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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring NIST Security Controls for the Ground System: Selection and Implementation -- Recommendations for Information System Owners

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).

GOVERNANCE↗
DOE OSTI2017

Implementing an Information Security Program

The threats to information security have dramatically increased with the proliferation of information systems and the internet. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNe) facilities need to address these threats in order to protect themselves from the loss of intellectual property, theft of valuable or hazardous materials, and sabotage. Project 19 of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is designed to help CBRN security managers, information technology/cybersecurity managers, and other decision-makers deal with these threats through the application of cost-effective information security programs. Project 19 has developed three guidance documents that are publically available to cover information security best practices, planning for an information security management system, and implementing security controls for information security.

blended attack↗
NASA NTRS2003

Managing information technology security risk

Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task for the organization to protect against the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of IT resources. As systems bgecome more complex and diverse and and attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security risk. This paper describes a two-pronged approach in addressing IT security risk and risk management in the organization: 1) an institutional enterprise appraoch, and 2) a project life cycle approach.

security toolset↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗
NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗
NASA NTRS2004

Security engineering: systems engineering of security through the adaptation and application of risk management

Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task in the organization, which must protect its resources and data against the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As systems become more complex and diverse, and more vulnerabilities are discovered while attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security. This paper describes an approach to address IT security risk through risk management and mitigation in both the institution and in the project life cycle.

security↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA Automatic Information Security Handbook

This handbook details the Automated Information Security (AIS) management process for NASA. Automated information system security is becoming an increasingly important issue for all NASA managers and with rapid advancements in computer and network technologies and the demanding nature of space exploration and space research have made NASA increasingly dependent on automated systems to store, process, and transmit vast amounts of mission support information, hence the need for AIS systems and management. This handbook provides the consistent policies, procedures, and guidance to assure that an aggressive and effective AIS programs is developed, implemented, and sustained at all NASA organizations and NASA support contractors.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2018

Energy Efficiency and Infrastructure Upgrades on Nuclear Clean-up Sites: The Hanford Experience - 18641

The Hanford site, located in southeastern Washington, produced much of our nation's weapons-grade plutonium for the Defense nuclear weapons program. This production lasted the better part of four decades with production ending in 1987. Since 1987, the focus of the Hanford site has turned to clean-up activities. Mission Support Alliance (MSA) is the integrator of the multi-contractor effort to clean up the Hanford site. MSA collaborates with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and all Hanford site contractors in finding and implementing new, cost-saving, safe and practical solutions to cleanup challenges with a continual focus on innovative processes and technologies that reduce costs, energy use and bring safety improvements to the site. Support Services include environmental integration and land management; fleet and road maintenance; water/electric and utilities; cyber security and information management as well as the preservation of the site's cultural artifacts. This paper describes the process, challenges, and focus on infrastructure upgrade and energy efficiency projects in the context of a multi-contractor nuclear clean-up site. Project development and new technology deployment at Hanford has long been plagued with economic challenges. For example, despite extensive auditing, analysis, and project development, most of the energy-related projects on the Hanford site have gone unfunded due to the low cost of electricity, the relatively high cost of labor, and costs associated with detailed safety and cultural reviews. - The Hanford site is a direct-service customer of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and has a marginal electricity rate of $0.033/kWh. - Labor costs on the Hanford site track high because of the requirements associated with the safety and security necessary to operate a legacy nuclear weapons complex. - In partnership with three federally recognized and other affected Native American tribes (Yakama Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Nez Perce Tribe, and Wanapum People), most activities on the Hanford site are afforded in-depth cultural reviews. To work within these constraints, the MSA Energy Management team has embarked on a three-pronged approach to energy project development: Program Visibility: The MSA Energy Management team has promoted both project opportunities and requirements across the Hanford site. This information comes in the form of site-wide newsletters, group meetings, e-mails, success stories, and recognition of staff. Single-point Analysis: To by-pass the inevitable duplications of effort, learning curve issues, and to improve project consistency/delivery, the MSA Energy Management team serves as the single resource to the site for energy project analysis. This resource includes initial assessment, engineering analysis, efficiency calculation and project recommendations. Contractor/utility Interface: In addition to the infrastructure under its own purview, MSA provides all support services for the contractor/utility interface. These activities include formulation and submission of incentive-based efficiency projects, project tracking, and incentive awards. All incentive awards are forwarded to the relevant contractor and then highlighted in the visibility campaign. Successful energy efficiency projects at Hanford have included high efficiency heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) systems, interior and exterior lighting/lighting control systems, pump and motor systems, and the right-sizing of transformers and area-wide electrical distribution systems. Prior to the initiation of this program and structure (roughly 3 years ago) the average annual energy efficiency incentive applied for and received was under $10,000, with an annual energy savings of approximately 36,000 kilowatt hours (kWh). In fiscal year 2017, the annual incentive received was over $419,000, with identified energy savings of over 1.3 million kWh. Details and case studies of the major project accomplishments are included. The success of this program can be traced to an understanding of the constraints, the development of a program to address these constraints, and good communication/coordination across DOE and the multiple contractors serving the Hanford site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Testbed-based Evaluation of SIEM Tool for Cyber Kill Chain Model in Power Grid SCADA System

