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Fuel Fabrication Capability Research and Development Plan

The purpose of this document is to provide a comprehensive review of the mission of the Fuel Fabrication Capability (FFC) within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Convert Program, along with research and development (R&D) needs that have been identified as necessary to ensuring mission success. The design and fabrication of successful nuclear fuels must be closely linked endeavors. Therefore, the overriding motivation behind the FFC R&D program described in this plan is to foster closer integration between fuel design and fabrication to reduce programmatic risk. These motivating factors are all interrelated, and progress addressing one will aid understanding of the others. The FFC R&D needs fall into two principal categories, 1) baseline process optimization, to refine the existing fabrication technologies, and 2) manufacturing process alternatives, to evaluate new fabrication technologies that could provide improvements in quality, repeatability, material utilization, or cost. The FFC R&D Plan examines efforts currently under way in regard to coupon, foil, plate, and fuel element manufacturing, and provides recommendations for a number of R&D topics that are of high priority but not currently funded (i.e., knowledge gaps). The plan ties all FFC R&D efforts into a unified vision that supports the overall Convert Program schedule in general, and the fabrication schedule leading up to the MP-1 and FSP-1 irradiation experiments specifically. The fabrication technology decision gates and down-selection logic and schedules are tied to the schedule for fabricating the MP-1 fuel plates, which will provide the necessary data to make a final fuel fabrication process down-selection. Because of the short turnaround between MP-1 and the follow-on FSP-1 and MP-2 experiments, the suite of specimen types that will be available for MP-1 will be the same as those available for FSP-1 and MP-2. Therefore, the only opportunity to explore parameter space and alternative processing is between now and 2016 when the candidate processes are down-selected in preparation for the MP-1, FSP-1, and MP-2 plate manufacturing campaigns. A number of key risks identified by the FFC are discussed in this plan, with recommended mitigating actions for those activities within FFC, and identification of risks that are impacted by activities in other areas of the Convert Program. The R&D Plan does not include discussion of FFC initiatives related to production-scale manufacturing of fuel (e.g., establishment of the Pilot Line Production Facility), rather, the goal of this plan is to document the R&D activities needed ultimately to enable high-quality and cost-effective production of the fuel by the commercial fuel fabricator. The intent is for this R&D Plan to be a living document that will be reviewed and updated on a regular basis (e.g., annually) to ensure that FFC R&D activities remain properly aligned to the needs of the Convert Program. This version of the R&D Plan represents the first annual review and revision.

Convert Program↗

The Future of Robotics/Remote Handling Solutions for the Nuclear Industry - 17347

The nuclear industry is seeing a resurgence of development and utilization of advanced integrated systems; fused sensor arrays; autonomous, remote and hybrid operations; and augmented reality display and control system interfaces. A new age of 'robotics' and remote handling technologies. For many years the use of robotics in nuclear applications has been done sparingly due to technical limitations, perceived and real reliability issues, perceived and real risk concerns, and cost. Although robotics have been used successfully on a variety of projects globally, the underuse of this technology, particularly within the nuclear industry both public and private, is overwhelming. As the number of complex, high hazard projects in the nuclear industry increases, the use of robotics for maintenance, inspection, repair, decommissioning, and remediation activities will become increasingly vital in the future. The risks associated with direct human exposure are high and thus eliminating the risk, or managing it to acceptable levels by using robotics/remote handling as well as other technologies is critical to success as more extreme environment operations and tasks are undertaken. Recent and ongoing advances in technology now allows us to safely and effectively remove the direct / in-situ human element from these type of activities. All the while delivering the same or better outcomes when considering the alternatives when limited or no direct / in-situ human intervention would be allowed. The biggest obstacles the nuclear industry faces center on the cost, reliability, maintainability, effectiveness and appropriate uses of robotics/remote handling solutions in a nuclear (radiation and/or contamination) environment. In order to mitigate these concerns, a sound approach to the use of robotics needs to be addressed. This approach must include: 1. A better understanding of what technology is available and how it can be utilized across multiple sectors, e.g. Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology modified / adapted for the nuclear sector; 2. How to implement technology in an integrated pragmatic approach that is cost effective by combining technological know-how / subject matter expertise (SME) with the equivalent subject matter expertise in regulatory, operational and maintenance requirements and limitations, such that a more complete set of functional and operational requirements can be jointly developed in the process. 3. The integration of requirements (project, site, regulatory, etc.), risk management (human factors) and technology, i.e. a marriage between political, programmatic, and technological factors. As the development of robotic/remote handling technology progresses and the successful implementation on projects is demonstrated, the better off the industry will be. This paper provides an overview of the fundamental issues facing the nuclear industry with regard to effective and successful technology selection, maturation, deployment, and integrated risk management, and offers suggestions on how we may overcome these persistent issues now and in the future. Robotic systems and solution experts that are focused on the integration of proven technologies - and that are an integrated part of the project team from its onset - are a necessity for successful planning during nuclear operations. The approach to nuclear operations should always be, 'what is the simplest, most effective way we can approach a particular project need?'. Understanding and implementing the right technologies is where the true value will be recognized. The integration of systems, which includes more than just robotics, is key when developing schemes for these types of complex operations. Often times during planning, the remote handling needs of the job are set aside to be evaluated at a later time due to risk concerns and lack of knowledge. The issue is, experts in the area of robotics or remote handling are rarely involved in the upfront planning. As a result, unnecessary constraints, risks, and obstacles are imposed on project teams to deliver. If done intelligently, this should be introduced at the forefront of planning. Using this type of sound approach leads to effective task organization for the end user. By developing an overall philosophy that leverages proven technologies with implementation expertise; i.e. solutions versus products, is a recipe for success. This is the area that is under-appreciated in the industry and one that needs to be recognized on a much broader scale. (authors)

