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Safety Analysis Report for Packagings – Model 9979 Type AF Shipping Package

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the performance of the Department of Energy (DOE) Model USA/9979/AF-96 shipping package and compliance with the regulatory safety requirements of Title 10 and Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The SARP is prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1D. The Model 9979 Type A Fissile shipping package replaces the Department of Transportation (DOT) UN1A2 Specification Packaging. Formerly, the UN1A2 was authorized under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 173.417 (2004) for transport of Type A quantities of fissile material over public highways. In accordance with the Federal Register, final rule making issued on January 26, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a joint effort with the Department of Transportation, initiated a planned phase out of multiple Specification Packagings from 49 CFR 173, the UN1A2 being one. The rulemaking mandated, by law, removal of these specification packagings from service no later than September 30, 2008. The 9979 is a Performance Packaging and replaces the UN1A2 Specification Packaging. The Packaging Technology and Transportation Engineering (PT&TE) organization of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the Design Authority and Design Agency for the 9979.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING SHIELDING & NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY COURSES DEVELOPED AND CONDUCTED BY OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to improve their understanding of how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader spectrum of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses included in a SARP, and it illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners, including safety analysts and/or technical reviewers, to prepare and/or review technical analyses for SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. Both courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and for interested students, the analyst course is offered for one hour of graduate credit (course ME-690) from the University of Nevada at Reno. An overview of the course will be provided to ensure that the NCS community is aware of the course and its intent to support the shielding and NCS aspects of packaging and transportation analyses for SARP activities.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Safety analysis report for packaging shielding and nuclear criticality safety courses developed and conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to better understand how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader body of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses for a SARP and illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners (i.e., safety analysts and/or technical reviewers) to prepare and/or review technical analyses for the SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. The courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory's National Transportation Research Center. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

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Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Analysis Report For Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR.

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Package Review Guide for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (Revision 4)

This Package Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for Department of Energy (DOE) review and approval of packages to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE Order 460.1D for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (SARP). This Package Review Guide is intended for use by the United States Department of Energy Headquarters Certifying Official and their staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for Department of Energy package approval. This Package Review Guide is generally organized at the chapter-level in a format similar to that recommended in United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 7.9. One notable exception is the addition of Chapter 9 Quality Assurance, which is not included as a separate chapter in Regulatory Guide 7.9. Within each chapter, this Package Review Guide addresses the technical and regulatory bases for the review, the manner in which the review is accomplished, and findings that are generally applicable for a package that meets the approval standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESSING GAS GENERATION IN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING

Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARP) document why the transportation of radioactive material is safe in Type A(F) and Type B shipping containers. The content evaluation of certain actinide materials require that the gas generation characteristics be addressed. Most packages used to transport actinides impose extremely restrictive limits on moisture content and oxide stabilization to control or prevent flammable gas generation. These requirements prevent some users from using a shipping container even though the material to be shipped is fully compliant with the remaining content envelope including isotopic distribution. To avoid these restrictions, gas generation issues have to be addressed on a case by case basis rather than a one size fits all approach. In addition, SARP applicants and review groups may not have the knowledge and experience with actinide chemistry and other factors affecting gas generation, which facility experts in actinide material processing have obtained in the last sixty years. This paper will address a proposal to create a Gas Generation Evaluation Committee to evaluate gas generation issues associated with Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging material contents. The committee charter could include reviews of both SARP approved contents and new contents not previously evaluated in a SARP.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical Review Report for the "Justification for Small Gram Quantity Contents" Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Model 9977-96, Addendum 3, S-SARA-G-00006, Revision 4

