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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2010

Acceptance sampling using judgmental and randomly selected samples

We present a Bayesian model for acceptance sampling where the population consists of two groups, each with different levels of risk of containing unacceptable items. Expert opinion, or judgment, may be required to distinguish between the high and low-risk groups. Hence, high-risk items are likely to be identifed (and sampled) using expert judgment, while the remaining low-risk items are sampled randomly. We focus on the situation where all observed samples must be acceptable. Consequently, the objective of the statistical inference is to quantify the probability that a large percentage of the unsampled items in the population are also acceptable. We demonstrate that traditional (frequentist) acceptance sampling and simpler Bayesian formulations of the problem are essentially special cases of the proposed model. We explore the properties of the model in detail, and discuss the conditions necessary to ensure that required samples sizes are non-decreasing function of the population size. The method is applicable to a variety of acceptance sampling problems, and, in particular, to environmental sampling where the objective is to demonstrate the safety of reoccupying a remediated facility that has been contaminated with a lethal agent.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Disposition Program Final Status Survey Report

As part of the Battelle Facility Restoration Program (Smoter and Biebesheimer 2017), the Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Complex was remediated through demolition and surveyed to show it meets the radiological release criteria for unrestricted use under the clearance process (DOE 2011). The restoration program has directed the implementation of the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) methodology (NRC 2011) to verify the suitability of the site to be released for unrestricted use under the clearance process in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 (Biebesheimer 2018a; DOE 2011). The use of MARSSIM is accepted by federal and state agencies, including DOE. This report documents how the MARSSIM process was used to assure any residual radioactivity is within acceptable levels and as low as reasonably achievable. Past land use for the RTL Complex property included agricultural, residential, and industrial activity. The historical site assessment (HSA) (Lindenmeier et al. 2015; Biebesheimer 2018b) identified use of radionuclides in past RTL Complex research and development activities from commissioning in 1966 until it was vacated in 2017. Based on the information provided in the HSA, the RTL Complex was delineated into six survey units. The 520 building footprint, tank vault and 530 building footprint, other building footprints, and pipeline survey units included excavated areas. The paved areas and open areas survey units were unexcavated areas. Survey units were all determined to be Class 3, with low probability of containing residual radioactivity, after demolition of the structures within the RTL Complex. The Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Disposition Program: Final Status Survey Plan (Bunn et al. 2018) was designed and conducted to provide quantitative data regarding the residual radioactivity present in each survey unit. Authorized radiological release limits were developed and approved by the DOE Office of Science in December 2016 (DOE 2017). Fourteen random sample locations were identified within each survey unit. Forty-four specific judgmental sample locations were selected across the site based on information in the HSA. The number of sample locations within a survey unit ranged from 15 to 28, for a total of 127 random and judgmental sample locations identified across the RTL Complex. Sampling for the final status survey occurred over 12 days between November 11 and December 7, 2018. Laboratory results were independently validated by Analytical Quality Associates prior to evaluation. All of the over 880 residual radioactivity measurements were less than the release limits and action levels established through the RTL Disposition Program. A sum of fractions calculation for each survey unit resulted in values that were less than unity. Based on the results presented in this report, the restoration program recommends that the RTL Complex be released for unrestricted use.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2010

Visual Sample Plan (VSP) Statistical Software as Related to the CTBTO’s On-Site Inspection Procedure