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Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗

CloudZero Phase 2 Technical Report

Expand upon the successful Phase 1 net zero cloud test proof of concept by moving actual OT systems to the cloud and proving cloud feasibility to support various OT technologies such as IoT, Machine Learning, etc. Explore threat analysis when these technologies are moved to the cloud. A detailed analysis in NREL ARIES Cyber Range will be used to conduct deeper analysis of cloud suitability to support OT and net zero system operations in a higher fidelity representative environment. Outputs will identify, quantify, and document the results and cyber security risks associated with the move of these OT technologies in a formal delivered report. Programmatic Benefits: Identify cloud integration challenges for energy systems characterize the cloud threat space, contribute to policy and standards discussions, empower the sector to change their cloud culture where appropriate.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

IMPLEMENTING CYBERSECURITY INTO AN EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMME – A CASE STUDY

Cyber threat profiling and risk mitigation is critical to any nuclear state organization and should be considered as part of any comprehensive nuclear security programme. Defining and evaluating the impact of the cyber threat to mission can be challenging. An existing national nuclear non-proliferation organization undertook an effort to incorporate computer security activities into its programme to address cyber risk. One of the primary goals of this endeavour was to develop a set of prioritised recommendations for organizational follow-through. The organization dedicated subject matter expert resources in the form of a cyber task force to support this goal. Opportunities were identified where computer security could be built into each programme including office-level strategies and tools. Of course, no new identified threat vector is easily considered and incorporated into existing programmes without impact. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Technically literate subject matter experts are difficult to find, management has comparatively less experience applying computer security into its programmes, and trying to change the culture to consider computer security risk at policy and programmatic levels takes time and management attention. As an outcome of this process, a roadmap for program integration was developed, including the establishment of a cyber support team. This paper will discuss the challenges and successes associated with establishing such a team.

Cyber Security, Nuclear, Non-proliferation↗

Taking Risk Assessment and Management to the Next Level: Program-Level Risk Analysis to Enable Solid Decision-Making on Priorities and Funding

A multi-level (facility and programmatic) risk assessment was conducted for the facilities in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Program and results were included in a new Risk Management Plan (RMP), which was incorporated into the fiscal year (FY) 2010 Integrated Plans. Risks, risk events, probability, consequence(s), and mitigation strategies were identified and captured, for most scope areas (i.e., risk categories) during the facilitated risk workshops. Risk mitigations (i.e., efforts in addition to existing controls) were identified during the facilitated risk workshops when the risk event was identified. Risk mitigation strategies fell into two broad categories: threats or opportunities. Improvement projects were identified and linked to specific risks they mitigate, making the connection of risk reduction through investments for the annual Site Execution Plan. Due to the amount of that was collected, analysis to be performed, and reports to be generated, a Risk Assessment/ Management Tool (RAMtool) database was developed to analyze the risks in real-time, at multiple levels, which reinforced the site-level risk management process and procedures. The RAMtool database was developed and designed to assist in the capturing and analysis of the key elements of risk: probability, consequence, and impact. The RAMtool calculates the facility-level and programmatic-level risk factors to enable a side-by-side comparison to see where the facility manager and program manager should focus their risk reduction efforts and funding. This enables them to make solid decisions on priorities and funding to maximize the risk reduction. A more active risk management process was developed where risks and opportunities are actively managed, monitored, and controlled by each facility more aggressively and frequently. risk owners have the responsibility and accountability to manage their assigned risk in real-time, using the RAMtool database.

