Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “plant shutdowns”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Used Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Components for Shutdown Plants to Expedite Defueling of Spent Fuel Pool - 18378

For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the Used Nuclear Fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. One of the major expenses for a decommissioned plant is the cost of maintenance of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the ability of the dry storage system to store short cooled fuel is an important aspect of dry storage system for shutdown plants. When a shutdown plant evaluates the dry storage options, total cost of the transferring the fuel from the pool to ISFSI site needs to be evaluated. One of the major costs to the utility for dry storage is the cost of ISFSI pad (basemat) along with the cost of dry storage system hardware. Smaller ISFSI footprint saves utility for the cost of ISFSI site excavation, cost of engineered backfill and cost of ISFSI pad. In order to minimize the cost of dry storage systems, besides the size of the ISFSI pad as described above, other important considerations is to use high capacity systems. The highest capacity systems available in the dry storage market today are with 37 PWR or 89 BWR used fuel assemblies per canister. These dry storage systems are expected to be at the plant sites for extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the dry storage systems canisters and storage overpack so that they can safely protect the fuel and integrity of used nuclear fuel is maintained during storage period is of utmost importance. Robust Aging Management Program is an important aspect for dry storage systems not only at the shutdown plants but also at the operating plants. This paper will provide the update of a reduced footprint version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM and NUHOMS{sup R} EOS Canisters that addresses the need for maximizing safety, ISFSI capacity while optimizing cost. It will provide an update on the current capabilities, design features and current status of the licensing and deployment of NUHOMS{sup R} EOS System. It will provide the current status of the MATRIX HSM along with the significant enhancement included for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. It will also describe the construction sequence; loading operations, and inspections during extended storage as a part of aging management program. The compact version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all different designs dry storage canisters available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for optimized dry storage systems, compact ISFSIs and prudent aging management programs, this new evolution of the TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} system with MATRIX HSM and EOS Canisters offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2014

Electricity-market price and nuclear power plant shutdown: Evidence from California

Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster, triggered by the March 11, 2011 earthquake, has led to calls for shutting down existing nuclear plants. To maintain resource adequacy for a grid's reliable operation, one option is to expand conventional generation, whose marginal unit is typically fueled by natural-gas. Two timely and relevant questions thus arise for a deregulated wholesale electricity market: (1) what is the likely price increase due to a nuclear plant shutdown? and (2) what can be done to mitigate the price increase? To answer these questions, we perform a regression analysis of a large sample of hourly real-time electricity-market price data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) for the 33-month sample period of April 2010-December 2012. Our analysis indicates that the 2013 shutdown of the state's San Onofre plant raised the CAISO real-time hourly market prices by $6/MWH to $9/MWH, and that the price increases could have been offset by a combination of demand reduction, increasing solar generation, and increasing wind generation.

Electricity market↗
DOE OSTI2025

A knowledge-informed large language model framework for U.S. nuclear power plant shutdown initiating event classification for probabilistic risk assessment

Identifying and classifying shutdown initiating events (SDIEs) is critical for developing shutdown probabilistic risk assessment for nuclear power plants. Existing computational approaches cannot achieve satisfactory performance due to the challenges of unavailable large, labeled datasets, imbalanced event types, and label noise. To address these challenges, we propose a hybrid pipeline that integrates a knowledge-informed machine learning model to prescreen non-SDIEs and a large language model (LLM) to classify SDIEs into four types. In the prescreening stage, we proposed a set of 44 SDIE text patterns that consist of the most salient keywords and phrases from six SDIE types. Text vectorization based on the SDIE patterns generates feature vectors that are highly separable by using a simple binary classifier. The second stage builds Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT)-based LLM, which learns generic English language representations from self-supervised pretraining on a large dataset and adapts to SDIE classification by fine-tuning it on an SDIE dataset. The proposed approaches are evaluated on a dataset with 10,928 events using precision, recall ratio, F 1 score, and average accuracy. In conclusion, the results demonstrate that the prescreening stage can exclude more than 97% non-SDIEs, and the LLM achieves an average accuracy of 95.1% for SDIE classification.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