In the event of a potential nuclear weapons test the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is commissioned to conduct an on-site investigation (OSI) of the suspected test site in an effort to find confirmatory evidence of the nuclear test. The OSI activities include collecting air, surface soil, and underground samples to search for indications of a nuclear weapons test - these indicators include radionuclides and radioactive isotopes Ar and Xe. This report investigates the capability of the Visual Sample Plan (VSP) software to contribute to the sampling activities of the CTBTO during an OSI. VSP is a statistical sampling design software, constructed under data quality objectives, which has been adapted for environmental remediation and contamination detection problems for the EPA, US Army, DoD and DHS among others. This report provides discussion of a number of VSP sample designs, which may be pertinent to the work undertaken during an OSI. Examples and descriptions of such designs include hot spot sampling, combined random and judgment sampling, multiple increment sampling, radiological transect surveying, and a brief description of other potentially applicable sampling methods. Further, this work highlights a potential need for the use of statistically based sample designs in OSI activities. The use of such designs may enable canvassing a sample area without full sampling, provide a measure of confidence that radionuclides are not present, and allow investigators to refocus resources in other areas of concern.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Successful Characterization and Remedial Contour of Highly Contaminated Mercury Soil at the Y-12 National Security Complex - 13593

An area known as the 81-10 pad within the footprint of the Y-12 National Security Complex, suspected to be heavily contaminated with mercury, was slated for characterization in support of a Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) milestone to be accomplished by September 30, 2012. A full remedial design report (RDR) required the soil in Exposure Unit -9 (EU-9) to be fully characterized for a number of contaminates of concern including mercury. The goal of this characterization effort was to determine what soil, if any, would need to be removed for the protection of industrial workers and impacts to the surface and ground water. Funding for this project was made available using buy-back scope under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The EU-9 soil unit involved 3 different classifications which were determined as follows: Class 1: Known to have been impacted, contamination is likely; Class 2: Suspected to have been impacted, contamination is unknown; Class 3: Area not known to have been impacted, contamination unlikely. Due to various sampling and analysis events since the 1980's, significant mercury contamination was expected under the concrete pad of an area known as 81-10. Mercury contamination outside of the boundary of this pad within the EU-9 footprint was not known and therefore an original planned estimate of 1,461 cubic meters of material were expected to be heavily contaminated with mercury requiring removal, treatment and disposal. Through the use of a highly effective nature and extent sampling and analysis design that involved a hybrid of statistically-based and judgmental sampling, the actual remedial contour requiring removal was approximately 717 cubic meters, roughly 12% of the original estimate. This characterization approach was executed in full compliance with the Record of Decision (ROD) [1] documents that were agreed upon by the U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency and Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. In addition, the RDR was completed ahead of the FFA milestone date of September 30, 2012. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Selection of 3013 Containers for Field Surveillance (FY 2021 Update)

This Update is the ninth in a series of reports that document the binning and sample selection of 3013 containers for the Field Surveillance program as part of the Integrated Surveillance Program. The last Update was in 2016. This Update documents changes to the binning and changes to the random and engineering judgment samples since 2016. This Update also documents field surveillance activities since 2016 and describes plans to complete random sampling in 2025. In addition, this Update describes a new effort to collect surveillance data as part of down blending operations and updates assumptions about Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) 3013 containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Independent Verification Survey of the SPRU Lower Level Hillside Area at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Niskayuna, New York (Final Report)

During August 10, 2011 through August 19, 2011, and October 23, 2011 through November 4, 2011, ORAU/ORISE conducted verification survey activities at the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) site that included in-process inspections, surface scans, and soil sampling of the Lower Level Hillside Area. According to the Type-B Investigation Report, Sr-90 was the primary contributor to the majority of the activity (60 times greater than the Cs-137 activity). The evaluation of the scan data and sample results obtained during verification activities determined that the primary radionuclide of concern, Sr-90, was well below the agreed upon soil cleanup objective (SCO) of 30 pCi/g for the site. However, the concentration of Cs-137 in the four judgmental samples collected in final status survey (FSS) Units A and B was greater than the SCO. Both ORAU and aRc surveys identified higher Cs-137 concentrations in FSS Units A and B; the greatest concentrations were identified in FSS Unit A.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Gamma Detector Response/Soil Concentration Correlation Study at the AAR Manufacturing, Inc. Site, Livonia, Michigan

