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Standard review plan for evaluating nuclear power reactor license termination plans

This standard review plan (SRP) guides the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in conducting safety reviews of license termination plans (LTPs). The principal purpose of this SRP is to ensure the quality and uniformity of NRC staff reviews and to present a well-defined base from which to evaluate the requirements for terminating the license of a nuclear power plant. It is also the purpose of this SRP to make information about regulatory matters widely available, so that interested members of the public and the nuclear industry can gain a better understanding of the NRC staff's review process. Specific guidance for licensees is included in Regulatory Guide 1.179, "Standard Format and Content of License Termination Plans for Nuclear Power Reactors." Licensees may also use this SRP to assist in developing an LTP. The SRP presents the acceptance criteria for all areas of review for license termination, and identifies the matters to be reviewed, the basis for the review, and the conclusions that are sought. For example, NUREG-1757, "Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance" offers additional guidance on how to demonstrate compliance with the unrestricted release, restricted release, and alternative criteria for license termination, in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 20, "Standards for Protection against Radiation," Subpart E, "Radiological Criteria for License Termination." To avoid duplication of information, this SRP references applicable sections of NUREG-1757 for additional guidance. In addition, the NRC has issued supplemental guidance that will subsequently be consolidated into NUREG-1757 to address partial site release before LTP approval, and compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E. It should be noted that the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Environmental Protection Agency and NRC may contain consultation triggers for some radionuclides that may be lower than the NUREG-1757 Vol. 2 Revision 1, Appendix H screening values.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Proposed Advanced Reactor Adaptation of the Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800 Chapter 4 (Reactor) for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors and Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors

This report proposes adaptation of the previous regulatory gap analysis in Chapter 4 (Reactor) of NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition. The proposed adaptation would result in a Chapter 4 review plan applicable to certain advanced reactors. This report addresses two technologies: the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) and the modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (mHTGR). SRP Chapter 4, which addresses reactor components, was selected for adaptation because of the possible significant differences in advanced non-light water reactor (non-LWR) technologies compared with the current LWR-based description in Chapter 4. SFR and mHTGR technologies were chosen for this gap analysis because of their diverse designs and the availability of significant historical design detail.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Proposed Adaptation of the Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800, Chapter 4 (Reactor) for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors and Modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors

This report provides a proposed adaptation of a previous regulatory gap analysis of Chapter 4 (Reactor) of NUREG-0800 , Standard Review Plan (SRP) for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition, for applicability to advanced reactors; specifically, the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) and the modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (mHTGR). SRP Chapter 4, which addresses reactor components, was selected for the review because of the possible significant differences in advanced non-light water reactor (non-LWR) technologies compared with the current LWR-based Chapter 4. SFR and mHTGR technologies were chosen for this gap analysis because of their diverse designs and the availability of significant historical design detail. This report satisfies M3AT-16OR2001042, “Complete Development of an Advanced Reactor Adaptation of Chapter 4 NUREG-0800,” in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Advanced Reactor Technology program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Regulatory Gap Analysis of Select NUREG-0800 Chapters for Applicability to Molten Salt Reactors

The past licensing approach for advanced reactors was based on adapting the current LWR-based NRC process that exists today to the advanced reactor concept. This is the approach used by advanced technologies such as the Pebble Bed Reactor licensing application, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor licensing application, and more recently the NuScale licensing application. Current Standard Review Plan (SRP) guidance for large LWRs is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, the SRP is cumbersome to apply to liquid-fueled molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies. Therefore, a thoughtful licensing approach for MSRs is necessary.This report documents for DOE-NE an additional regulatory gap analysis of select chapters from the LWR SRP to further inform a generic nonpower MSR test program. Although the review process outlined in NUREG-0800 is LWR-specific, the plant functions and processes to be reviewed will be similar for the MSR. Therefore, a well-planned nonpower MSR test program can provide the performance data needed to better facilitate the eventual commercial-sized MSR review. The LWR SRP chapters dealing with the reactor, reactor coolant, engineered safety features, auxiliary systems, and waste management systems were reviewed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of a Consensus Standard for Verification and Validation of Nuclear System Thermal-Fluids Software

