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DOE OSTI2019

Enhanced Performance Fast Reactors with Engineered Passive Safety Systems

This report summarizes the work and results of NEUP Project #15-8251, "Enhanced Performance Fast Reactors with Engineered Passive Safety System," performed from 2015-2018 at UC Berkeley and Argonne National Laboratory. This project concerns the incorporation of a novel engineered passive safety system, called the Autonomous Reactivity Control (ARC) system, into Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) to improve their transient and economic performance. The first part of this project consisted of fleshing out the basic principles and the manufacturing process for an SFR fuel assembly with the ARC system installed, with the details provided in high-quality, step-by-step CAD drawings. Once the detailed design is laid out, high-fidelity simulations were performed to optimize the dimensions of important ARC system components and to quantify the standalone time-response of ARC systems in a typical SFR environment. These high-fidelity simulations were used to create reduced-order models of ARC system response which could be incorporated into the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 whole-core transient models. In order to accurately account for the time-response of ARC systems in whole-core transient simulations, modifications were made to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 transient code. These new capabilities were tested and incorporated into the production version of the code, and have been used extensively in this analysis. Before performing whole-core transient calculations, the two reference cores selected for this study to cover a wide design space were simulated and characterized. The two reference cores, (1) a medium-sized oxide-fueled Advanced Burner Reactor and (2) a large metal-fueled Breed-and-Burn core, challenge conventional means of achieving passive safety. Because the two cores vary substantially, simulating the ARC system in both allows for conclusions to be drawn about the applicability of ARC systems in different SFRs. Once both cores were fully characterized, transient calculations were performed to understand the complicated interplay between the ARC system and other inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms. By performing parametric studies of the transient behavior, ARC system designs that best improve transient performance in each core were identified. Once transient improvements were established, the transient calculations were extended to improve reactor economics through design modifications. Upon establishing the potential benefits of ARC system inclusion, the study examines the negative neutronic implications of incorporating ARC systems into the reference cores. The study concludes by discussing a number of knowledge gaps that exist which may have important implications for ARC system implementation. Ultimately, the results of this project indicate that ARC systems may provide an effective means to improve transient performance in certain types of systems. The transient simulations in the oxide Advanced Burner Reactor showed that significant margin to coolant boiling and fuel melting could be gained through the use of a properly designed ARC system, thus improving inherent safety. While oscillatory behavior was induced in the transient response for certain combinations of ARC system parameters, the oscillation-free design space that can be effectively used to improve performance was found to be large, and the additional margin was demonstrated to allow economical improvements to the core design. Conversely, difficulties were encountered in the Breed-and-Burn core due to fundamental aspects of the core design. The combination of a particularly strong positive coolant void feedback and the use of metallic fuel allowed for diverging oscillations to manifest in response to certain transient initiators, and in the end it was found that the current ARC system design could not simultaneously enable passive safety in all transients examined. In order for complete passive safety to be achieved, a mechanism for slowing the reverse actuation of ARC systems is necessary. Regardless, the standard ARC system was able to improve the performance of two out of the three examined transients by increasing the margin to boiling in Loss of Heat Sink transients and avoiding boiling in Transient Overpower accidents. Additionally, no significant barriers to implementation were found, although the issue of tritium production should be closely monitored in any core incorporating ARC systems. Still, a number of technology gaps exist, and these are discussed at the conclusion of the report to recommend directions for future work.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2016

FFTF Passive Safety Test Data for Benchmarks for New LMR Designs

Liquid Metal Reactors (LMRs) continue to be considered as an attractive concept for advanced reactor design. Software packages such as SASSYS are being used to im-prove new LMR designs and operating characteristics. Significant cost and safety im-provements can be realized in advanced liquid metal reactor designs by emphasizing inherent or passive safety through crediting the beneficial reactivity feedbacks associ-ated with core and structural movement. This passive safety approach was adopted for the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), and an experimental program was conducted to characterize the structural reactivity feedback. The FFTF passive safety testing pro-gram was developed to examine how specific design elements influenced dynamic re-activity feedback in response to a reactivity input and to demonstrate the scalability of reactivity feedback results to reactors of current interest. The U.S. Department of En-ergy, Office of Nuclear Energy Advanced Reactor Technology program is in the pro-cess of preserving, protecting, securing, and placing in electronic format information and data from the FFTF, including the core configurations and data collected during the passive safety tests. Benchmarks based on empirical data gathered during operation of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) as well as design documents and post-irradiation examination will aid in the validation of these software packages and the models and calculations they produce. Evaluation of these actual test data could provide insight to improve analytical methods which may be used to support future licensing applications for LMRs