At the NRC's request, ORAU conducted surveys of the AAR Manufacturing site during the period of September 25 through September 27, 2012. The survey activities included walkover surveys and sampling activities. Once the survey team was onsite, the NRC personnel decided to forgo survey activities in the New Addition and the pickling area. Areas of the planned study boundary were inaccessible due to overgrowth/large pieces of concrete covering the soil surface; therefore, the study boundary was redefined. Gamma walkover scans of the site boundary and front yard identified multiple areas of elevated gamma radiation. As a result, two judgmental samples were collected. Sample results were above thorium background levels The answer to the PSQ relating to the relationship between thorium concentration in soil and NaI instrument response is Yes. NaI instrument response can be used as a predictor of Th-232 concentration in the 0 to 1 m layer. An R2 value of 0.79 was determined for the surface soil relationship, thus satisfying the DQOs. Moreover, the regression was cross-checked by comparing the predicted Th-232 soil core concentration to the average Th-232 concentration (Section 5.3.2). Based on the cross-check, the regression equation provides a reasonable estimate for the Th-232 concentration at the judgmental locations. Consideration must be given when applying this equation to other soil areas of the site. If the contamination was heterogeneously distributed, and not distributed in a discrete layer as it was in the study area, then using the regression equation to predict Th-232 concentration would not be applicable.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Application of the Combined Judgmental and Randomly Placed Sampling Method

In the wake of the 2001 anthrax incidents in the United States, there has been considerable discussion about the role of judgmental and probabilistic sampling strategies, particularly in the context of clearance sampling. The Combined Judgmental and Random (CJR) methodology provides a statistical methodology that allows practitioners to leverage information from both judgmental and randomly selected sample locations and then quantify the confidence in negative results. The objective of the CJR sampling design is to demonstrate, with high probability, that a high percentage of the decision area (or population) is acceptable, given that none of the samples are unacceptable. The purpose of this document is to assist practitioners to appropriately use the CJR methodology and to implement this sampling design in Visual Sample Plan (VSP). We begin by defining some fundamental terms. A decision area is the geographical or spatial area (indoor or outdoor) about which practitioners wish to draw a conclusion on the basis of sampling and other relevant information. Decision areas typically include all or part of a building, but they may be any contaminated (or potentially contaminated) area for which characterization or clearance is required. In this report, a statistical sampling approach refers to any sampling approach based on a mathematical or statistical model that provides confidence or probability statements about the decision area. Statistical sampling approaches typically involve taking samples at random locations, or at the nodes of a randomly located grid or lattice that is superimposed on the decision area. The term probabilistic sampling is often used to describe statistical sampling designs that exclusively use randomly located samples. This terminology implies that probabilistic statements can only be made based upon the results of randomly placed samples. However, the CJR method utilizes a Bayesian model that gives rise to a formal probabilistic statement regarding the acceptability of the decision area based upon the information obtained from both judgmental and random samples. Judgmental samples play a vital role in the characterization and clearance process because they include the informed prior belief and expert knowledge of personnel involved in the sampling process.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Data sharing report characterization of the surveillance and maintenance project miscellaneous process inventory waste items Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (EM-OR) requested Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), working under the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) contract, to provide technical and independent waste management planning support under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Specifically, DOE EM-OR requested ORAU to plan and implement a sampling and analysis campaign to target certain items associated with URS|CH2M Oak Ridge, LLC (UCOR) surveillance and maintenance (S&M) process inventory waste. Eight populations of historical and reoccurring S&M waste at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have been identified in the Waste Handling Plan for Surveillance and Maintenance Activities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, DOE/OR/01-2565&D2 (WHP) (DOE 2012) for evaluation and processing for final disposal. This waste was generated during processing, surveillance, and maintenance activities associated with the facilities identified in the process knowledge (PK) provided in Appendix A. A list of items for sampling and analysis were generated from a subset of materials identified in the WHP populations (POPs) 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, plus a small number of items not explicitly addressed by the WHP. Specifically, UCOR S&M project personnel identified 62 miscellaneous waste items that would require some level of evaluation to identify the appropriate pathway for disposal. These items are highly diverse, relative to origin; composition; physical description; contamination level; data requirements; and the presumed treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF). Because of this diversity, ORAU developed a structured approach to address item-specific data requirements necessary for acceptance in a presumed TSDF that includes the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF)—using the approved Waste Lot (WL) 108.1 profile—the Y-12 Sanitary Landfill (SLF) if appropriate; EnergySolutions Clive; and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (ORAU 2013b). Finally, the evaluation of these wastes was more suited to a judgmental sampling approach rather than a statistical design, meaning data were collected for each individual item, thereby providing information for item-byitem disposition decisions. ORAU prepared a sampling and analysis plan (SAP) that outlined data collection strategies, methodologies, and analytical guidelines and requirements necessary for characterizing targeted items (ORAU 2013b). The SAP described an approach to collect samples that allowed evaluation as to whether or not the waste would be eligible for disposal at the EMWMF. If the waste was determined not to be eligible for EMWMF disposal, then there would be adequate information collected that would allow the waste to be profiled for one of the alternate TSDFs listed above.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Development of a statistically based access delay timeline methodology.

