquarters, (2) results of audits by the Office of Inspector General, (3) review of a proposed NASA Equipment Management System, (4) current and planned field center activities, (5) National Bureau of Standards (NBS) calibration services for NASA, (6) review of NBS's Precision Measurement and Test Equipment Project activities, (7) NASA instrument loan pool operations at two centers, (8) mobile cart calibration systems at two centers, (9) calibration intervals and decals, (10) NASA Calibration Capabilities Catalog, and (11) development of plans and objectives for FY 1981. Several papers in this proceedings are slide presentations only.
The goal of this collaboration was to produce Flight Software Branch (FSB) process standards for software inspections which could be used across three new missions within the FSB. The standard was developed by Dr. Forrest Shull (Fraunhofer Center for Experimental Software Engineering, Maryland) using the Perspective-Based Inspection approach, (PBI research has been funded by SARP) , then tested on a pilot Branch project. Because the short time scale of the collaboration ruled out a quantitative evaluation, it would be decided whether the standard was suitable for roll-out to other Branch projects based on a qualitative measure: whether the standard received high ratings from Branch personnel as to usability and overall satisfaction. The project used for piloting the Perspective-Based Inspection approach was a multi-mission framework designed for reuse. This was a good choice because key representatives from the three new missions would be involved in the inspections. The perspective-based approach was applied to produce inspection procedures tailored for the specific quality needs of the branch. The technical information to do so was largely drawn through a series of interviews with Branch personnel. The framework team used the procedures to review requirements. The inspections were useful for indicating that a restructuring of the requirements document was needed, which led to changes in the development project plan. The standard was sent out to other Branch personnel for review. Branch personnel were very positive. However, important changes were identified because the perspective of Attitude Control System (ACS) developers had not been adequately represented, a result of the specific personnel interviewed. The net result is that with some further work to incorporate the ACS perspective, and in synchrony with the roll out of independent Branch standards, the PBI approach will be implemented in the FSB. Also, the project intends to continue its collaboration with the technology provider (Dr. Forrest Shull) past the end of the grant, to allow a more rigorous quantitative evaluation.
This panel discussion convened in Houston, Texas, at the Lunar and Planetary Institute, on November 6 to 8, 1989, to review NASA's plans for microbiology on Space Station Freedom. A panel of distinguished scientists reviewed, validated, and recommended revisions to NASA's proposed acceptability standards for air, water, and internal surfaces on board Freedom. Also reviewed were the proposed microbiology capabilities and monitoring plan, disinfection procedures, waste management, and clinical issues. In the opinion of this advisory panel, ensuring the health of the Freedom's crews requires a strong goal-oriented research effort to determine the potential effects of microorganisms on the crewmembers and on the physical environment of the station. Because there are very few data addressing the fundamental question of how microgravity influences microbial function, the panel recommended establishing a ground-based microbial model of Freedom, with subsequent evaluation using in-flight shuttle data. Sampling techniques and standards will be affected by both technological advances in microgravity-compatible instrumentation, and by changes in the microbial population over the life of the station.
This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.
The Multi-angle Imaging SpectroRadiometer (MISR) will fly on the EOS-AM1 spacecraft, and provide global data sets with nine discrete view directions per scene. This paper reviews the MISR standard radiometric product and the in-flight radiometric calibration and characterization plans.
This paper contains a general description of the NASA Space Station Payloads Office (SSPO) integration process for International Space Station (ISS) payloads. The end-to-end processes described herein cover the Increment and execute preparation, real-time operations and post-flight phases of payload integration. The paper describes the necessary agreements, plans, documents and reviews required to integrate and operate payloads into standard payload locations. It also summarizes the Program boards, panels and points of contact that a Payload Developer (PI)) will participate in or interface with during the course of the process. The purpose is to provide potential PDs with an outline of the SSPO processes to deliver payloads to orbit, conduct research on orbit and return them to Earth.
The Structures Technology Program Office (STPO) at NASA Langley Research Center has held two workshops with representatives from the commercial airframe companies to establish a plan for development of a standard cost reporting format and a cost prediction tool for conceptual and preliminary designers. This paper reviews the findings of the workshop representatives with a plan for implementation of their recommendations. The recommendations of the cost tracking and reporting committee will be implemented by reinstituting the collection of composite part fabrication data in a format similar to the DoD/NASA Structural Composites Fabrication Guide. The process of data collection will be automated by taking advantage of current technology with user friendly computer interfaces and electronic data transmission. Development of a conceptual and preliminary designers' cost prediction model will be initiated. The model will provide a technically sound method for evaluating the relative cost of different composite structural designs, fabrication processes, and assembly methods that can be compared to equivalent metallic parts or assemblies. The feasibility of developing cost prediction software in a modular form for interfacing with state of the art preliminary design tools and computer aided design (CAD) programs is assessed.
