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Identifying and Analyzing Web Server Attacks

Abstract: Client honeypots can be used to identify malicious web servers that attack web browsers and push malware to client machines. Merely recording network traffic is insufficient to perform comprehensive forensic analyses of such attacks. Custom tools are required to access and analyze network protocol data. Moreover, specialized methods are required to perform a behavioral analysis of an attack, which helps determine exactly what transpired on the attacked system. This paper proposes a record/replay mechanism that enables forensic investigators to extract application data from recorded network streams and allows applications to interact with this data in order to conduct behavioral analyses. Implementations for the HTTP and DNS protocols are presented and their utility in network forensic investigations is demonstrated.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Hybrid methods for cybersecurity analysis :

Early 2010 saw a signi cant change in adversarial techniques aimed at network intrusion: a shift from malware delivered via email attachments toward the use of hidden, embedded hyperlinks to initiate sequences of downloads and interactions with web sites and network servers containing malicious software. Enterprise security groups were well poised and experienced in defending the former attacks, but the new types of attacks were larger in number, more challenging to detect, dynamic in nature, and required the development of new technologies and analytic capabilities. The Hybrid LDRD project was aimed at delivering new capabilities in large-scale data modeling and analysis to enterprise security operators and analysts and understanding the challenges of detection and prevention of emerging cybersecurity threats. Leveraging previous LDRD research e orts and capabilities in large-scale relational data analysis, large-scale discrete data analysis and visualization, and streaming data analysis, new modeling and analysis capabilities were quickly brought to bear on the problems in email phishing and spear phishing attacks in the Sandia enterprise security operational groups at the onset of the Hybrid project. As part of this project, a software development and deployment framework was created within the security analyst work ow tool sets to facilitate the delivery and testing of new capabilities as they became available, and machine learning algorithms were developed to address the challenge of dynamic threats. Furthermore, researchers from the Hybrid project were embedded in the security analyst groups for almost a full year, engaged in daily operational activities and routines, creating an atmosphere of trust and collaboration between the researchers and security personnel. The Hybrid project has altered the way that research ideas can be incorporated into the production environments of Sandias enterprise security groups, reducing time to deployment from months and years to hours and days for the application of new modeling and analysis capabilities to emerging threats. The development and deployment framework has been generalized into the Hybrid Framework and incor- porated into several LDRD, WFO, and DOE/CSL projects and proposals. And most importantly, the Hybrid project has provided Sandia security analysts with new, scalable, extensible analytic capabilities that have resulted in alerts not detectable using their previous work ow tool sets.

Dunlavy, Daniel M.↗

Use of Deception to Improve Client Honeypot Detection of Drive-by-Download Attacks

This paper presents the application of deception theory to improve the success of client honeypots at detecting malicious web page attacks from infected servers programmed by online criminals to launch drive-by-download attacks. The design of honeypots faces three main challenges: deception, how to design honeypots that seem real systems; counter-deception, techniques used to identify honeypots and hence defeating their deceiving nature; and counter counter-deception, how to design honeypots that deceive attackers. The authors propose the application of a deception model known as the deception planning loop to identify the current status on honeypot research, development and deployment. The analysis leads to a proposal to formulate a landscape of the honeypot research and planning of steps ahead.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

AIDE - Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment

Would you like to know when someone has dropped an undesirable executable binary on our system? What about something less malicious such as a software installation by a user? What about the user who decides to install a newer version of mod_perl or PHP on your web server without letting you know beforehand? Or even something as simple as when an undocumented config file change is made by another member of the admin group? Do you even want to know about all the changes that happen on a daily basis on your server? The purpose of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to detect unauthorized, possibly malicious activity. The purpose of a host-based IDS, or file integrity checker, is check for unauthorized changes to key system files, binaries, libraries, and directories on the system. AIDE is an Open Source file and directory integrity checker. AIDE will let you know when a file or directory has been added, deleted, modified. It is included with the Red Hat Enterprise 6. It is available for other Linux distros. This is a case study describing the process of configuring AIDE on an out of the box RHEL6 installation. Its goal is to illustrate the thinking and the process by which a useful AIDE configuration is built.

