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Cost Risk Analysis Framework (CRAFT): An Integrated Risk Analysis Tool and its Application in an Industry Use Case
This report presents the initial application design of the Cost Risk Analysis Framework Tool (CRAFT). The initial concept was formulated from a need to perform financial risk analysis that can be quickly deployable through the nuclear industry to evaluate the risk associated to capital projects and asset management. The design evolved into a framework that can integrate several forms of risk (e.g., not just financial, but also safety related) into a single analysis. In order to reduce the research and development and deployment time, we have decided to use the Risk Analysis Virtual environment (RAVEN) statistical framework as a basis for the CRAFT architecture.
Application and Interpretation of Acumen Risk ® Schedule and Cost Risk Analysis
Schedule risk and cost risk analyses use statistical techniques to predict a level of confidence in meeting a program’s completion date and cost. This paper describes how to interpret key Schedule Risk Analysis (SRA) and Cost Risk Analysis (CRA) results to determine the likelihood that the program completion dates are met, how much management reserve (MR) is needed to provide the acceptable certainty of completion by a specific date, and the risks and activities that are most likely to delay or add cost to a project. The combined process is often called a Schedule/Cost Uncertainty and Risk Analysis or “SCURA.”
Advancing Risk Analysis for Nanoscale Materials: Report from an International Workshop on the Role of Alternative Testing Strategies for Advancement: Advancing Risk Analysis for Nanoscale Materials
The Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) has a history of bringing thought leadership to topics of emerging risk. In September 2014, the SRA Emerging Nanoscale Materials Specialty Group convened an international workshop to examine the use of alternative testing strategies (ATS) for manufactured nanomaterials (NM) from a risk analysis perspective. Experts in NM environmental health and safety, human health, ecotoxicology, regulatory compliance, risk analysis, and ATS evaluated and discussed the state of the science for in vitro and other alternatives to traditional toxicology testing for NM. Based on this review, experts recommended immediate and near-term actions that would advance ATS use in NM risk assessment. Three focal areas-human health, ecological health, and exposure considerations-shaped deliberations about information needs, priorities, and the next steps required to increase confidence in and use of ATS in NM risk assessment. The deliberations revealed that ATS are now being used for screening, and that, in the near term, ATS could be developed for use in read-across or categorization decision making within certain regulatory frameworks. Participants recognized that leadership is required from within the scientific community to address basic challenges, including standardizing materials, protocols, techniques and reporting, and designing experiments relevant to real-world conditions, as well as coordination and sharing of large-scale collaborations and data. Experts agreed that it will be critical to include experimental parameters that can support the development of adverse outcome pathways. Numerous other insightful ideas for investment in ATS emerged throughout the discussions and are further highlighted in this article.
Risk Analysis for Remote Operation of Microreactors
Microreactors are a subset of advanced nuclear reactors that can be factory fabricated, transportable, and self-regulating. They have the potential to be used in microgrids, rural and remote areas, or emergency response applications, replacing fossil fuel sources like diesel generators and enabling sustainable energy generation. In order to make microreactor operation cost-effective, it is likely that remote communications will be needed to reduce the number of personnel required to be on site. While remote operation of energy generation and other industrial control systems is common in other industries, it is not yet adopted in the nuclear community and has many perceived and actual risks. In this paper, the severity of the risks introduced by remote operations for microreactors are explored. The primary changes in the operations involve the addition of a remote communications network and a certification system for data and controls. These changes lend themselves to considerations of cyber risks, whether unintentional or adversarial, but the assessment considers not just cyber risks introduced, but also how physical and human factors-based risks will impact the remote operations system and change the overall risk profile. This initial assessment indicates that there are standard cyber and mitigation measures that can be put in place so the risk of doing remote operations does not dramatically increase compared to local operations. This evaluation is a critical step in the process of evaluating if remote operations of microreactors is a suitable solution to meet future sustainable grid needs
Peak Pc Prediction in Conjunction Analysis: Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis
Satellite conjunction risk typically evaluated through the probability of collision (Pc). Considers both conjunction geometry and uncertainties in both state estimates. Conjunction events initially discovered through Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) screenings, usually seven days before Time of Closest Approach (TCA). However, JSpOC continues to track objects and issue conjunction updates. Changes in state estimate and reduced propagation time cause Pc to change as event develops. These changes a combination of potentially predictable development and unpredictable changes in state estimate covariance. Operationally useful datum: the peak Pc. If it can reasonably be inferred that the peak Pc value has passed, then risk assessment can be conducted against this peak value. If this value is below remediation level, then event intensity can be relaxed. Can the peak Pc location be reasonably predicted?