With the resurgence of nuclear power and increased interest in advanced nuclear reactors as an option to supply abundant energy without the associated greenhouse gas emissions of the more conventional fossil fuel energy sources, there is a need to establish internationally recognized standards for the verification and validation (V&V) of software used to calculate the thermal-hydraulic behavior of advanced reactor designs for both normal operation and hypothetical accident conditions. To address this need, ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Standards and Certification has established the V&V 30 Committee, under the jurisdiction of the V&V Standards Committee, to develop a consensus standard for verification and validation of software used for design and analysis of advanced reactor systems. The initial focus of this committee will be on the V&V of system analysis and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software for nuclear applications. To limit the scope of the effort, the committee will further limit its focus to software to be used in the licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors. In this framework, the Standard should conform to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other regulatory practices, procedures and methods for licensing of nuclear power plants as embodied in the United States (U.S.) Code of Federal Regulations and other pertinent documents such as Regulatory Guide 1.203, 'Transient and Accident Analysis Methods' and NUREG-0800, 'NRC Standard Review Plan'. In addition, the Standard should be consistent with applicable sections of ASME NQA-1-2008 'Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (QA)'. This paper describes the general requirements for the proposed V&V 30 Standard, which includes; (a) applicable NRC and other regulatory requirements for defining the operational and accident domain of a nuclear system that must be considered if the system is to be licensed, (b) the corresponding calculation domain of the software that should encompass the nuclear operational and accident domain to be used to study the system behavior for licensing purposes, (c) the definition of the scaled experimental data set required to provide the basis for validating the software, (d) the ensemble of experimental data sets required to populate the validation matrix for the software in question, and (e) the practices and procedures to be used when applying a validation standard. Although this initial effort will focus on software for licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors, it is anticipated that the practices and procedures developed for this Standard can eventually be extended to other nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Development of a Standard for Verification and Validation of Software Used to Calculate Nuclear System Thermal Fluids Behavior

With the resurgence of nuclear power and increased interest in advanced nuclear reactors as an option to supply abundant energy without the associated greenhouse gas emissions of the more conventional fossil fuel energy sources, there is a need to establish internationally recognized standards for the verification and validation (V&V) of software used to calculate the thermal-hydraulic behavior of advanced reactor designs for both normal operation and hypothetical accident conditions. To address this need, ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Standards and Certification has established the V&V 30 Committee, under the responsibility of the V&V Standards Committee, to develop a consensus Standard for verification and validation of software used for design and analysis of advanced reactor systems. The initial focus of this committee will be on the V&V of system analysis and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software for nuclear applications. To limit the scope of the effort, the committee will further limit its focus to software to be used in the licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors. In this framework, the standard should conform to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) practices, procedures and methods for licensing of nuclear power plants as embodied in the United States (U.S.) Code of Federal Regulations and other pertinent documents such as Regulatory Guide 1.203, “Transient and Accident Analysis Methods” and NUREG-0800, “NRC Standard Review Plan”. In addition, the standard should be consistent with applicable sections of ASME Standard NQA-1 (“Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (QA)”). This paper describes the general requirements for the V&V Standard, which includes; (a) the definition of the operational and accident domain of a nuclear system that must be considered if the system is to licensed, (b) the corresponding calculational domain of the software that should encompass the nuclear operational and accident domain to be used to study the system behavior for licensing purposes, (c) the definition of the scaled experimental data set required to provide the basis for validating the software, (d) the ensemble of experimental data sets required to populate the validation matrix for the software in question, and (e) the practices and procedures to be used when applying a validation standard. Although this initial effort will focus on software for licensing of High-Temperature Gas Reactors, it is anticipated that the practices and procedures developed for this standard can eventually be extended to other nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Precipitation (Rain and Snow) Levels and Straight-line Wind Speeds in Support of the 10-year Natural Phenomena Hazards Review for Los Alamos National Laboratory

This report provides site-specific return level analyses for rain, snow, and straight-line wind extreme events. These analyses are in support of the 10-year review plan for the assessment of meteorological natural phenomena hazards at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). These analyses follow guidance from Department of Energy, DOE Standard, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities (DOE-STD-1020-2012), Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, 2007) and ANSI/ ANS-2.3-2011, Estimating Tornado, Hurricane, and Extreme Straight-Line Wind Characteristics at Nuclear Facility Sites. LANL precipitation and snow level data have been collected since 1910, although not all years are complete. In this report the results from the more recent data (1990–2014) are compared to those of past analyses and a 2004 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration report. Given the many differences in the data sets used in these different analyses, the lack of statistically significant differences in return level estimates increases confidence in the data and in the modeling and analysis approach.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

