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Determine what a criticality safety evaluation is. Define the components to a criticality safety evaluation. Define what is needed and how to create a criticality safety evaluation.
The Nuclear Criticality Safety Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has taken a unique approach to developing criticality safety evaluation topics in support of the University of California Berkeley criticality safety pipeline course. The evaluation topics are designed to go beyond the typical evaluation examples used for many training courses including vault storage and variations on storage arrays. These types of evaluations provide in-depth analysis into the fundamentals of criticality safety and are complex but may be far off from what a new criticality safety engineer may actually be evaluating. To provide more practical examples of criticality safety evaluation topics that are better fit for the knowledge level of a criticality safety engineer in-training, variations of current and future operations and research operations performed at LLNL are used as evaluation topics. Additionally, an emphasis on research is included in all evaluation topics as it allows students to take advantage of the concepts learned in class to apply them for process improvement, engineering equipment that is favorable for criticality safety, and negotiation tactics to work with operations personnel. The process used by LLNL to develop project topics for the pipeline course is provided in this paper. The intent is to provide an alternative technique for training students and potentially younger staff members in criticality safety on developing criticality safety evaluations.
Learning Objectives: Know that there are multiple sets of factors affecting nuclear criticality safety; Know how the neutron physics relates to physical factors; Know the basic requirements for performing a safety evaluation; Know the basic process for performing a safety evaluation.
Federal safety standards for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and liquid natural gas facilities incorporate rules and requirements for boiler and pressure vessel design and fabrication into 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, and 195 through the IBR process. The equivalent safety evaluations documented in this report demonstrate that boilers and pressure vessels in pipeline facilities that are designed and fabricated in accordance with rules and requirements specified in the 2021 edition do not violate the fundamental safety assumptions stated or implied in the 2007 edition of the ASME BPVC and therefore provide equivalent safety.
The presentation describes the necessary elements of developing a common approach to molten salt reactor (MSR) safety adequacy evaluation. Developing a common approach to establishing adequate safety for MSRs could substantially decrease the developer risks. However, safety adequacy is intimately associated with reactor licensing which is an element with national sovereignty. No reactor class has a common, portable international license. The advantageous performance characteristics of MSRs can be leveraged to decrease the cost and time necessary to develop reasonable confidence of adequate safety. Adequate safety can be demonstrated though either accident prevention or mitigation. MSR have characteristics that may make accident mitigation a preferable safety adequacy evaluation approach. Adequate quality as well as a thorough understanding of accident progression validated through separate and integral effects testing remains central to any safety adequacy demonstration method.
Fusion energy holds the promise of being a transformative technology as a carbon-neutral, sustainable source of energy. Whole device modeling and the development of fusion digital twins will be increasingly important for emerging fusion device concepts at both national laboratories and within the commercial fusion industry. However, meeting the challenge of whole device modeling of fusion energy devices requires robust, multiphysics, multiscale modeling and simulation technologies capable of running on large-scale supercomputers. Detailed analysis of individual systems at-scale is also required to ensure safe and efficient operation as well as provide the safety basis for future device designs and licensing activities. In a tokamak, toroidal and poloidal magnets confine and shape the fusion plasma to promote the fusion reaction. High plasma temperatures and high magnetic field requirements in modern design concepts (leading to high amounts of energy stored within each magnet) impose electrical, thermal, and mechanical loads on the magnet components, which in turn impacts the safety considerations of the magnet and their supporting systems. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a history of working in this space, including development and benchmarking of the Magnetic System Circuitry Analysis Program (MSCAP) and Magnet Arcing (MAGARC) codes to study magnet quench events; notably, MAGARC was used to study quenching during the ITER Engineering Design Activity. However, these legacy codes and capabilities are not parallel and scalable, and new tools are required for future advances in this area, which leads to the INL-developed Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE) framework. Developed originally for fission reactor systems under United States Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy modeling and simulation programs, the MOOSE framework has been well-suited to multiscale, multiphysics modeling and simulation needs for nuclear systems. The framework is open-source, well-tested, under continuous development and deployment, and developed to a Nuclear Quality Assurance, Level 1 software quality standard. MOOSE has also been used in the fusion space previously in several projects: INL’s Tritium Migration Analysis Program, Version 8 (TMAP8) for tritium migration, UK Atomic Energy Authority’s A Unified Resource for OpenMC (fusion) Reactor Applications (AURORA) code for fusion thermo-mechanical and neutronics analysis, and Argonne National Laboratory’s Cardinal for high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics and neutronics. However, to model superconducting magnets, several MOOSE enhancements are required: additions to the current MOOSE electromagnetic capabilities, new material libraries for superconductors of interest (such as YBCO), as well as fusion-specific models for thermo-mechanics. This talk will discuss initial development activities to build these capabilities in MOOSE, focusing on initial validation and benchmarking activities. Proposed coupling workflows and future work to support the simulation of fusion magnets and magnet structural assemblies for performance and safety evaluation in MOOSE will also be discussed.
Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) can potentially improve the performance of the transportation system by reducing human errors. This paper investigates the safety impact of CAVs in a mixed traffic with conventional vehicles at intersections. Analyzing real-world AV crashes in California revealed that rear-end crashes at intersections are the dominant crash type. Therefore, to enhance our understanding of the future interactions between human-driven vehicles with CAVs at intersections, a simulation framework was developed to model the mixed traffic environment of Automated Vehicles (AV), cooperative AVs, and conventional human-driven vehicles. In order to model AVs driving behavior, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and cooperative ACC (CACC) models are utilized. Particularly, this study explores system improvements due to automation and connectivity across varying CAV market penetration scenarios. ACC and CACC car following models are used to mimic the behavior of AVs and cooperative AVs. Real-world connected vehicle data are utilized to modify and tune the acceleration/deceleration regimes of the Wiedemann model. Next, the driving volatility concept capturing variability in vehicle speeds was utilized to calibrate the simulation to represent the safety performance of a real-world environment. Two surrogate safety measures are used to evaluate the safety performance of a representative intersection under different market penetration rate of CAVs: the number of longitudinal conflicts and driving volatility. At low levels of ACC market penetration, the safety improvements were found to be marginal, but safety improved substantially with more than 40% ACC penetration. Additional safety improvements can be achieved more quickly through the addition of cooperation and connectivity through CACC. Furthermore, ACC/CACC vehicles were found to improve mobility performance in terms of average speed and travel time at intersections.
This report documents rationale to develop analytical tools and data applicable to the safety and design of advanced molten salt power reactors. This report represents early steps in the implementation of the tasks defined by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2018 in the following sections of A Safety and Licensing Roadmap to identify the Research and Development Gaps of Commercial Molten Salt Reactors
This presentation includes an overview of the program and Background of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1. Additionally, discussed is the Fissile Material Holdup and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS).
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.
Molten salt reactor (MSR) sites may include additional elements of the nuclear fuel cycle beyond those of the existing fleet. In the existing fleet, the individual elements of the fuel cycle typically have been located on different sites and licensed separately. Providing robust separation between hazards remains a useful safety practice for MSRs. Although the different elements of the fuel cycle at a nuclear site that includes MSRs may transfer material between processes more frequently than prior practices, providing adequate separation between distinct facilities avoids the potential for adverse interactions. Additionally, some elements of the MSR fuel cycle, such as fuel salt preparation or waste stabilization, may be more efficient to share among multiple nearby reactors, and nuclear sites that include MSRs may also include other reactor classes. Hence, discrete MSR fuel cycle facilities located at a common site could be physically separated with robust barriers—albeit potentially connected by piping—and licensed individually. This report describes the hazards of individual elements of representative MSR fuel cycle facilities, including their relationship to overall site level hazards. The report maps the regulatory compliance aspects of the individual MSR fuel cycle elements (e.g., fuel salt preparation, reactor, waste stabilization) to existing and developing regulations, as well as describes current and developing site-level regulations from an MSR perspective.
Poster for the LDRD presentation event.
Not Available
The hazards of non-polysaccharide materials in a transuranic (TRU) waste drum exposed to nitric acid (HNO 3 ) and metal nitrate salts have been evaluated, focusing on sorbents and on resins used in ion-exchange chromatography. The range of sorbent materials can be grouped into two general categories: 1) a variety of polyacrylate and polyacrylamide compounds that incorporate polar carbonyl functional groups designed to sorb protic (i.e., acidic) substrates and solutions; 2) hydrocarbon based polymers that include polystyrene, polybutadiene, and polyethylene derivatives, which are designed to sorb non-polar organic substrates and solutions. The ion-exchange resins are constructed of hydrocarbon based polymeric networks equipped with pendant ionizable functional groups designed to reversibly sorb/desorb ionic species that are targeted for separation from a mobile phase.
The agenda for the presentation is as follows: Defining the Process (Process Description, The Team, Importance of a Walkdown, Tips and Tricks, Common Mistakes); and, Examples.
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Evaluations of nuclear data are based on statistical analysis of available experimental data and their uncertainties plus model calculations and their uncertainties. As the models are currently rather limited, the evaluations are heavily biassed toward experimental data, with the caveat that a thorough analysis is also required to understand possible discrepancies between data sets. Hence, as new experimental data become available, they are incorporated into the evaluation procedure. Recent measurements of the 233 U capture to fission cross section ratio at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center have prompted a re-evaluation of the capture cross section in the resonance and fast regions up to 250 keV. We will discuss the challenges of including the new fast neutron experimental data in an evaluation that is consistent with the resonance region. We will also discuss our consistent evaluation procedure based on the Hauser-Feshbach statistical model for nuclear reactions and its application to the evaluations of 239 Pu and 139 La neutron-induced reactions.