The charter for adversarial delay is to hinder access to critical resources through the use of physical systems increasing an adversary s task time. The traditional method for characterizing access delay has been a simple model focused on accumulating times required to complete each task with little regard to uncertainty, complexity, or decreased efficiency associated with multiple sequential tasks or stress. The delay associated with any given barrier or path is further discounted to worst-case, and often unrealistic, times based on a high-level adversary, resulting in a highly conservative calculation of total delay. This leads to delay systems that require significant funding and personnel resources in order to defend against the assumed threat, which for many sites and applications becomes cost prohibitive. A new methodology has been developed that considers the uncertainties inherent in the problem to develop a realistic timeline distribution for a given adversary path. This new methodology incorporates advanced Bayesian statistical theory and methodologies, taking into account small sample size, expert judgment, human factors and threat uncertainty. The result is an algorithm that can calculate a probability distribution function of delay times directly related to system risk. Through further analysis, the access delay analyst or end user can use the results in making informed decisions while weighing benefits against risks, ultimately resulting in greater system effectiveness with lower cost.

Rivera, W. Gary↗
DOE OSTI2012

Independent Confirmatory Survey Results of Soils Associated with the Argyle Street Sewer Line at the United Nuclear Corporation Naval Products Site, New Haven, Connecticut (Letter Report)

Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) personnel visited the United Nuclear Corporation (UNC) Naval Products site on three separate occasions during the months of October and November 2011. The purpose of these visits was to conduct confirmatory surveys of soils associated with the Argyle Street sewer line that was being removed. Soil samples were collected from six different, judgmentally determined locations in the Argyle Street sewer trench. In addition to the six soil samples collected by ORISE, four replicate soil samples were collected by Cabrera Services, Inc. (CSI) for analysis by the ORISE laboratory. Replicate samples S0010 and S0011 were final status survey (FSS) bias samples; S0012 was an FSS systematic sample; and S0015 was a waste characterization sample. Six soil samples were also collected for background determination. Uranium-235 and uranium-238 concentrations were determined via gamma spectroscopy; the spectra were also reviewed for other identifiable photopeaks. Radionuclide concentrations for these soil samples are provided. In addition to the replicate samples and the samples collected by ORISE, CSI submitted three soil samples for inter-laboratory comparison analyses. One sample was from the background reference area, one was from waste characterization efforts (material inside the sewer line), and one was a FSS sample. The inter-laboratory comparison analyses results between ORISE and CSI were in agreement, except for one sample collected in the reference area. Smear results For Argyle Street sewer pipes are tabulated.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Fission gas bubble identification using MATLAB's image processing toolbox