AIDE↗

ShadowNet: An Active Defense Infrastructure for Insider Cyber Attack Prevention

The ShadowNet infrastructure for insider cyber attack prevention is comprised of a tiered server system that is able to dynamically redirect dangerous/suspicious network traffic away from production servers that provide web, ftp, database and other vital services to cloned virtual machines in a quarantined environment. This is done transparently from the point of view of both the attacker and normal users. Existing connections, such as SSH sessions, are not interrupted. Any malicious activity performed by the attacker on a quarantined server is not reflected on the production server. The attacker is provided services from the quarantined server, which creates the impression that the attacks performed are successful. The activities of the attacker on the quarantined system are able to be recorded much like a honeypot system for forensic analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Classification of HTTP Attacks: A Study on the ECML/PKDD 2007 Discovery Challenge

As the world becomes more reliant on Web applications for commercial, financial, and medical transactions, cyber attacks on the World Wide Web are increasing in frequency and severity. Web applications provide an attractive alternative to traditional desktop applications due to their accessibility and ease of deployment. However, the accessibility of Web applications also makes them extremely vulnerable to attack. This inherent vulnerability is intensified by the distributed nature ofWeb applications and the complexity of configuring application servers. These factors have led to a proliferation of Web-based attacks, in which attackers surreptitiously inject code into HTTP requests, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems and perform malicious activities such as reading, altering, or destroying sensitive data. One approach for dealing with HTTP-based attacks is to identify malicious code in incoming HTTP requests and eliminate bad requests before they are processed. Using machine learning techniques, we can build a classifier to automatically label requests as “Valid” or “Attack.” For this study, we develop a simple, but effective HTTP attack classifier, based on the vector space model used commonly for Information Retrieval. Our classifier not only separates attacks from valid requests, but can also identify specific attack types (e.g., “SQL Injection” or “Path Traversal”). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through experiments on the ECML/PKDD 2007 Discovery Challenge data set. Specifically, we show that our approach achieves higher precision and recall than previous methods. In addition, our approach has a number of desirable characteristics, including robustness to missing contextual information, interpretability of models, and scalability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Taxonomy and Feature set for Server-Side Identification of Proxies

Malicious actors frequently use proxies and VPNs to evade detection and hide their origin. Current challenges to information security include the use of residential proxies to blend in with normal traffic and Man-in-the-Middle phishing proxies that are used to compromise accounts protected with mult-factor authentication. We advance a taxonomy and feature set for the identification of proxied traffic based on the network layer where proxying occurs. We describe how these features apply to common proxy types and how to use these features in the classification of the proxied traffic. Collection of these additional features is feasible using existing network sensors and web servers, while only adding about 30% volume to commonly deployed network sensor logs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Using the Domain Name System to Thwart Automated Client-Based Attacks

On the Internet, attackers can compromise systems owned by other people and then use these systems to launch attacks automatically. When attacks such as phishing or SQL injections are successful, they can have negative consequences including server downtime and the loss of sensitive information. Current methods to prevent such attacks are limited in that they are application-specific, or fail to block attackers. Phishing attempts can be stopped with email filters, but if the attacker manages to successfully bypass these filters, then the user must determine if the email is legitimate or not. Unfortunately, they often are unable to do so. Since attackers have a low success rate, they attempt to compensate for it in volume. In order to have this high throughput, attackers take shortcuts and break protocols. We use this knowledge to address these issues by implementing a system that can detect malicious activity and use it to block attacks. If the client fails to follow proper procedure, they can be classified as an attacker. Once an attacker has been discovered, they will be isolated and monitored. This can be accomplished using existing software in Ubuntu Linux applications, along with our custom wrapper application. After running the system and seeing its performance on three popular Web browsers Chromium, Firefox and Internet Explorer as well as two popular email clients, Thunderbird and Evolution, we found that not only is this system conceivable, it is effective and has low overhead.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Detecting and Blocking Network Attacks at Ultra High Speeds