Wootan, David W.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Passive Safety System Reliability Analysis: Lessons Learned and Open Items

Passive safety systems have multiple benefits, largely stemming from their high functional reliability due to their simplicity and lack of dependencies. However, accurately assessing the reliability of passive systems can be challenging due in large part to the possibility of functional failures. Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has been involved in several recent efforts concerning the reliability assessment of passive safety systems for advanced, non-light water reactors (non-LWRs). These efforts have focused on the development and application of mechanistic methods for the evaluation of passive system reliability, which rely on system modelling and uncertainty analyses to derive reliability values for use in probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs). Further information on these efforts is provided in ref [1]. The current paper reviews key lessons learned through these projects, along with outstanding open items regarding the reliability assessment of passive systems.

Grabaskas, David↗

DOE OSTI2024

Passive Safety System [Slides]

These slides are intended as an introduction to the concept of passive safety systems in LWRs and a discussion on designs that incorporate passive safety.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Thermal-hydraulic validation tests using the SMART-ITL facility with a single train passive safety injection system for the smart design

A test program was launched using a large-scale thermal-hydraulic integral effect test facility of SMART-ITL (or FESTA) to validate the performance of the SMART passive safety system. In this paper thermal-hydraulic validation tests using the SMART-ITL facility equipped with a single train of a passive safety injection system were performed and their major results were summarized. The effect of the flow distributor, break size and different types of Core Makeup Tank (CMT) and Safety Injection Tank (SIT) on the thermal-hydraulic behavior during a Small-Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) scenario was investigated for the SMART passive safety system development. During the SBLOCA scenario, the water layer was well stratified thermally in the core makeup tank, and the safety injection water was injected efficiently into the reactor pressure vessel from the initial period. Eventually, the reactor coolant system was cooled down properly. From the test results, it was estimated that the SMART passive safety system has sufficient cooling capability to deal with the SBLOCA scenario of SMART. The acquired data will be used to validate the safety analysis code and its related models, to evaluate the performance of SMART PSS, and to provide the base data during the application phase of the revision of standard design approval and construction licensing. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spacecraft Passive Safety Assessment Using Ellipse Constraints and Relative Orbital Elements

This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for validating spacecraft passive safety using relative orbital elements (ROE) centered around the far-field to near-field trajectory design of a hypothetical autonomous rendezvous and docking (AR&D) mission. The specific formulation of the ROEs used in this study are of quasi-nonsingular form based on elative eccentricity/inclination vectors. Current methodologies for ensuring passive safety apply keep-out volumes (KOV) to maintain appropriate separation between the Servicer and Client. Widely used techniques to assess the integrity of the KOV involve forward propagation of the relative Cartesian state to check for a potential KOV breach. In this study, an alternative approach to the propagation-based method is proposed using ROEs due to their valuable geometric insights of spacecraft relative motion. Modeling the relative trajectory and KOV ellipsoids as ellipses into the 2-D ROE sub-space simplifies the passive safety validation to a root-finding problem within the unit disk with high computational efficiency. Other approaches to intersection detection of the KOV are also evaluated in accuracy and run-time. Furthermore, a Monte Carlo simulation was employed to compare the ROE-based and relative Cartesian approaches in terms of maneuver error.

