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NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection

Adaptive Mission Assurance (AMA) – A Conceptual Guide for NASA Missions

NASA is well acquainted with and skilled in conducting Risk Class A Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA). Class A missions are characterized as having highly specific performance with an ultra-low risk tolerance for risk and mission failure. But space is rapidly changing, and the space enterprise is challenged to pursue faster more agile mission developments with fewer resources and directed schedules. To meet this demand mission development teams face accepting more risk and trading performance within strict cost and schedule constraints. In responding to this challenge, The Aerospace Corporation has evolved the Adaptive Mission Assurance (AMA) approach. The benefit of an “adaptive” approach is most realized for smaller Research and Development (R&D), or Science and Technology (S&T) demonstration missions constrained by significantly smaller budgets and directed schedules. The challenge for these “risk tolerant, constraints-driven” missions is how to identify the most valuable mission assurance tasks that will fit within strict budgetary and schedule constraints for “gracefully” accepting risk that still achieves an agreeable expectation of mission success. AMA can respond to this challenge with little to no impact to team staffing or existing workload. This conceptual guide introduces AMA as a potential implementation for NASA Risk Class D and Sub-Class D missions.

Douglas A. Harris

Preparing to Assure Mission Success

Space flight missions are inherently risky. The mission operations assurance discipline grew out of strategies to control error and evolved into what today is an independent technical authority dedicated to achieving mission success. After the Mars Climate Orbiter loss, NASA made a set of recommendations for missions. Two of those recommendations led to the creation of today’s Mission Operations Assurance Manager role: (1) require an independent Mission Assurance representative during the operational phase of every flight project, and (2) require all flight projects to report and track post-launch anomalies. Since then, the MOAM role has been continually refined by lessons learned from its practice on more than 20 concurrent missions. The MOAM role requires significant operations experience as well as an additional set of skills. In the interests of developing a cadre of potential MOAMs, the MOAM training program was developed. It is a 14-unit set of presentations/discussions covering the 11 categories of MOAM tasks. It is offered to new MOAMs and interested systems engineers with an eye to preparing both types of personnel for present and future assignments, as well as building relationships among personnel of different organizations. MOAM training sessions include presentations on the various tools and processes employed by MOAMs, interspersed with mindset lessons illustrated via “war story” discussions of previous missions.

Bryant, Larry

Standards Roadmapping for Mission Assurance in Commercial Spaceflight

This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.

Enterprise Systems Engineering

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

Johnson, Teresa A.

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro

Quality Interaction Between Mission Assurance and Project Team Members

Mission Assurance independent assessments started during the development cycle and continued through post launch operations. In operations, Health and Safety of the Observatory is of utmost importance. Therefore, Mission Assurance must ensure requirements compliance and focus on process improvements required across the operational systems including new/modified products, tools, and procedures. The deployment of the interactive model involves three objectives: Team member Interaction, Good Root Cause Analysis Practices, and Risk Assessment to avoid reoccurrences. In applying this model, we use a metric based measurement process and was found to have the most significant effect, which points to the importance of focuses on a combination of root cause analysis and risk approaches allowing the engineers the ability to prioritize and quantify their corrective actions based on a well-defined set of root cause definitions (i.e. closure criteria for problem reports), success criteria and risk rating definitions.

quality

Mission Assurance: A Model-Based Approach

The purpose of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory is to ensure mission safety and success. As the complexity of technical systems increases, the tools, processes, and infrastructure used to facilitate SMA activities must evolve. A transition from a document-centric approach to a data-driven, model-based architecture is critical in allowing SMA efforts to grapple with complex system designs. This work describes how a sample subset of existing SMA processes can be executed in a model-based environment, while also describing ways in which a model-based architecture can further augment SMA efforts. One key aspect is supporting the complex interplay between the different SMA processes and the systems engineering effort to provide additional insight into the system from an SMA perspective. The proposed architecture for model-based mission assurance provides an avenue for assuring mission safety and success in increasingly complex systems.

Schreiner, Samuel S.

Final Report of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Agile Benchmarking Team

To ensure that the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) community remains in a position to perform reliable Software Assurance (SA) on NASAs critical software (SW) systems with the software industry rapidly transitioning from waterfall to Agile processes, Terry Wilcutt, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) established the Agile Benchmarking Team (ABT). The Team's tasks were: 1. Research background literature on current Agile processes, 2. Perform benchmark activities with other organizations that are involved in software Agile processes to determine best practices, 3. Collect information on Agile-developed systems to enable improvements to the current NASA standards and processes to enhance their ability to perform reliable software assurance on NASA Agile-developed systems, 4. Suggest additional guidance and recommendations for updates to those standards and processes, as needed. The ABT's findings and recommendations for software management, engineering and software assurance are addressed herein.

