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Electricity systems around the world are decarbonizing, driven by reductions in the cost of renewable energy and encouraged by supportive regulatory policy. Electricity market designs are increasingly being tested to ensure that the bulk power system can deliver reliable, cost-effective energy to all consumers.
The following paper reviews various market design issues that will need to be reconsidered due to anticipated changes in the resources that supply energy in wholesale electricity markets. As the energy supply continues towards decarbonization, the change in resource technologies will affect the fundamentals of production scheduling and the policies to address supply variability and uncertainty. We show through simple numerical examples that the existing market design approach based on fuel costs will result in $0/MWh prices with intermittent price spikes during reserve shortages, but that incorporating more granular reserve pricing, energy storage participation, and price-responsive demand participation can restore efficient market clearing with reasonable pricing outcomes. The market design approach fundamentally shifts from fuel based to opportunity cost based. We briefly review alternative market design frameworks that can support this shift, including intraday markets, decentralized markets, flexibility options, and swing contracts. Market designs may also be required to accommodate or support various out-of-market policies and agreements; ideally, these external factors can be integrated into the market design to facilitate efficient exchanges across longer time scales, between other markets, and in support of public policy goals. The paper concludes by discussing how decarbonization trends may affect the design and use of production cost models for short term operations and long term planning studies.
Well-designed electricity markets play a crucial role in maintaining reliable electric power systems, which are critical in modern society. Here, this study examines the impact of different electricity market designs and clean energy incentive schemes on supporting renewable energy integration and achieving clean energy goals. To this end, we utilize a game-theoretical generation expansion planning model where generation companies make investment and retirement decisions to maximize their expected profit. The model is structured as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and solved using a diagonalization approach combined with progressive hedging. We analyze three types of electricity market designs: an energy-only market, a capacity market, and a clean energy market, and consider a wide range of market parameters resulting in 14 total scenarios. Wind and solar capacity comprise the majority of new investments in all considered scenarios, but the resultant system planning reserve margin (PRM) can differ significantly depending on market parameters. We also find that profit-driven investments lead to lower PRMs than a traditional system cost minimization approach. These individual scenario results further demonstrate how different market designs and clean energy incentive schemes may influence investor decision-making and impact resource adequacy throughout the clean energy transition.
This document provides various model formulations that will be implemented for the Energy Storage Participation Algorithm pilot competition (ESPA-Comp). This competition will assess the performance of different storage offer algorithms in terms of their ability to maximize the value of storage resources participating under various market designs that vary in the range of complexity of possible storage offers. The model formulations include a general market clearing optimization model and specification to implement it in various market designs. We provide specifications for three market designs to be tested in ESPA-Comp, which we call the two-settlement, multi-settlement, and rolling horizon forward markets. The market designs include different trading frequencies and offer formats. Storage resources participating in the market are provided with primitive values for the resource’s physical capabilities, and they are provided with a storage offer format that their algorithms will be tasked with populating. A detailed physical model is used to assess each storage resource’s ability to maintain its scheduled dispatch according to its state-of-charge, operating temperature, and power conversion efficiency.
A novel peer-to-peer (P2P) market design is proposed in this work for the distribution grid level. Envisioning that the grid constraints violations are the major challenge for P2P energy sharing, we propose they are handled through the ancillary service (AS) market. By calculating the decomposable distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs), the essential price signals of procuring AS can be recovered to determine the grid usage prices (GUPs) to each P2P transaction. Hence, the GUPs, due to their decomposable properties, act as incentive signals for the P2P market to support the grid operation in terms of loss reduction, voltage support and congestion management. The proposed market design comprises: i) an interactive market design of P2P trade & AS and, ii) a fully decentralized peer-centric market clearing model for P2P energy trade. The duality analysis provides the composition of market equilibrium prices of P2P trading and their interpretations. The case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed P2P trade to support grid operational objectives.
This report explores the concept of gate closure, the time at which market participants must submit their final bids and offers for electricity. Gate closure is typically considered a minor feature of market design, but its implementation could be pivotal to how power markets will operate under high penetrations of renewable energy. This report analyzes global experiences with gate closure, and then reviews the unique benefits, challenges, and other considerations that will impact the implementation of gate closure in the Indian electricity market.
This report provides a comprehensive review of challenges, research needs, and potential solutions for competitive wholesale electricity market design in deeply decarbonized power systems. We provide context regarding how competitive wholesale electricity markets can evolve in a longer-term perspective to ensure that they still operate efficiently throughout the transition to a deeply decarbonized future. We organize the discussion across seven topics: operational reliability, emerging technology integration, adequacy and resilience, price formation, interactions across transmission and distribution systems, transmission planning, achieving clean energy objectives, and challenges associated with cost-effectively achieving clean energy objectives. In each section we first identify key associated challenges before proposing a set of corresponding solutions and research needs.
Electricity markets are at a crossroads - join the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory for an exclusive one-hour workshop where you'll engage directly with the project team and help shape the rules for a potential prize. This competition could redefine how electricity markets support renewables and storage resources and create innovative solutions for the challenges ahead. NREL has also issued a Request for Information (RFI) to gather feedback and gauge interest in this potential prize. Whether or not you attend the workshop, we encourage you to review the brief presentation and share your thoughts through the RFI.