This Technical Review Report (TRR) summarizes the results of the Staff’s review of the Model 9977-96 Package, Addendum 3, Revision 4 for the Type 4 contents. Type 4 contents may include 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 241 Am, 244 Cm, 252 Cf, 90 Sr, 226 Ra, 137 Cs, 60 Co, 192 Ir with the Special Actinide Isotopes ( 242 mAm, 243 Cm, 245 Cm, 247 Cm, 249 Cf and 251 Cf) limited to a total of 1000 ppm. Type 4 pertains primarily to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP). These new contents will be authorized for shipment in the Model 9977-96 Package, supplementing existing Revision 2 to the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), once Addendum 3, Justification for Small Gram Quantity (SGQ) Contents, is accepted by the certifying official, EM-40, and the existing Certificate of Compliance (CoC) is revised, reflecting the added contents. Existing Content Envelopes for the Model 9977-96 Package include heat sources in food-pack cans or in radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), neptunium metal, a beryllium-reflected plutonium ball, plutonium/uranium metal at 25% and 50% maximum 240Pu, respectively, and uranium metal at limits of 95% and 100% 235U, respectively. The percentages are of total radioactive material mass. The Isentropic Compression Experiment (ICE) apparatus is an additional content of the Model 9977-96 Package SARP. The latest content added to the Model 9977-96 Package is Type 5, AGR fuel compacts. Addendum 3 was prepared by Savannah River Packaging Technology, Savannah River National Laboratory, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, Savannah River Site, in support of work being performed by LANL. The Model 9977-96 Package is currently certified under two Certificate of Compliance Numbers, i.e., USA/9977/B(M)F-96 (DOE) and USA/9977/B(M)F-96 (DOE-S/T-1), covering transportation and periodic and extended maintenance, respectively. For transportation, the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging is S-SARP-G-0001, Revision 2 (August 2007). Extended maintenance is covered by Addendum 1, Justification for DNDO Contents, S-SARA-G-00003, Revision 2 (October 2008). The new Content Envelope and container configurations will be incorporated into the next revision to the Model 9977-96 Package SARP. This TRR addresses only Type 4 contents; content Types 1, 2, and 3 will be covered under a separate TRR. Content Type 5 has been dealt with in a previous TRR. Hereafter, in this TRR, the Type 4 content may be referred to as Sources.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Technical Review Report for the Justification for 9975 Gram Based Content Envelopes, C.10 and C.11

The Department of Energy (DOE) desires to ship Model 9975-85 and Model 9975-96 Packages loaded with Pu/U metal and Pu/U oxide materials as identified in new Content Envelopes C.10 and C.11. The new Content Envelopes C.10 and C.11 consist of radioisotopes and impurities that are similar to the existing C.3, Pu/U metal, and C.4, Pu/U oxide, Content Envelopes but that list the radioisotopes as gram values in lieu of the existing weight percent of radioactive material mass values listed for the C.3 and C.4 Content Envelopes. Authorization for shipment requires acceptance of this report by the DOE-Headquarters (HQ) Certifying Official (EM-10/EM-2) as an Addendum to WSRC-SA-2002-00008, Revision 0, S-SARA-G-00001, Addendum 1, Revision 0, and S-SARA-G-00002 Addendum 2, Revision 1, of the Model 9975-85 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). This Addendum also applies to S-SARP-G-00003, Revision 0, of the Model 9975-96 Package SARP. These documents are collectively referred to as the existing Model 9975 Package SARP. The safety basis described addresses specific supplements to the currently approved safety basis. Justification is made for shipping the new Content Envelopes C.10 and C.11 under this Addendum. Following acceptance of this Addendum by EM-10/EM-2 and subsequent revision to the current Certificates of Compliance (CoCs), the new contents will be authorized for shipment in the Model 9975 Package. The new Content Envelopes will be incorporated into the next revision to the Model 9975-85 and Model 9975-96 Package SARPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Model 9977, Addendum 3: Justification for Small Gram Quantity Contents (Revision 5)

This Addendum establishes a new family of content envelopes consisting of small quantities of radioactive materials. These content envelopes and specific packing configurations are shown to be subcritical. However, the dose rates of some payloads must be measured and shown to comply with applicable radiation limits. Authorization for shipment of the content envelop requires acceptance of this Addendum by the DOE-HQ certifying official as a supplement to the 9977 SARP Revision 2 and DOE-HQ's subsequent revision of the CoC Revision 10 (which is based on SARP Addendum 2 and SARP Addendum 4) to authorize the additional content envelope. The Small Gram Quantity Content Envelopes and packing configurations will be incorporated in the next revision of the 9977 SARP.

42 ENGINEERING↗

COMPACTION OF FIBERBOARD OVERPACK MATERIALS IN A 9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE

Compaction of lower layers in the 9975 fiberboard overpack has been observed in packages that contain excess moisture. Dynamic loading of the package during transportation may also contribute to compaction of the fiberboard. This condition is being tested and analyzed to better understand these compaction mechanisms and provide a basis from which to evaluate their impact to the safety basis for transportation (Safety Analysis Report for Packaging) and storage (facility Design Safety Analysis) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). A test program has been developed and is being implemented to identify the extent of the compaction as a function of fiberboard moisture and typical transport dynamic loadings. Test conditions will be compared to regulatory requirements for dynamic loading. Characterization of the recovery of short-term compaction following the application of dynamic loading is also being evaluated. Interim results from this test program will be summarized.