Bruce Barbour↗

DOE OSTI2015

Impact of Passive Safety on FHR Instrumentation Systems Design and Classification

Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) will rely more extensively on passive safety than earlier reactor classes. 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum design requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate safety. 10CFR50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors, provides guidance on how the safety significance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) should be reflected in their regulatory treatment. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has provided 10 CFR 50.69 SSC Categorization Guideline (NEI-00-04) that factors in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model insights, as well as deterministic insights, through an integrated decision-making panel. Employing the PRA to inform deterministic requirements enables an appropriately balanced, technically sound categorization to be established. No FHR currently has an adequate PRA or set of design basis accidents to enable establishing the safety classification of its SSCs. While all SSCs used to comply with the general design criteria (GDCs) will be safety related, the intent is to limit the instrumentation risk significance through effective design and reliance on inherent passive safety characteristics. For example, FHRs have no safety-significant temperature threshold phenomena, thus enabling the primary and reserve reactivity control systems required by GDC 26 to be passively, thermally triggered at temperatures well below those for which core or primary coolant boundary damage would occur. Moreover, the passive thermal triggering of the primary and reserve shutdown systems may relegate the control rod drive motors to the control system, substantially decreasing the amount of safety-significant wiring needed. Similarly, FHR decay heat removal systems are intended to be running continuously to minimize the amount of safety-significant instrumentation needed to initiate operation of systems and components important to safety as required in GDC 20. This paper provides an overview of the design process employed to develop a pre-conceptual FHR instrumentation architecture intended to lower plant capital and operational costs by minimizing reliance on expensive, safety related, safety-significant instrumentation through the use of inherent passive features of FHRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

RFA-17-14597, Methodology for Meeting Containment System Principal Design Criteria to Maximize the Passive Safety Value in Advanced Nuclear Energy Economic Competitiveness

Advanced (Non-Light Water) Reactors are being designed with Passive Safety as an essential and integral feature. To help streamline the licensing of advanced reactors, the DOE and the NRC have drafted Principal Design Criteria (PDCs) for advanced reactors. A question that remains to be answered is: how an Advanced Reactor take credit for passive safety features inherent in certain advanced reactors while at the same time complying the evolving PDC.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Experimental validation on the operational and cooling performance of the passive safety system with Atlas

After the Fukushima accident, passive safety systems are considered as the most promising alternatives to reinforce the safety and reliability of an ultimate heat removal system without any operator actions. In Korea, a passive auxiliary feedwater system (PAFS) was developed and adopted to a GEN-III+ nuclear power plant, APR+ to completely replace the conventional auxiliary feedwater system. The integral effect tests were performed to validate the cooling and operational performance of PAFS, coupled with the reactor coolant systems using the ATLAS facility. The representative design basis accidents (DBAs) such as a feedwater line break, a steam line break, and a steam generator tube rupture transients were experimentally simulated in this study. In addition, an integral effect test was performed for simulating a station blackout transient as a limiting beyond DBA. From the integral effect test results, it could be concluded that the APR+ has the capability of coping with the hypothetical DBA and bDBA by adopting PAFS and proper set-points of its operation. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2017

Impact of Active Control on Passive Safety Response Characteristics of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors: I - Theoretical background

Here, the interaction of the active control system with passive safety behavior is investigated for sodium-cooled fast reactors. A claim often made of advanced reactors is that they are passively safe against unprotected upset events. In practice, such upset events are not analyzed in the context of the plant control system, but rather the analyses are performed without considering the normally programmed response of the control system (open-loop approach). This represents an oversimplification of the safety case. The issue of passive safety override arises since the control system commands actuators whose motions have safety consequences. Depending on the upset involving the control system ( operator error, active control system failure, or inadvertent control system override), an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. So neglecting to account for control system action during an unprotected upset is nonconservative from a safety standpoint. It is important then, during the design of the plant, to consider the potential for the control system to work against the inherent and safe regulating effects of purposefully engineered temperature feedbacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2014

New reactor cavity cooling system having passive safety features using novel shape for HTGRs and VHTRs