This report contributes to the body of literature by reviewing key challenges for competitive wholesale electricity market design in deeply decarbonized power systems and establishing potential solutions and associated research needs. We provide a long-term perspective on ways in which competitive wholesale electricity markets can evolve to ensure that they still operate efficiently throughout the transition to a deeply decarbonized future. In this report, we use the term “deep decarbonization” to refer broadly to systems that generate nearly all their electricity from zero-carbon or carbon-neutral resources, while recognizing that there are many potential configurations of such systems. We also stress that many of these issues will arise to varying degrees as systems move toward full decarbonization, even if they are not truly 100% carbon-free.
Wholesale electricity markets are intended to incentivize system generation investments and operations outcomes that meet evolving system needs. In this work, we evaluate the effectiveness of wholesale market structures, rules and policies in achieving system resource adequacy (RA) and clean energy targets in the presence of self-interested generation investors using the Electricity Markets and Investment Suite Agent-based Simulation (EMIS-AS) model. Results highlight that both capacity markets and operating reserve demand curves (ORDCs) can help achieve a reliable system but with different RA compliance timelines and distribution of generation technologies. Structures with capacity markets tend to favor more capital-intensive peaking technologies while reducing wind and solar build-outs due to suppressed energy and clean energy market prices, particularly in the absence of strong clean energy targets. Conversely, ORDCs improve the commitment of available generation units, but this comes at the expense of higher system costs and renewable generation curtailment. We also find that well-calibrated static capacity demand curves can yield similar reliability and total cost compared to capacity market demand curves informed dynamically by resource adequacy while also yielding stable annual capacity prices. Different approaches to formulating ORDC curves can also yield key trade-offs, namely that a more efficient treatment of storage chronology results in lower ORDC curves and prices, yielding less investment and cost but at the expense of reliability. Finally, the effectiveness of wholesale electricity markets in practically achieving very high clean energy generation targets highly depends on the cost-competitiveness of clean energy technologies that can support critical balancing needs across multiple timescales.
This paper presents an inter-microgrid peer-topeer (P2P) transactive market mechanism to support the coordination of multiple microgrids in a mixed-ownership environment, while enabling prosumers to actively participate in the market to get their own benefits. An equitable P2P transactive energy market is designed, in which the energy burden to customers within microgrids is fairly distributed by leveraging a peer-to-peer communication network among MG owners and the distribution system operator (DSO). To reach the market settlement, a consensus-based distributed optimization algorithm is introduced to enable each MG owner and the DSO to distributedly determine the cleared price which is compensated by a household-income-based discount factor to encourage the energy-burden equity among customers in networked microgrids service territory. Numerical results on the modified 123 node test feeder including 6 microgrids are used to demonstrate the operation of the introduced equitable transactive energy market.
In this paper, we propose a two-stage electricity market framework to explore the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in a day-ahead (DA) market and a real-time (RT) market. The objective is to determine the optimal bidding strategies of the aggregated DERs in the DA market and generate online incentive signals for DER-owners to optimize the social-welfare taking into account network operational constraints. Distributionally robust optimization is used to explicitly incorporate data-based statistical information of renewable forecasts into the supply/demand decisions in the DA market. We evaluate the conservativeness of bidding strategies distinguished by different risk aversion settings. In the RT market, a bi-level time-varying optimization problem is proposed to design the online incentive signals to tradeoff the RT imbalance penalty for distribution system operators (DSOs) and the costs of individual DER-owners. This enables tracking their optimal dispatch to provide fast balancing services, in the presence of time-varying network states while satisfying the voltage regulation requirement. Simulation results on both DA wholesale market and RT balancing market demonstrate the necessity of this two-stage design, and its robustness to uncertainties, the performance of convergence, the tracking ability and the feasibility of the resulting network operations.
As electricity markets begin to shift from reliance on large, centralized power plants and towards distributed energy resources (DERs), there is a growing acknowledgement that more efficient planning, operations, and oversight is needed in the distribution system. This paper addresses one step in that direction by proposing an auction mechanism that uses a detailed distribution system planning model that allocates permits to end-used customers who request capacity to install new devices at their location and network upgrade contracts to utilities or 3rd-party companies who offer to upgrade system components. The resulting plan maximizes market surplus, that is, maximizes the total benefit to consumers minus the cost of network upgrades. We apply a marginal pricing scheme to the auction’s results such that the cost of each permits or contracts is differentiated by time and location, based on the Lagrangian multipliers of binding network constraints. These prices are shown to be no greater than the bid price of any awarded contract and no less than the offered cost of any awarded upgrade contract. Furthermore, the nonlinearity of power flows in the planning model result in an additional surplus that would be collected by the entity that hosts the auction, which could then be refunded to market participants or used to cover overhead costs of running the market. We provide four example auction results in a simple three-node distribution feeder to demonstrate the properties of the design. Results suggest that larger or more realistic case studies could be a promising next step.