42 ENGINEERING↗

STATUS REPORT FOR MOISTURE EFFECTS ON COMPACTION OF FIBERBOARD IN A 9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE

Compaction of lower layers in the fiberboard overpack has been observed in 9975 packages that contain elevated moisture. Lab testing has resulted in a better understanding of the relationship between the fiberboard moisture level and compaction of the lower fiberboard assembly, and the behavior of the fiberboard during transport. In laboratory tests, higher moisture content has been shown to correspond to higher total compaction of fiberboard material, greater rate of compaction, and continued compaction over a longer period of time. In addition, laboratory tests have shown that the application of a dynamic load results in higher fiberboard compaction. The test conditions and sample geometric/loading configurations were chosen to simulate the regulatory requirements for 9975 package input dynamic loading. Dynamic testing was conducted over a period of six months to acquire immediate and cumulative changes in geometric data for various moisture levels. Currently, one sample set has undergone a complete dynamic test regimen, while testing of another set is still in-progress. The dynamic input, data acquisition, test effects on sample dynamic parameters, and interim results from this test program are summarized and compared to regulatory specifications for dynamic loading. This will provide a basis from which to evaluate the impact of moisture and fiberboard compaction on the safety basis for transportation (Safety Analysis Report for Packaging) and storage (facility Documented Safety Analysis) at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

COMPACTION OF FIBERBOARD IN A 9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE

Compaction of lower layers in the fiberboard overpack has been observed in 9975 packages that contain elevated moisture. Lab testing has resulted in a better understanding of (1) the relationship between the fiberboard moisture level and compaction of the lower fiberboard assembly, and (2) the behavior of the fiberboard during transport. In laboratory tests, higher moisture content has been shown to correspond to higher total compaction of fiberboard material, greater rate of compaction, and continued compaction over a longer period of time. In addition, laboratory tests have shown that the application of a dynamic load results in higher fiberboard compaction. The test conditions and sample geometric/loading configurations were chosen to simulate the regulatory requirements for 9975 package input dynamic loading. Dynamic testing was conducted over a period of several months to acquire immediate and cumulative changes in geometric data for various moisture levels. Currently, one sample set has undergone a complete dynamic test regimen, while testing of another set is still in-progress. The dynamic input, data acquisition, test effects on sample dynamic parameters, and interim results from this test program will be summarized and compared to regulatory specifications for dynamic loading. This will provide a basis from which to evaluate the impact of moisture and fiberboard compaction on the safety basis for transportation (Safety Analysis Report for Packaging) and storage (facility Documented Safety Analysis) at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Definition of Small Gram Quantity Contents for Type B Radioactive Material Transportation Packages: Activity-Based Content Limitations

Since the 1960's, the Department of Transportation Specification (DOT Spec) 6M packages have been used extensively for transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials between Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, laboratories, and productions sites. However, due to the advancement of packaging technology, the aging of the 6M packages, and variability in the quality of the packages, the DOT implemented a phased elimination of the 6M specification packages (and other DOT Spec packages) in favor of packages certified to meet federal performance requirements. DOT issued the final rule in the Federal Register on October 1, 2004 requiring that use of the DOT Specification 6M be discontinued as of October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was the fact that the 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 71 (10 CFR 71). Therefore, materials that would have historically been shipped in 6M packages are being identified as contents in Type B (and sometimes Type A fissile) package applications and addenda that are to be certified under the requirements of 10 CFR 71. The requirements in 10 CFR 71 include that the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) must identify the maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents and maximum quantities of fissile constituents (10 CFR 71.33(b)(1) and 10 CFR 71.33(b)(2)), and that the application (i.e., SARP submittal or SARP addendum) demonstrates that the external dose rate (due to the maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents and maximum quantities of fissile constituents) on the surface of the packaging (i.e., package and contents) not exceed 200 mrem/hr (10 CFR 71.35(a), 10 CFR 71.47(a)). It has been proposed that a 'Small Gram Quantity' of radioactive material be defined, such that, when loaded in a transportation package, the dose rates at external points of an unshielded packaging not exceed the regulatory limits prescribed by 10 CFR 71 for non-exclusive shipments. The mass of each radioisotope presented in this paper is limited by the radiation dose rate on the external surface of the package, which per the regulatory limit should not exceed 200 mrem/hr. The results presented are a compendium of allowable masses of a variety of different isotopes (with varying impurity levels of beryllium in some of the actinide isotopes) that, when loaded in an unshielded packaging, do not result in an external dose rate on the surface of the package that exceeds 190 mrem/hr (190 mrem/hr was chosen to provide 5% conservatism relative to the regulatory limit). These mass limits define the term 'Small Gram Quantity' (SGQ) contents in the context of radioactive material transportation packages. The term SGQ is isotope-specific and pertains to contents in radioactive material transportation packages that do not require shielding and still satisfy the external dose rate requirements. Since these calculated mass limits are for contents without shielding, they are conservative for packaging materials that provide some limited shielding or if the contents are placed into a shielded package. The isotopes presented in this paper were chosen as the isotopes that Department of Energy (DOE) sites most likely need to ship. Other more rarely shipped isotopes, along with industrial and medical isotopes, are planned to be included in subsequent extensions of this work.

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