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Top-down and bottom-up definitions of human failure events in human reliability analysis

In the probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question is crucial, however, as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PRAs tend to be top-down—defined as a subset of the PRA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) often tend to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications.

02 PETROLEUM↗

SIMULATED HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO DYNAMIC HUMAN FAILURE EVENTS

Abstract Objectives: Human reliability analysis (HRA) methods typically analyze human failure events (HFEs) at the overall task level. For dynamic HRA, it is important to model human activities at the subtask level. There exists a disconnect between dynamic subtask level and static task level that presents issues when modeling dynamic scenarios. For example, the SPAR-H method is typically used to calculate the human error probability (HEP) at the task level. As demonstrated in this paper, quantification in SPAR-H does not translate to the subtask level. Methods: Two different discrete distributions were generated for each SPAR-H Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) to define the frequency of PSF levels. The first distribution was a uniform, or uninformed distribution that assumed the frequency of each PSF level was equally likely. The second non-continuous distribution took the frequency of PSF level as identified from an assessment of the HERA database. These two different approaches were created to identify the resulting distribution of the HEP. The resulting HEP that appears closer to the known distribution, a log-normal centered on 1E-3, is the more desirable. Each approach then has median, average and maximum HFE calculations applied. To calculate these three values, three events, A, B and C are generated from the PSF level frequencies comprised of subtasks. The median HFE selects the median PSF level from each PSF and calculates HEP. The average HFE takes the mean PSF level, and the maximum takes the maximum PSF level. The same data set of subtask HEPs yields starkly different HEPs when aggregated to the HFE level in SPAR-H. Results: Assuming that each PSF level in each HFE is equally likely creates an unrealistic distribution of the HEP that is centered at 1. Next the observed frequency of PSF levels was applied with the resulting HEP behaving log-normally with a majority of the values under 2.5% HEP. The median, average and maximum HFE calculations did yield different answers for the HFE. The HFE maximum grossly over estimates the HFE, while the HFE distribution occurs less than HFE median, and greater than HFE average. Conclusions: Dynamic task modeling can be perused through the framework of SPAR-H. Identification of distributions associated with each PSF needs to be defined, and may change depending upon the scenario. However it is very unlikely that each PSF level is equally likely as the resulting HEP distribution is strongly centered at 100%, which is unrealistic. Other distributions may need to be identified for PSFs, to facilitate the transition to dynamic task modeling. Additionally discrete distributions need to be exchanged for continuous so that simulations for the HFE can further advance. This paper provides a method to explore dynamic subtask to task translation and provides examples of the process using the SPAR-H method.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

HUMAN FAILURE EVENT DEPENDENCE: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS

Abstract Objectives: This paper discusses the differences between classical human reliability analysis (HRA) dependence and the full spectrum of probabilistic dependence. Positive influence suggests an error increases the likelihood of subsequent errors or success increases the likelihood of subsequent success. Currently the typical method for dependence in HRA implements the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) positive dependence equations. This assumes that the dependence between two human failure events varies at discrete levels between zero and complete dependence (as defined by THERP). Dependence in THERP does not consistently span dependence values between 0 and 1. In contrast, probabilistic dependence employs Bayes Law, and addresses a continuous range of dependence. Methods: Using the laws of probability, complete dependence and maximum positive dependence do not always agree. Maximum dependence is when two events overlap to their fullest amount. Maximum negative dependence is the smallest amount that two events can overlap. When the minimum probability of two events overlapping is less than independence, negative dependence occurs. For example, negative dependence is when an operator fails to actuate Pump A, thereby increasing his or her chance of actuating Pump B. The initial error actually increases the chance of subsequent success. Results: Comparing THERP and probability theory yields different results in certain scenarios; with the latter addressing negative dependence. Given that most human failure events are rare, the minimum overlap is typically 0. And when the second event is smaller than the first event the max dependence is less than 1, as defined by Bayes Law. As such alternative dependence equations are provided along with a look-up table defining the maximum and maximum negative dependence given the probability of two events. Conclusions: THERP dependence has been used ubiquitously for decades, and has provided approximations of the dependencies between two events. Since its inception, computational abilities have increased exponentially, and alternative approaches that follow the laws of probability dependence need to be implemented. These new approaches need to consider negative dependence and identify when THERP output is not appropriate.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

One Size Does Not Fit All: Human Failure Event Decomposition and Task Analysis

In the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered or exacerbated by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question remains central as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PSAs tend to be top-down—defined as a subset of the PSA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) are more likely to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications. In this paper, I first review top-down and bottom-up approaches for defining HFEs and then present a seven-step guideline to ensure a task analysis completed as part of human error identification decomposes to a level suitable for use as HFEs. This guideline illustrates an effective way to bridge the bottom-up approach with top-down requirements.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Defining Human Failure Events for Petroleum Risk Analysis

In this paper, an identification and description of barriers and human failure events (HFEs) for human reliability analysis (HRA) is performed. The barriers, called target systems, are identified from risk significant accident scenarios represented as defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHAs). This report serves as the foundation for further work to develop petroleum HFEs compatible with the SPAR-H method and intended for reuse in future HRAs.

