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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

Deep Space Network Scheduling Using Multi-Objective Optimization with Uncertainty

We have developed a novel technique to incorporate uncertainty modeling within an evolutionary algorithm approach to multi-objective scheduling, with the goal of identifying a Pareto frontier (tradeoff curve) that recognizes the likelihood of events that can impact the schedule outcome. Our approach is particularly applicable to the generation of multiobjective optimized robust schedules, where objectives are assigned a service level, for example that we require an objective value to be greater than or equal to X with Y% confidence. We have demonstrated that such an approach can, for example, minimize scheduling on less reliable resources, based solely on a resource reliability model and not on any ad hoc heuristics. We have also investigated an alternative method of optimizing for robustness, in which we add to the set of objectives a failure risk objective to minimize. We compare the advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches. Future plans for further developing this technology include its application to space-based observatory scheduling problems.

Johnston, Mark D.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Risk-Based Object Oriented Testing

Software testing is a well-defined phase of the software development life cycle. Functional ("black box") testing and structural ("white box") testing are two methods of test case design commonly used by software developers. A lesser known testing method is risk-based testing, which takes into account the probability of failure of a portion of code as determined by its complexity. For object oriented programs, a methodology is proposed for identification of risk-prone classes. Risk-based testing is a highly effective testing technique that can be used to find and fix the most important problems as quickly as possible.

Rosenberg, Linda H.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Post-Challenger evaluation of space shuttle risk assessment and management

As the shock of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident began to subside, NASA initiated a wide range of actions designed to ensure greater safety in various aspects of the Shuttle system and an improved focus on safety throughout the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program. Certain specific features of the NASA safety process are examined: the Critical Items List (CIL) and the NASA review of the Shuttle primary and backup units whose failure might result in the loss of life, the Shuttle vehicle, or the mission; the failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA); and the hazard analysis and their review. The conception of modern risk management, including the essential element of objective risk assessment is described and it is contrasted with NASA's safety process in general terms. The discussion, findings, and recommendations regarding particular aspects of the NASA STS safety assurance process are reported. The 11 subsections each deal with a different aspect of the process. The main lessons learned by SCRHAAC in the course of the audit are summarized.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

An Upper Bound on Orbital Debris Collision Probability When Only One Object has Position Uncertainty Information

Upper bounds on high speed satellite collision probability, P (sub c), have been investigated. Previous methods assume an individual position error covariance matrix is available for each object. The two matrices being combined into a single, relative position error covariance matrix. Components of the combined error covariance are then varied to obtain a maximum P (sub c). If error covariance information for only one of the two objects was available, either some default shape has been used or nothing could be done. An alternative is presented that uses the known covariance information along with a critical value of the missing covariance to obtain an approximate but useful P (sub c) upper bound. There are various avenues along which an upper bound on the high speed satellite collision probability has been pursued. Typically, for the collision plane representation of the high speed collision probability problem, the predicted miss position in the collision plane is assumed fixed. Then the shape (aspect ratio of ellipse), the size (scaling of standard deviations) or the orientation (rotation of ellipse principal axes) of the combined position error ellipse is varied to obtain a maximum P (sub c). Regardless as to the exact details of the approach, previously presented methods all assume that an individual position error covariance matrix is available for each object and the two are combined into a single, relative position error covariance matrix. This combined position error covariance matrix is then modified according to the chosen scheme to arrive at a maximum P (sub c). But what if error covariance information for one of the two objects is not available? When error covariance information for one of the objects is not available the analyst has commonly defaulted to the situation in which only the relative miss position and velocity are known without any corresponding state error covariance information. The various usual methods of finding a maximum P (sub c) do no good because the analyst defaults to no knowledge of the combined, relative position error covariance matrix. It is reasonable to think, given an assumption of no covariance information, an analyst might still attempt to determine the error covariance matrix that results in an upper bound on the P (sub c). Without some guidance on limits to the shape, size and orientation of the unknown covariance matrix, the limiting case is a degenerate ellipse lying along the relative miss vector in the collision plane. Unless the miss position is exceptionally large or the at-risk object is exceptionally small, this method results in a maximum P (sub c) too large to be of practical use. For example, assuming that the miss distance is equal to the current ISS alert volume along-track (+ or -) distance of 25 kilometers and that the at-risk area has a 70 meter radius. The maximum (degenerate ellipse) P (sub c) is about 0.00136. At 40 kilometers, the maximum P (sub c) would be 0.00085 which is still almost an order of magnitude larger than the ISS maneuver threshold of 0.0001. In fact, a miss distance of almost 340 kilometers is necessary to reduce the maximum P (sub c) associated with this degenerate ellipse to the ISS maneuver threshold value. Such a result is frequently of no practical value to the analyst. Some improvement may be made with respect to this problem by realizing that while the position error covariance matrix of one of the objects (usually the debris object) may not be known the position error covariance matrix of the other object (usually the asset) is almost always available. Making use of the position error covariance information for the one object provides an improvement in finding a maximum P (sub c) which, in some cases, may offer real utility. The equations to be used are presented and their use discussed.

