DOE OSTI2025
In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