Automated image processing routines have the potential to aid in the fuel performance evaluation process by eliminating bias in human judgment that may vary from person-to-person or sample-to-sample. This study presents several MATLAB based image analysis routines designed for fission gas void identification in post-irradiation examination of uranium molybdenum (U–Mo) monolithic-type plate fuels. Frequency domain filtration, enlisted as a pre-processing technique, can eliminate artifacts from the image without compromising the critical features of interest. This process is coupled with a bilateral filter, an edge-preserving noise removal technique aimed at preparing the image for optimal segmentation. Adaptive thresholding proved to be the most consistent gray-level feature segmentation technique for U–Mo fuel microstructures. The Sauvola adaptive threshold technique segments the image based on histogram weighting factors in stable contrast regions and local statistics in variable contrast regions. Once all processing is complete, the algorithm outputs the total fission gas void count, the mean void size, and the average porosity. The final results demonstrate an ability to extract fission gas void morphological data faster, more consistently, and at least as accurately as manual segmentation methods. - Highlights: •Automated image processing can aid in the fuel qualification process. •Routines are developed to characterize fission gas bubbles in irradiated U–Mo fuel. •Frequency domain filtration effectively eliminates FIB curtaining artifacts. •Adaptive thresholding proved to be the most accurate segmentation method. •The techniques established are ready to be applied to large scale data extraction testing.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Benefits of utilizing CellProfiler as a characterization tool for U–10Mo nuclear fuel

Automated image processing techniques have the potential to aid in the performance evaluation of nuclear fuels by eliminating judgment calls that may vary from person-to-person or sample-to-sample. Analysis of in-core fuel performance is required for design and safety evaluations related to almost every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. This study presents a methodology for assessing the quality of uranium–molybdenum fuel images and describes image analysis routines designed for the characterization of several important microstructural properties. The analyses are performed in CellProfiler, an open-source program designed to enable biologists without training in computer vision or programming to automatically extract cellular measurements from large image sets. The quality metric scores an image based on three parameters: the illumination gradient across the image, the overall focus of the image, and the fraction of the image that contains scratches. The metric presents the user with the ability to ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ an image based on a reproducible quality score. Passable images may then be characterized through a separate CellProfiler pipeline, which enlists a variety of common image analysis techniques. The results demonstrate the ability to reliably pass or fail images based on the illumination, focus, and scratch fraction of the image, followed by automatic extraction of morphological data with respect to fission gas voids, interaction layers, and grain boundaries. - Graphical abstract: Display Omitted - Highlights: • A technique is developed to score U–10Mo FIB-SEM image quality using CellProfiler. • The pass/fail metric is based on image illumination, focus, and area scratched. • Automated image analysis is performed in pipeline fashion to characterize images. • Fission gas void, interaction layer, and grain boundary coverage data is extracted. • Preliminary characterization results demonstrate consistency of the algorithm.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Uncertainty Quantification Study of CTF for the OECD/NEA LWR Uncertainty Analysis in Modeling Benchmark

This work describes the results of a quantitative uncertainty analysis of the thermal-hydraulic subchannel code for nuclear engineering applications, Coolant Boiling in Rod Arrays-Three Field (COBRA-TF). CTF is used, which is a version of COBRA-TF developed in cooperation between the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors and North Carolina State University. Four steady-state cases from Phase II Exercise 3 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency Light Water Reactor Uncertainty Analysis in Modeling (UAM) Benchmark are analyzed using the statistical analysis tool, Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale Applications (Dakota). The input parameters include boundary condition, geometry, and modeling uncertainties, which are selected using a sensitivity study and then defined based on expert judgment. Here, a forward uncertainty quantification method with Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) is used, where the sample size is based on available computational resources.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2011