Frisbee, Joseph H., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Project Interface Requirements Process Including Shuttle Lessons Learned

Most failures occur at interfaces between organizations and hardware. Processing interface requirements at the start of a project life cycle will reduce the likelihood of costly interface changes/failures later. This can be done by adding Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to the Project top level drawing tree, providing technical direction to the Projects for interface requirements, and by funding the interface requirements function directly from the Project Manager's office. The interface requirements function within the Project Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office would work in-line with the project element design engineers early in the life cycle to enhance communications and negotiate technical issues between the elements. This function would work as the technical arm of the Project Manager to help ensure that the Project cost, schedule, and risk objectives can be met during the Life Cycle. Some ICD Lessons Learned during the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Life Cycle will include the use of hardware interface photos in the ICD, progressive life cycle design certification by analysis, test, & operations experience, assigning interface design engineers to Element Interface (EI) and Project technical panels, and linking interface design drawings with project build drawings

Bauch, Garland T.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Deficits in Sustained Attention and Changes in Dopaminergic Protein Levels Following Exposure to Proton Radiation are Related to Basal Dopaminergic Function

The current report assessed the effects of low-level proton irradiation in inbred adult male Fischer 344 and Lewis rats performing an analog of the human Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT), commonly utilized as an object risk assessment tool to quantify fatigue and sustained attention in laboratory, clinical, and operational settings. These strains were used to determine if genetic differences in dopaminergic function would impact radiation-induced deficits in sustained attention. Exposure to head-only proton irradiation (25 or 100 cGy) disrupted rPVT performance in a strain-specific manner, with 25 cGy-exposed Fischer 344 rats displaying the most severe deficits in sustained attention (i.e., decreased accuracy and increased premature responding); Lewis rats did not display behavioral deficits following radiation. Fischer 344 rats displayed greater tyrosine hydroxylase and dopamine transporter levels in the frontal cortex compared to the Lewis rats, even though radiation exposure increased both of these proteins in the Lewis rats only. Tyrosine hydroxylase was decreased in the parietal cortex of both rat strains following radiation exposure, regardless of proton dose. Strain-specific cytokine changes were also found in the frontal cortex, with the Lewis rats displaying increased levels of putative neurotrophic cytokines (e.g., CNTF). These data support the hypothesis that basal dopaminergic function impacts the severity of radiation-induced deficits in sustained attention.

Catherine M Davis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
NASA NTRS2001

Probabilistic Approaches for Evaluating Space Shuttle Risks

The objectives of the Space Shuttle PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) are to: (1) evaluate mission risks; (2) evaluate uncertainties and sensitivities; (3) prioritize contributors; (4) evaluate upgrades; (5) track risks; and (6) provide decision tools. This report discusses the significance of a Space Shuttle PRA and its participants. The elements and type of losses to be included are discussed. The program and probabilistic approaches are then discussed.

William Vesely↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Sensor Test for Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation Development Test Objective

The Sensor Test for Orion Relative-Navigation Risk Mitigation (STORRM) Development Test Objective (DTO) ew aboard the Space Shuttle Endeavour on STS-134, and was designed to characterize the performance of the ash LIDAR being developed for the Orion. This ash LIDAR, called the Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS), will be the primary navigation instrument used by the Orion vehicle during rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking. This paper provides an overview of the STORRM test objectives and the concept of operations. It continues with a description of the STORRM's major hardware compo nents, which include the VNS and the docking camera. Next, an overview of crew and analyst training activities will describe how the STORRM team prepared for flight. Then an overview of how insight data collection and analysis actually went is presented. Key ndings and results from this project are summarized, including a description of "truth" data. Finally, the paper concludes with lessons learned from the STORRM DTO.

Christian, John A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analytical Framework for Rodent/NHP Data Set Utilization to Inform Human CNS Risk Estimation

Objectives Review and inform on tactics to analyze & communicate data from animal research (e.g., rodents, mini-pigs, NHPs, et al) exposed to single and combinations of spaceflight hazards, using NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) process for the Behavioral Medicine Risk - To quantitatively inform Behavioral Medicine Risk posture - i.e., likelihood (L) and consequence (C) - To help inform estimation of crew health standards for operational task performance (i.e., Fitness For Duty, Space Permissible Exposure Levels, Permissible Operational Limits).