Continuing advances in airport surface management and improvements in airport surface safety are required to enable future growth in air traffic throughout the airspace, as airport arrival and departure delays create a major system bottleneck. These airport management and safety advances will be built upon improved communications, navigation, surveillance, and weather sensing, creating an information environment supporting system automation. The efficient movement of the digital data generated from these systems requires an underlying communications network infrastructure to connect data sources with the intended users with the required quality of service. Current airport surface communications consists primarily of buried copper or fiber cable. Safety related communications with mobile airport surface assets occurs over 25 kHz VHF voice and data channels. The available VHF spectrum, already congested in many areas, will be insufficient to support future data traffic requirements. Therefore, a broadband wireless airport surface communications network is considered a requirement for the future airport component of the air transportation system. Progress has been made on defining the technology and frequency spectrum for the airport surface wireless communications network. The development of a test and demonstration facility and the definition of required testing and standards development are now underway. This paper will review the progress and planned future work.
This viewgraph presentation reviews an X-38 laser pyro system standardization system designed for a new manned rated program. The plans to approve this laser initiation system and preliminary ideas for this system are also provided.
Since the early years of the manned space program, NASA has developed and used exposure limits called Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMACs) to help protect astronauts from airborne toxicants. Most of these SMACS are based on an exposure duration of 7 days, since this is the duration of a 'typical' mission. A set of 'contingency SMACs' is also being developed for scenarios involving brief (1-hour or 24- hour) exposures to relatively high levels of airborne toxicants from event-related 'contingency' releases of contaminants. The emergency nature of contingency exposures dictates the use of different criteria for setting exposure limits. The NASA JSC Toxicology Group recently began a program to document the rationales used to set new SMACs and plans to review the older, 7-day SMACs. In cooperation with the National Research Council's Committee on Toxicology, a standard procedure has been developed for researching, setting, and documenting SMAC values.
Activities of the Center for Space Environmental Health (CSEH), one of several NSCORTs supported by NASA in order to advance knowledge in environmental health in space habitats, are reviewed. Research in environmental health will define the standards or requirements needed to protect human health. This information will affect mission plans and the design of space habitats. This reseach will study unique contaminant stresses and lead to risk models for human health and performance.
Planetary protection is defined as: a) the prevention of contamination of extraterrestrial bodies by terrestrial microorganisms, and b) biohazard containment of returned samples from bodies in the Solar System that could harbor life.1 While the majority of interplanetary missions to date have involved robotic exploration, future missions will include human explorers. Current planetary protection requirements do not address the unique challenges associated with human exploration. The purpose of this abstract is to review planetary protection efforts for crewed missions and provide a forward plan for implementing them at the systems level. Article IX of the UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides the definition of planetary protection, outlined above.1 COSPAR holds the international standard in line with this treaty2, while NASA's Planetary Protection Policy (NPD 8020.7G) outlines the U.S. implementation of the COSPAR standard. 3;4 NPI 8020.7 groups future human spaceflight planetary protection studies as follows: 1) microbial monitoring, 2) contamination mitigation and control, and 3) environmental effects. Additionally, a NPI 8020.7 outlines a five-step plan for forward work: 1) a literature review, 2) community inputs, 3) completion of recommended studies, 4) developing a draft NPR, and 5) implementation with NASA teams. The literature review was published in 2016.5 Inputs from the community were gathered at the Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions, held in 2015.6 Johnson and Race (2016) outlined notional requirements and prioritized studies needed before final requirements can be produced. This prior work sets the stage for completing the necessary studies and finalizing planetary protection requirements for human spaceflight. We propose a continuation of the systems engineering approach adopted thus far. The challenges associated with the implementation of notional requirements will be quantified in detailed discussions with internal stakeholders. The status and results of high-priority studies that have been completed since 2016 or are ongoing will be incorporated into discussions with stakeholders. In this way, we plan to bridge the gap between the science behind planetary protection and the engineering development that will implement it, allowing finalized planetary protection requirements to be developed for future human space missions.
This volume contains the complete software system documentation for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Transponder Loading Data Conversion Software (FIX-FCC). This software was written to facilitate the formatting and conversion of FCC Transponder Occupancy (Loading) Data before it is loaded into the NASA Geosynchronous Satellite Orbital Statistics Database System (GSOSTATS). The information that FCC supplies NASA is in report form and must be converted into a form readable by the database management software used in the GSOSTATS application. Both the User's Guide and Software Maintenance Manual are contained in this document. This volume of documentation passed an independent quality assurance review and certification by the Product Assurance and Security Office of the Planning Research Corporation (PRC). The manuals were reviewed for format, content, and readability. The Software Management and Assurance Program (SMAP) life cycle and documentation standards were used in the development of this document. Accordingly, these standards were used in the review. Refer to the System/Software Test/Product Assurance Report for the Geosynchronous Satellite Orbital Statistics Database System (GSOSTATS) for additional information.