To Decommission or Not To Decommission? That is the Question... Revisited

Major Highlights Comparing 1998 to 2014: Favoring Plant Shutdown: Electric utility deregulation has created greater competition; Markets have been disrupted by cheap natural gas; Despite high availability, cost of electric power from natural gas still below break-even cost of nuclear generation; Emerging ISO acceptance of fluctuating renewable energy on the grid. Favoring DECON: D and D technologies have matured; Reactor Vessel and Internals segmentation methods still being refined; Nuclear workforce is 16 years older and leaving the nuclear industry (Impact on D and D TBD); Avoiding risk of more restrictive regulation and higher LLW disposal costs. Favoring SAFSTOR: Full funding of NDT still major driver for deferring immediate dismantlement. SAFSTOR vs. near term D and D influenced by: Status of and confidence in decommissioning fund (NDT) and cost estimate; Local and state politics; Public pressure. Most early shutdown plants tend to have under-funded decommissioning funds and opt for SAFSTOR. SAFSTOR allows for fund growth through interest compounding, but must assume that cost increase is less than fund growth: May not be true across the board, Much uncertainty/risk in waste disposal costs, regulatory requirements, etc. when projected out several decades. Once initiated SAFSTOR decision is not easily changed to DECON: Plant infrastructure equipment and components not readily available, RCS chemical decontamination can be very challenging, Key/knowledgeable plant personnel are gone. Consideration for phased approach to DECON: Remove >95% of the radiological source term under today's known regulations and cost by full System Decontamination of the primary circuit systems, and removal of NSSS and decontamination of the Containment Building; Improves risk profile in those areas most vulnerable to excessive cost growth; Able to defer D and D of the remainder of the plant to allow for the NDT to grow with interest.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Effect of input parameters intensity and duration on dynamic performance of MED-TVC plant

Multi-Effect-Desalination (MED) may be exposed to fluctuations (disturbances) in input parameters during operation. Therefore, there is a requirement to analyze the transient behavior of such MED systems. In this work, a dynamic model is developed and used to examine the effect of abrupt and ramp changes in the main operational parameters on the plant behavior and performance. The results show that the disturbance intensity variation has a major role in the desalination plant behavior. For the current MED-TVC configuration, it is recommended to limit the reduction in the seawater cooling flow rate to under 12% of the designed steady-state value to avoid dry out in the evaporators. Here, a reduction in the motive steam flow rate and cooling seawater temperature of more than 20% and 35% of the nominal operating values, respectively, may lead to flooding in the evaporators and a complete plant shutdown. On the other hand, the disturbance period has a minimal effect on plant performance if it avoids the critical values of the disturbance intensity that can cause plant shutdown. Simultaneous combinations of two different disturbances with opposing effects result in a modest effect on the plant operation and they can be used to control and mitigate the flooding/drying effects of the disturbances. For simultaneous combinations of disturbances with similar effect, the plant needs an accurate control system to avoid an operational shutdown.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1999

10 000-hr Cyclic Oxidation Behavior of 68 High-Temperature Co-, Fe-, and Ni- Base Alloys Evaluated at 982 deg. C (1800 deg. F)

