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CloudSat safety operations at Vendenberg AFB is given. The topics include: 1) CloudSat Project Overview; 2) Vandenberg Ground Operations; 3) Delta II Launch Vehicle; 4) The A-Train; 5) System Safety Management; 6) CALIPSO Hazards Assessment; 7) CALIPSO Supplemental Safeguards; 8) Joint System Safety Operations; 9) Extended Stand-down; 10) Launch Delay Safety Concerns; and 11) Lessons Learned.
STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991 from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed 4 minutes 45 seconds because of safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and the wind direction in the potential blast area. Based on the limited number and type of inflight anomalies encountered, the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. A contingency EVA was performed by the crew on Flight Day (FD) 3 to free a sticky Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) high gain antenna, after which the GRO primary payload was successfully deployed by the Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System. The GRO, which weighed just over 35,000 lbs, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space Shuttle into low Earth orbit. The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for one day due to high wind conditions at Edwards Air Force Base. Atlantis landed on FD 7, 11 April 1991 on Edwards AFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.
The state-of-the-art for storable hypergolic bipropellant systems is monomethylhydrazine (MMH) and mixed oxides of nitrogen (MON). While MMH and MON provide fast and highly reliable hypergolic ignition with excellent propulsive performance, they suffer from safety concerns impacting their production, cost, and supply to various test and launch facilities. In contrast, identifying and demonstrating low-toxicity fuels hypergolic with rocket grade hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) has been challenging with long ignition delay (IDT) and low propulsive performance affecting their deployment in flight systems. This work describes a preliminary observational study to assess the effects of molecular descriptors suspected to predict the reactivity and hypergolicity of compounds within the same chemical class (i.e., thioamide). The approach centered on evaluating functional groups, electrostatic potential, number of carbons, dipole moment, and adiabatic ionization energy. Thiourea is hypergolic with 89.2 wt.% H2O2 (minimum IDT of 21.9 ms) and was selected as a core fuel to study the reactivity of derived fuels with different functionalities. Additionally, the chemical properties were calculated with the Gaussian16 suite. The results showed that group substitution and generally increased number of carbons on thiourea increases IDT. It was observed that a more positively charged sulfur atom in the thioamide does not increase the reactivity towards H2O2. The dipole moment analysis revealed an overall trend of decreasing IDT due to increasing dipole moment. Finally, a lower adiabatic ionization energy related to increased IDTs for most cases. Additional chemical classes comprising a wider range of functionalities and electrophilic attributes are being investigated in on-going work.
The delay of the Ulysses launch from May 1986 to October 1990, because of the Challenger disaster, has altered both the constraints under which the mission must be designed and the timing of several mission critical events. Safety and launch reliability concerns from the Shuttle have increased the effective launch window to durations greater than one hour. Fortuitously high declinations of the launch asymptote (DLA), of the order of the launch site latitude, ameliorate the impact of the new constraints on the launch window. Target overlays in the first hour of the launch window provide higher departure energies that improve mission performance and avoid a science schedule conflict at second opposition near the time of closest Jupiter approach. The mission design starts with the maximum earth departure energy that the upper stage can deliver within the launch constraints. The Jupiter arrival asymptotes are chosen from the optimal point of mission performance in the mission space defined in the Jupiter B-plane by contours mapped by the science and spacecraft constraints. More than half the orbital energy of the earth-to-Jupiter transfer orbit is lost in the Jupiter flyby, and the Jupiter gravitational assist rotates the orbit plane out of the ecliptic to an inclination of about 80 degrees.
After several months delay due to Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) leaks in the External Tank (ET) 17 in LH2 umbilical disconnect, Atlantis was launched at 6:48 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on 15 Nov. 1990. Atlantis was cleared for launch after the replacement of the ET 17 in umbilical disconnect and a successful tanking test on 24 Oct. 1990. No technical concerns were encountered during the countdown. The end of the STS-38 mission was extended by one day because of high crosswinds at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Calif. On the next day, 20 Nov. 1990, the winds were too high for a safe landing at EAFB, and a decision was made to select the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at the primary landing site. The deorbit burn was performed on orbit 79 of the STS-38 mission. Reentry and descent were effected with no problems. Postlanding inspection of Atlantis' exterior found little evidence of damage. There has been a concern about returning an Orbiter to KSC, because the last mission to do so experienced tire failure. Atlantis' tires and brakes were in excellent condition with no indication of excessive wear.
