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Grid Communications Supply Chain & Emerging Regulation Challenges Session 1

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One - Abridged

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

Role of reinforcement learning for risk-based robust control of cyber-physical energy systems

Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Navigating United States Standards and Regulation for Digital Energy Systems

This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order: Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan with ROTC 1

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). (Note: This pertains to those FFACO sites not managed by the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE], Legacy Management.) The closure in place alternative is used for sites closed with residual contamination at levels requiring corrective action as determined using the FFACO process. The URs contain and control all requirements for long-term monitoring. This URMP also serves as the single repository of the URs implemented under the FFACO that identify use restricted areas and contain the current requirements for inspections, maintenance, and monitoring of the UR. The requirements in these URs replace all requirements listed in previous documentation. This consolidates post-closure monitoring requirements into a single source that ensures completeness and consistency of UR requirements and information. Standardized UR forms were developed to clearly document post-closure requirements that are consistent with current protocols and to ensure consistent information is contained in the URs. Standard notification, summary, and site controls statements were developed for all URs with provisions to insert site-specific options in the text. Current protocols for Industrial Sites and Soils URs are defined in this document and in the Soils Risk-Based Corrective Action (RBCA) Evaluation Process (DOE/EMNV, 2018). The standardized UR forms that have been approved to date are listed in Appendix A. Additional UR forms will be added once the review and approval process has been completed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies – GETs and HPCs Session 2: Advanced Power Flow Control and Transmission Topology Optimization

The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 2, held on November 7, 2025, conducted in collaboration with ScottMadden, focused on two core Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs): Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC) and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO). These technologies are pivotal in enhancing grid flexibility, reliability, and cybersecurity resilience. APFC, particularly through modular FACTS devices like Modular Static Synchronous Series Compensators (M-SSSCs), enables dynamic voltage injection to reroute power flows. The session highlighted the deployment benefits of APFC, such as rapid installation, minimal civil works, and re-deployability. Regulatory drivers like FERC Order 2023 mandate the inclusion of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) in interconnection studies. Case studies from Central Hudson, CAISO, and National Grid (UK) demonstrated APFC’s effectiveness in congestion relief and cost savings. The session also addressed cybersecurity concerns, including firmware vulnerabilities, SCADA integration risks, and supply chain dependencies. Participants engaged in interactive exercises to rank cybersecurity and supply chain risks, emphasizing the need for robust digital assurance strategies. TTO involves software-based reconfiguration of transmission networks to optimize power flow without new infrastructure. The session showcased its operational value, with examples from SPP, PJM, and MISO showing significant congestion cost reductions. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities were discussed, particularly in API security and software supply chains, referencing incidents like SolarWinds and attacks on Danish utilities. Digital assurance exercises explored worst-case scenarios, attack paths, and mitigation responsibilities between vendors and utilities. Reliability challenges such as algorithm stability, vendor dependency, and operator trust were also examined. Cross-cutting themes emphasized the importance of digital assurance tools, including Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and hardware-in-loop testing. Human performance, training, and operational confidence were identified as critical enablers of technology adoption. The session concluded with a preview of Session 3, which will focus on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and risk-based cybersecurity tools. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NORTH DAKOTA CARBONSAFE PHASE III: SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND PERMITTING OF GEOLOGIC STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE

The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), in partnership with Minnkota Power Cooperative Inc. (Minnkota), SLB, and Computer Modelling Group Ltd. (CMG), supported wide-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory Carbon Storage Assurance Facility Enterprise (CarbonSAFE) Initiative Phase III. This phase included the acquisition, analysis, and development of information to fully characterize two storage complexes to demonstrate viable storage resources for commercial volumes of CO2 (defined by DOE as a minimum of 50 million tonnes [MMt] of CO2 within a 30-year period) (National Energy Technology Laboratory, 2024). Phase III also involved the preparation, submission, and approval of North Dakota underground injection control (UIC) Class VI storage facility permits (SFPs)—required precursors to applications for Class VI injection well permits. The presumed viability of commercial-scale CCS, situated adjacent to Minnkota’s Milton R. Young Station (MRYS), is validated by Minnkota’s continued pursuit of Project Tundra—an initiative to build the world’s largest lignite-based CCS project in central North Dakota (www.projecttundrand.com). Project Tundra comprises two scopes of work, Tundra Capture (installation of postcombustion CO2 capture at MRYS) and Tundra SGS (secure geologic storage). The efforts of North Dakota CarbonSAFE Phase III, Site Characterization and Permitting, supported Tundra SGS. Extensive site-specific characterization activities included a successful multimeasurement geophysical approach and drilling a stratigraphic test well (J-ROC 1, subsequently renamed Liberty-1) adjacent to MRYS. Core collection and analyses, downhole testing and fluid sampling, and geophysical logging were performed on J-ROC 1 and on a nearby stratigraphic test well (known as J-LOC 1), which was drilled, cored, and tested under a complementary project funded by the North Dakota Lignite Research Program. The injection tests performed on J-LOC 1 positively impacted the CarbonSAFE project, resulting in fewer proposed injection wells and significant construction, operations, and monitoring cost savings. The characterization data collected and analyses performed were integrated into geologic models, and successive numerical simulations were run to determine CO2 plume extent and subsurface pressure buildup associated with the planned CO2 injection rate of nearly 4 MMt per year. The latter doubles the CarbonSAFE Initiative goal with an estimated 100 MMt of CO2 stored in 20 years. Application of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) method for estimating the Class VI Rule area of review (AOR) to the overpressurized Broom Creek Formation inspired an alternative method of calculation, called risk-based AOR delineation. This peer-reviewed method was applied for the first time during the storage facility-permitting process. The two SFP applications submitted in 2021 successfully resulted in North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC) orders in 2022 authorizing the creation of the storage facility areas and amalgamation of pore space as well as establishing financial responsibility requirements. After approval of the SFPs, Minnkota filed in 2022 applications for permits to reenter the J-ROC 1 well and to drill two new wells—all with the intended purpose to become Class VI injection wells. To establish eligibility under the Internal Revenue Code for Section 45Q tax incentives, a monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) plan was prepared and submitted by Minnkota to EPA in 2022, resulting in the first such plan approved in North Dakota. Also in 2022, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Minnkota prepared and submitted an environmental information volume (EIV) describing the proposed CCS project and associated potential environmental impacts. Based on the EIV, DOE determined that the proposed construction project required an environmental assessment, and Minnkota submitted the first draft in 2023 and a revised draft in 2024. Both submissions were followed by a public comment period. Subsequently, DOE issued a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on September 13, 2024. A successful outreach program, strongly based in the production, presentation, and dissemination of informational material, fostered an environment to aid stakeholders in making informed decisions regarding the planned project. Opportunities for public input were provided at various steps along the way, including at county planning and zoning meetings, before and during the SFP administrative hearing, and during environmental assessment public comment periods. In addition, land/pore space owners and mineral owners had various points of contact, including granting access rights, securing pore space leasing, and mineral owner notifications. Based upon the successful storage facility permitting issued by NDIC, approval of the MRV plan by EPA, and receipt of a FONSI under the NEPA, Minnkota is continuing its pursuit of Project Tundra. In December 2023, the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations under its Carbon Capture Demonstrations Projects Program announced funding for the capture system (Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, 2023) and a proposal for CarbonSAFE Phase IV: Construction funding was submitted in March 2024 for the storage project. A go/no-go decision to proceed with construction and operations in the Broom Creek Formation is anticipated in 2024. References National Energy Technology Laboratory, CarbonSafe Initiative, https://netl.doe.gov/carbon-management/carbon-storage/carbonsafe (accessed August 2024). Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, 2023, OCED selects three projects in CA, ND, and TX to reduce harmful carbon pollution, create new economic opportunities, and advance carbon reducing technologies, December, www.energy.gov/oced/articles/oced-selects-three-projects-ca-nd-and-tx-reduce-harmful-carbon-pollution-create-new (accessed August 2024).