Power systems with operating temperatures in the range of 815 to 982 C (1500 to 1800 F) frequently require alloys that can operate for long times at these temperatures. A critical requirement is that these alloys have adequate oxidation resistance. The alloys used in these power systems require thousands of hours of operating life with intermittent shutdown to room temperature. Intermittent power plant shutdowns, however, offer the possibility that the protective scale will tend to spall (i.e., crack and flake off) upon cooling, increasing the rate of oxidative attack in subsequent heating cycles. Thus, it is critical that candidate alloys be evaluated for cyclic oxidation behavior. It was determined that exposing test alloys to ten 1000-hr cycles in static air at 982 10 000-hr Cyclic Oxidation Behavior of 68 High-Temperature Co-, Fe-, and Ni-Base Alloys Evaluated at 982 C (1800 F) could give a reasonable simulation of long-time power plant operation. Iron- (Fe-), nickel- (Ni-), and cobalt- (Co-) based high-temperature alloys with sufficient chromium (Cr) and/or aluminum (Al) content can exhibit excellent oxidation resistance. The protective oxides formed by these classes of alloys are typically Cr2O3 and/or Al2O3, and are usually influenced by their Cr, or Cr and Al, content. Sixty-eight Co-, Fe-, and Ni-base high-temperature alloys, typical of those used at this temperature or higher, were used in this study. At the NASA Lewis Research Center, the alloys were tested and compared on the basis of their weight change as a function of time, x-ray diffraction of the protective scale composition, and the physical appearance of the exposed samples. Although final appearance and x-ray diffraction of the final scale products were two factors used to evaluate the oxidation resistance of each alloy, the main criterion was the oxidation kinetics inferred from the specific weight change versus time data. These data indicated a range of oxidation behavior including parabolic (typical of isothermal oxidation), paralinear, linear, and mixed-linear kinetics.

Barrett, Charles A.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Analysis and improvement of input channel selection algorithm for reliability of control systems in nuclear power plants - 138

In most of non-safety NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) control systems, a process input is composed of two channels for redundancy. In a normal situation, the average of both input channels is used in the control algorithm. If a failed channel is detected, the 'channel selection algorithm' chooses the remaining normal input channel. For a bumpless transition, many implemented control systems include the 'ramping rate' function, which makes it possible for the selected input to slowly approach the new input channel. However, it recently turned out that this function adopted for positive effects may result in unintended consequences for the related control system and the plant in certain cases. Due to a process transient in the plant according to a significant event, any related sensor input signal can rapidly change and finally exceed the pre-defined range for detecting an out-of-range event in a short time. During the process of channel conversion due to a rapid transient in the plant, the processed input from the redundant channels can be distorted if the ramping rate function is not properly implemented. As a result, it can result in a plant shutdown because the control system fails to perform the critical function to mitigate a plant transient. To solve these potential problems, we analyzed the overall causes and derived a proposed algorithm for improving reliability and performance of the control systems. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Mitigation of Syngas Cooler Plugging and Fouling

This Final Report summarizes research performed to develop a technology to mitigate the plugging and fouling that occurs in the syngas cooler used in many Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plants. The syngas cooler is a firetube heat exchanger located downstream of the gasifier. It offers high thermal efficiency, but its’ reliability has generally been lower than other process equipment in the gasification island. The buildup of ash deposits that form on the fireside surfaces in the syngas cooler (i.e., fouling) lead to reduced equipment life and increased maintenance costs. Our approach to address this problem is that fouling of the syngas cooler cannot be eliminated, but it can be better managed. The research program was funded by DOE using two budget periods: Budget Period 1 (BP1) and Budget Period 2 (BP2). The project used a combination of laboratory scale experiments, analysis of syngas cooler deposits, modeling and guidance from industry to develop a better understanding of fouling mechanisms and to develop and evaluate strategies to mitigate syngas cooler fouling and thereby improve syngas cooler performance. The work effort in BP 1 and BP 2 focused on developing a better understanding of the mechanisms that lead to syngas cooler plugging and fouling and investigating promising concepts to mitigate syngas cooler plugging and fouling. The work effort focused on the following: • analysis of syngas cooler deposits and fuels provided by an IGCC plant collaborating with this project; • performing Jet cleaning tests in the University of Utah Laminar Entrained Flow Reactor to determine the bond strength between an ash deposit to a metal plate, as well as implementing planned equipment modifications to the University of Utah Laminar Entrained Flow Reactor and the one ton per day, pressurized Pilot Scale Gasifier; • performing Computational Fluid Dynamic modeling of industrially relevant syngas cooler configurations to develop a better understanding of deposit formation mechanisms; • performing Techno-Economic-Analysis for a representative IGCC plant to investigate the impact on plant economics, in particular the impacts on the Cost of Electricity (COE), due to plant shutdowns caused by syngas cooler plugging and fouling and potential benefits to plant economics of developing strategies to mitigate syngas cooler fouling; and • performing modeling and pilot scale tests to investigate the potential benefits of using a sorbent (fuel additive) to capture the vaporized metals that result in syngas cooler fouling. All project milestones for BP 1 and BP 2 were achieved. DOE was provided a briefing on our accomplishments in BP1 and BP2 and our proposed plans for Budget Period 3 (BP 3). Based on our research the mitigation technology selected to investigate in BP 3 was the use of a sorbent that can be injected into the gasifier with the fuel slurry to capture vaporized metals that lead to the deposit formation in the syngas cooler. The work effort proposed for BP 3 would have focused on addressing concerns raised by gasification industry personnel for the impacts on gasifier performance of sorbent injection, so that at the end of BP 3 the use of sorbent injection would be at “pre-commercial” stage and ready for use in a Field Demonstration that could be funded by industry or DOE. A Budget Continuation Application (BCA) was submitted to obtain funding for BP3 DOE but DOE chose to not fund the proposed BP3 effort.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Data Analytics Applied to Coal Fired Boilers for Detecting Leaks

