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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Software Risk Identification for Interplanetary Probes

The need for a systematic and effective software risk identification methodology is critical for interplanetary probes that are using increasingly complex and critical software. Several probe failures are examined that suggest more attention and resources need to be dedicated to identifying software risks. The direct causes of these failures can often be traced to systemic problems in all phases of the software engineering process. These failures have lead to the development of a practical methodology to identify risks for interplanetary probes. The proposed methodology is based upon the tailoring of the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) method of taxonomy-based risk identification. The use of this methodology will ensure a more consistent and complete identification of software risks in these probes.

Dougherty, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS2002

A Quantitative Software Risk Assessment Model

This slide presentation reviews a risk assessment model as applied to software development. the presentation uses graphs to demonstrate basic concepts of software reliability. It also discusses the application to the risk model to the software development life cycle.

Lee, Alice↗
NASA NTRS2002

Software risk management

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

software assurance risk mitigation↗
NASA NTRS1995

Software risk management through independent verification and validation

Software project managers need tools to estimate and track project goals in a continuous fashion before, during, and after development of a system. In addition, they need an ability to compare the current project status with past project profiles to validate management intuition, identify problems, and then direct appropriate resources to the sources of problems. This paper describes a measurement-based approach to calculating the risk inherent in meeting project goals that leverages past project metrics and existing estimation and tracking models. We introduce the IV&V Goal/Questions/Metrics model, explain its use in the software development life cycle, and describe our attempts to validate the model through the reverse engineering of existing projects.

Callahan, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Software risk estimation and management techniques at JPL

In this talk we will discuss how uncertainty has been incorporated into the JPL software model, probabilistic-based estimates, and how risk is addressed, how cost risk is currently being explored via a variety of approaches, from traditional risk lists, to detailed WBS-based risk estimates to the Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) tool.

software risk↗
NASA NTRS1993

Developing interpretable models with optimized set reduction for identifying high risk software components

Applying equal testing and verification effort to all parts of a software system is not very efficient, especially when resources are limited and scheduling is tight. Therefore, one needs to be able to differentiate low/high fault frequency components so that testing/verification effort can be concentrated where needed. Such a strategy is expected to detect more faults and thus improve the resulting reliability of the overall system. This paper presents the Optimized Set Reduction approach for constructing such models, intended to fulfill specific software engineering needs. Our approach to classification is to measure the software system and build multivariate stochastic models for predicting high risk system components. We present experimental results obtained by classifying Ada components into two classes: is or is not likely to generate faults during system and acceptance test. Also, we evaluate the accuracy of the model and the insights it provides into the error making process.

Briand, Lionel C.↗
NASA NTRS2000

A Software Risk Model

Topics on the slide include:quality, test coverage, functional criticality, exposure, criticality, and risk index.

Lee, Alice↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗
NASA NTRS2008

Product Engineering Class in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Building Safety-Critical Systems

When software safety requirements are imposed on legacy safety-critical systems, retrospective safety cases need to be formulated as part of recertifying the systems for further use and risks must be documented and managed to give confidence for reusing the systems. The SEJ Software Development Risk Taxonomy [4] focuses on general software development issues. It does not, however, cover all the safety risks. The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy [8] was developed which provides a construct for eliciting and categorizing software safety risks in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we present extended work on the taxonomy for safety that incorporates the additional issues inherent in the development and maintenance of safety-critical systems with software. An instrument called a Software Safety Risk Taxonomy Based Questionnaire (TBQ) is generated containing questions addressing each safety attribute in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. Software safety risks are surfaced using the new TBQ and then analyzed. In this paper we give the definitions for the specialized Product Engineering Class within the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. At the end of the paper, we present the tool known as the 'Legacy Systems Risk Database Tool' that is used to collect and analyze the data required to show traceability to a particular safety standard

Hill, Janice↗
NASA NTRS1997

IV and V Issues in Achieving High Reliability and Safety in Critical Control System Software

Risk analysis and integrated verification and validation are two important elements in a plan for ensuring the safety of critical software systems. We describe an approach we are currently developing for integrating risk analysis, and metrics analysis, and propose a fault predictor that would integrate the results of these activities. Practical difficulties associated with our approach are also discussed, as are limitations of the proposed predictor. We conclude with a discussion of what as been learned to date, and with suggestions for future work.

validation software reliability software risk asse↗
NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety-critical computer systems must be engineered to meet system and software safety requirements. For legacy safety-critical computer systems, software safety requirements may not have been formally specified during development. When process-oriented software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, where software development artifacts don't exist or are incomplete, the question becomes 'how can this be done?' The risks associated with only meeting certain software safety requirements in a legacy safety-critical computer system must be addressed should such systems be selected as candidates for reuse. This paper proposes a method for ascertaining formally, a software safety risk assessment, that provides measurements for software safety for legacy systems which may or may not have a suite of software engineering documentation that is now normally required. It relies upon the NASA Software Safety Standard, risk assessment methods based upon the Taxonomy-Based Questionnaire, and the application of reverse engineering CASE tools to produce original design documents for legacy systems.

Hill, Janice↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Use in Retrospective Safety Cases

Safety standards contain technical and process-oriented safely requirements. The best time to include these requirements is early in the development lifecycle of the system. When software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, a retrospective safety case will need to be constructed for the software in the system. This can be a difficult task because there may be few to no art facts available to show compliance to the software safely requirements. The risks associated with not meeting safely requirements in a legacy safely-critical computer system must be addressed to give confidence for reuse. This paper introduces a proposal for a software safely risk taxonomy for legacy safely-critical computer systems, by specializing the Software Engineering Institute's 'Software Development Risk Taxonomy' with safely elements and attributes.

Hill, Janice L.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Addressing software security risk mitigations in the life cycle

The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has funded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) with a Center Initiative, 'Reducing Software Security Risk through an Integrated Approach' (RSSR), to address this need. The Initiative is a formal approach to addressing software security in the life cycle through the instantiation of a Software Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI) for the development and maintenance life cycles.

software tools↗