Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “improvised nuclear device”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Improvised Nuclear Device Case Study

Reducing the casualties of catastrophic terrorist attacks requires an understanding of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) effects, infrastructure damage, atmospheric dispersion, and health effects. The Federal Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation provides the strategy for response to an improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation. The supporting science developed by national laboratories and other technical organizations for this document significantly improves our understanding of the hazards posed by such an event. Detailed fallout predictions from the advanced suite of three-dimensional meteorology and plume/fallout models developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, including extensive global geographical and real-time meteorological databases to support model calculations, are a key part of response planning. This presentation describes the methodology and results to date, including visualization aids developed for response organizations. These products have greatly enhanced the community planning process through first-person points of view and description of the dynamic nature of the event.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Implications of an Improvised Nuclear Device Detonation on Command and Control for Surrounding Regions at the Local, State and Federal Levels

This paper discusses command and control issues relating to the operation of Incident Command Posts (ICPs) and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) in the surrounding area jurisdictions following the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). Although many aspects of command and control will be similar to what is considered to be normal operations using the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the IND response will require many new procedures and associations in order to design and implement a successful response. The scope of this white paper is to address the following questions: • Would the current command and control framework change in the face of an IND incident? • What would the management of operations look like as the event unfolded? • How do neighboring and/or affected jurisdictions coordinate with the state? • If the target area’s command and control infrastructure is destroyed or disabled, how could neighboring jurisdictions assist with command and control of the targeted jurisdiction? • How would public health and medical services fit into the command and control structure? • How can pre-planning and common policies improve coordination and response effectiveness? • Where can public health officials get federal guidance on radiation, contamination and other health and safety issues for IND response planning and operations?

command and control, Incident Command Post, ICP, E↗

Task 4 Improvised Nuclear Device Response Curves

LLNL performed fallout and nuclear blast modeling for the 60 cities using the NARAC modeling system and predominant weather patterns determined in a previous Task 4 effort. LLNL performed model simulations and analyses to identify and provide response curves (expressed as two-dimensional contours) for radioactive fallout deposition, transport, population, and blast overpressure as a function of yield, weather, location and time. These contours can then be further combined and correlated with infrastructure and population databases to estimate city specific effects on KPFs such as impacted infrastructure and casualty rates.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Future of EPA's Waste Estimation Support Tool - 17227

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a GIS-based decision support tool for estimating the characteristics, amount, and residual radioactivity of waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities after a radiological incident, including those involving radiological dispersal devices, improvised nuclear devices, and nuclear power plants. WEST has been released to the public and has been used in numerous national level exercises and planning scenarios; however, it continues to be improved and refined to add additional functionality and performance. Since its inception, WEST has undergone a myriad of updates, routinely ensuring compatibility with ESRI's ArcGIS and FEMA's Hazus, a tool for estimating potential losses from earthquakes, wind, and flood events. Furthermore, recent enhancements have added reporting and mapping features and multi-state support. Over time, this progress has strained WEST's Microsoft{sup C} Excel based platform. The inherent limitations of Excel have limited the capacity of WEST and narrowed the scope of potential enhancements. Recent collaborative efforts between the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Science and Technology Directorate (S and T) and EPA will see the introduction of a new software platform for easing memory limitations and new and innovative features for improving the accuracy of waste estimates. The planned enhancements include: 1) Systems approach: measure or predict the outcome of decisions associated with disaster response (e.g., decontamination efficacy vs. waste) and to a greater extent, the overall resource demand (e.g., cost, time, etc.); 2) Custom infrastructure data and international support: accommodate non-US building information where available and also add new data and information on recently used decontamination technologies as applied in a real-world incident; 3) Additional waste factors: addition of waste factors that are unique to wide area scenarios such as vehicles and trees as they will likely contribute in a significant manner to the overall waste stream;4) Site analysis and logistics: apply spatial information and analysis technologies to locate and prioritize potential waste staging or storage sites; and use GIS-based logistics planning to better organize, route, and estimate the cost, time, and logistical requirements (i.e., resource demand) associated with transporting large volumes of waste from a disaster-stricken area to waste staging or storage sites; 5) Decontamination technologies: introduce new decontamination technologies, better understand the feasibility and efficacy of new and preexisting decontamination technologies when applied to a wide area incident, and use historical incidents to ground truth waste results; and 6) Resource demand: ability to estimate resource demand information associated with decontamination technologies, waste staging and storage, and logistical information for transporting waste. This paper will describe the next version of WEST (WEST 4.0), and how the aforementioned enhancements will contribute to improving the planning and response capabilities of the tool. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a Methodology to Assess the Impact of Non-Conventional Waste Streams Following a Radiological Incident - 18271