Data analytics were used to detect boiler leaks from five different coal-fired boilers including both subcritical and supercritical systems. Discriminant functions were developed that detected leaks up to two weeks prior to forced plant shutdowns for repairs. The leaks were identified to occur at different sections of the boiler for each plant, including waterwalls, economizer and superheater using conventional process measurement data. Leaking conditions were detected with a high degree of confidence (≪ 1% misclassified observations) and were able to distinguish normal operations from those time periods with steam leaks even while operating the power plants in power cycling mode.Multivariable statistical analyses, including Principal Component (PCA), cluster, and Fischer Discriminant Analysis (FDA) were used to characterize the leak occurrence. Normal and operational states with steam leaks were provided in the original process datasets. These datasets were split into two different groups for training and validation purposes. The data were sorted chronologically, and every third observation was assigned to training the Discriminant Function Model (DFM) while the rest were reserved for validation. PCA was used to reduce dimensionality of the original datasets. Canonical and FDA analyses were used to investigate the relationship between process variables. The outcome of the analyses revealed that nearly 35,000 observations were classified correctly; less than 0.05% of total observations were misclassified to be leaking, i.e. both false positives and false negatives.

Indrawan, Natarianto↗
DOE OSTI2016

Systems and methods for harvesting and storing materials produced in a nuclear reactor

Systems produce desired isotopes through irradiation in nuclear reactor instrumentation tubes and deposit the same in a robust facility for immediate shipping, handling, and/or consumption. Irradiation targets are inserted and removed through inaccessible areas without plant shutdown and placed in the harvesting facility, such as a plurality of sealable and shipping-safe casks and/or canisters. Systems may connect various structures in a sealed manner to avoid release of dangerous or unwanted matter throughout the nuclear plant, and/or systems may also automatically decontaminate materials to be released. Useable casks or canisters can include plural barriers for containment that are temporarily and selectively removable with specially-configured paths inserted therein. Penetrations in the facilities may limit waste or pneumatic gas escape and allow the same to be removed from the systems without over-pressurization or leakage. Methods include processing irradiation targets through such systems and securely delivering them in such harvesting facilities.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

An Unsteady State Gas Transport Model in Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) for PWR Gas Management