CO 2 Accounting and Risk Analysis for CO 2 Sequestration at Enhanced Oil Recovery Sites
Using CO2 in enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR) is a promising technology for emissions management because CO2-EOR can dramatically reduce sequestration costs in the absence of emissions policies that include incentives for carbon capture and storage. This study develops a multiscale statistical framework to perform CO2 accounting and risk analysis in an EOR environment at the Farnsworth Unit (FWU), Texas. A set of geostatistical- based Monte Carlo simulations of CO2-oil/gas-water flow and transport in the Morrow formation are conducted for global sensitivity and statistical analysis of the major risk metrics: CO2/water injection/production rates, cumulative net CO2 storage, cumulative oil/gas productions, and CO2 breakthrough time. The median and confidence intervals are estimated for quantifying uncertainty ranges of the risk metrics. A response-surface-based economic model has been derived to calculate the CO2-EOR profitability for the FWU site with a current oil price, which suggests that approximately 31% of the 1000 realizations can be profitable. If government carbon-tax credits are available, or the oil price goes up or CO2 capture and operating expenses reduce, more realizations would be profitable. The results from this study provide valuable insights for understanding CO2 storage potential and the corresponding environmental and economic risks of commercial-scale CO2- sequestration in depleted reservoirs.
Uncertainty Quantification Methods for Model Calibration Validation and Risk Analysis.
Abstract not provided.
Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.
Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.
The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis
NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.
Potential Chemical Impacts of CO2 Leakage on Underground Source of Drinking Water Assessed by Quantitative Risk Analysis
Many geologic carbon storage site options include not only excellent storage reservoirs bounded by effective seal layers, but also Underground Sources of Drinking Water (USDWs). An effective risk assessment and mitigation plan provides maximum protection for USDWs, to respect not only current policy but also to accommodate likely future USDW-specific regulatory protections. The goal of this study is to quantify possible risks to USDWs, specifically risks associated with chemical impacts on USDWs. Reactive transport models involve tremendous computational expense. Therefore, a secondary purpose of this study is to develop, calibrate and test reduced order models specifically for assessing risks of USDW chemical impacts by CO2 leakage from a storage reservoir. In order to achieve these goals, a geochemical model was developed to interpret changes in water chemistry following CO2 intrusion. A response surface methodology (RSM) based on these geochemical simulations was used to quantify associated risks. The case study example for this analysis is the Ogallala aquifer overlying the Farnsworth unit (FWU), an active commercial-scale CO2-enhanced oil recovery field. Specific objectives of this study include: (1) to understand how CO2 leakage is likely to influence geochemical processes in aquifer sediments; (2) to quantify potential risks to the Ogallala groundwater aquifer due to CO2 leakage from the FWU oil reservoir; and (3) to identify water chemistry factors for early detection criteria. Results indicate that the leakage rate would most likely range between 10-14 – 10-10 kg/(m2·year) for typical and likely leakage pathway permeability ranges. Within this range of CO2 leakage rate, groundwater quality is not likely to be significantly impacted. The worst-case scenario yields trace metal concentrations approximately twice as much as the initial value, but these predicted concentrations are still less than one-fifth of regulation-stipulated maximum contamination levels and do not exceed the no-impact thresholds. Finally, the results of this analysis suggest that pH may be an effective geochemical indicator of CO2 leakage.
Simulation–Extrapolation for Bias Correction with Exposure Uncertainty in Radiation Risk Analysis Utilizing Grouped Data
Summary In observational epidemiological studies, the exposure that is received by an individual often cannot be precisely observed, resulting in measurement error, and a common approach to dealing with measurement error is regression calibration (RC). Use of RC, which requires assumptions about the distribution of unknown error-free (true) variables, leads to concern about the possibility of bias due to misspecification of that distribution. The simulation–extrapolation (SIMEX) method, in contrast, does not require a distributional assumption. However, analyses of large cohorts may be performed by using grouped or person-year data, and application of SIMEX to grouped data is not straightforward, particularly when there is a mixture of classical and Berkson measurement errors. We compared RC and SIMEX with grouped data analyses to assess robustness of the RC method to misspecification of the true dose distribution. We also applied SIMEX assuming mixtures of classical and Berkson errors and compared the results with those obtained by using RC for classical error only. SIMEX had less bias than RC and performed well regardless of the true dose distribution, whereas RC based on a misspecified true dose distribution showed greater bias than when based on the correctly specified true dose distribution.
