Planetary Protection for the Mars Sample Return Project
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Independent Scientific Review of Biological Assumptions and Planned Ultraviolet Treatment for Mars Sample Return Backward Planetary Protection
The Backward Planetary Protection Study Team (“the Study Team”), assembled by the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) at the request of the Office of Planetary Protection (OPP), has conducted numerous detailed discussions on the potential use of an active ultraviolet (UV) approach for minimizing or eliminating biological contamination of the exterior of the planned Orbiting Sample container (OS) of the Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission. This review of the backward planetary protection (BPP) considerations for the MSR mission focused on two key parameters that are opportunities for further process development to support implementation of planetary protection practices in meeting mission requirements. These parameters include: 1) Sub-cellular biological assumptions – should Mars missions consider self-replicating organisms only or do they need to consider non-self-replicating entities without a cellular organization such as viruses, prions, etc. and macromolecules capable of genetic information transfer, as well? 2) UV biocidal impact – what is the UV fluence in the Mars atmosphere and its associated potential biocidal credit? The assembled subject matter experts (SMEs) in the Study Team are listed in Appendix A, with a brief description of each member’s relevant expertise.
Mamta Patel Nagaraja↗
Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2
Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.
Rummel, John D.↗
Mars Sample Return: Risk Management & Sample Safety Assessment
Returning samples from Mars has long been a major planetary science objective due to the high scientific value and transformative potential of the resulting data. An exciting dimension of this objective is the potential for the detection of ancient microbiological life, and the possibility of improving our understanding of the evolution of habitable environments on Mars and the development of life on Earth. To ensure that returned samples meet stringent planetary protection requirements and do not expose Earth to potential biohazards, the joint NASA/ESA Sample Receiving Project (SRP) assembled the Sample Safety Assessment Protocol Tiger Team (SSAP-TT). Members were recruited with the specific goal of creating a multi-disciplinary and internationally distributed team of experts in their respective fields across the federal government, academia, and private industry. This team was chartered with reassessing previous sample safety assessment strategies, defining what constitutes a biological hazard, developing a protocol to test for potential biohazards, and establishing a statistical framework to determine if samples are “safe” for release. The team developed a three-step protocol, supported by a Bayesian statistical framework, to assess whether returned samples contain potential biohazards that could present a risk to Earth’s biosphere. Initial conclusions indicated that an effective and comprehensive safety assessment protocol is feasible using modern techniques and does not require an excessive amount of sample consumption or traditional microbiological detection methodology. Herein, we will present an overview of the MSR SRP, the proposed safety assessment protocol, and how aspects of this novel approach can be applied to biological assessment in healthcare product manufacturing practices.
Alvin L Smith↗
Planetary protection issues and future Mars missions
A primary scientific theme for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) is the search for life, extant or extinct, on Mars. Because of this, concerns have arisen about Planetary Protection (PP), the prevention of biological cross-contamination between Earth and other planets during solar system exploration missions. A recent workshop assessed the necessity for, and impact of, PP requirements on the unmanned and human missions to Mars comprising the SEI. The following ground-rules were adopted: (1) Information needed for assessing PP issues must be obtained during the unmanned precursor mission phase prior to human landings. (2) Returned Mars samples will be considered biologically hazardous until proven otherwise. (3) Deposition of microbes on Mars and exposure of the crew to martian materials are inevitable when humans land. And (4) Human landings are unlikely until it is demonstrated that there is no harmful effect of martian materials on terrestrial life forms. These ground-rules dictated the development of a conservative PP strategy for precursor missions. Key features of the proposed strategy include: to prevent forward-contamination, all orbiters will follow Mars Observer PP procedures for assembly, trajectory, and lifetime. All landers will follow Viking PP procedures for assembly, microbial load reduction, and bio-shield. And, to prevent back-contamination, all sample return missions will have PP requirements which include fail-safe sample sealing, breaking contact chain with the martian surface, and containment and quarantine analysis in Earth-based laboratory. In addition to deliberating on scientific and technical issues, the workshop made several recommendations for dealing with forward and back-contamination concerns from non-scicntific perspectives.