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hydrogen gas management can be a challenge at Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) during shutdown, startup, and steady state operation. Poor hydrogen control can result in higher general corrosion rates for RCS components and increases in critical path time for shutdown or startup. Also, performance indicator penalties may be accrued by entry into Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Action Level conditions or by accrual of Chemistry Effectiveness Index (CEI) penalties established by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Furthermore, poor hydrogen control may increase industrial safety risk due to the creation of an explosive environment. Part of the hydrogen management difficulty arises from the interaction of several phenomena that require complex simulations to fully understand. While hydrogen gas transport models have been developed, the application of these models is limited by the computational intensity required to accurately model the dynamism inherent in plant shutdown or startup. Subsequently, a gas transport model is developed in a suitable computational program to meet these needs and provide input to an optimized RCS hydrogen management strategy for all operational modes. The gas transport model is used to model RCS hydrogen behavior for an example PWR during an End of Cycle (EOC) Forced Outage (FO) startup, a refueling outage (RFO) shutdown, and during nominal steady state operation. The computational software selected is Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB{sup R})

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Activation of lead coolant in Westinghouse lead fast reactor

The Westinghouse Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) is a medium-sized, passively safe, scalable reactor being developed by Westinghouse in collaboration with domestic and international organizations with the primary goals of reducing front-end capital cost and generating flexible and cost-competitive electricity while satisfying the highest standards in terms of safety and sustainability. An important aspect of new plant design is an assessment of activation level of its components so that an appropriate nuclear waste management plan can be established. As lead coolant is a distinguishing design feature of the LFR, its activation due to irradiation and the implications on establishing an appropriate waste disposal approach are important for engagement of project stakeholders, customers and nuclear safety regulators. This paper provides a brief description of the Westinghouse LFR design, a background on lead activation phenomenology, and then describes the methodology used for lead activation analysis performed with the computer code Serpent 2. It was determined that impurities naturally occurring in lead have the biggest contribution to lead activation. Corrosion and erosion products from the components immersed in lead can also be important contributors to lead activity and their impact can be limited by appropriate selection of materials and operating conditions. Polonium isotopes, resulting from bismuth generated from lead irradiation and its impurities, bring a notable contribution to the inhalation and ingestion doses during the plant operation and in the first years after the plant shutdown. However, it is not by far as important as for lead-bismuth coolant.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

MP197HB; First licensed transportation package with canistered high burnup fuel after dry storage - 15580

AREVA TN has recently received the NRC 10 CFR Part 71 transportation license CoC 9302 Revision 7 for the MP197HB transportation package that allows transportation of canistered high burnup fuel assemblies. The Nuclear Horizontal Modular Storage (NUHOMS{sup R}) system canisters containing high burnup PWR and BWR fuel assemblies are now licensed for transportation as a payload in MP197HB after these canisters were in dry storage at the utility ISFSIs. Enhancements have been made to the MP197HB transportation package to improve thermal performance and also provide superior shielding capabilities. Design features of existing AREVA TN transportation packages such as radial fins, thermal shield, neutron resin and optimized gamma and neutron shielding were used to accommodate transportation of high burnup fuel assemblies with heat loads up to 32 kW. The transportation package is designed for exclusive use by rail, truck or marine transport. State-of-the-art analyses methodologies were used to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 71.55 for the high burnup fuel after dry storage at any ISFSI. Some of the issues addressed in the license application related to the transportation of high burnup fuel included potential degradation of fuel cladding, uncertainty associated with high burnup fuel cladding material properties, and larger radiation and thermal sources due to higher burnups. Bounding conservative assumptions were made where limited test data was available. AREVA TN's licensing approach did not rely on the cladding integrity of high burnup fuel cladding. Instead, the criticality, thermal and shielding analyses were carried out assuming high burnup fuel reconfiguration. With the approval of this transportation package for PWR and BWR canistered high burnup fuel from dry storage at ISFSIs, the utilities can now transport these canisters which are in dry storage at their sites. This is also a major step forward for the canistered fuel that is currently in dry storage at the shutdown plants because they can use this AREVA TN MP197HB transportation package to ship that fuel to any interim storage facility (ISF) or to a repository when they become available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Future German R and D on HLW Disposal - 16519