HFE Process Guidance and Standards for potential application to updating NRC guidance

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews and evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of these guidance documents to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools. Thus, the NRC has initiated a project with BNL to update the NRC guidance to remain current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology. INL supported Brookhaven National Lab (BNL) to update the detailed HFE review criteria contained in NUREG-0711 and NUREG-0700 based on (1) feedback obtained from end users, (2) the results of NRC research and development efforts supporting the NRC staff’s HFE safety reviews, and (3) other material the project staff identify as applicable to the update effort. INL submitted comments on development plans and sections of NUREGs 0800, 0711, and 0700. The contractor prepared the report attached here as the deliverable for this work.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Evaluation of ASCE 4-16 and AISC 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components

This report describes the assessment of ASCE Standards 4-16 and 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based (RIPB) seismic design of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) at nuclear power plants. This work was performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Regulatory Research (RES), to support potential endorsement of these industry standards for the design of nuclear power plants based on the RIPB approach. Currently, the NRC endorses a deterministic design approach for demonstrating the design adequacy of SSCs based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and NRC Regulatory Guides. In the RIPB approach, the design criteria are developed to achieve a target performance goal, which is defined by the annual frequency of occurrence of the design basis earthquake (i.e., Seismic Design Category) and the acceptable level of structural performance (i.e., Limit State) for the SSCs. ASCE 4-16 provides methods for performing a seismic analysis of structures to obtain the seismic response of these structures (e.g., building displacements, accelerations, in-structure response spectra) which are used in the design of the SSCs. It also provides methods for performing seismic analysis of SSCs to determine the seismic demands (e.g. member forces and displacements) needed to design individual SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provides the criteria for the seismic design of SSCs using the seismic demands developed in ASCE 4-16. The use of ASCE Standard 43-18 (Draft), along with ASCE 4-16, provides the criteria for the seismic design of the SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (DRAFT) relies on other consensus codes and standards such as ACI 349 for reinforced concrete, AISC/N690 for steel structures, ASME Section III for pressure-retaining mechanical components and Containments, and IEEE-344 for Class 1E equipment. The goal of this technical review was to assess the adequacy of the provisions in these standards for use by the NRC in developing regulatory guidance for design of SSCs in nuclear power plants, based on the RIPB approach. The research reported herein describes the basis for acceptance of the new standards and identifies areas where additional staff guidance is needed for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants. This technical review has determined that ASCE 4-16 and ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provide an appropriate framework for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants using a Risk-Informed Performance-Based approach. However, some of the criteria therein warrant exceptions, qualifications, and/or clarifications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Knowledge Management Initiatives Used to Maintain Regulatory Expertise in Transportation and Storage of Radioactive Materials - 12177

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established in 1974 with the mission to license and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials for commercial, industrial, academic, and medical uses in order to protect public health and safety, and the environment, and promote the common defense and security. Currently, approximately half (∼49%) of the workforce at the NRC has been with the Agency for less than six years. As part of the Agency's mission, the NRC has partial responsibility for the oversight of the transportation and storage of radioactive materials. The NRC has experienced a significant level of expertise leaving the Agency due to staff attrition. Factors that contribute to this attrition include retirement of the experienced nuclear workforce and mobility of staff within or outside the Agency. Several knowledge management (KM) initiatives have been implemented within the Agency, with one of them including the formation of a Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation (SFST) KM team. The team, which was formed in the fall of 2008, facilitates capturing, transferring, and documenting regulatory knowledge for staff to effectively perform their safety oversight of transportation and storage of radioactive materials, regulated under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 71 and Part 72. In terms of KM, the SFST goal is to share critical information among the staff to reduce the impact from staff's mobility and attrition. KM strategies in place to achieve this goal are: (1) development of communities of practice (CoP) (SFST Qualification Journal and the Packaging and Storing Radioactive Material) in the on-line NRC Knowledge Center (NKC); (2) implementation of a SFST seminar program where the seminars are recorded and placed in the Agency's repository, Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS); (3) meeting of technical discipline group programs to share knowledge within specialty areas; (4) development of written guidance to capture 'administrative and technical' knowledge (e.g., office instructions (OIs), generic communications (e.g., bulletins, generic letters, regulatory issue summary), standard review plans (SRPs), interim staff guidance (ISGs)); (5) use of mentoring strategies for experienced staff to train new staff members; (6) use of Microsoft SharePoint portals in capturing, transferring, and documenting knowledge for staff across the Division from Division management and administrative assistants to the project managers, inspectors, and technical reviewers; and (7) development and implementation of a Division KM Plan. A discussion and description of the successes and challenges of implementing these KM strategies at the NRC/SFST will be provided. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Neutron Absorber Plate Characterization Plan for Criticality Experiments Design

