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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Explosives Safety Office - An Overview

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Groups (NESSG) are convened to evaluate NEOs to determine if positive measures are adequate to meet the Standards as specified in DOE O 452.2E - Nuclear Explosive Safety, DOE O 452.4E – Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons, and NA SD 452.2.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Biggest Fool Thing

This presentation provides an overview of Nuclear Explosives Safety for a W/Q/E Division WebeX. It includes an overview of how detonators and high explosives are considered as part of Nuclear Explosives Safety. Several accidents involving High Explosives are also discussed. This presentation was adapted from LA-CP-16-20438.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Introduction to Los Alamos National Laboratory [Slides]

The Weapon Systems Engineering Division (W) provides the system engineering and program management necessary to sustain the safety, reliability, and security of the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s assets in the active United States nuclear stockpile - the B61, W76, W78 and W88. The Division generates key certification data for Annual Assessment supporting the Laboratory Director's letter to the President on the health of those warheads. This role demands ongoing surveillance of the active stockpile and evaluation of the potential impact of any issues through design, engineering, fabrication, testing using state-of-the-art computational simulation tools and engineering test facilities. The Division works in close liaison with the several production facilities across the nuclear security complex as well as with the customers in the US Navy and Air Force.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

2023 Annual Explosives Inventory Completion

The 2023 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) annual explosives inventory was executed from May 18, 2023 to September 27, 2023 and was verified for accuracy effective September 28, 2023 following the LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan. This year’s annual inventory includes changes incorporated based on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report DOE-OIG-20-50, The Department of Energy’s Storage and Disposition of Explosives Material at Selected Sites, dated July of 2020. Based on the associated recommendations, explosives at DOE and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) sites are considered "sensitive personal property" and applicable inventories must comply with 41 CFR 109, Personal Property Management. This regulation adds additional stipulations which require the annual inventory to include accountability of the total site inventory. In addition, the inventory must be performed by personnel other than the property owner, or alternatively must include independent verification. The development of the inventory plan was agreed to by the LLNL Explosives Safety Committee in conjunction with the LLNL Property and Business Division Leader. The LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan was reviewed and approved by the DOE Explosives Safety Committee Chair on May 17, 2023 and by the NNSA Property Management Office on May 25, 2023.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2020

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: (Jan 1 - Dec 31 2018)

During the late 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted a series of safety experiments to determine if a nuclear device subjected to a large conventional explosives detonation would result in a nuclear yield. The AEC obtained temporary use of a large portion of western Emigrant Valley from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for one of these experiments: Project 57. Following the Project 57 safety experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Emigrant Valley is part of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). For safety and security reasons, access to the NTTR is controlled using both physical (i.e., fences) and administrative (e.g., signs and postings) controls. Therefore, the public cannot access the Project 57 site and there are no known human receptors that routinely access the site. Project 57 was detonated on April 24, 1957, in Emigrant Valley approximately 13 mi (21 km) northeast of the north end of Yucca Flat. This test was undertaken to develop: (1) a means of estimating immediate distribution and long-term redistribution of plutonium dispersed during a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in likely plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of decontaminating ground areas, pavements, and building materials; and (4) alpha survey instruments and field monitoring procedures to promptly estimate contaminant deposition. Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the ground surface. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area since Project 57 was conducted. The AEC delineated the area containing radioactive material based on radioactivity surveys performed shortly after the test was conducted. A designated Contamination Area (CA), marked by a fence, was established later. The distribution of americium-241 (Am-241) in the area was determined again in a 1997 flyover, which showed Am-241 ranging from as much as 70,000 counts per second (cps) at ground zero to background (<70 cps). This survey also documented Am-241 radioactivity on the ground surface beyond the east side CA fence at levels of up to 150 cps. In 2007, the DOE expanded the CA by posting “Contamination Area” signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) beyond the original fence, which formed a new CA boundary.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Abatement Case Study

Radioxenon emissions from industrial sources such as fission based medical isotope production (MIP) facilities and nuclear reactors are generally known to be well below levels of public health and safety concern. However, the global background of radioxenon produced by MIP interferes with nuclear explosion monitoring by the International Monitoring System (IMS) developed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (CTBTO, 2024). It was calculated that xenon emissions levels of 5×10 9 Bq/day 133 Xe were low enough to have minimal impact on International Monitoring System (IMS) stations (Bowyer et al, 2013). There are several technologies currently used to abate radioactive xenon emissions to meet regulatory release levels, and some alternative methods have been investigated to reduce xenon release levels well below required regulatory levels (Doll et al, 2014, Gueibe, et al, 2014). While MIP producers are sympathetic to the issue of radioxenon interference with IMS monitoring, the cost to implement and maintain additional abatement systems has resulted in limited implementation. Therefore, more cost-effective options for xenon abatement are needed to help reduce the impact of these emissions on nuclear explosion monitoring.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
NASA NTRS1975