In 2009, after the General elections, the new German Government showed a relatively positive attitude towards a prolonged use of nuclear power. Power plant shutdown was planned for the year 2032. Nuclear power was considered as a sort of transition energy technology until the energy supply would take place by the use of renewable energy sources. This was in line with the legal framework and the political strategy of the energy turnaround. Then, 17 nuclear power plants (NPP) were operational. The Fukushima incident heralded the sound of drastic changes in the German energy policy: Besides an intermediate stop of operation of reactors until a so-called stress test was accomplished, the general political decision was to phase-out nuclear earlier than planned and to implement faster the decisions regarding the energy transition policy. The shut-down of the last German nuclear power plant will occur in 2022. Accordingly, all the necessary legal changes were made. A consensus about the appropriate waste management strategy for heat generating waste (spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified waste (HLW)) was still pending at this time. Public and political discussions on this subject continued as in the years before. In July 2013, after intensive discussions, most of the parties represented in the German parliament agreed to eventually tackle the challenge of finding a repository by a consensual, transparent and science-based approach. This was to be codified in a law. In July 2013, the Site Selection Act passed the parliament. This law should pave the way for a new holistic process that addresses social, political, and scientific aspects of siting and the site selection process. The basics for this process should be provided by the 'Commission Storage of Radioactive Waste Materials' which was established according this law. Against this background discussions showed that scientific-technical R and D activities should be mirrored accordingly and R and D has to deal both with the future challenges of radioactive waste HLW disposal and related aspects. Considering this the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), which is responsible for non-site specific R and D, created the new Research Concept 'Research for the management of radioactive waste', being fundamental and the frame for non-site specific R and D projects funded by BMWi. Key changes - mirroring the new requirements and different aspects - touch the issues: host rock research, i.e. all potential host rocks available in Germany are equally addressed and there is no prioritization, consideration of consequences of prolonged storage at NPP sites, alternative waste management strategies compared to direct disposal in a mined repository, and involvement of socio-technical aspects.This paper intends to highlight the key changes, its consequences, and will give a brief overview on first initiated R and D activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Quantifying the reductions in mortality from air-pollution by cancelling new coal power plants

Deep decarbonization paths to the 1.5°C or 2°C temperature stabilization futures require a rapid reduction in conventional coal-fired power plants, but countries are currently building 223 GW of new coal power capacity and plan to build 377 GW more in the next decade. Coal-fired plants are also a major contributor to air pollution related health impacts. Here, we couple an integrated human-earth system model (GCAM) with an air quality model (TM5-FASST) to examine regional health co-benefits from cancelling new coal-fired plants worldwide. Additionally, we find that cancelling all new proposed projects would decrease air pollution related premature mortality between 101,388 - 213,205 deaths (2-5%) in 2030, and 213,414 - 373,054 (5-8%) in 2050, globally, but heavily concentrated in developing Asia. Furthermore, we estimate that strengthening the climate target from 2°C to 1.5°C would avoid 326,351 additional mortalities in 2030, of which 251,011 (75%) are attributable to the incremental coal plant shutdown.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2015

The decommissioning imperative - motivating progress in us used fuel management - 15185

