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DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Review and Summary of Corrosion Behavior for Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage

A description of the corrosion behavior of aluminum alloys used for cladding on aluminum-based, aluminum-clad nuclear fuel used in research reactors under potential dry storage conditions has been compiled. An evaluation is made of potential additional corrosion with water postulated to not be removed during drying. The relative humidity (RH) produced by typical dryness criteria for industrial spent nuclear fuel drying is expected to be low, particularly at high temperatures (17% RH at 20°C and lower at higher temperatures). Existing corrosion data suggests that negligible vapor-phase corrosion of aluminum is expected at such low humidity, even for nominally bare aluminum surfaces. That is, the predicted relative humidity from free water (e.g., 17% RH) is below the “critical” relative humidity (~40% RH at room temperature), below which no significant corrosion is observed for bare aluminum. Furthermore, reported room-temperature corrosion rates are very low even under saturated (100% RH) water vapor. Existing results showing significant vapor-phase corrosion corresponded specifically to conditions of high temper ed with high relative humidity. A relatively large reservoir of (chemically bound) water exists in the aluminum (oxy)hydroxide films on the SNF cladding surface. The estimated total could saturate the gas even at relatively high temperature if fully released; however, its release as molecular water is expected to only be plausible if the temperature during storage exceeds both the drying temperature and the threshold for thermal decomposition of the trihydroxides (~220°C). Therefore, the combination of high temperature and high relative humidity that could drive significant corrosion is considered implausible during sealed dry storage following an appropriate drying process, to include >220°C drying for canisters that may approach or exceed this temperature during storage. Vapor-phase testing of aluminum samples with an adherent (oxy)hydroxide layer, prepared in liquid water to resemble those on actual aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF), did not observe evidence of additional corrosion even at combined high-temperature (up to 180°C) and high-humidity (up to 100% RH) conditions. Instead, small net mass losses were observed for most specimens and attributed to dehydration of the samples, which had been air-dried only prior to testing. ASNF being moved to dry storage is expected to have an existing (oxy)hydroxide film, suggesting that the cladding will be less prone to additional corrosion than bare aluminum metal. If significant corrosion did occur during sealed storage, the overall extent and impact is expected to be small. Corrosion post-closure of a canister would not alter the total amount of hydrogen in the canister, so it would have no effect on the maximum H 2 release already assessed in existing bounding calculations. In addition, the total amount of water in a 25-µm dense bayerite film would consume a only ~8 µm additional aluminum metal on average, if fully consumed by oxidizing aluminum metal to Al 2 O 3 . These conclusions are consistent with ASNF-in-canister simulations to date, which included a reaction pathway for corrosion using kinetics from previous literature and believed to be conservative and predicted very low rates of corrosion.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