NASA's Europa Clipper mission will investigate Jupiter's icy moon Europa using a payload suite consisting of nine instruments to address a range of scientific objectives concerning Europa's habitability. As the project proceeds past its Critical Design Review, confidence is being built in the system's ability to achieve mission objectives through the implementation of a rigorous payload verification and validation (V&V) program. As part of this payload V&V program, instrument box-level testing was performed by the payload team to verify select instrument-avionics interface requirements. This testing was performed at JPL using the avionics testbed's Bulk Data Storage Emulator (BDSEM) with visiting instrument Test Models. This paper summarizes the Data Link test campaign involving roughly four days of functional testing per instrument, including planning, testing methods, types of issues found, and the requirement closure process. Detail is also provided on the development, deployment, and validation of a standardized analysis tool used in data reviews. This testing verified requirements related to commanding rates, loss of link, packet format, clock counters, loopback test capability, and SpaceWire jitter and skew margins. Additional risk reduction testing of basic commanding, counter behavior, science data collection and transfer, and interface swapping was also performed. Because the BDSEM venue was not originally designed to be a run for record venue, the process of characterizing venue fidelity and establishing suitability for requirement closure using data collected in this venue will also be addressed.In order to close requirements, an extensible tool was developed to post-process instrument command and telemetry data from their original binary to a human-readable format and give visibility to errors detected within the data, such as packets with Cyclic Redundancy Check errors. This tool, called payload-packet-parser, is a Python 3.9 command line tool built using a variety of open-source Python libraries. Payload-packet-parser was designed to support parsing command and telemetry packets for all Europa Clipper instruments and additional analysis tools were developed for verification of specific information interface requirements. This test campaign, including post-processing using a single parsing and verification toolset, allowed for early interface testing, alleviating testing burdens on instrument teams and buying down risk on the instrument-avionics interface by finding hardware and software issues and idiosyncrasies prior to integration with system test venues. Over twenty issues were discovered across the payload, resulting in software updates and instrument rework well in advance of any system impacts. This paper concludes with an assessment of benefits and costs of this type of testing and lessons learned.
Technological and planning issues for data management, processing, and communication on Space Station Freedom are discussed in reviews and reports by U.S., European, and Japanese experts. The space-information-system strategies of NASA, ESA, and NASDA are discussed; customer needs are analyzed; and particular attention is given to communication and data systems, standards and protocols, integrated system architectures, software and automation, and plans and approaches being developed on the basis of experience from past programs. Also included are the reports from workshop sessions on design to meet customer needs, the accommodation of growth and new technologies, and system interoperability.
The stress rupture specification for Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) is discussed. The composite shell of the COPV shall be designed to meet the design life considering the time it is under sustained load. A Mechcanical Damage Control Plan (MDCP) shall be created and implemented that assures the COPV will not fail due to mechanical damage due to manufacturing, testing, shipping, installation, or flight. Proven processes and procedures for fabrication and repair shall be used to preclude damage or material degradation during material processing, manufacturing operations, and refurbushment.Selected NDI techniques for the liner and/or boss(es) shall be performed before overwrapping with composite. When visual inspection reveals mechanical damage or defects exceeding manufacturing specification levels (and standard repair procedures), the damaged COPV shall be submitted to a material review board (MRB) for disposition. Every COPV shall be subjected to visual and other non-destructive inspection (NDI), per the inspection plan.
NASA’s Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI), in conjunction with NASA’s Small Spacecraft Systems Virtual Institute (S3VI), has developed the SSRI Knowledge Base to improve mission confidence for small spacecraft. The SSRI Knowledge Base provides vetted, high-quality sources of information on elements that are key to successful small spacecraft missions. These resources include SSRI working group generated documents and presentations in addition to existing guides, publications, standards, software tools, websites, and books. The Knowledge Base is fully searchable, offers downloadable content when possible, and otherwise links to or references content directly from within the tool. All 58 of the planned topic pages that comprise the SSRI Knowledge Base have been recently completed and include over 450 unique resources that are now available for review. Over the past several months significant enhancements to the tool’s capabilities have been developed and implemented. These enhancements consist of the completed baseline content; development of an Application Programming Interface (API); improved user interfaces; scalable and searchable Best Practices and Lessons Learned (BPLL) lists with ratings; and custom website analytics. The SSRI Knowledge Base is a comprehensive and searchable online tool that consolidates and organizes resources, best practices, and lessons learned from previous small spacecraft missions sponsored by NASA, other government agencies, and academia. This free, publicly available tool is available to the entire SmallSat community at: NASA SSRI Knowledge Base | Explore. This presentation will discuss the motivation for and development of the SSRI Knowledge Base, demonstrate the existing tool, share how the smallsat community can get involved and outline plans for further enhancement development. The SSRI is a collaborative activity with broad participation from civil, Department of Defense, and both national and international commercial space systems providers and stakeholders. The S3VI is jointly sponsored by NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate and Science Mission Directorate.