Nelson, J. G.↗

Prioritization Risk Integration Simulation Model (PRISM) For Environmental Remediation and Waste Management - 12097

The PRISM (Prioritization Risk Integration Simulation Model), a computer model was developed to support the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) in its mission to clean up the environmental legacy from the Nation's nuclear weapons materials production complex. PRISM provides a comprehensive, fully integrated planning tool that can tie together DOE-EM's projects. It is designed to help DOE managers develop sound, risk-informed business practices and defend program decisions. It provides a better ability to understand and manage programmatic risks. The underlying concept for PRISM is that DOE-EM 'owns' a portfolio of environmental legacy obligations (ELOs), and that its mission is to transform the ELOs from their current conditions to acceptable conditions, in the most effective way possible. There are many types of ELOs - - contaminated soils and groundwater plumes, disused facilities awaiting D and D, and various types of wastes waiting for processing or disposal. For a given suite of planned activities, PRISM simulates the outcomes as they play out over time, allowing for all key identified uncertainties and risk factors. Each contaminated building, land area and waste stream is tracked from cradle to grave, and all of the linkages affecting different waste streams are captured. The progression of the activities is fully dynamic, reflecting DOE-EM's prioritization approaches, precedence requirements, available funding, and the consequences of risks and uncertainties. The top level of PRISM is the end-user interface that allows rapid evaluation of alternative scenarios and viewing the results in a variety of useful ways. PRISM is a fully probabilistic model, allowing the user to specify uncertainties in input data (such as the magnitude of an existing groundwater plume, or the total cost to complete a planned activity) as well as specific risk events that might occur. PRISM is based on the GoldSim software that is widely used for risk and performance assessment calculations. PRISM can be run in a deterministic mode, which quickly provides an estimate of the most likely results of a given plan. Alternatively, the model can be run probabilistically in a Monte Carlo mode, exploring the risks and uncertainties in the system and producing probability distributions for the different performance measures. The PRISM model demonstrates how EM can evaluate a portfolio of ELOs, and transform the ELOs from their current conditions to acceptable conditions, utilizing different strategic approaches. There are many types of ELOs - contaminated soils and groundwater plumes, disused facilities awaiting D and D, and various types of wastes waiting for processing or disposal. This scope of work for the PRISM process and the development of a dynamic simulation model are a logical extension of the GoldSim simulation software used by the OCRWM to assess the long-term performance for the Yucca Mountain Project and by NNSA to assess project risk at its sites. Systems integration modeling will promote better understanding of all project risks, technical and nontechnical, and more defensible decision-making for complex projects with significant uncertainties. It can provide effective visual communication and rapid adaptation during interactions with stakeholders (Administration, Congress, State, Local, and NGO). It will also allow rapid assessment of alternative management approaches. (authors)

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Technetium Management Program Plan - 17376

Technetium management is a high-priority activity for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) complex. Waste management and remediation issues involving technetium represent environmental risks and challenges that are unique to DOE. This plan lays out the technology development activities that are underway as well as future technology needs to address technetium issues across DOE EM sites and across programmatic areas of tank waste, groundwater and soils, and facility decommissioning and deactivation in order to be comprehensive and to allow integration of similar activities. The program was developed in close coordination with site representatives and program offices. Activities and needs that were identified share common themes and were grouped into areas of characterization, treatment, and disposition. Characterization includes understanding the inventory at particular locations, the chemical species, and chemical and physical behavior, whether in a treatment process flowsheet or a geological setting that displays periodic contaminant releases. The tools for characterization in these different environments might use the same sensors or protocols. Treatment options include methods to capture technetium such as ion-exchange or manipulation of oxidation states, which also may be applied across program areas. Disposition includes end-points of the processes and environmental risk, including waste form behavior, mobility of technetium once it is treated or remediated, and long-term monitoring. Disposition represents integration of all cleanup actions at a site. (authors)

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Integrating regulatory, programmatic and technical needs for modeling tools to support decision-making - 15219