While the dominant focus on short response missions has appropriately centered on the launch vehicle and spacecraft, often overlooked or afterthought phases of these missions have been launch site operations and the activities of launch range organizations. Throughout the history of organized spaceflight, launch ranges have been the bane of flight programs as the source of expense, schedule delays, and seemingly endless requirements. Launch Ranges provide three basic functions: (1) provide an appropriate geographical location to meet orbital other mission trajectory requirements, (2) provide project services such as processing facilities, launch complexes, tracking and data services, and expendable products, and (3) assure safety and property protection to participating personnel and third-parties. The challenge with which launch site authorities continuously struggle, is the inherent conflict arising from projects whose singular concern is execution of their mission, and the range s need to support numerous simultaneous customers. So, while tasks carried out by a launch range committed to a single mission pale in comparison to efforts of a launch vehicle or spacecraft provider and could normally be carried out in a matter of weeks, major launch sites have dozens of active projects separate sponsoring organizations. Accommodating the numerous tasks associated with each mission, when hardware failures, weather, maintenance requirements, and other factors constantly conspire against the range resource schedulers, make the launch range as significant an impediment to responsive missions as launch vehicles and their cargo. The obvious solution to the launch site challenge was implemented years ago when the Department of Defense simply established dedicated infrastructure and personnel to dedicated missions, namely an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile. This however proves to be prohibitively expensive for all but the most urgent of applications. So the challenge becomes how can a launch site provide acceptably responsive mission services to a particular customer without dedicating extensive resources and while continuing to serve other projects? NASA's Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) is pursuing solutions to exactly this challenge. NASA, in partnership with the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority, has initiated the Rapid Response Range Operations Initiative (R3Ops). R3Ops is a multi-phased effort to incrementally establish and demonstrate increasingly responsive launch operations, with an ultimate goal of providing ELV-class services in a maximum of 7-10 days from initial notification routinely, and shorter schedules possible with committed resources. This target will be pursued within the reality of simultaneous concurrent programs, and ideally, largely independent of specialized flight system configurations. WFF has recently completed Phase 1 of R3Ops, an in-depth collection (through extensive expert interviews) and software modeling of individual steps by various range disciplines. This modeling is now being used to identify existing inefficiencies in current procedures, to identify bottlenecks, and show interdependencies. Existing practices are being tracked to provide a baseline to benchmark against as new procedures are implemented. This paper will describe in detail the philosophies behind WFF's R3Ops, the data collected and modeled in Phase 1, and strategies for meeting responsive launch requirements in a multi-user range environment planned for subsequent phases of this initiative.
This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.
The TechEdSat flight series (TES-n), developed by the Nano Orbital Workshop (NOW) group at NASA Ames, has been studying cube satellite re-entry technologies with a focus on Exo-Brake drag device research. An exo-atmospheric braking device, the Exo-Brake uses the tenuous upper atmosphere acting in a free molecular flow regime to enable controllable adjustment of the drag profile of the host spacecraft, currently enabling rapid disposal of small spacecraft after mission conclusion, and eventual targeted de-orbit to a desired entry point at the Von Karman line, or approximately 100km in altitude. The TES-7 mission, flown on the first successful Virgin Orbit flight January 17, 2021, was injected into a 500km, 61-degree inclination orbit, with an expected orbital lifetime of approximately ten years. After successful deployment of a unique hydrogen gas-cell inflation design ‘disposal’-type Mylar Exo-Brake intended to rapidly de-orbit the spacecraft, the maximum expected orbital lifetime of the TES-7 spacecraft was successfully reduced from ten years to 1.3 years, an 87% reduction in orbit lifetime via a passive, fuel-less system. The subsequent TES-13 mission utilized a new, less complex ‘disposal’-type Exo-Brake design made from collapsible rigid struts rather than inflated struts to reduce the engineering, construction, and safety complexities introduced by the prior hydrogen gas inflation design. The rigid strut Exo-Brake design is stowed via rotational compression and deploys using only stored spring energy once released via electronic actuator. This