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a Geographic Information System (GIS)-based decision support tool for estimating waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities following a radiological incident. WEST uses the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Hazus-MH software's infrastructure information combined with image classification capabilities to estimate the quantity of waste and debris that may result from a radiological incident. WEST can be used to create customized decontamination strategies that allow end-users to evaluate different means of decontamination and how those strategies may impact the resulting waste stream in each geographical locality. This capability can potentially reduce the response/recovery time frame and cost. One of the key observations from past applications of WEST is that planning scenarios are site-specific, especially when dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) waste management issues. Furthermore, site-specific issues are not limited to resource limitations or response bottlenecks but should also account for differences in an area's geography and urban footprint, a phenomenon observed during the Fukushima response. For instance, a recent WEST case study found that the amount of waste generated per unit of affected area, for a given decontamination approach, is largely a function of the building surface area in the affected area (relative to the ground surfaces). However, differences in the geometry and density of contaminated objects in the landscape may impact the amount and characteristics of the waste stream. Although buildings typically constitute a large portion of the surface area in urban environments, other objects such as vehicles and trees can be just as prominent. For example, seasonal changes in the amount of foliage present can alter the non-structural surface area calculated for an area like New York City by 20-30%. Very little is known about the impact that these non-conventional waste streams have on overall remediation strategies, or to what extent differences in characteristics of urban versus rural environments, traffic activities, or seasonal variations may have on these factors. This paper will present the proposed methodology to incorporate into WEST the impacts that niche, nonconventional waste streams might have from rural and urban environments following a nuclear power plant incident or detonation of a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Rapid determination of actinides in asphalt samples

A new rapid method for the determination of actinides in asphalt samples has been developed that can be used in emergency response situations or for routine analysis If a radiological dispersive device (RDD), Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) or a nuclear accident such as the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March, 2011 occurs, there will be an urgent need for rapid analyses of many different environmental matrices, including asphalt materials, to support dose mitigation and environmental clean up. The new method for the determination of actinides in asphalt utilizes a rapid furnace step to destroy bitumen and organics present in the asphalt and sodium hydroxide fusion to digest the remaining sample. Sample preconcentration steps are used to collect the actinides and a new stacked TRU Resin + DGA Resin column method is employed to separate the actinide isotopes in the asphalt samples. The TRU Resin plus DGA Resin separation approach, which allows sequential separation of plutonium, uranium, americium and curium isotopes in asphalt samples, can be applied to soil samples as well.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

ASSESSMENT OF 90SR AND 137CS PENETRATION INTO REINFORCED CONCRETE (EXTENT OF 'DEEPENING') UNDER NATURAL ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS

When assessing the feasibility of remediation following the detonation of a radiological dispersion device or improvised nuclear device in a large city, several issues should be considered including the levels and characteristics of the radioactive contamination, the availability of resources required for decontamination, and the planned future use of the city's structures and buildings. Currently, little is known about radionuclide penetration into construction materials in an urban environment. Knowledge in this area would be useful when considering costs of a thorough decontamination of buildings, artificial structures, and roads in an affected urban environment. Pripyat, a city substantially contaminated by the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in April 1986, may provide some answers. The main objective of this study was to assess the depth of {sup 90}Sr and {sup 137}Cs penetration into reinforced concrete structures in a highly contaminated urban environment under natural weather conditions. Thirteen reinforced concrete core samples were obtained from external surfaces of a contaminated building in Pripyat. The concrete cores were drilled to obtain sample layers of 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50 mm. Both {sup 90}Sr and {sup 137}Cs were detected in the entire 0-50 mm profile of the reinforced cores sampled. In most of the cores, over 90% of the total {sup 137}Cs inventory and 70% of the total {sup 90}Sr inventory was found in the first 0-5 mm layer of the reinforced concrete. {sup 90}Sr had penetrated markedly deeper into the reinforced concrete structures than {sup 137}Cs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Summary of Building Protection Factor Studies for External Exposure to Ionizing Radiation

