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Accident mitigation based safety adequacy evaluation is anticipated to be less costly and time consuming than accident prevention for molten salt reactors due characteristics of the reactor class. The presentation provides an overview of the technical basis for developing accident mitigation-based regulatory guidance for future commercial molten salt reactor nuclear power plants.
This report summarizes spreading and heat transfer results calculated using MELTSPREAD for a scenario of molten FLiNaK spilling onto a flat stainless steel substrate that was inspired by the “maximum credible accident” scenario of the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE). MELTSPREAD was developed at Argonne to model the one-dimensional flowing and freezing of molten corium and was applied to model molten salts for the first time during FY21. The molten salt MELTSPREAD model that was developed during FY21 was updated as part of this work using a corrected heat of fusion value of FLiNaK and to accommodate a larger salt spill volume. The model was run with and without the inclusion of contributions from decay heat and a sensitivity analysis of initial spill conditions was performed to determine the importance of those factors on model outcome. The results provide insight into the expected spreading and heat transfer behavior of simulated and irradiated fuel salt that has been spilled and indicate aspects of the model to be revised in future versions of the MELTSPREAD model for applications to molten salt.
The Lewis Research Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration proposes to build a nuclear research reactor which will be located in the Plum Brook Ordnance Works near Sandusky, Ohio. The purpose of this report is to inform the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission in regard to the design Lq of the reactor facility, the characteristics of the site, and the hazards of operation at this location. The purpose of this research reactor is to make pumped loop studies of aircraft reactor fuel elements and other reactor components, radiation effects studies on aircraft reactor materials and equipment, shielding studies, and nuclear and solid state physics experiments. The reactor is light water cooled and moderated of the MTR-type with a primary beryllium reflector and a secondary water reflector. The core initially will be a 3 by 9 array of MTR-type fuel elements and is designed for operation up to a power of 60 megawatts. The reactor facility is described in general terms. This is followed by a discussion of the nuclear characteristics and performance of the reactor. Then details of the reactor control system are discussed. A summary of the site characteristics is then presented followed by a discussion of the larger type of experiments which may eventually be operated in this facility. The considerations for normal operation are concluded with a proposed method of handling fuel elements and radioactive wastes. The potential hazards involved with failures or malfunctions of this facility are considered in some detail. These are examined first from the standpoint of preventing them or minimizing their effects and second from the standpoint of what effect they might have on the reactor facility staff and the surrounding population. The most essential feature of the design for location at the proposed site is containment of the maximum credible accident.
The object of this study is to provide an estimate of bounding radionuclide releases from a nuclear power plant accident. The time frame of interest is the release phase from the initiating event through 30 days. The maximum credible initiating event includes an initial failure of the containment function with a primary system leak. All estimates include a complete loss-of-onsite power and no successful mitigative actions. The active safety injection systems are also assumed failed. The review considers the following commonly deployed reactor designs in the following order of interest: RBMK 1000, VVER-440, VVER-1000, 1000 MWe PWR, 1000 MWe BWR, BN-800, and the 600 MWe CANDU/PHWR. The review also considers spent fuel pool accident scenarios.
The LBNF Absorber consists of thirteen 6061-T6 aluminum core blocks. The core blocks are water cooled with de-ionized (DI) water which becomes radioactive during beam operations. The cooling water flows through gun-drilled channels in the core blocks. The cooling water is supplied by the LBNF Absorber Radioactive Water (RAW) cooling system which is designed as per ASME B31.3 Normal Fluid Service [1]. An uninhibited beam accident pulse striking the water channels was identified as a credible accident scenario. In this study, it is assumed that the beam pulse hits the Absorber directly without interacting with any of the other upstream beamline components. The beam parameters used for the LBNF beam are 120 GeV, 2.4 MW with a 1.2 s cycle time. The accident pulse lasts for 10 μs. The maximum energy is deposited in the 3rd aluminum core block. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the accident pulse strikes the 1 in. ID water channel directly. The analysis here simulates the pressure rise in the water during and after the beam pulse and its effects on the aluminum piping components that deliver water to the core blocks. The weld strengths as determined by the Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRDF) and the Allowable Strength Design (ASD) are compared to the forces generated in the weld owing to the pressure spike. A transient structural analysis was used to determine the equivalent membrane, peak, and bending stresses and they were com-pared to allowable limits.
he LBNF absorber consists of thirteen 6061-T6 aluminum core blocks. The core blocks are water cooled with de-ionized (DI) water which becomes radioactive during beam operations. The cooling water flows through gun-drilled channels in the core blocks. The cooling water is supplied by the LBNF absorber radioactive water (RAW) cooling system which is designed as per ASME B31.3 normal fluid service. An uninhibited beam accident pulse striking the water channels was identified as a credible accident scenario. In this study, it is assumed that the beam pulse hits the absorber directly without interacting with any of the other upstream beamline components. The beam parameters used for the LBNF beam are 120 GeV, 2.4 MW with a 1.2 s cycle time. The accident pulse lasts for 10 µs. The maximum energy is deposited in the 3rd aluminum core block. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the accident pulse strikes the 1 in. ID water channel directly. The analysis here simulates the pressure rise in the water during and after the beam pulse and its effects on the aluminum piping components that deliver water to the core blocks. The weld strengths as determined by the Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRDF) and the Allowable Strength Design (ASD) are compared to the forces generated in the weld owing to the pressure spike. A transient structural analysis was used to determine the equivalent membrane, peak, and bending stresses and they were compared to allowable limits.
