Stability of coupled-core nuclear reactor systems
Stability of coupled-core nuclear reactor systems
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Stability of coupled-core nuclear reactor systems
Linear optimal feedback control synthesis for nuclear reactor system models
Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.
This paper addresses the power conditioning subsystem for both Stirling and Brayton conversion of space nuclear reactor systems. Included are the requirements summary, trade results related to subsystem implementation, subsystem description, voltage level versus weight, efficiency and operational integrity, components selection, and shielding considerations. The discussion is supported by pertinent circuit and block diagrams. Summary conclusions and recommendations derived from the above studies are included.
Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) is being developed to support crewed or cargo transfer missions to Mars. Obtaining regulatory approval for NTP engine testing proves a challenge for not only the technology maturation required but also the fabrication, launch and operational nuclear regulatory environments. Existing regulations currently apply to either (1) high power, long duration commercial power plants, or (2) low power, short duration research reactors. NTP systems find themselves in a separate and unique area due to their higher power but short operating duration. This is supplemented by use of the reactor coolant as propellant. When planning the regulatory approach for NTP systems, operations in space and testing on Earth must be considered – each have their own challenges. This paper identifies a preliminary pathway for regulatory approval to operate a NTP demonstration engine as well as supporting test data that is recommended to be generated during the development program to support major regulatory milestones and deliverables.
Most thermionic reactors are designed to allow the fission gases to escape out of the emitter. A scheme to allow the fission gases to escape is proposed. Because of the low activity of the fission products, this method should pose no radiation hazards.
Reactor shielding, safety studies, and heat pipe development work are described. Monte Carlo calculations of gamma and neutron shield configurations show that substantial weight penalties are incurred if exposure at 25 m to neutrons and gammas must be limited to 10 to the 12th power nvt and 10 to the 6th power rad, instead of the 10 to the 13th power nvt and 10 to the 7th power rad values used earlier. For a 1.6 MW sub t reactor, the required shield weight increases from 400 to 815 kg. Water immersion critically calculations were extended to study the effect of water in fuel void spaces as well as in the core heat pipes. These show that the insertion into the core of eight blades of B4C with a mass totaling 2.5 kg will guarantee subcriticality. The design, fabrication procedure, and testing of a 4m long molybdenum/lithium heat pipe are described. It appears that an excess of oxygen in the wick prevented the attainment of expected performance capability.
Multiyear civilian manned missions to explore the surface of Mars are thought by NASA to be possible early in the next century. Expeditions to Mars, as well as permanent bases, are envisioned to require enhanced piloted vehicles to conduct science and exploration activities. Piloted rovers, with 30 kWe user net power (for drilling, sampling and sample analysis, onboard computer and computer instrumentation, vehicle thermal management, and astronaut life support systems) in addition to mobility are being considered. The rover design, for this study, included a four car train type vehicle complete with a hybrid solar photovoltaic/regenerative fuel cell auxiliary power system (APS). This system was designed to power the primary control vehicle. The APS supplies life support power for four astronauts and a limited degree of mobility allowing the primary control vehicle to limp back to either a permanent base or an accent vehicle. The results showed that the APS described above, with a mass of 667 kg, was sufficient to provide live support power and a top speed of five km/h for 6 hours per day. It was also seen that the factors that had the largest effect on the APS mass were the life support power, the number of astronauts, and the PV cell efficiency. The topics covered include: (1) power system options; (2) rover layout and design; (3) parametric analysis of total mass and power requirements for a manned Mars rover; (4) radiation shield design; and (5) energy conversion systems.
Nuclear reactor Brayton cycle space power system design point characteristics, discussing cycle parameters, working fluid, turbine inlet temperature, operating pressure level, etc
Various system aspects of a 300-kW nuclear reactor power system for spacecraft have been investigated. Special attention is given to the cases of a reusable OTV and a space-based radar. It is demonstrated that the stowed length of the power system is important to mission design, and that orbital storage for months to years may be needed for missions involving orbital assembly.
The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.
The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.
The detailed abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride (ZrH) reactor power module that have been generated for each phase of the reference Space Base program mission are presented. The trees are graphical representations of causal sequences. Each tree begins with the phase identification and the dichotomy between success and failure. The success branch shows the mission phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch is subdivided, as conditions require, into various primary initiating abort conditions.
The Space Nuclear Reactor Power System Technology Program designated SP-100 was created in 1983 by NASA, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Attention is presently given to the development history of SP-100 over the course of its first year, in which it has been engaged in program objectives' definition, the analysis of civil and military missions, nuclear power system functional requirements' definition, concept definition studies, the selection of primary concepts for technology feasibility validation, and the acquisition of initial experimental and analytical results.
Impact tests on model nuclear reactor containment system with models weighing 350 lb to 1305 lb and impact velocities varying from 241 to 580 ft/sec
Nuclear safety analysis as applied to a space base mission is presented. The nuclear safety analysis document summarizes the mission and the credible accidents/events which may lead to nuclear hazards to the general public. The radiological effects and associated consequences of the hazards are discussed in detail. The probability of occurrence is combined with the potential number of individuals exposed to or above guideline values to provide a measure of accident and total mission risk. The overall mission risk has been determined to be low with the potential exposure to or above 25 rem limited to less than 4 individuals per every 1000 missions performed. No radiological risk to the general public occurs during the prelaunch phase at KSC. The most significant risks occur from prolonged exposure to reactor debris following land impact generally associated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories can be high.
A nuclear reactor vessel is supported by a Z-ring and a box ring girder. The two proposed structural configurations to transmit the loads from the Z-ring and the box ring girder to the foundation are shown. The cantilever concrete ledge transmitting the load from the Z-ring and the box girder via the cavity wall to the foundation is shown, along with the loads being transmitted through one of the six steel columns. Both of these two supporting systems were analyzed by using rigid format 9 of NASTRAN for dynamic loads, and the thermal stresses were analyzed by AXISOL. The six column configuration was modeled by a combination of plate and bar elements, and the concrete cantilever ledge configuration was modeled by plate elements. Both configurations were found structurally satisfactory; however, nonstructural considerations favored the concrete cantilever ledge.
Activities related to the development of high-temperature compact nuclear reactors for space applications had reached a comparatively high level in the U.S. during the mid-1950s and 1960s, although only one U.S. nuclear reactor-powered spacecraft was actually launched. After 1973, very little effort was devoted to space nuclear reactor and propulsion systems. In February 1983, significant activities toward the development of the technology for space nuclear reactor power systems were resumed with the SP-100 Program. Specific SP-100 Program objectives are partly related to the determination of the potential performance limits for space nuclear power systems in 100-kWe and 1- to 100-MW electrical classes. Attention is given to potential missions and applications, regimes of possible space power applicability, safety considerations, conceptual system designs, the establishment of technical feasibility, nuclear technology, materials technology, and prospects for the future.