Software Assurance

Assured Mission Support Space Architecture (AMSSA) study

The assured mission support space architecture (AMSSA) study was conducted with the overall goal of developing a long-term requirements-driven integrated space architecture to provide responsive and sustained space support to the combatant commands. Although derivation of an architecture was the focus of the study, there are three significant products from the effort. The first is a philosophy that defines the necessary attributes for the development and operation of space systems to ensure an integrated, interoperable architecture that, by design, provides a high degree of combat utility. The second is the architecture itself; based on an interoperable system-of-systems strategy, it reflects a long-range goal for space that will evolve as user requirements adapt to a changing world environment. The third product is the framework of a process that, when fully developed, will provide essential information to key decision makers for space systems acquisition in order to achieve the AMSSA goal. It is a categorical imperative that military space planners develop space systems that will act as true force multipliers. AMSSA provides the philosophy, process, and architecture that, when integrated with the DOD requirements and acquisition procedures, can yield an assured mission support capability from space to the combatant commanders. An important feature of the AMSSA initiative is the participation by every organization that has a role or interest in space systems development and operation. With continued community involvement, the concept of the AMSSA will become a reality. In summary, AMSSA offers a better way to think about space (philosophy) that can lead to the effective utilization of limited resources (process) with an infrastructure designed to meet the future space needs (architecture) of our combat forces.

Hamon, Rob

Identifying Where Mission Assurance Can Benefit from Model Based Systems Engineering

Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is being introduced and used to support many aspects of the engineering of complex systems. Our focus is on space systems, with a particular interest in Mission Assurance of those systems. We seek to identify where Mission Assurance can potentially benefit when a space system is developed using an MBSE approach. To do so we consider how MBSE can help provide the evidence that Mission Assurance needs, using the recently developed NASA Reliability and Maintainability Objective Hierarchy as the exposition of those needs. We illustrate this MBSE’s potential contributions using examples drawn from our prior survey of the MBSE literature addressing space mission assurance concerns. The overall conclusion we draw from this is that there are numerous ways in which MBSE may, and in some cases already does, support Mission Assurance.

Feather, Martin S.

Mission Assurance Modeling and Simulation: A Cyber Security Roadmap

This paper proposes a cyber security modeling and simulation roadmap to enhance mission assurance governance and establish risk reduction processes within constrained budgets. The term mission assurance stems from risk management work by Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute in the late 19905. By 2010, the Defense Information Systems Agency revised its cyber strategy and established the Program Executive Officer-Mission Assurance. This highlights a shift from simply protecting data to balancing risk and begins a necessary dialogue to establish a cyber security roadmap. The Military Operations Research Society has recommended a cyber community of practice, recognizing there are too few professionals having both cyber and analytic experience. The authors characterize the limited body of knowledge in this symbiotic relationship. This paper identifies operational and research requirements for mission assurance M&S supporting defense and homeland security. M&S techniques are needed for enterprise oversight of cyber investments, test and evaluation, policy, training, and analysis.

Gendron, Gerald

Model Based Mission Assurance: NASA's Assurance Future

Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is seeing increased application in planning and design of NASA’s missions. This suggests the question: what will be the corresponding practice of Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)? Contemporaneously, NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evaluating a new objectives based approach to standards to ensure that the Safety and Mission Assurance disciplines and programs are addressing the challenges of NASA’s changing missions, acquisition and engineering practices, and technology. MBSE is a prominent example of a changing engineering practice. We use NASA’s objectives-based strategy for Reliability and Maintainability as a means to examine how MBSE will affect assurance. We surveyed MBSE literature to look specifically for these affects, and find a variety of them discussed (some are anticipated, some are reported from applications to date). Predominantly these apply to the early stages of design, although there are also extrapolations of how MBSE practices will have benefits for testing phases. As the effort to develop MBMA continues, it will need to clearly and unambiguously establish the roles of uncertainty and risk in the system model. This will enable a variety of uncertainty-based analyses to be performed much more rapidly than ever before and has the promise to increase the integration of CRM (Continuous Risk Management) and PRA (Probabilistic Risk Analyses) even more fully into the project development life cycle. Various views and viewpoints will be required for assurance disciplines, and an over-arching viewpoint will then be able to more completely characterize the state of the project/program as well as (possibly) enabling the safety case approach for overall risk awareness and communication.

Evans, John

GSFC Safety and Mission Assurance Organization

This viewgraph presentation reviews NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's approach to safety and mission assurance. The contents include: 1) NASA GSFC Background; 2) Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate; 3) The Role of SMA-D and the Technical Authority; 4) GSFC Mission assurance Requirements; 5) GSFC Systems Review Office (SRO); 6) GSFC Supply Chain Management Program; and 7) GSFC ISO9001/AS9100 Status Brief.

Kelly, Michael P.