Peck, Wesley↗

Aviation security screening optimizer for risk and throughput (ASSORT)

The increasing number of air travelers each year presents a challenge as many airports are near their capacity in terms of resources and space for passenger screening. Fortunately, advancements in technologies like next-generation millimeter wave scanning offer solutions to ease this strain. The focus remains on managing risk while enhancing the passenger experience for the traveling public. The risk model presented in this paper known as the Aviation Security Screening Optimizer for Risk and Throughput (ASSORT) is designed to assess risk-based approaches for passenger screening and checkpoint operations. Additionally, ASSORT is exploring various traveler categories — general, trusted, and trusted-plus — along with different checkpoint screening Concept of Operations tailored to each traveler type. For instance, travelers with a higher trust level may experience fewer screening technologies, resulting in quicker processing times at the checkpoint. The output of ASSORT provides a risk score for predefined threat scenarios, as well as the overall risk to the checkpoint, aircraft, and airport by traveler type. In conclusion, benefits of using this tool include assessing the trade-offs between the overall risk associated with checkpoints and the throughput rate of passengers screened. We show for example the impact that different passenger volumes at the checkpoint can have on risk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Aviation Security Screening Optimizer for Risk and ThroughputASSORT

The Aviation Security Screening Optimizer for Risk and Throughput (ASSORT) is designed to assess risk-based approaches for passenger screening and checkpoint operations. Additionally, ASSORT is exploring various traveler categories — general, trusted, and trusted-plus — along with different checkpoint screening Concept of Operations tailored to each traveler type

Brigantic, Robert [Pacific Northwest National Labo↗

Application of quantitative risk assessment to address stakeholder questions in geologic carbon storage

Ambitious international greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets demand a rapid transformation to a low-carbon economy. This transformation includes the accelerated adoption of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, as with any large-scale engineering enterprise, the widespread commercial-scale deployment of geologic carbon storage (GCS) raises important questions about technology and cost-effectiveness, safety, environmental risk, and long-term liability. Effectively assessing and managing risks and liability associated with GCS projects is a key technical need throughout the project life cycle-from site selection and permitting to monitoring design, operational risk management, and post-operational site closure. This presentation highlights recent advancements in tools for quantitative risk assessment, being developed by the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP). NRAP is a multi-year, multinational laboratory research collaboration sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management. Our focus will be on these tools' applications in addressing critical stakeholder questions related to supporting permitting to ensure secure and environmentally protective storage; designing effective and efficient monitoring plans; evaluating the effectiveness of remedial actions and risk management alternatives; and informing liability assessment and investment decisions. This paper will detail the key functionality of NRAP’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM), a computational framework for assessing leakage risk and containment assurance. This model features streamlined workflows for calculating leakage risk profiles, delineating risk-based area of review, and assessing contingency plans and post-injection site care requirements. ORION is an open-source, observation-based ensemble forecasting toolkit to help operators assess the seismic hazard at a carbon storage site. The State of Stress Analysis Tool (SOSAT), designed to assess subsurface stress conditions and evaluate geomechanical risk resulting from CO2 injection in an area of interest will also be presented. We will also introduce a prototype model to evaluate storage project costs and liability associated with risk management. The Technoeconomic and Liability Evaluation for Storage (TALES) model uses results from forecasts of leakage and induced seismicity risk to estimate the lifecycle cost of managing risk. Finally, a preliminary example of how the NRAP Risk-based Adaptive Monitoring Plan (RAMP) tool can be used to design efficient and effective site monitoring plans and estimate the detectability of fluid leakage will be provided. The relevance of these tools for addressing key stakeholder questions amidst uncertainty will be emphasized.

decision support↗