After being used in nuclear installations, depleted fuel can still be highly reactive and must be handled securely to prevent any radiological or criticality concerns. In particular, spent fuel from use in nuclear power reactors must be stored and transported in specifically designed containers using neutron absorber materials to prevent criticality. Various neutron absorber material types exist and are manufactured by various entities, as thoroughly described in the Handbook of Neutron Absorber Materials for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage and Transportation Applications written by EPRI. Presently, one of the most modern and most widely used types of neutron absorber material contains particles of boron carbide, or B 4 C, embedded in aluminum matrix: Boralcan, manufactured by Rio Tinto. It is very important for the community to know as much as possible about such neutron absorber materials. Therefore, in the recent years, a US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration–Nuclear Criticality Safety Program funded project initiated design of an experiment that places Boralcan neutron-absorbing plates in an established critical assembly using low-enriched uranium fuel at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiments (SPRF/CX) apparatus at Sandia National Laboratories. The goal of the experiment is to produce high-quality benchmark data to submit to the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), for use in validating calculational tools and nuclear data by criticality safety analysts. The project, named IER-554, is currently in its final design stage, following a successful preliminary design. In the work documented in the design study, ten critical configurations using Boralcan neutron absorber plates were designed, and the experiment was proven to be feasible, with a predicted low k eff uncertainty around 100 pcm. An overview of the modeled cutout of the critical assembly with a Boralcan plate is shown in Figure 1, representing one of the configurations planned for the critical experiments. Before the plates are inserted in the critical assembly, it is necessary to know more about their composition and uniformity. This summary focuses on the plate characterization plans. Each plate will undergo (1) neutron transmission measurements at different locations to determine the 10 B areal density and (2) an in-depth x-ray computed tomography (XCT) examination to obtain the exact Sizes and distribution of the B4C powder particles inside the plates. In parallel, plate modeling studies are performed with a goal to determine the validity of the currently used approximation of modeling the neutron absorber plates as a homogeneous mixture of Aluminum 1100 alloy and B4C— instead of explicitly modeling the B4C particles. By using the experimental 10 B areal density measurements, and the exact size and location of the B4C particles obtained by XCT, a plate model can theoretically be built that reproduces the plate with extremely high fidelity. The results of this modeling study could increase the confidence of the criticality safety community in its modeling methods when using this type of neutron absorber material, and the industry could use these validations to change the boron loading credit limits from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission standard review plan for dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel. The modeling calculations are performed with SCALE 6.3.0 using the KENO V.a sequence for criticality calculations with the ENDF/B-VIII.0 continuous-energy cross section library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Review Guidelines for Biosphere Safety Assessment of Low-Level Waste Disposal Repository in Taiwan - 19606

Conducting reviews of radiological dose assessments is a crucial step toward the approval of long-term radiological safety requirements for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities. However, the concentration of radionuclides released from the near field into the biosphere and the radiation exposure levels to an individual can influence the performance acceptability of the LLW disposal facility and safety of the disposal environment. Therefore, all LLW must be managed and disposed of such that it minimizes risk to individuals and the environment. A dose of 0.25 mSv/year is the limit for individuals expected to receive the highest level of exposure to residual radioactivity. In Taiwan, a review for license applications has been proposed for LLW disposal facilities. These review guidelines are based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1200) and are amended according to the environmental conditions in Taiwan. These guidelines can help reviewers to perform safety assessment reviews of applications for the construction and operation of LLW disposal facilities. The review guidelines for biosphere safety assessment include radiological dose assessment, description of waste characteristics, radionuclide transport characteristics, radiation dose under normal and unusual conditions, radionuclide release into the biosphere, and interpretation of evaluation results in various transfer mechanisms. These guidelines can also serve as references for regulatory departments conducting safety assessments of radiological doses in LLW disposal facilities in Taiwan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Validation of the Computational Fluid Dynamics Method using the Aboveground Configuration of the Dry Cask Simulator