Development of a smarter electric grid necessitates addressing the associated cyber security challenges. Since the interdependence between the legacy grid infrastructure and advanced information technology is growing rapidly, there are numerous ways advanced, motivated, and persistent attackers can affect the SCADA based critical infrastructure. Hence, developing a security information and event management (SIEM) is crucial for securing the SCADA power system. This paper presents the application of Security Onion (SecOn) to develop the network security monitoring (NSM) and intrusion detection system (IDS) in the context of SCADA cyber physical security. Initially, we have applied a cyber kill-chain model to demonstrate the different stages of attacks and associated mechanisms. Later, the rule- based IDS (RIDS) is developed using Snort IDS, and tested in the cyber-physical SCADA environment. Furthermore, we have evaluated its performance in terms of accuracy and detection latency. Our experimental results reveal that the SecOn tool is efficient in monitoring and detecting attacks within an acceptable time frame with a high accuracy rate.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Mapping SIEM Vulnerabilities in STIG

SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) tools monitor network traffic and allow users to quickly detect problems in their networks. Because of the valuable information processed by SIEM tools, it is important to understand their vulnerabilities. STIG (Structured Threat Intelligence Graph) is an application created at INL used to visualize data related to cyber threats. Using STIG can allow users to understand vulnerabilities related to their SIEM products and how to protect their systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1986

The Johnson Space Center Management Information Systems (JSCMIS). 1: Requirements Definition and Design Specifications for Versions 2.1 and 2.1.1. 2: Documented Test Scenario Environments. 3: Security Design and Specifications

The Johnson Space Center Management Information System (JSCMIS) is an interface to computer data bases at NASA Johnson which allows an authorized user to browse and retrieve information from a variety of sources with minimum effort. This issue gives requirements definition and design specifications for versions 2.1 and 2.1.1, along with documented test scenario environments, and security object design and specifications.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2012

Autonomous Information Unit for Fine-Grain Data Access Control and Information Protection in a Net-Centric System

As communication and networking technologies advance, networks will become highly complex and heterogeneous, interconnecting different network domains. There is a need to provide user authentication and data protection in order to further facilitate critical mission operations, especially in the tactical and mission-critical net-centric networking environment. The Autonomous Information Unit (AIU) technology was designed to provide the fine-grain data access and user control in a net-centric system-testing environment to meet these objectives. The AIU is a fundamental capability designed to enable fine-grain data access and user control in the cross-domain networking environments, where an AIU is composed of the mission data, metadata, and policy. An AIU provides a mechanism to establish trust among deployed AIUs based on recombining shared secrets, authentication and verify users with a username, X.509 certificate, enclave information, and classification level. AIU achieves data protection through (1) splitting data into multiple information pieces using the Shamir's secret sharing algorithm, (2) encrypting each individual information piece using military-grade AES-256 encryption, and (3) randomizing the position of the encrypted data based on the unbiased and memory efficient in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle method. Therefore, it becomes virtually impossible for attackers to compromise data since attackers need to obtain all distributed information as well as the encryption key and the random seeds to properly arrange the data. In addition, since policy can be associated with data in the AIU, different user access and data control strategies can be included. The AIU technology can greatly enhance information assurance and security management in the bandwidth-limited and ad hoc net-centric environments. In addition, AIU technology can be applicable to general complex network domains and applications where distributed user authentication and data protection are necessary. AIU achieves fine-grain data access and user control, reducing the security risk significantly, simplifying the complexity of various security operations, and providing the high information assurance across different network domains.

Chow, Edward T.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Radio Frequency Spectrum Audit to Inventory Private Cellular Base Station Infrastructure

The ever-changing cellular communication landscape makes it difficult to identify, map, and localize cellular base stations. Localizing cellular base stations provides various advantages, including information security, cybersecurity, spectrum management, and interference detection. For example, the MITRE ATT&CK® (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge architecture) [1] and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification [2] emphasize the importance of being able to minimize the cyber security threat presented by unregulated private cellular base stations (PCBS). The majority of published research looks at the malicious use of PCBSs and focuses on using data retrieved from user equipment (UE), data obtained from an application on the UE, or data shared between the UE and a mobile network to locate it. This innovative strategy, however, focuses on the passively discovered uniqueness of radio frequency (RF) transmissions from commercial cellular infrastructure received in a designated monitoring position (DMP).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) User Story

This document presents a user story for the Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) tool designed to aggregate and analyze cyber-attack observables for operational technology (OT) systems. BAM aims to empower cybersecurity analysts by providing a streamlined interface for collecting observable data from various sources, enabling real-time analysis of potential adversary activity. By enhancing the response capabilities of security teams, BAM facilitates risk-informed decision-making and improves organizational security posture. This user story outlines the key functionalities, user interactions, and requirements necessary to successfully integrate BAM with other security information and event management (SIEM) technology and cybersecurity operations centers (CSOCs).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

The EGS Data Collaboration Platform: Enabling Scientific Discovery

Collaboration in the digital age has been stifled in recent years. Reasonable responses to legitimate security concerns have created a virtual landscape of silos and fortified castles incapable of sharing information efficiently. This trend is unfortunately opposed to the geothermal scientific community's migration toward larger, more collaborative projects. To facilitate efficient sharing of information between team members from multiple national labs, universities, and private organizations, the 'EGS Collab' team has developed a universally accessible, secure data collaboration platform and has fully integrated it with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Geothermal Data Repository (GDR) and the National Geothermal Data System (NGDS). This paper will explore some of the challenges of collaboration in the modern digital age, highlight strategies for active data management, and discuss the integration of the EGS Collab data management platform with the GDR to enable scientific discovery through the timely dissemination of information.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