Stateful, in-depth, in-line traffic analysis for intrusion detection and prevention has grown increasingly more difficult as the data rates of modern networks rise. One point in the design space for high-performance network analysis - pursued by a number of commercial products - is the use of sophisticated custom hardware. For very high-speed processing, such systems often cast the entire analysis process in ASICs. This project pursued a different architectural approach, which we term Shunting. Shunting marries a conceptually quite simple hardware device with an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) running on commodity PC hardware. The overall design goal is was to keep the hardware both cheap and readily scalable to future higher speeds, yet also retain the unparalleled flexibility that running the main IPS analysis in a full general-computing environment provides. The Shunting architecture we developed uses a simple in-line hardware element that maintains several large state tables indexed by packet header fields, including IP/TCP flags, source and destination IP addresses, and connection tuples. The tables yield decision values the element makes on a packet-by-packet basis: forward the packet, drop it, or divert ('shunt') it through the IPS (the default). By manipulating table entries, the IPS can, on a fine-grained basis: (i) specify the traffic it wishes to examine, (ii) directly block malicious traffic, and (iii) 'cut through' traffic streams once it has had an opportunity to 'vet' them, or (iv) skip over large items within a stream before proceeding to further analyze it. For the Shunting architecture to yield benefits, it needs to operate in an environment for which the monitored network traffic has the property that - after proper vetting - much of it can be safely skipped. This property does not universally hold. For example, if a bank needs to examine all Web traffic involving its servers for regulatory compliance, then a monitor in front of one of the bank's server farms cannot safely omit a subset of the traffic from analysis. In this environment, Shunting cannot realize its main performance benefits, and the monitoring task likely calls for using custom hardware instead. However, in many other environments we find Shunting holds promise for delivering major performance gains. This arises due to the the widely documented 'heavy tail' nature of most forms of network traffic, which we might express as 'a few of the connections carry just about all the bytes.' The key additional insight is '... and very often for these few large connections, the very beginning of the connection contains nearly all the information of interest from a security analysis perspective.' We argue that this second claim holds because it is at the beginning of connections that authentication exchanges occur, data or file names and types are specified, request and reply status codes conveyed, and encryption is negotiated. Once these occur, we have seen most of the interesting facets of the dialog. Certainly the remainder of the connection might also yield some grist for analysis, but this is generally less likely, and thus if we want to lower analysis load at as small a loss as possible of information relevant to security analysis, we might best do so by skipping the bulk of large connections. In a different context, the 'Time Machine' work by Kornexl and colleagues likewise shows that in some environments we can realize major reductions in the volume of network traffic processed, by limiting the processing to the first 10-20 KB of each connection. As a concrete example, consider an IPS that monitors SSH traffic. When a new SSH connection arrives and the Shunt fails to find an entry for it in any of its tables (per-address, per-port, per-connection), it executes the default action of diverting the connection through the IPS. The IPS analyzes the beginning of the connection in this fashion. As long as it is satisified with the dialog, it reinjects the packets forwarded to it so that the connection can continue. If the connection successfully negotiates encryption, the IPS can no longer profitably analyze it, so it downloads a per-connection table entry to the Shunt specifying that the action for the connection in the future is 'forward.' For heavy-tailed connections, this means a very large majority of the connection's packets will now pass through the Shunt device without burdening the IPS with any further analysis load. On the other hand, if the IPS is dissatisfied with some element of the initial dialog, it downloads a 'drop' entry to terminate the connection. Note that by providing for reinjection, we can promote an intrusion detection system into an intrusion prevention system, one that does not merely detect attacks but can block them before they complete. Reinjection also allows the IPS to normalize traffic to remove ambiguities that attackers can leverage to evade the IPS.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