Dry cask applicants submit their spent nuclear fuel dry storage and transportation cask designs to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certification under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72, 'Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste'. The NRC staff performs its technical review of these designs in accordance with 10 CFR Part 72 and NUREG-1536, 'Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems at a General License Facility,' Revision 1, issued July 2010. To ensure that the cask and fuel material temperatures of the dry cask storage system remain within the allowable limits or criteria for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, the NRC staff performs a thermal review as part of the technical review. Recent applications increasingly have used thermalhydraulic analyses using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes (e.g., ANSYS FLUENT) to demonstrate the adequacy of the thermal design. The NRC performs validation studies of the FLUENT CFD code to assist it in making regulatory decisions to ensure adequate protection for storage and transportation casks. Recent advances in dry storage cask designs have significantly increased the maximum thermal load allowed in a cask in part by increasing the efficiency of internal conduction pathways and by increasing the internal convection through greater canister helium pressure. In efforts to further validate these designs, the NRC in conjunction with the Department of Energy and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are conducting an experiment to capture the effects of elevated helium pressures and accurately portray the external convection of aboveground and belowground canister dry cask systems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A qualitative assessment of current CCF guidance based on a review of safety system digital implementation changes with evolving technology - 148

This paper is a summary of a study performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate current policy on software common-cause failure (CCF). The study reported in this paper is one of several that contributed to the technical basis to inform NRC staff. The study first reviewed policies and assessment guidance as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, 'Instrumentation and Controls', in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. The study then examined instrumentation and controls (I and C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF remains appropriate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed. The methodology adopted was to review the vendors' technology and software implementation processes for digital safety systems as technology evolved. The following three representative safety systems were selected to provide illustrative examples: - Eagle 21 was selected to represent vintage microprocessor-based technology used from the 1980's to mid-1990's, - TELEPERM XS (TXS) was selected to represent second generation microprocessor-based technology used from the mid-1990's to the 2000's, and - The advanced logic system (ALS) was selected to represent the latest trend of using technology based on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Technology implementations were reviewed in light of the basic premise of the NRC in BTP 7-19 (Revision 6), that software-based or software-logic-based digital system development errors are a credible source of CCF and therefore are susceptible to CCF because identical copies of the software-based logic and architecture are present in redundant divisions of safety-related systems. BTP 7-19 categorizes firmware and logic developed from software-based development systems all under software. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Accident-Tolerant Fuel

Advanced light water reactor (LWR) fuels have been developed incrementally for more than 60 years before the term Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF) was created. There are many different categories of ATF concepts, which range from near-term marginal enhancements to fission gas release in fuel or hydrogen pickup in the cladding, to transformational fuel types with new engineered fission product barriers. In this work we characterize these different types of ATF, and give several important examples for each.We conclude that transformational ATF concepts have the greatest potential to enhance the traditional definition of defense-in-depth by enhancing current barriers and/or by providing additional barriers to fission product release. This objective can primarily be achieved by introducing a new fission product barrier that enhances defense-in-depth by design, for example the added barriers to fission product release in some engineered ATF concepts. We recommend future gap analyses and a phenomena identification and ranking to assess the applicability of existing safe acceptable fuel design limits and the standard review plan to specific ATF concepts.

Brown, Nicholas↗

A risk-informed assessment tool to support review of license amendment requests for spent nuclear fuel dry cask storage systems

We report that while risk-informed safety evaluations are common methodologies used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), their application in the field of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage has received limited attention. For instance, license amendment requests (LARs) for SNF dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) are evaluated according to U.S. NRC standard review plans (SRPs). However, risk-informed LAR review strategies could improve the understanding of critical system modifications, and lead to more predictable, efficient, and consistent LAR review processes. A methodology to develop a risk-informed LAR review tool is presented. Although focused on DCSSs, this methodology can be used to develop similar tools for a broad spectrum of safety-relevant systems. The end product (i.e., the tool) includes a tree diagram to help visualize the review risk significances assigned to a predefined set of system modifications and supporting rationale documentation. Instructions support correct tool application and provide the user with a path to incorporate currently unevaluated modifications in the tool structure. The demonstration of the methodology leads to the conclusion that risk-informed reviews of DCSS LARs are possible, although the tool precision could benefit from additional risk information. Further, the results indicate that many typical LARs involve low-risk or medium-risk modifications.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