Selected technology for the gas industry

A number of papers were presented at a conference concerned with the application of technical topics from aerospace activities for the gas industry. The following subjects were covered: general future of fossil fuels in America, exploration for fossil and nuclear fuels from orbital altitudes, technology for liquefied gas, safety considerations relative to fires, explosions, and detonations, gas turbomachinery technology, fluid properties, fluid flow, and heat transfer, NASA information and documentation systems, instrumentation and measurement, materials and life prediction, reliability and quality assurance, and advanced energy systems (including synthetic fuels, energy storage, solar energy, and wind energy).

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

CISME report on experiments with HMX powder, PBX 9501 prills, and heated PBX 9501

The ability to predict post-ignition explosive response is relevant to explosives safety, particularly weapons assembly/disassembly operations that must operate under a sufficiently conservative safety basis to meet risk mitigation criteria for inadvertent nuclear detonation (IND). In particular, hazard determinations hinge on whether the PBX 9501 main charge can ultimately attain detonation from an initial, non-shock, ignition stimulus. The CISME experiment uses a spherical explosive charge, which is thermally ignited in the center using a fiber-delivered infrared laser pulse. This ignition mechanism - i.e. a localized thermal hotspot - is representative of the ignition-causing insults typical in accident scenarios, including low-velocity impact, drop, skid, and punch events. In fiscal year 2018 CISME experiments were conducted with pristine PBX 9501 spheres, confined and unconfined. Sub-detonative, low-violence reactions were observed. Here we report experiments conducted since 2018. The explosive charge was varied: experiments were conducted with room temperature pour-density HMX powder and prills of PBX 9501, and heated, thermally damaged PBX 9501. Experiments were conducted in a confined configuration, with two 4 mm-thick stainless-steel hemispherical shells bolted around the sphere. Detonation, via DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition) was observed in the 3-inch diameter powdered HMX and the 6-inch diameter heated and thermally-damaged PBX 9501 tests. No transition to DDT was observed in smaller diameters for those configurations, and no DDT was observed for pour-density prills of PBX 9501 of any diameter. The original test series demonstrated that the response of pristine, undamaged PBX 9501 to a central ignition is relatively benign. This new test series shows that increased porosity, lack of polymer binders and thermal damage can greatly increase the violence of the post-ignition response, up to and including detonation. These results bridge the explosive response of PBX 9501 from sub-detonative through detonation as a function of diameter and provide valuable test cases for modeling efforts that strive to capture the DDT threshold. By exploring explosive response in a more representative 3D geometry, we can also benchmark these new results to more plentiful DDT datasets generated from testing in 1D tube confinement (the historical test configuration)–the configuration upon which almost all DDT models were developed.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Estimating Explosion Yields Using Moment Tensor Solutions and Seismic Moment

We report seismic moment, a measurable and well-understood quantity of seismic sources, is used to estimate the yield of explosions. Application of such a method in the past, as in the manner of m b -derived yields, has been complicated by the effect of variations in the explosion working point, depth, and secondary source effects (such as spalling and tectonic release) on the observed moment. We start using the full (six-element) moment tensor solution, which can capture the relevant source physics and, at least in theory, better isolate the primary explosion source. The moment-to-yield ratio is then estimated using an explosion source model which, provided with emplacement conditions, can relate the two parameters. We discuss the major sources of uncertainty associated with the method, and calibrate it with chemical and nuclear explosions at the Nevada National Security Site. We then apply the method to published moment tensor solutions for the six declared North Korean nuclear explosions that occurred between 2006 and 2017. The results are mostly consistent with other yield estimates made using a variety of high-frequency methods. This technique is a new approach to estimating explosive yield and simple to implement, as much of the complexity is captured by the source models.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Office of Nuclear Verification FY 2023 Quarterly Report TSVT Q1

