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Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 31 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 40 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to the Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 41 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 28 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 34 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
As part of the effort to review the Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report and to understand the risk of plutonium release from the Ulysses spacecraft General Purpose Heat Source-Radioisotope Thermal Generator, the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) performed an integrated, quantitative analysis of the uncertainties of the calculated risk of plutonium release from Ulysses. Using state-of-art probabilistic risk assessment technology, the uncertainty analysis accounted for both variability and uncertainty of the key parameters of the risk analysis. The results show that INSRP had high confidence that risk of fatal cancers from potential plutonium release associated with calculated launch and deployment accident scenarios is low.
Space Transportation System 33 (STS-33) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and the factors that are not unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late to include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
Space Transportation System 35 (STS-35) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that were unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late too include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
This document satisfies ATM-X UAM Task UID 989 “Evaluation Report on Tactical Separation Provision Services with Advisory Detect and Avoid Safety Metrics”. The first version of this document was delivered to the UAM team on October 3, 2022, for initial revision and comments.This current version incorporates all the comments received and is being delivered to the UAM subproject for a final revision before is submitted to satisfy the L1 milestone deliverable.
A health and safety analysis of a single entry coal tunnel borer system is given. The results of the health analysis indicated that while the tunnel borer design offered improvements in dust control through the use of water sprays, a higher face ventilation rule, and the application of spalling rather than the conventional grinding process, it interjected an additional mutagen and toxic compound into the environment through the use of shotcrete. The tunnel borer system easily conformed with the prescribed fatality limit, but exceeded the required limits for disabling and overall injuries. It also exhibited projected disabling and overall injury rates considerably higher than existing continuous mining injury rates. Consequently, the tunnel borer system was not considered an advanced system.
The topics covered include: (1) an STS-29 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-29 safety risk factors; (4) STS-27 flight anomalies; (5) STS-26 flight anomalies; and (6) the STS-29 official inflight anomaly report. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.
The topics covered include: (1) an STS-30 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-30 safety risk factors; (4) STS-29 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-27 inflight anomalies; and (6) the STS-30 official inflight anomaly report. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.
The topics covered include: (1) an STS-32 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-32 safety risk factors; (4) STS-32 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-28 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-32 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.
The topics covered include: (1) an STS-36 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-36 safety risk factors; (4) STS-32 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-34 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-36 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.
Some of the topics covered include: (1) an STS-43 mission summary; (2) safety risks factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-43 safety risk factors; (4) STS-40 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-37 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-43 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.
STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991 from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed 4 minutes 45 seconds because of safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and the wind direction in the potential blast area. Based on the limited number and type of inflight anomalies encountered, the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. A contingency EVA was performed by the crew on Flight Day (FD) 3 to free a sticky Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) high gain antenna, after which the GRO primary payload was successfully deployed by the Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System. The GRO, which weighed just over 35,000 lbs, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space Shuttle into low Earth orbit. The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for one day due to high wind conditions at Edwards Air Force Base. Atlantis landed on FD 7, 11 April 1991 on Edwards AFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
Methodolgy evaluates design of proposed mining systems. Analysis tests proposed mining systems against specifications and hazards of existing similar systems, examines soundness of new design in terms of reducing or eliminating major health and safety hazards, and identifies major design weaknesses.
Lithium-ion batteries have been used for applications on the Shuttle and Station for the past six years. A majority of the li-ion batteries flown are Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) varieties. The COTS batteries and cells were tested under nominal and abusive conditions for performance and safety characterization. Within the past six months two batteries have been certified for flight and use on the Space Station. The first one is a Hand Spring PDA battery that had a single prismatic li-ion cell and the second is an Iridium satellite phone that had a two-cell pack with prismatic li-ion cells.