3013/9975 Surveillance Program Interim Summary Report

The K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requires a surveillance program to monitor the safety performance of 3013 containers and 9975 shipping packages stored in KAMS. The SRS surveillance program [Reference 1] outlines activities for field surveillance and laboratory tests that demonstrate the packages meet the functional performance requirements described in the DSA. The SRS program also supports the complexwide Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) [Reference 2] for 3013 containers. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the SRS portion of the surveillance program activities through fiscal year 2010 (FY10) and formally communicate the interpretation of these results by the Surveillance Program Authority (SPA). Surveillance for the initial 3013 container random sampling of the Innocuous bin and the Pressure bin has been completed and there has been no indication of corrosion or significant pressurization. The maximum pressure observed was less than 50 psig, which is well below the design pressure of 699 psig for the 3013 container [Reference 3]. The data collected during surveillance of these bins has been evaluated by the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Working Group and no additional surveillance is necessary for these bins at least through FY13. A decision will be made whether additional surveillance of these bins is needed during future years of storage and as additional containers are generated. Based on the data collected to date, the SPA concludes that 3013 containers in these bins can continue to be safely stored in KAMS. This year, 13 destructive examinations (DE) were performed on random samples from the Pressure & Corrosion bin. To date, DE has been completed for approximately 30% of the random samples from the Pressure & Corrosion bin. In addition, DE has been performed on 6 engineering judgment (EJ) containers, for a total of 17 to date. This includes one container that exceeded the 3013 Standard moisture limit which was opened at LANL. The container pieces and an oxide sample were sent to SRNL for examination in FY11. No significant pressurization has been observed for the Pressure & Corrosion bin containers. Relatively minor corrosion has been observed on some convenience containers and the inside of two inner containers. While the limited extent of corrosion does not jeopardize the integrity of the outer 3013 containers, it does highlight the importance of continuing to perform DE and the Shelf Life program to assure that the corrosion rate is not accelerating or changing to a different corrosion mechanism (e.g., stress corrosion cracking). Statistical sampling is currently scheduled to be completed in FY17, but there is a proposed reduction of the number of DE's per year for FY11 and beyond which may delay the completion date. Since 3013 containers are stored inside 9975 containers, surveillances of 9975 containers are performed in conjunction with 3013 container surveillances. Results of 9975 container nondestructive examinations (NDEs) and DEs indicate that the containers will provide adequate protection of the 3013 containers in K-Area storage for at least 15 years [Reference 4].

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of Naturally Occurring Be-7 Activity on LANL Stack Filter Clumps

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is responsible for providing solutions to challenging issues through multidisciplinary science, engineering, and technology that impact national security. As part of the Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) Team, it is our responsibility to ensure LANL operates within the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (Rad-NESHAP). The standard states, “Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr” (EPA, 2002) During a routine assessment of LANL’s Rad-NESHAP compliance program, an opportunity for improvement was identified that addresses the evaluation of routine stack samples which potentially have naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) on the filter media. In the past and based on professional judgment, detections of NORM such as K-40 and Be-7 typically were rejected from the analytical results. The assessment finding suggested developing a technical criterion to ensure that such rejections were justified, comparing actual measured values with anticipated NORM concentrations for various stacks located at LANL. The significance of accepting or rejecting samples as “true” or “NORM” and its impact on the RAEM’s mission and compliance to the regulations is explained later in the document. Additionally, this document will describe the process and calculations for how such results are to be accepted as actual samples “true positive” or rejected as NORM.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

Psychosocial Modeling of Insider Threat Risk Based on Behavioral and Word Use Analysis

In many insider crimes, managers and other coworkers observed that the offenders had exhibited signs of stress, disgruntlement, or other issues, but no alarms were raised. Barriers to using such psychosocial indicators include the inability to recognize the signs and the failure to record the behaviors so that they can be assessed. A psychosocial model was developed to assess an employee’s behavior associated with an increased risk of insider abuse. The model is based on case studies and research literature on factors/correlates associated with precursor behavioral manifestations of individuals committing insider crimes. A complementary Personality Factor modeling approach was developed based on analysis to derive relevant personality characteristics from word use. Several implementations of the psychosocial model were evaluated by comparing their agreement with judgments of human resources and management professionals; the personality factor modeling approach was examined using email samples. If implemented in an operational setting, these models should be part of a set of management tools for employee assessment to identify employees who pose a greater insider threat.

behavioral modeling↗