Devincenzi, D. L.↗
The Importance of Contamination Knowledge - Insights into Mars Sample Return
The Astromaterials Acquisition and Curation Office at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), in Houston, TX (henceforth Curation Office) manages the curation of all past, present, and future extraterrestrial samples returned by NASA missions and shared collections from international partners, preserving their integrity for future scientific study while providing the samples to the international community in a fair and unbiased way. The Curation Office also curates all reference and witness materials for each mission (e.g., flight and non-flight hardware coupons; lubricants; non-flight, flight-like, and flown witness plates). These reference and witness materials provide the scientific community with the fundamental ability to reconstruct the contamination/alteration history of the sample collection through the course of the mission, with the overall goal of strengthening the scientific conclusions drawn from the study of returned materials. The information gained from characterizing the physical, biological, inorganic, and organic chemical properties of reference and witness materials is defined as the Contamination Knowledge (CK) of the sample collection. Unlike the data collected for Contamination Control (CC) and Planetary Protection (PP), CK is exclusively concerned with preserving reference and witness materials for study by future scientists upon sample return. Although CC and PP data collected for sample integrity and forward contamination purposes can be complementary to CK, they are two separate data sets with distinct objectives. A robust collection of samples for CK is necessary to allow the extraterrestrial material in a returned sample to be distinguished from terrestrial contamination. Traditionally CK is utilized by sample scientists in order to accomplish the mission’s scientific objectives, however this information can also be utilized by the Office of Planetary Protection to help evaluate the presence of any back contamination. Mars 2020, the first phase of a potential multipart Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign, is expected to contribute to NASA’s Mars Exploration Program Science Goals by filling in knowledge gaps concerning: 1) the existence of past or present life on Mars, 2) the past and present climate of Mars, 3) the geology of Mars, and 4) hazards associated with human exploration of Mars. Although there is debate concerning which samples will best answer these questions, the necessity for proper sample blanks is well-understood. The CC and PP requirements, driven by the restricted Class V mission designation, are the most stringent of any sample return mission in recent history. The extremely low levels of allowable terrestrial contamination on the spacecraft and rover can complicate these analyses given the detection limits of current analytical instrumentation, especially in the case of biological contamination. By collecting and curating unanalyzed samples specifically for CK, future sample scientists will not be relegated to: 1) relying on data collected using possibly obsolete tools and techniques for return sample blanks, or 2) using remnants of extracted and/or cultured samples from ATLO (Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations), which could be incompatible with the desired experimental endpoints or state-of-the-art techniques available at the time of sample return.The addition of biological experimental endpoints to a sample return campaign’s objectives broadens the requisite range in preservation environments (e.g. inert ultra-pure nitrogen gaseous environment at 18 degrees Centigrade versus less than or equal to minus 80 degrees Centigrade) and types of CK samples. As a result, the Curation Office will also curate the following CK samples at less than or equal to minus 80 degrees Centigrade for the Mars 2020 mission: 1) unanalyzed swabs and wipes in sterile containers, 2) all recirculation filters from the clean rooms used for sample and caching subsystem assembly and all filters from the laminar flow benches used to assemble sample intimate hardware, and 3) witness plates collecting airborne contamination within the assembly clean rooms. It has been Curation Office policy since the Apollo missions to preserve as many pristine samples as possible for future scientific research. Although CK is required to be collected for all stages of the MSR campaign, the CK for the Mars 2020 mission is the most critical for understanding contamination in the returned samples given the intimacy between the Martian samples and the Mars 2020 flight hardware. This presentation highlights the importance of CK for sample return missions as well as the traditional and novel types of CK samples required for a successful MSR campaign.
Harrington, A. D.↗
The Evolution of Planetary Protection Implementation on Mars Landed Missions
NASA has developed requirements dedicated to the prevention of forward and backward contamination during space exploration. Historically, international agreements provided guidelines to prevent contamination of the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the Earth (e.g., sample return missions). The UN Outer Space Treaty was established in 1967 and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) maintains a planetary protection policy complying with Article IX of this treaty. By avoiding forward contamination, the integrity of scientific exploration is preserved. Planetary Protection mission requirements are levied on missions to control contamination. These requirements are dependent on the science of the mission and on the celestial bodies encountered or targeted along the way. Consequently, categories are assigned to missions, and specific implementation plans are developed to meet the planetary protection requirements. NASA missions have evolved over time with increasingly more demanding scientific objectives and more complex flight systems to achieve those objectives and, thus, planetary protection methods and processes used for implementation have become much more intricate, complicated, and challenging. Here, we will portray the evolution of planetary protection implementation at JPL in several important areas throughout the course of NASA sponsored robotic Mars lander or rover missions, starting from Mars Pathfinder through the beginning of Mars 2020. Highlighted in the discussion will be process changes in planetary protection requirements development and flow down. Development and implementation of new and improved methods used in the reduction of spacecraft bioburden will be discussed as well as approaches and challenges that come along with setting up remote laboratories to perform bioassays. The consequences and forward planning of delays on missions will be highlighted as well as lessons learned on the impact of communication and training in achieving planetary protection requirements. The evolution of methods used for the detection of microbial bioburden on spacecraft hardware will be considered. These methods use standard microbiology as well as the adaptation of advances in biotechnology, molecular biology, and bioinformatics. Technical approaches developed for the prevention of contamination and recontamination of hardware during Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations will be discussed.
Kazarians, Gayane A.↗