The U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM), Office of Soil and Groundwater Remediation, is supporting development of the Advanced Simulation Capability for Environmental Management (ASCEM). ASCEM provides a modeling work-flow to support decision-making for site restoration, tank closure and waste management activities. Potential users involved in regulatory applications (e.g., performance and risk assessments and other activities supporting regulatory decisions) are a key target group for the tool-set. Decision-making in these applications often requires consideration of multiple perspectives, including: regulators and the public, oversight and project management personnel, as well as practitioners involved in conducting the calculations, each with different interests. From its inception, a key objective of the ASCEM project has been to actively seek input from these different user perspectives to help guide development. ASCEM formed a User Steering Committee (USC) with membership representing interests from management/staff at DOE Site Contractors, DOE-HQ and Field offices and Regulators (State and Federal). The project also provides opportunities for input from the broader user community through participation in meetings of the Performance and Risk Assessment (P and RA) Community of Practice (CoP), routine briefings and participation in meetings of the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group, and direct interactions with users involved in regulatory applications. Interactions with users involved in regulatory applications have influenced the requirements for the tool-sets and are reflected in capabilities that have been and are being implemented. (authors)

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Dexterity test data contribute to reduction in leaded glovebox gloves use

Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (T A-55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through the use of a variety of gloveboxes. Using an integrated approach, controls have been developed and implemented through an efficient Glovebox Glove Integrity Program. A key element of this program is to consider measures that lower the overall risk of glovebox operations. Line management who own glovebox processes through this program make decisions on which type of glovebox gloves (hereafter referred to as gloves), the weakest component of this safety-significant system, would perform best in these aggressive environments. As Low as Reasonably Achievable considerations must be balanced with glove durability and worker dexterity, both of which affect the final overall risk of the operation. In the past, lead-loaded (leaded) gloves made from Hypalon(reg.) were the primary glove for programmatic operations at TA55. Replacing leaded gloves with unleaded gloves for certain operations would lower the overall risk as well as reduce the amount of mixed transuranic waste. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos National Laboratory Continuous Improvement Program by improving the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and formality of glovebox operations. In this report, the pros and cons of wearing leaded gloves, the effect of leaded gloves versus unleaded gloves on task performance using standard dexterity tests, the justification for switching from leaded to unleaded gloves, and the pollution prevention benefits of this dramatic change in the glovebox system are presented.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Risk Assessment/Management Tool

RAMTool performs the following: • A tool to perform facility and programmatic risk assessments, produce risk registers, develop risk management plans (RMPs), link risks to improvement/risk-reduction projects, and actively manage risks • Ability to conduct risk assessments. Ease of determination of probability and consequence based on industry standard risk matrices. Complies with site risk management performance document. Provides multiple outputs/report for required risk forms. Conduct quick risk data analysis. • Performs/calculates a facility risk factor (RF) and a programmatic RF. Supports project and initiative prioritization and funding in order to make solid decisions on risk reduction. Assigns responsibility and accountability at a risk owner (RO) level. Monitors and tracks progress toward completing mitigation strategies. Ability to import massive amounts of data at the push of a button. Integrates development of a Risk Management Plan (RMP) Built for ease-of-use – design, built, and used by technical/management personnel. Can be customized (functions and/or reports) for further analysis

Carlos Castillo, Jerel Nelson↗

Pursuing Cost Effective Tank Waste Characterization at the Savannah River Site - 16172

The U. S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management has tasked the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) with developing strategies and technologies to understand, optimize, scale, and speed up tank waste characterization. This scope is part of a multi-year project with the end goal of implementing programmatic changes that accelerate tank waste processing and tank closure schedules, and at the same time reduce characterization costs, while maintaining data integrity. The project is currently in its second year. During the first year of the project, SRNL completed a series of activities focused on understanding the range of current characterization practices, needs, gaps, risks, and potential alternative approaches. Based on the results, conclusions were drawn regarding aspects of the programs that are most costly and time consuming; particular waste constituents that drive costs, schedule, and program risks; alternative characterization approaches (other than sampling and analysis) that are less expensive and more rapid; new laboratory methods holding the greatest promise for reducing characterization costs and schedule; and in whole, the primary areas where current characterization practices can be improved. SRNL's current scope is focusing on three primary activities: 1) development of a technical basis/strategy for improving the cost effectiveness and schedule of SRNL's tank closure characterization program; 2) design/assembly of hardware, plumbing, and software for automating select radiochemical separation and waste removal processes; and 3) development and testing of alternative radiochemical separation protocols most likely to improve high resource demand/time consuming analysis methods (such as Ra-226, Pa-231, Tc-99/I-129, and/or Y/trivalent actinide separations). (authors)