When the Yucca Mountain project was terminated in 2010 there was approximately 3500 metric tons of used fuel stored at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) at which there was no operating reactor (10 shutdown plant sites and the GE Morris facility). By 2015, four additional sites with five reactors will have shut down, causing the amount of used fuel 'stranded' at sites where there is no operating reactor to nearly double to approximately 6900 metric tons which will be stored at a total of 15 sites. At each of these sites, once the reactors are decommissioned, the only thing preventing the land from being returned to communities for other uses is the remaining presence of the used fuel. The cost of maintaining 15 stand-alone ISFSIs is born by electric ratepayers and taxpayers. Going forward, the costs of maintaining stand-alone ISFSIs is certain to grow even if the number of stand-alone ISFSIs does not grow beyond the already announced shutdown of the Oyster Creek reactor in 2019 (which would increase the amount of stranded used fuel by another 10% and create a 16. stand-alone ISFSI). One reason for this cost escalation will be the need for ISFSI owners to renew storage licenses, and implement aging management programs to support these renewals, due to the continued delay in the federal program for removing the used fuel. Storage licenses at 10 of 16 stand-alone ISFSIs will expire by 2021, which is the earliest projected date at which the Department of Energy (DOE) has indicated it could have a pilot interim storage facility available - and nearly 3 decades before DOE projects a repository will be available. The burden and cost of continuing to renew storage licenses - and manage aging storage facilities - at 16 stand-alone sites instead of moving stranded used fuel to a single consolidated storage location or repository will likely be significant. Industry resources are increasingly being channeled into dry storage aging management activities as public and regulator interest in potential long-term degradation mechanism continues to grow. Whether the ultimate destination for used fuel is Yucca Mountain or some other location, the current stalemate preventing progress in the federal program to move it must be broken - and the increasing prominence of the decommissioned reactor quandary may very well be a pivotal factor in breaking that stalemate. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 2018 - 19101

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. The evaluations of the shutdown sites contain four components: - A characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory; - A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites; - An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience at the shutdown sites - An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF were the DOE GC-859 and RW-859 spent nuclear fuel inventory databases. This inventory has been augmented with data obtained from the shutdown sites for SNF discharges that occurred after June 2013. The primary sources for information on the conditions of site and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included field observations and information collected during visits to the 14 shutdown sites, information provided by managers and staff at the shutdown sites, and Google Earth imagery. Extensive photographs taken during the shutdown site visits have proven to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at and near the shutdown sites. Tribal and state representatives, State and Regional Group representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in 11 of the shutdown site visits. In addition to visiting the shutdown site, site visits often include activities such as meeting with local railroads to discuss the near-site railroad infrastructure and meeting with community engagement panels. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018 and fuel was removed from the reactor vessel on September 25, 2018. Planning for the Oyster Creek site visit has begun and is conducted in three stages. In the first stage, data and documents that are applicable to Oyster Creek are collected. In the second stage, questions are developed based on the data and documents collected during the first stage. These questions are submitted to the Oyster Creek site approximately one month before the site visit. The third stage involves establishing specific schedules and participants. Participants will likely include tribal and state representatives, the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, and the Federal Railroad Administration. State participation will likely include a representative of the State Rail Safety Participation Program, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering. The site visit is tentatively expected to occur in April or May of 2019. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

External Engagement During Evaluations of Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 19221

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. A key part of the shutdown site evaluations are visits to the sites. These site visits typically take place over 3 days. The first day is spent at the nuclear power plant site. The second day is spent evaluating the near-site transportation infrastructure, including rail infrastructure, potential heavy-haul routes, and potential rail and barge transload locations. The third day is often spent meeting with community engagement or advisory panels. External engagement activities during site visits are conducted in two areas. The first area involves inviting tribal and state representatives, State Regional Group (SRG) representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) representatives to participate in the entire site visit. The SRG representatives are from the Southern States Energy Board, the Western Interstate Energy Board, the Council of State Governments - Midwest, or the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, according to the location of the nuclear power plant. State representatives typically represent their state department of energy, state department of environmental or natural resources, State Rail Safety Participation Program, state police, state department of transportation, radiation protection organization, or emergency management organization. Tribal representatives explore issues associated with cultural affiliation and tribal involvement with past and present site activities. As the regulator of the U.S. railroads, the FRA representatives bring unique experience to the site visits. They also coordinate meetings with the railroads that serve the shutdown sites. The second area of external engagement activities during site visits involves meeting with local community engagement or advisory panels. Meeting with local community engagement or advisory panels provides an opportunity to inform these panels on DOE activities and the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies during site decommissioning. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