A new, highly efficient reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) with passive safety features without a requirement for electricity and mechanical drive is proposed for high temperature gas cooled reactors (HTGRs) and very high temperature reactors (VHTRs). The RCCS design consists of continuous closed regions; one is an ex-reactor pressure vessel (RPV) region and another is a cooling region having heat transfer area to ambient air assumed at 40 (°C). The RCCS uses a novel shape to efficiently remove the heat released from the RPV with radiation and natural convection. Employing the air as the working fluid and the ambient air as the ultimate heat sink, the new RCCS design strongly reduces the possibility of losing the heat sink for decay heat removal. Therefore, HTGRs and VHTRs adopting the new RCCS design can avoid core melting due to overheating the fuels. The simulation results from a commercial CFD code, STAR-CCM+, show that the temperature distribution of the RCCS is within the temperature limits of the structures, such as the maximum operating temperature of the RPV, 713.15 (K) = 440 (°C), and the heat released from the RPV could be removed safely, even during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Finally, when the RCCS can remove 600 (kW) of the rated nominal state even during LOCA, the safety review for building the HTTR could confirm that the temperature distribution of the HTTR is within the temperature limits of the structures to secure structures and fuels after the shutdown because the large heat capacity of the graphite core can absorb heat from the fuel in a short period. Therefore, the capacity of the new RCCS design would be sufficient for decay heat removal.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Systems Engineering (SE) Approach of Developing A Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) to Cope with APR1400 Extended Station Black-Out (SBO) Accident Using RELAP5

On 11 March 2011 the power supply and cooling of the three Fukushima Daiichi reactors were disabled by a major earthquake followed by a relatively high tsunami waves. The earthquake damaged the electrical grid which is the normal power supply for the reactors, then the tsunami waves disabled the emergency diesel generators of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, which left the plant with no alternating current (AC) source. This condition is called 'Station Black-Out'. The reactors were tripped immediately, but due to the nuclear physics phenomena, the reactor cores were still producing thermal power, which is generated by the decay of radioactive fission products in the reactor core, known as decay heat. The decay heat had not been circulated to an external heat sink and eventually the accumulative heat produced in the core led to damage to the reactor cores. After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Design Extension Condition (DEC) such as total loss of feed water (TLOFW), and prolonged Station Black-Out (SBO) attracted the attention of nuclear experts. The attention focuses on the defense in depth concept, redundancy and sustainability of the systems, and development of the passive safety systems, which rely on natural physics laws. The topic of this paper is to discuss the possibility of attaching a Passive Safety Injection System (PSIS) to the APR1400. The PSIS is a safety system which provides adequate cooling water to the steam generators after the loss of the Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) during an extended SBO accident. The PSIS will be available while the power supply of the plant is being recovered and the active safety systems take over the functionality. The anticipated PSIS will be automatically actuated to enhance the engineered safety feature and to reduce the human errors. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2015

Passive safety device and internal short tested method for energy storage cells and systems

A passive safety device for an energy storage cell for positioning between two electrically conductive layers of the energy storage cell. The safety device also comprising a separator and a non-conductive layer. A first electrically conductive material is provided on the non-conductive layer. A first opening is formed through the separator between the first electrically conductive material and one of the electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device. A second electrically conductive material is provided adjacent the first electrically conductive material on the non-conductive layer, wherein a space is formed on the non-conductive layer between the first and second electrically conductive materials. A second opening is formed through the non-conductive layer between the second electrically conductive material and another of the electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device. The first and second electrically conductive materials combine and exit at least partially through the first and second openings to connect the two electrically conductive layers of the energy storage device at a predetermined temperature.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2017

Impact of Active Control on Passive Safety Response Characteristics of Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors: II-Model Implementation and Simulations

