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DOE OSTI2026

A Framework for Building Security into the Design Process

This report presents guidance to support the implementation of security objectives during the design process for nuclear facilities using an organization’s quality management system. The guidance in this document is intended for design vendors and operators of nuclear power facilities. Additionally, this guidance document can be beneficial to regulatory bodies, industry partners, customers, and other stakeholders within the nuclear power market. This report aims to ensure security consequences are identified before designs are completed, which may lead to reduced costs and higher security effectiveness and efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Framework for Building Security into the Design Process

This report presents guidance to support the implementation of security objectives during the design process for nuclear facilities using an organization’s quality management system. The guidance in this document is intended for design vendors and operators of nuclear power facilities. Additionally, this guidance document can be beneficial to regulatory bodies, industry partners, customers, and other stakeholders within the nuclear power market. This report aims to ensure security consequences are identified before designs are completed, which may lead to reduced costs and higher security effectiveness and efficiency.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantum Computing Strategy 2026

Quantum computing (QC) is a rapidly maturing technology with the potential for revolutionary impacts on stockpile stewardship science and national security. Recent developments in fault-tolerant architectures have compressed vendor roadmaps, and predictions of a production-ready quantum computer by the mid-2030s are becoming increasingly credible. This strategy provides a roadmap for integrating QC into the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program by investing in four strategic focus areas: 1. Develop Capabilities in Mission-Relevant Quantum Applications: ASC will prioritize developing quantum-ready applications in mission areas that have shown significant promise for quantum advantage, including simulations of materials in extreme environments, nuclear dynamics, solving linear and nonlinear partial differential equations, and uncertainty quantification. These applications directly support stockpile stewardship science and modernization objectives. 2. Conduct R&D in Algorithms, Software, and Hardware: Sustained research into quantum algorithms, robust software tools, and quantum hardware is essential. ASC will develop efficient quantum algorithms; invest in quantum compilers, debuggers, and performance tools; and explore specialized quantum hardware tailored to NNSA’s unique requirements. 3. Engage with Vendors and Partners: Early and active collaboration with commercial quantum hardware vendors and academic partners is critical. Through testbeds, co-design agreements, and quantum demonstration facilities, ASC will influence hardware design, gain early access to emerging technologies, and ensure that quantum platforms evolve to meet mission needs. 4. Build Knowledge, Experience, and Workforce: Expanding and upskilling the quantum-trained workforce is essential to long-term success. This includes hiring, internal training, university outreach, and postdoctoral support to ensure ASC maintains the expertise required to operate, program, and integrate quantum systems as they become available. While quantum computing will never replace classical computing, it has the potential to solve certain problems with speed and accuracy that would be unachievable using any conceivable classical high-performance computing (HPC) system. By investing strategically in QC, ASC will help propel the emergent QC industry, maintain U.S. technological leadership, ensure mission readiness, and position itself to rapidly adopt quantum technologies as they mature.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan

The Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan has been developed in accordance with the requirements identified in the: • Interagency Agreement for the Pantex Superfund Site, Article 8.5 Work to be Performed, • Compliance Plan Provision of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, and • Record of Decision for Groundwater, Soil, and Associated Media, Pantex Plant. A Long‐Term Monitoring System Design has been designed to monitor conditions in the perched groundwater including changes in the perched aquifer as a result of implementing the response actions. Monitoring is required for verifying the effectiveness of perched groundwater response actions (i.e., conditions in the perched aquifer are being affected as intended) and for confirming that the perched aquifer and Ogallala Aquifer characterization as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation Report and the Corrective Measure Studies/Feasibility Study remains accurate. If monitoring results obtained through the monitoring network identify an unexpected condition or deviation, contingent actions will be considered and implemented as necessary to ensure continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and human health and the environment. Potential deviations to expected technology performance may be encountered for each of the four primary response actions that compose the selected remedy for perched groundwater; Playa 1 Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System (comprised of the Southeast In‐Situ Bioremediation System Original System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System Extension System, Offsite In‐Situ Bioremediation System, Perchlorate/Chromium ISB, Northeast ISB and County Road 8 ISB), and Zone 11 In‐Situ Bioremediation System. Monitoring will also be conducted to determine if there are deviations to the expected characterization, e.g., contaminants not expected as a result of the RCRA Facility Investigation characterization. Deviations to expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer could also be encountered if the response actions in the perched groundwater are not performing as expected, i.e., preventing contaminants from migrating to the Ogallala Aquifer. Currently, Pantex has begun investigation of detections of high explosives above groundwater protection standards in wells on the Texas Tech University property and a plume that is moving to the northeast from that area. Due to those detections, this Plan recognizes the fact that future detections in the Ogallala will be focused on first‐ time detections of analytes. After a remedy is determined, this Plan will require modification to address-deviations and contingent actions. This Plan was developed to identify the contingent actions necessary to mitigate impacts resulting from deviations to site conditions or response action performance. The Plan defines the environmental problem being addressed by the response actions, clarifies the expected conditions and objectives of the response actions, and identifies the potential deviations to the response actions (due to site conditions or technology performance) that could be encountered. The deviations were evaluated to determine the likelihood of occurrence, potential impact, and time to respond to avoid impact. The Plan also identifies the monitoring outlined in the Long‐Term Monitoring System Design Report (Consolidated Nuclear Security, 2024) and Sampling Analysis Plan (PanTeXas Deterrence, 2024) that will be used to detect the deviations. Lastly, the Plan specifies the contingent actions that could be implemented in response to the deviations. Because each response focuses on a discrete portion of the perched aquifer and contaminant plume, each response action has a different set of expected conditions, and therefore differing impacts from deviations to the site and technology expectations. As a result, the contingent actions are identified for each response action and potential deviation including specific constituents, location, and conditions. If deviations are encountered that impact the ability of the response action to meet performance objectives, the contingent actions will be focused on ensuring the response action can meet the performance objective. Contingent actions may be implemented as interim actions (ISMs/removal actions) in accordance with the Record of Decision, Interagency Agreement, and Hazardous Waste Permit‐50284, if warranted by the specific circumstances. For deviations to site characterization expected conditions, the contingent action will focus on determination of the source of the deviation, determination of the appropriate response, and evaluation of additional work to be completed. However, if the deviation to characterization impacts the performance of the response action, the contingent action will again focus on ensuring performance objectives can be met. Early source term removals and cleanup actions have been implemented to protect the Ogallala Aquifer. Because of these actions and based on modeling results, the expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer are that constituents of concern will not be detected above the Groundwater Protection Standards (GWPSs) nor will they reach potential points of exposure above the GWPS. The primary deviation of concern for the Ogallala is if constituents are detected in the Ogallala Aquifer near or above GWPSs. If it occurs, this change in expected conditions would require further evaluation of site and contaminant characteristics to determine an appropriate course of action. The evaluation would include additional monitoring, source identification, implementation of interim protective measures (if necessary), and delineation of extent. These evaluations are necessary to determine an appropriate response action for the Ogallala. The primary goal of the Plan is to provide for the continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and the health of its consumers. In recognition, this Plan presents a flexible and rational approach for making future decisions associated with confirming the change in perched and Ogallala aquifer conditions and identifying a response (technical activities, changes to response actions, regulatory oversight, and public involvement).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

HEP High Power Targetry Roadmap -- Workshop Report

Designing a reliable target is already a challenge for MW-class facilities today and has led several major accelerator facilities to operate at lower than design power due to target concerns. With present plans to increase beam power for next generation accelerator facilities in the next decade, timely R and D in support of robust high power targets is critical to secure the full physics benefits of ambitious accelerator power upgrades. A comprehensive R and D program must be implemented to address the many complex challenges faced by multi MW beam intercepting devices. This roadmap is envisioned to be helpful to the DOE-OHEP office when planning and prioritizing future R and D activities as well as leveraging synergies across the Office of Science. The roadmap will be extremely beneficial to the broader (external to DOE HEP) HPT community by communicating OHEP s high level strategy and objectives for HPT R and D and highlighting possible opportunities for collaboration.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