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Emerging contaminants: Presentations at the 2009 Toxicology and Risk Assessment Conference

A session entitled 'Emerging Contaminants' was held in April 2009 in Cincinnati, OH at the 2009 Toxicology and Risk Assessment Conference. The purpose of the session was to share information on both programmatic and technical aspects associated with emerging contaminants. Emerging contaminants are chemicals or materials that are characterized by a perceived or real threat to human health or environment, a lack of published health standards or an evolving standard. A contaminant may also be 'emerging' because of the discovery of a new source, a new pathway to humans, or a new detection method or technology. The session included five speakers representing the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and each of the military services. The DoD created the Emerging Contaminant Directorate to proactively address environmental, health, and safety concerns associated with emerging contaminants. This session described the scan-watch-action list process, impact assessment methodology, and integrated risk management concept that DoD has implemented to manage emerging contaminants. EPA presented emerging trends in health risk assessment. Researchers made technical presentations on the status of some emerging contaminates in the assessment process (i.e. manganese, RDX, and naphthalene).

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

FutureGen 2.0 Oxy-combustion Large Scale Test – Final Report

The primary objectives of the FutureGen 2.0 CO 2 Oxy-Combustion Large Scale Test Project were to site, permit, design, construct, and commission, an oxy-combustion boiler, gas quality control system, air separation unit, and CO 2 compression and purification unit, together with the necessary supporting and interconnection utilities. The project was to demonstrate at commercial scale (168MWe gross) the capability to cleanly produce electricity through coal combustion at a retrofitted, existing coal-fired power plant; thereby, resulting in near-zeroemissions of all commonly regulated air emissions, as well as 90% CO 2 capture in steady-state operations. The project was to be fully integrated in terms of project management, capacity, capabilities, technical scope, cost, and schedule with the companion FutureGen 2.0 CO 2 Pipeline and Storage Project, a separate but complementary project whose objective was to safely transport, permanently store and monitor the CO 2 captured by the Oxy-combustion Power Plant Project. The FutureGen 2.0 Oxy-Combustion Large Scale Test Project successfully achieved all technical objectives inclusive of front-end-engineering and design, and advanced design required to accurately estimate and contract for the construction, commissioning, and start-up of a commercial-scale "ready to build" power plant using oxy-combustion technology, including full integration with the companion CO 2 Pipeline and Storage project. Ultimately the project did not proceed to construction due to insufficient time to complete necessary EPC contract negotiations and commercial financing prior to expiration of federal co-funding, which triggered a DOE decision to closeout its participation in the project. Through the work that was completed, valuable technical, commercial, and programmatic lessons were learned. This project has significantly advanced the development of near-zero emission technology and will be helpful to plotting the course of, and successfully executing future large demonstration projects. This Final Scientific and Technical Report describes the technology and engineering basis of the project, inclusive of process systems, performance, effluents and emissions, and controls. Further, the project cost estimate, schedule, and permitting requirements are presented, along with a project risk and opportunity assessment. Lessons-learned related to these elements are summarized in this report. Companion reports Oxy-combustion further document the accomplishments and learnings of the project, including: A.01 Project Management Report which describes what was done to coordinate the various participants, and to track their performance with regard to schedule and budget B.02 Lessons Learned - Technology Integration, Value Improvements, and Program Management, which describes the innovations and conclusions that we arrived upon during the development of the project, and makes recommendations for improvement of future projects of a similar nature . B.03 Project Economics, which details the capital and operation costs and their basis, and also illustrates the cost of power produced by the plant with certain sensitivities. B.04 Power Plant, Pipeline, and Injection Site Interfaces, which details the interfaces between the two FutureGen projects B.05 Contractual Mechanisms for Design, Construction, and Operation, which describes the major EPC, and Operations Contracts required to execute the project.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Systems Engineering Project - Tritium

The purpose of this project is to apply a systems engineering method to a programmatic improvement or implementation of a system found within the Weapons and Complex Integration (WCI) Nuclear Materials Technology Program (NMTP) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). This project identifies an opportunity for improvement of the Tritium Processing Station (TPS) based on key stakeholder requirements. This document will cover the generation of the selected concept, system operational context and use cases, the production of verifiable engineering requirements, functional decomposition, and an assessment of risk via a failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Readiness Evaluation for Sustained Operations