The objective of this paper is to present a method for importance analysis in parametric probabilistic modeling where the result of interest is the identification of potential engineering vulnerabilities associated with postulated anomalies in system behavior. In the context of Accident Precursor Analysis (APA), under which this method has been developed, these vulnerabilities, designated as anomaly vulnerabilities, are conditions that produce high risk in the presence of anomalous system behavior. The method defines a parameter-specific Parameter Vulnerability Importance measure (PVI), which identifies anomaly risk-model parameter values that indicate the potential presence of anomaly vulnerabilities, and allows them to be prioritized for further investigation. This entails analyzing each uncertain risk-model parameter over its credible range of values to determine where it produces the maximum risk. A parameter that produces high system risk for a particular range of values suggests that the system is vulnerable to the modeled anomalous conditions, if indeed the true parameter value lies in that range. Thus, PVI analysis provides a means of identifying and prioritizing anomaly-related engineering issues that at the very least warrant improved understanding to reduce uncertainty, such that true vulnerabilities may be identified and proper corrective actions taken.
NASA has considered the use of mercury ion bombardment engines as extra-terrestrial propulsion systems where low thrust must be provided for long periods of time. However, the mercury fuel in these engines may pose a hazard if it is accidentally released to the troposphere. A description is presented of diffusion-model estimates of maximum 10-minute and 24-hour ground-level concentrations that could result from the accidental release of mercury from Titan/Centaur and Space Shuttle/Tug transportation systems. Three types of accidental release modes have been considered in the concentration calculations. For all three modes, the diffusion-model calculations were made for a variety of meteorological conditions in an effort to obtain estimates of the maximum credible concentrations under 'worst-case' conditions.
The commercial nuclear industry is pursuing advancements in fuel and reactor design that increase the uranium enrichment above 5 wt. % 235 U. These advancements will necessitate the ability to transport bulk quantities of UF 6 at increased enrichments. Currently, the 30B cylinder is the primary container used by the industry for UF 6 storage and transportation and has a long history of successful shipments. This container can support up to 2,277 kg of UF 6 at a maximum enrichment of 5 wt. % 235 U. Previous evaluations have assessed the potential impact of criticality safety for 30B transport at higher enrichments but assumed moderator intrusion would not require evaluation. Although current regulations allow for the exception of moderator intrusion for UF 6 packages through the design and quality control of the package content, this exception is limited to enrichments up to 5 wt. % 235 U. Thus, an investigation of moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder should be performed. Moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder is a unique condition for criticality safety evaluation in transportation because of the violent chemical reactions that occur between UF 6 and H 2 O. The resulting intrusion is strongly dependent on the breach size, breach location, breach interface solid/ullage of the UF 6 content, the UF 6 distribution (which is temperature dependent), and temperature/pressure conditions which are dynamic in accident conditions. Additionally, the complexity of the HF-UO 2 F 2 -H 2 O interface that occurs during the event can influence the potential solubility of uranium in the system, as well as influence the amount of UF 6 reaction with H 2 O. With the operating experience from Orano Federal Services LLC, the UF 6 chemical expertise from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the criticality safety expertise from ORNL, this paper evaluates the neutronic conditions (i.e., k eff ) that apply the understood chemistry and experimental conditions that occur during moderator intrusion of a breached 30B cylinder under postulated accidents. This report examines the historical evaluations of UF 6 transport and expands these evaluations for the enrichments expected for nuclear industry advancement. These simulations primarily feature a homogeneous mixture of UF 6 and H 2 O as an infinite media system and as a sphere with water reflection given an impurity limit of 0.5 wt. % UF 6 . This report demonstrates that this H/U limit is valid up to 8 wt. % enrichment for both H 2 O and HF as the moderating mixture. The water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres evaluated demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. Additionally, this report evaluates moderator ingress scenarios of a 30B cylinder. The 30B cylinder simulations vary the cylinder orientation, the mass of UF 6 in the system, the mass of H 2 O in the system, and how much H 2 O has reacted with UF 6 . The moderator ingress of a 30B cylinder was evaluated for the water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres to demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. These simulations are standard practice and are independent of the UF 6 -H 2 O reaction. This work also explored more complex simulations that layer the H 2 O over the UF 6 , which incorporates the amount of reacted UF 6 as a separate layer and considers solubility limits of UO 2 F 2 in H 2 O as it is produced. This approach is intended to simulate the postulated event of a large hairline crack occurring on a submerged cylinder. Finally, this work considers the potential of H 2 O mixing into the UF 6 solid heterogeneously using a sponge-like model. The water ingress into the UF 6 is treated as random size spheres, and the reaction products form into a layer over the spheres.