An open source test system is developed that permits the dynamic modeling of centrally-managed wholesale power markets operating over highvoltage transmission grids. In default mode, the test system models basic operations in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT): namely, centrally-managed day-ahead and real-time markets operating over successive days, with congestion handled by locational marginal pricing. These basic operational features characterize all seven U.S. energy regions organized as centrally-managed wholesale power markets. Modeled participants include dispatchable generators, load-serving entities, and non-dispatchable generation such as unrmed wind and solar power. Users can congure a broad variety of parameters to study basic market and grid features under alternative system conditions. Users can also easily extend the test system's Java/Python software classes to study modied or newly envisioned market and grid features. Finally, the test system is integrated with a high-level simulation framework that permits it to function as a software component within larger systems, such as multi-country systems or integrated transmission and distribution systems. Finally, detailed test cases with 8-bus and 200-bus transmission grids are reported to illustrate these test system capabilities.
Recent advances in information and communication technologies and smart metering, provides strategic opportunities for ``prosumers" to reform their conventional energy practices towards more consumer-centric economies. From an operational perspective, managing power distribution networks is becoming more difficult with such active grid-edge systems providing limited to no visibility or control. Transactive Energy (TE) has been emerging as a key enabler towards effectively and efficiently integrating prosumers into competitive electricity markets. This work presents a transactive implementation of community-centric markets. A co-simulation framework is developed for evaluating the proposed market structure with high-fidelity models. Case studies on the IEEE-123 node test system demonstrate that community-centric transactive markets can enable communities of prosumers to operate collaboratively as grid-edge systems. The potential benefits of implementing community-centric TE systems are also illustrated.
Future power systems dominated by zero-carbon generation resources may require significant revisions to electricity market designs to ensure capacity adequacy and market efficiency. Here, in this paper, we first conceptually outline key fundamentals underlying electricity market design and price formation in U.S. electricity markets. We then discuss a set of potential market design challenges related to price formation in a grid dominated by zero-carbon resources with marginal cost profiles that differ compared to traditional thermal resources. Next, we review electricity market design solutions that have been proposed in the literature to ensure market efficiency in zero-carbon systems, and the associated implications for price formation. We conclude by summarizing key observations and establishing a set of research questions that should be addressed to improve our understanding of market design, price formation, and market efficiency in zero-carbon power systems.
The goal of this project is to provide Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) a market design and prototyping software, High-Performance Power-Grid Optimization (HIPPO), that they can evaluate electricity market design options, calculate market planning strategies and operational performance. With the high standards and strict reliability requirements for operating power systems, impacts of new technologies need to be fully investigated prior to any consideration for adoption. A market design and prototyping software tool which can be used to prototype electricity market design options, to calculate market planning strategies and operational performance with high precision, and to investigate the impacts for integrating future power grid technologies will be valuable to RTOs/ISOs who operate power systems, to vendors like GE and ABB who provide the market solvers, and to market participants and researchers who are actively doing market research. HIPPO is a such tool that can be used to improve the current market operations and provide capabilities for rigorous forward-looking design and prototyping of next-generation energy markets. HIPPO has a high-resolution model for the day-ahead SCUC, which was validated with MISO and GE-Grid Solutions. HIPPO is built with parallel and distributed computing capabilities and can be executed in both multi-thread and high-performance computing (HPC) settings. This capability provides fast solution speed necessary to handle the larger and more complex SCUC problems of real-world cases and the potentially growing size and complexity of future scenarios. In addition, HIPPO has a concurrent optimizer (CO) which manages multiple algorithm executions simultaneously and leverages the advantages from different algorithms. This structure provides flexibility to better benchmark competing approaches. Highly accurate market model, fast solution technologies and flexible model and algorithm control are the features which will make HIPPO an extensible platform for developing and testing multiple approaches to meet a wide range of future market needs.
Increasing amounts of Variable Renewable Energy Resources (VREs) impact electricity markets and their operation. VREs are intermittent, zero marginal cost resources that tend to displace emissions-intensive generators in electricity dispatch, reducing emissions, but impacting price formation, revenue sufficiency, reliability, and market power mitigation processes of electricity markets. But VREs are not the only factor that affects operational and financial challenges in electricity markets. Declining natural gas prices, changing resource mixes, as well as different electricity market designs and regulatory policies all factor into the challenges both electricity market participants and operators face in today’s electricity markets. With this in-depth examination of electricity markets and related literature review, we aim to inform on key challenges of market design and operation for successful integration of large amounts of zero marginal cost resources. We’ve identified several areas, including VREs impact on price formation, revenue sufficiency, reliability, market power monitoring and mitigation, as well as how state-level incentives and market design impact VREs and these challenges. With each key challenge, we survey the literature to answer the question: To what extent is the problem, and how has it evolved over time? We first conduct a thorough review of ongoing challenges in electricity markets to understand the problem and review the empirical literature to capture important findings on how VREs, specifically, impact the problem. From this review, we highlight metrics that are important to understanding VRE integration and how market designs and outcomes are evolving with increasing levels of VREs. We propose several empirical models for future research to determine the impact of VREs on these identified challenges.