Readiness evaluation for sustained operations is a continuous function that progresses from overseeing establishment of five key programmatic elements during design and construction phases to monitoring the output of those elements performing during commissioning and operations. Continuously assessing readiness for sustained operations becomes an important business function for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of River Protection as competition for federal funds increases with increasing waste treatment operations throughout the Office of Environmental Management complex. The five key programmatic elements are as follows: Risk management – Risks and opportunities should prioritize continuous improvement initiatives and be informed by the design and technical authorities and stakeholder monitors. Continuous improvement – All levels of the project organization should exhibit commitment to continuous improvement and learning. Continuity of design and technical authorities – The authorities are responsible for managing knowledge for its effective use in the other elements. Stakeholder monitoring – Active and deliberate monitoring of stakeholder relationships. Sustained operations integrated business planning – Integrated business planning in a federal environment competitive for congressional funding.

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Transition and Transfer of Remediated Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

The US Department of Energy (DOE) expects to receive the transfer of 10 FUSRAP Sites from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is highly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. When remediation for each site is complete and the 2-year operations and maintenance period has concluded, each site will transfer from USACE to DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS&M). US DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (LM) will accept program responsibility for these sites and conduct LTS&M activities required to maintain protectiveness, preserve site-specific knowledge, and retain the cleanup and stewardship records while keeping stakeholders informed. Since the last FUSRAP site transfer occurred in 2007, LM in coordination with USACE intends to establish a transition process to promote the seamless transfer of sites from the time when the first record of decision is signed to the completion of FUSRAP activities. The approach to transfer active FUSRAP sites to completed sites status has been historically outlined in foundational documents such as the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding and supporting letters of agreement between the two agencies. As more complex FUSRAP sites are completed, this transition process will provide a model between the two agencies to communicate future long-term care liabilities. Ultimately, the FUSRAP transition process is structured to acquire and preserve site knowledge and information necessary for protecting the environment and public health. As of 2015, LM has transitioned and accepted programmatic responsibility for over 90 sites. From LM’s perspective, successful transition of any site includes understanding the long-term environmental liabilities. LM uses site transition framework requirements from past transitions to develop site-specific transition plans. Site-specific transition plans are developed by LM in coordination with USACE and executed during the 2-year operations and maintenance period. An integrated project team of subject matter experts is assembled to address the conditions of the transitioning site; acquire a site records collection; evaluate site operations and final site conditions and associated risks; identify and contact stakeholders; and document the basis for site LTS&M requirements. While the majority of the transition activities are completed by LM, close coordination between US DOE LM and USACE throughout this process is essential for an effective and seamless transfer to assure that there is no lapse in site protectiveness.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Transition and Transfer of Remediated FUSRAP Sites from USACE to US DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance - 16209

The US Department of Energy (DOE) expects to receive the transfer of 10 FUSRAP Sites from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) over the next 10 years; however, the timing of the transfers is highly dependent upon federal funding of the ongoing remedial actions. When remediation for each site is complete and the 2-year operations and maintenance period has concluded, each site will transfer from USACE to DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). US DOE's Office of Legacy Management (LM) will accept program responsibility for these sites and conduct LTS and M activities required to maintain protectiveness, preserve site-specific knowledge, and retain the cleanup and stewardship records while keeping stakeholders informed. Since the last FUSRAP site transfer occurred in 2007, LM in coordination with USACE intends to establish a transition process to promote the seamless transfer of sites from the time when the first record of decision is signed to the completion of FUSRAP activities. The approach to transfer active FUSRAP sites to completed sites status has been historically outlined in foundational documents such as the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding and supporting letters of agreement between the two agencies. As more complex FUSRAP sites are completed, this transition process will provide a model between the two agencies to communicate future long-term care liabilities. Ultimately, the FUSRAP transition process is structured to acquire and preserve site knowledge and information necessary for protecting the environment and public health. As of 2015, LM has transitioned and accepted programmatic responsibility for over 90 sites. From LM's perspective, successful transition of any site includes understanding the long-term environmental liabilities. LM uses site transition framework requirements from past transitions to develop site-specific transition plans. Site-specific transition plans are developed by LM in coordination with USACE and executed during the 2-year operations and maintenance period. An integrated project team of subject matter experts is assembled to address the conditions of the transitioning site; acquire a site records collection; evaluate site operations and final site conditions and associated risks; identify and contact stakeholders; and document the basis for site LTS and M requirements. While the majority of the transition activities are completed by LM, close coordination between US DOE LM and USACE throughout this process is essential for an effective and seamless transfer to assure that there is no lapse in site protectiveness. (authors)

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