Radiation dose assessments are used to help inform decisions to minimize health risks in the event of an atmospheric release of radioactivity including, for example, from a Radiological Dispersal Device, an Improvised Nuclear Device detonation, or a Nuclear Power Plant accident. During these incidents, radiation dose assessments for both indoor and outdoor populations are needed to make informed decisions. These dose assessments inform emergency plans and decisions including, for example, identifying areas in which people should be sheltered and determining when controlled population evacuations should be made. US dose assessment methodologies allow consideration of the protection, and therefore dose reduction, that buildings provide their occupants. However, these methodologies require an understanding of the protection provided by various building types that is currently lacking. To help address this need, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in cooperation with Sandia National Laboratories and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was tasked with (a) identifying prior building protection studies, (b) extracting results relevant to US building construction, and (c) summarizing building protection by building type. This report focuses primarily on the protection against radiation from outdoor fallout particles (external gamma radiation).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Options for Providing Radiation Protection Shelter Quality Information to U.S. Local, State and Federal Government Agencies

This report describes available information on protection that can be provided by buildings from exposure to radioactive contamination in the environment, and options for how this information can be provided to government organizations across the United States. This information is potentially useful for planning how to protect the public in the event of an atmospheric release of radioactivity including, for example, from a Radiological Dispersal Device, an Improvised Nuclear Device detonation, or a Nuclear Power Plant accident. During these incidents, knowledge of the radiation protection provided by buildings is critical to predicting and assessing radiation dose to the population, and the associated health risk. These dose assessments inform emergency plans and decisions including, for example, identifying areas in which people should be sheltered in place, and determining when controlled population evacuations should be made.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Integrating decontamination strategies into a waste estimation support tool for radiological incidents - 15284

In the planning and preparedness stages for a response to a radiological incident, it is important to include waste management considerations when developing the decontamination/demolition/cleanup approach because waste management can be a driver for time and cost. An individualized type of strategy based on the occupancy of affected buildings may be an effective approach. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a novel application of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazus-MH software. WEST enables users to estimate the characteristics, amount, and residual radioactivity of waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities after a radiological incident, including incidents caused by radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices, as well as nuclear power plant accidents. This paper will describe the recently released update to WEST, which includes the ability to export the waste estimate results back into ArcGIS for further visualization. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Estimation from a Wide-Area Radiological Incident: The Impact of Geography and Urban Footprint - 16256

In the planning and preparedness stages for a response to a radiological incident, it is important to include waste management considerations when developing the decontamination/demolition/cleanup approach because waste management can be a driver for time and cost for return to normalcy. Waste management is also inextricably linked to the geography and urban footprint of the impacted area. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a novel application based on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazus-MH software. WEST enables users to estimate the characteristics, amount, and residual radioactivity of waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities after a radiological incident, including incidents caused by radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices, as well as nuclear power plant accidents. These waste estimates are generated as a function of user-defined decontamination strategies and are specific to a geographic location. This paper will describe the recently released version 3 update to WEST, and how differences in geography and urban footprints can impact the waste that is generated. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status Update on the NCRP Scientific Committee SC 5-1 Report: Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents - 13450

In August 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its final Protective Action Guide (PAG) for radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. This document specifies protective actions for public health during the early and intermediate phases and cleanup guidance for the late phase of RDD or IND incidents, and it discusses approaches to implementing the necessary actions. However, while the PAG provides specific guidance for the early and intermediate phases, it prescribes no equivalent guidance for the late-phase cleanup actions. Instead, the PAG offers a general description of a complex process using a site-specific optimization approach. This approach does not predetermine cleanup levels but approaches the problem from the factors that would bear on the final agreed-on cleanup levels. Based on this approach, the decision-making process involves multifaceted considerations including public health, the environment, and the economy, as well as socio-political factors. In an effort to fully define the process and approach to be used in optimizing late-phase recovery and site restoration following an RDD or IND incident, DHS has tasked the NCRP with preparing a comprehensive report addressing all aspects of the optimization process. Preparation of the NCRP report is a three-year (2010-2013) project assigned to a scientific committee, the Scientific Committee (SC) 5-1; the report was initially titled, Approach to Optimizing Decision Making for Late- Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. Members of SC 5-1 represent a broad range of expertise, including homeland security, health physics, risk and decision analysis, economics, environmental remediation and radioactive waste management, and communication. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, and guided by a recent process led by the White House through a Principal Level Exercise (PLE), the optimization approach has since been expanded to include off-site contamination from major nuclear power plant accidents as well as other nuclear or radiological incidents. The expanded application under the current guidance has thus led to a broadened scope of the report, which is reflected in its new title, Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The NCRP report, which is due for publication in 2013, will substantiate the current DHS guidance by clarifying and elaborating on the processes required for the development and implementation of procedures for optimizing decision making for late-phase recovery, enabling the establishment of cleanup goals on a site-specific basis. The report will contain a series of topics addressing important issues related to the long-term recovery from nuclear or radiological incidents. Special topics relevant to supporting the optimization of the decision-making process will include cost-benefit analysis, radioactive waste management, risk communication, stakeholder interaction, risk assessment, and decontamination approaches and techniques. The committee also evaluated past nuclear and radiological incidents for their relevance to the report, including the emerging issues associated with the Fukushima nuclear accident. Thus, due to the commonality of the late-phase issues (such as the potential widespread contamination following an event), the majority of the information pertaining to the response in the late-phase decision-making period, including site-specific optimization framework and approach, could be used or adapted for use in case of similar situations that are not due to terrorism, such as those that would be caused by major nuclear facility accidents or radiological incidents. To ensure that the report and the NCRP recommendations are current and relevant to the effective implementation of federal guidance, SC 5-1 has actively coordinated with the agencies of interest and other relevant stakeholders throughout the duration of the project. The resulting report will be an important resource to guide those involved in late-phase recovery efforts following a nuclear or radiological incident. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2: Vol. 2—User’s Guide for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code