Performing Numerical Analysis of Cybersecurity Options Using Dynamic Risk Analysis Tool EMRALD
Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Considering a cyber threat should involve defense-in-depth methods and a quantitative or numerical evaluation of overall effectiveness against dynamic, time-dependent attacks to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related safety is a requirement set by North American Electric Reliability and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks may focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want to know business reliability and recovery from those threats, and that requires modeling physical behavior of the targets. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with different tools having issues such as state-base explosion. Dynamic modeling enables time and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic numerical risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies. Keywords: cyber modeling; cyber-physical systems; numerical cyber modeling
The Challenger Tradgedy was Caused by an Apollo Mistake, Terminating Risk Analysis
NASA’s attitude toward risk changed drastically between the Apollo and Space Shuttle design. [1]Apollo engineers were seriously alarmed about riskbecause of the fatal Apollo 1 fire and the fact that the estimated probability of another fatal accident was extremely high. The predictions were so appalling thatmanagement terminated risk analysis to avoid public apprehension. Because risk analysis was not done, the Space Shuttle design accepted excessively high andunknown risk. The immediate cause of the Challengertragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in coldweather that impaired the O-ring seals, but the fundamental cause was the high risk of the shuttle design. Before Challenger, management asserted that the probability of a fatal accident was 1 in 100,000.Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a shuttle failure.
Report on the U.S. DOE Geothermal Technologies Program's 2009 Risk Analysis
NREL conducted an annual program risk analysis on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy Geothermal Technologies Program (GTP). NREL implemented a probabilistic risk analysis of GTP-sponsored research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) work, primarily for enhanced geothermal systems (EGS). The analysis examined estimates of improvement potential derived from program RD&D work for two types of technology performance metric (TPM): EGS-enabling technologies potential and EGS cost improvement potential. Four risk teams (exploration, wells/pumps/tools, reservoir engineering, and power conversion) comprised of industry experts, DOE laboratory researchers, academic researchers, and laboratory subcontractors estimated the RD&D impacts and TPM-improvement probability distributions. The assessment employed a risk analysis spreadsheet add-in that uses Monte Carlo simulation to drive the Geothermal Electric Technology Evaluation Model (GETEM). The GETEM-based risk analysis used baseline data from the experts' discussion of multiple reports and data sources. Risk results are expressed in terms of each metric's units and/or the program's top-level metric: levelized costs of electricity (LCOE). Results--both qualitative comments and quantitative improvement potential--are thorough and cohesive in three of the four expert groups. This conference paper summarizes the industry's current thinking on various metrics and potential for research improvement in geothermal technologies.
Report on the U.S. DOE Geothermal Technologies Program's 2009 Risk Analysis
NREL conducted an annual program risk analysis on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy Geothermal Technologies Program (GTP). NREL implemented a probabilistic risk analysis of GTP-sponsored research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) work, primarily for enhanced geothermal systems (EGS). The analysis examined estimates of improvement potential derived from program RD&D work for two types of technology performance metric (TPM): EGS-enabling technologies potential and EGS cost improvement potential. Four risk teams (exploration, wells/pumps/tools, reservoir engineering, and power conversion) comprised of industry experts, DOE laboratory researchers, academic researchers, and laboratory subcontractors estimated the RD&D impacts and TPM-improvement probability distributions. The assessment employed a risk analysis spreadsheet add-in that uses Monte Carlo simulation to drive the Geothermal Electric Technology Evaluation Model (GETEM). The GETEM-based risk analysis used baseline data from the experts' discussion of multiple reports and data sources. Risk results are expressed in terms of each metric's units and/or the program's top-level metric: levelized costs of electricity (LCOE). Results--both qualitative comments and quantitative improvement potential--are thorough and cohesive in three of the four expert groups. This conference paper summarizes the industry's current thinking on various metrics and potential for research improvement in geothermal technologies.
Consideration of Collision "Consequence" in Satellite Conjunction Assessment and Risk Analysis
Classic risk management theory requires the assessment of both likelihood and consequence of deleterious events. Satellite conjunction risk assessment has produced a highly-developed theory for assessing collision likelihood but holds a completely static solution for collision consequence, treating all potential collisions as essentially equally worrisome. This may be true for the survival of the protected asset, but the amount of debris produced by the potential collision, and therefore the degree to which the orbital corridor may be compromised, can vary greatly among satellite conjunctions. This study leverages present work on satellite collision modeling to develop a method by which it can be estimated, to a particular confidence level, whether a particular collision is likely to produce a relatively large or relatively small amount of resultant debris and how this datum might alter conjunction remediation decisions. The more general question of orbital corridor protection is also addressed, and a preliminary framework presented by which both collision likelihood and consequence can be jointly considered in the risk assessment process.