new rotation compression storage design has become the new Exo-Brake design standard used on TES missions thanks to its simplicity. Following on the success of this new Exo-Brake design demonstrated by TES-13, the design was further refined to enabled active manipulation of the Exo-Brake effective drag area though a winch-like system. Both the TES-10 and TES-15 spacecraft were equipped with geometrically similar Exo-Brake devices capable of such active drag modulation, with the intent of studying the operational impact of having such devices on cube satellite missions. To increase the survival time of the Exo-Brake at low altitudes and thus gain more experiment time and better guidance capability, TES-15 was equipped with a modulated Exo-Brake constructed from 3M™ Nextel™ 440 ceramic oxide fiber, the same fabric material used in the Space Shuttle TPS system, rather than Mylar. After launching on Alpha Flight 2 October 1st, 2022, Firefly’s first successful launch, TES-15 met the same modulation restrictions as TES-10, with modulation prohibited above 200km to avoid possible collision with other spacecraft. In this case, a low deployment orbit caused an extremely short mission life, which, coupled with delayed spacecraft identification, exacerbated collision concerns and caused performance data of the high-temperature Exo-Brake design to be inconclusive. As such, the Nano Orbital Workshop has taken a new approach of only conducting modulated Exo-Brake research on missions deploying below ISS altitude to avoid collision avoidance restrictions, and is working to improve spacecraft identification and location reporting techniques to increase experiment durations. Upcoming TES mission will therefore use one of two classes of Exo-Brake depending on their target altitude, as to be described in the submission.
The TechEdSat flight series (TES-n), developed by the Nano Orbital Workshop (NOW) group at NASA Ames, has been studying cube satellite re-entry technologies with a focus on Exo-Brake drag device research. An exo-atmospheric braking device, the Exo-Brake uses the tenuous upper atmosphere acting in a free molecular flow regime to enable controllable adjustment of the drag profile of the host spacecraft, currently enabling rapid disposal of small spacecraft after mission conclusion, and eventual targeted de-orbit to a desired entry point at the Von Karman line, or approximately 100km in altitude. The TES-7 mission, flown on the first successful Virgin Orbit flight January 17, 2021, was injected into a 500km, 61-degree inclination orbit, with an expected orbital lifetime of approximately ten years. After successful deployment of a unique hydrogen gas-cell inflation design ‘disposal’-type Mylar Exo-Brake intended to rapidly de-orbit the spacecraft, the maximum expected orbital lifetime of the TES-7 spacecraft was successfully reduced from ten years to 1.3 years, an 87% reduction in orbit lifetime via a passive, fuel-less system. The subsequent TES-13 mission utilized a new, less complex ‘disposal’-type Exo-Brake design made from collapsible rigid struts rather than inflated struts to reduce the engineering, construction, and safety complexities introduced by the prior hydrogen gas inflation design. The rigid strut Exo-Brake design is stowed via rotational compression and deploys using only stored spring energy once released via electronic actuator. This new rotation compression storage design has become the new Exo-Brake design standard used on TES missions thanks to its simplicity. Following on the success of this new Exo-Brake design demonstrated by TES-13, the design was further refined to enabled active manipulation of the Exo-Brake effective drag area though a winch-like system. Both the TES-10 and TES-15 spacecraft were equipped with geometrically similar Exo-Brake devices capable of such active drag modulation, with the intent of studying the operational impact of having such devices on cube satellite missions. To increase the survival time of the Exo-Brake at low altitudes and thus gain more experiment time and better guidance capability, TES-15 was equipped with a modulated Exo-Brake constructed from 3M™ Nextel™ 440 ceramic oxide fiber, the same fabric material used in the Space Shuttle TPS system, rather than Mylar. After launching on Alpha Flight 2 October 1st, 2022, Firefly’s first successful launch, TES-15 met the same modulation restrictions as TES-10, with modulation prohibited above 200km to avoid possible collision with other spacecraft. In this case, a low deployment orbit caused an extremely short mission life, which, coupled with delayed spacecraft identification, exacerbated collision concerns and caused performance data of the high-temperature Exo-Brake design to be inconclusive. As such, the Nano Orbital Workshop has taken a new approach of only conducting modulated Exo-Brake research on missions deploying below ISS altitude to avoid collision avoidance restrictions, and is working to improve spacecraft identification and location reporting techniques to increase experiment durations. Upcoming TES mission will therefore use one of two classes of Exo-Brake depending on their target altitude, as to be described in the submission.