Brain↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Sensor Test for Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation (STORRM) Development Test Objective

The Sensor Test for Orion Relative-Navigation Risk Mitigation (STORRM) Development Test Objective (DTO) flew aboard the Space Shuttle Endeavour on STS-134 in May- June 2011, and was designed to characterize the performance of the flash LIDAR and docking camera being developed for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. The flash LIDAR, called the Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS), will be the primary navigation instrument used by the Orion vehicle during rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking. The DC will be used by the Orion crew for piloting cues during docking. This paper provides an overview of the STORRM test objectives and the concept of operations. It continues with a description of STORRM's major hardware components, which include the VNS, docking camera, and supporting avionics. Next, an overview of crew and analyst training activities will describe how the STORRM team prepared for flight. Then an overview of in-flight data collection and analysis is presented. Key findings and results from this project are summarized. Finally, the paper concludes with lessons learned from the STORRM DTO.

Christian, John A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Improving Estimation of Ground Casualty Risk From Reentering Space Objects

A recent improvement to the long-term estimation of ground casualties from reentering space debris is the further refinement and update to the human population distribution. Previous human population distributions were based on global totals with simple scaling factors for future years, or a coarse grid of population counts in a subset of the world's countries, each cell having its own projected growth rate. The newest population model includes a 5-fold refinement in both latitude and longitude resolution. All areas along a single latitude are combined to form a global population distribution as a function of latitude, creating a more accurate population estimation based on non-uniform growth at the country and area levels. Previous risk probability calculations used simplifying assumptions that did not account for the ellipsoidal nature of the Earth. The new method uses first, a simple analytical method to estimate the amount of time spent above each latitude band for a debris object with a given orbit inclination and second, a more complex numerical method that incorporates the effects of a non-spherical Earth. These new results are compared with the prior models to assess the magnitude of the effects on reentry casualty risk.

Ostrom, Chris L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Improving Estimation of Ground Casualty Risk from Reentering Space Objects

A recent improvement to the long-term estimation of ground casualties from reentering space debris is the further refinement and update to the human population distribution. Previous human population distributions were based on global totals with simple scaling factors for future years, or a coarse grid of population counts in a subset of the world's countries, each cell having its own projected growth rate. The newest population model includes a 5-fold refinement in both latitude and longitude resolution. All areas along a single latitude are combined to form a global population distribution as a function of latitude, creating a more accurate population estimation based on non-uniform growth at the country and area levels. Previous risk probability calculations used simplifying assumptions that did not account for the ellipsoidal nature of the earth. The new method uses first, a simple analytical method to estimate the amount of time spent above each latitude band for a debris object with a given orbit inclination, and second, a more complex numerical method that incorporates the effects of a non-spherical Earth. These new results are compared with the prior models to assess the magnitude of the effects on reentry casualty risk.

Ostrom, C.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Constellation Program Flight Test Methodology and Strategy

Main projects elements: a) Orion & Ares b) New & Modified heritage hardware. c) Shuttle retirement in 2010. Methodology: a) Flight test objectives. b) Risk reduction. Strategy a) Mapping Flight Test Objectives. b) Build incremental capability.

Vigil, Art↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the moon and eventually enable a human Mars mission. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the crew health and performance (CHP) research and technology development (R&D) necessary to enable these future missions. These organizations include flight programs as well as other organizations such as the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), Human Research Program, Space Technology Mission Directorate, and System Capability Leadership Teams, each of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for the management of risks and strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA for identifying and prioritizing R&D needs. Alignment and evolution of these strategic planning constructs is ongoing and will allow for alignment and traceability between M2M objectives and R&D investments at a detailed level. While this reorganization is ongoing, and even after it is established, there is a recognized need among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&D priorities in a unified and digestible way that synthesizes the considerations and perspectives of the CHP community across NASA. To achieve this, the HMTA facilitated a series of group discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, which culminated in a product identifying the eight highest priority mission-enabling CHP capabilities for human missions to Mars, referred to as the “Top Human System Capability Needs for Mars”. The list includes Earth-Independent Human Operations; Mars Duration Food System; Mars Duration Effects on Human Physiology; Risks Mitigations for Vehicle Atmospheres; Computational Injury & Anthropometric Models; Exploration Exercise Countermeasures; Individual Variability in Responses to Spaceflight; and Sensorimotor Countermeasures. Existing strategic planning and risk management tools and processes were considered, as well as practicalities of technical, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&D risk mitigations and technology solutions. The product is not owned by any one organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. It is anticipated that this list will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&D progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

Life Support↗