Advanced reactors are often claimed to be passively safe against unprotected upset events. In common practice, these events are not considered in the context of the plant control system, i.e., the reactor is subjected to classes of unprotected upset events while the normally programmed response of the control system is assumed not to be present. However, this approach constitutes an oversimplification since, depending on the upset involving the control system, an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. In this work, dynamic simulations are performed to assess the degree to which the inherent self-regulating plant response is safe from active control system override. The simulations are meant to characterize the resilience of the plant to unprotected initiators. The initiators were represented and modeled as an actuator going to a hard limit. Consideration of failure is further limited to individual controllers as there is no cross-connect of signals between these controllers. The potential for passive safety override by the control system is then relegated to the single-input single-output controllers. Here, the results show that when the plant control system is designed by taking into account and quantifying the impact of the plant control system on accidental scenarios there is very limited opportunity for the preprogrammed response of the control system to override passive safety protection in the event of an unprotected initiator.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Passive Safety Feature of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Passive Safety Feature of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have cooperated on the development, design, and construction of a neutron source facility. The facility was constructed at Kharkov, Ukraine and its commissioning process is underway. The facility has an electron accelerator driven subcritical assembly. The electron beam power is 100 kW using 100 MeV electrons. Tungsten or natural uranium is the target material for generating neutrons driving the subcritical assembly. The subcritical assembly is composed of WWR-M2 Russian fuel assemblies with U-235 enrichment of 19.7 wt%, surrounded by beryllium reflector assembles and graphite blocks. The water coolant operates at room temperature during normal operation, when the facility is operating at full power using 100-KW electron beam power. The passive safety features of the facility are discussed in in this study. Monte Carlo computer code MCNPX was utilized in the analyses with ENDF/BVII.0 nuclear data libraries. Negative reactivity temperature feedback was consistently observed, which is important for the facility safety performance. Due to the design of WWR-M2 fuel assemblies, slight temperature increase and the corresponding density decrease in the water coolant would cause relatively large reactivity drop, which offset the reactivity gain by mistakenly loading an additional fuel assembly. The increase of fuel temperature also causes sufficiently large reactivity decrease. This enhances the facility safety performance because fuel temperature increase provides prompt negative reactivity feedback. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2016

Passive Safety Features Evaluation of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have cooperated on the development, design, and construction of a neutron source facility. The facility was constructed at Kharkov, Ukraine and its commissioning process is underway. It will be used to conduct basic and applied nuclear research, produce medical isotopes, and train young nuclear specialists. The facility has an electron accelerator-driven subcritical assembly. The electron beam power is 100 kW using 100 MeV electrons. Tungsten or natural uranium is the target material for generating neutrons driving the subcritical assembly. The subcritical assembly is composed of WWR-M2 - Russian fuel assemblies with U-235 enrichment of 19.7 wt%, surrounded by beryllium reflector assembles and graphite blocks. The subcritical assembly is seated in a water tank, which is a part of the primary cooling loop. During normal operation, the water coolant operates at room temperature and the total facility power is ~300 KW. The passive safety features of the facility are discussed in in this study. Monte Carlo computer code MCNPX was utilized in the analyses with ENDF/B-VII.0 nuclear data libraries. Negative reactivity temperature feedback was consistently observed, which is important for the facility safety performance. Due to the design of WWR-M2 fuel assemblies, slight water temperature increase and the corresponding water density decrease produce large reactivity drop, which offset the reactivity gain by mistakenly loading an additional fuel assembly. The increase of fuel temperature also causes sufficiently large reactivity decrease. This enhances the facility safety performance because fuel temperature increase provides prompt negative reactivity feedback. The reactivity variation due to an empty fuel position filled by water during the fuel loading process is examined. Also, the loading mistakes of removing beryllium reflector assemblies and replacing them with dummy assemblies were analyzed. In all these circumstances, the reactivity change results do not cause any safety concerns.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Passive Safety System Reliability Analysis: Methodology, Application, and Results

Many advanced reactor designs rely on passive systems to provide assurance that certain safety functions, such as reactivity control and reactor heat removal, are maintained during transient scenarios. The performance of these systems is sensitive to boundary and environmental conditions and can lead to functional failure, which is the inability of the system to perform as intended even without any physical failures. Additionally, conditions can cause the passive systems to operate in an intermediate or degraded state. These operational modes of passive systems and their overall reliability can be difficult to capture in traditional probabilistic frameworks where discrete operating modes are assumed or time-dependent boundary conditions are not accounted for. Novel strategies and methods are needed to be able to capture the reliability of these passive systems and their impact on facility safety. The current abstract provides a summary of such a methodology and examples of its use in a case study, the GE Hitachi (GEH) PRISM probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), and the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) PSA.

Bucknor, M.↗