This project encompasses the continued development and training of a U.S. operational team, the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT), supporting verification of nuclear testing activities. TSVT builds on decades of U.S. nuclear testing history and nuclear explosion monitoring experience. The Team maintains readiness to deploy internationally on short notice to provide field-based support of verification of declared or undeclared nuclear testing and associated activities, as well as follow-on activities including monitoring and capability disablement and dismantlement, as established by negotiated agreement or treaty. The roles and structure of the TSVT are integrated with other NA-243 deployable verification teams and the interagency. FY23 TSVT activities focus on continued capability buildup within the team, including Team trainings and exercises with a focus on missions in confined spaces (e.g., tunnels, mines, other underground facilities), increased familiarity with foreign nuclear weapons testing programs, demonstration of Team capacity to deploy, train, and practice sustained OPSEC in non-western locations, establishment of sustainable storage and maintenance of equipment, specification and procurement of additional equipment to support field observations, further evolution of concepts of operation documents (CONOPs), and mission coordination with Headquarters and associated Stakeholders. Activities will culminate with a full-scale domestic team exercise at the end of FY23 focusing on underground activities signatures/observations and safety including advanced outdoor safety and familiarity in working around explosive test environments. In addition, we will be further articulating approaches and capacity relevant to the identification of nuclear tests, as well as monitoring of nuclear testing activities and/or dismantlement of nuclear test sites and anticipate developing additional equipment requests in support of this evolution. The TSVT Team Leads will also coordinate with its Senior Advisor, the TSVT Logistics and Readiness (L&R) Training Lead, and NNSA Headquarters to draft a five-year TSVT training and exercise plan, that strategically and incrementally builds capacity and expertise in key areas of significance for the continuum of nuclear and nuclear-related testing activities that fall within the team’s mission space.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2015

BILLIARDS: A Demonstration Mission for Hundred-Meter Class Near Earth Asteroid Disruption

Currently, no planetary defense demonstration mission has ever been flown. While Nuclear Explosive Devices (NEDs) have significantly more energy than a kinetic impactor launched directly from Earth, they present safety and political complications, and therefore may only be used when absolutely necessary. The Baseline Instrumented Lithology Lander, Inspector, and Asteroid Redirection Demonstration System (BILLIARDS) is a demonstration mission for planetary defense, which is capable of delivering comparable energy to the lower range of NED capabilities in the form of a safer kinetic impactor. A small asteroid (<10m) is captured by a spacecraft, which greatly increases the mass available as a kinetic impactor, without the need to bring all of the mass out of Earth's gravity well. The small asteroid is then deflected onto a collision course with a larger (approx. 100m) asteroid. This collision will deflect or disrupt the larger asteroid. To reduce the cost and complexity, an asteroid pair which has a natural close approach is selected.

Planetary Defense↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Sensitivity of PBX 9502 to Drilling Operations

Polymer-bonded explosive (PBX) 9502 (95% TATB, 5% Kel-F 800 by weight) is dry-drilled on a CNC milling machine and its thermomechanical response to varying feed rates, drilling speeds, and peck depths with 4 mm and 5 mm diameter drill bits is investigated. The tested samples are affixed to a force sensor that enables recording temporally resolved cutting forces and torques, and a drill-embedded thermocouple yields local temperature data. From the data, an empirical relationship between temperature changes and feed per revolution is developed, which reveals reduced temperatures in higher feed per revolution regimes for PBX 9502. The observed relationship allows extrapolating to temperatures for other hole diameters, indicating increased temperature for smaller diameter drilling across the board. Additional testing was performed with PBX 9501 (95% HMX, 2.5% Estane®, 2.5% BDNPA/BDNPF by weight), albeit over a reduced parameter space, which revealed the opposite behavior for the feed per revolution temperature dependence. It is concluded that both PBX 9502 and PBX 9501 can be dry-drilled efficiently beyond the limits of presently applicable US-DOE standards, where cutting interface temperatures remain far below material critical temperatures. Finally, data reveals that coolant usage in the drilling process for these materials provides a wide safety margin.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI1994

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1994

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1987

Space reactor assessment and validation study

The present difficulties experienced by the United States in launching payloads into space has suggested a number of problems which are associated with the handling of hazardous materials in spacecraft. The question has arisen as to the safety of launching highly radioactive material such as plutonium-238, related to the possibility of its dispersion into the atmosphere during a launch vehicle explosion. An alternative is the use of a small nuclear reactor which is not started until it is in space and contains little or no radioactivity at launch. A first order assessment of six small reactor concepts with power levels up to 100 MWe was performed. Both the nuclear feasibility of these concepts to operate at their rated power levels between 7 and 10 years and the capability of these concepts to remain subcritical both before and during launch and also in the case of water immersion during a potential launch failure or abort were investigated.

Gedeon, Stephen↗