Version 2.0 of the RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code is designed to support the implementation of protective action guides (PAGs) after a nuclear emergency incident including a radiological dispersal device (RDD) and/or an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident (EPA 2017). Eight different group types, addressing various decisions, are available for selection. The RESRAD-RDD&IND code calculates radiological doses, stay times, etc., for the selected group that the user wishes to focus on. (That is, the results for all the groups are not calculated simultaneously, and the input for those other groups do not matter, although some parameter values are shared between groups.) Version 2.0 has a user-friendly interface so that the RESRAD-RDD&IND code can be used with minimal training. For example, the user can select the major characteristics of the problem-event type, source term, and decision type from the left side of the interface and then calculate the results with the default assumptions for the exposure scenarios. More in-depth analysis would include specifying site-specific exposure scenario characteristics in the right side of the interface. The procedures for data entry and results viewing are self-explanatory. This is because common window maneuvering features and text instructions were incorporated in the interface design. General and context-specific help are available to aid users entering parameter values, as well. The RESRAD-RDD&IND computer code gives the user the option to select either an RDD or IND incident for analysis. For an RDD event analysis, 11 radionuclides (Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226, and Sr-90) are included. These 11 radionuclides are the radionuclides most likely used for an RDD. More than 90 radionuclides can be selected for an IND event analysis. Initial default concentrations are provided for 44 radionuclides for a uranium-fueled IND event. These 44 radionuclides are those that would contribute significantly to the radiation dose associated with a uranium-fueled bomb detonation. The radionuclides generated from ingrowth of these 44 initial radionuclides are also automatically included in the analysis. Pu-239, Cs-134m, Ru-105, and Rb-89 and their progeny can be selected for analysis if they are detected and their concentrations are determined. This user’s guide, which is Volume 2 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2, provides instructions to users on how to install the RESRAD-RDD&IND code, navigate the interface, and use the various features, including those discussed above, to set up an analysis and view/print the results in text outputs. Volume 1 of the User’s Manual for RESRAD-RDD&IND Code Version 2 (Yu et al. 2026), which contains descriptions of the methodology and theoretical basis for dose modeling and the mathematical equations implemented in the code, can be accessed and viewed through the Help menu in the code or can be downloaded from the RESRAD website (https://resrad.evs.anl.gov).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Briefing Products - Tools for Communicating Technical Issues to a Non-Technical Audience

Briefing Products are a new NARAC/IMAAC product line designed to communicate the consequences of a radiological, nuclear, chemical or biological agent incident to non-technical decision makers and key leaders. Each Briefing Product addresses a single decision or issue focused on potential actions that should be considered when responding to a hazard, while avoiding the use of technical or regulatory jargon. Briefing Products do not make protective action recommendations, although they do concretely assist decision-makers with development of their own protective actions by quoting or paraphrasing the published guidance relevant to the decision at hand. Briefing Products are produced in sets tailored to specific types of incident which together depict the key decisions and characteristics of the incident. Each Briefing Product in the set consists of three elements: (1) Primary Effects, (2) Key Points and (3) Presenter Notes. Both the Primary Effects and Key Points are ready for direct presentation, while the Presenter Notes are designed to provide background information to the presenter and are not for direct presentation to the audience. The Briefing Products themselves are alternative presentations of results from the customary standard NARAC/IMAAC technical products. Currently, Briefing Products are available for detonation of both RDDs (Radiological Dispersal Devices) and INDs (Improvised Nuclear Devices). A new set of products tailored to nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents is currently under development. This paper describes the scope, structure and content of the Briefing Product sets. Examples from the two sets of Briefing Products now available are presented.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