02 PETROLEUM↗

A Dynamic Approach to Modeling Dependence Between Human Failure Events

In practice, most HRA methods use direct dependence from THERP—the notion that error be- gets error, and one human failure event (HFE) may increase the likelihood of subsequent HFEs. In this paper, we approach dependence from a simulation perspective in which the effects of human errors are dynamically modeled. There are three key concepts that play into this modeling: (1) Errors are driven by performance shaping factors (PSFs). In this context, the error propagation is not a result of the presence of an HFE yielding overall increases in subsequent HFEs. Rather, it is shared PSFs that cause dependence. (2) PSFs have qualities of lag and latency. These two qualities are not currently considered in HRA methods that use PSFs. Yet, to model the effects of PSFs, it is not simply a matter of identifying the discrete effects of a particular PSF on performance. The effects of PSFs must be considered temporally, as the PSFs will have a range of effects across the event sequence. (3) Finally, there is the concept of error spilling. When PSFs are activated, they not only have temporal effects but also lateral effects on other PSFs, leading to emergent errors. This paper presents the framework for tying together these dynamic dependence concepts.

dependence↗

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Mid-Layer Model for Human Reliability Analysis: Understanding the Cognitive Causes of Human Failure Events

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is sponsoring work in response to a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) directing an effort to establish a single human reliability analysis (HRA) method for the agency or guidance for the use of multiple methods. As part of this effort an attempt to develop a comprehensive HRA qualitative approach is being pursued. This paper presents a draft of the method’s middle layer, a part of the qualitative analysis phase that links failure mechanisms to performance shaping factors. Starting with a Crew Response Tree (CRT) that has identified human failure events, analysts identify potential failure mechanisms using the mid-layer model. The mid-layer model presented in this paper traces the identification of the failure mechanisms using the Information-Diagnosis/Decision-Action (IDA) model and cognitive models from the psychological literature. Each failure mechanism is grouped according to a phase of IDA. Under each phase of IDA, the cognitive models help identify the relevant performance shaping factors for the failure mechanism. The use of IDA and cognitive models can be traced through fault trees, which provide a detailed complement to the CRT.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of HRA method predictions against operating crew performance: Part II: Overall simulator data, HRA method predictions, and intra-method comparisons

This is the third in a series of four papers documenting two large-scale human reliability analysis (HRA) empirical studies – the International HRA Empirical Study and the US HRA Empirical Study. Here, the goal of the two studies was to develop an empirically-based understanding of the performance, strengths, and weaknesses of HRA methods by comparing HRA method predictions against actual operator performance in simulated accident scenarios on nuclear power plant (NPP) simulators. However, since in most cases only a single HRA team applied a given method in the International study, it was often difficult to separate analyst effects from variability in results related to the methods themselves. Since at least two HRA teams used each of the HRA methods in the US Study, intra-method comparisons were performed to identify method strengths and weaknesses independent of analyst specific effects where possible. This paper first summarizes the intra-method comparison results from the U.S. Study. Then, it discusses the reasons for the observed HRA predictive differences and the underlying methodological and guidance limitations that permitted the differences to arise. In the fourth paper, this information is combined wit h the results of the comparisons of method predictions to the actual crew data, from both the International and U.S. Studies, to develop the final conclusions about overall strengths and weaknesses of HRA methods.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A mid-layer model for human reliability analysis : understanding the cognitive causes of human failure events.

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) is sponsoring work in response to a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) directing an effort to establish a single human reliability analysis (HRA) method for the agency or guidance for the use of multiple methods. As part of this effort an attempt to develop a comprehensive HRA qualitative approach is being pursued. This paper presents a draft of the method's middle layer, a part of the qualitative analysis phase that links failure mechanisms to performance shaping factors. Starting with a Crew Response Tree (CRT) that has identified human failure events, analysts identify potential failure mechanisms using the mid-layer model. The mid-layer model presented in this paper traces the identification of the failure mechanisms using the Information-Diagnosis/Decision-Action (IDA) model and cognitive models from the psychological literature. Each failure mechanism is grouped according to a phase of IDA. Under each phase of IDA, the cognitive models help identify the relevant performance shaping factors for the failure mechanism. The use of IDA and cognitive models can be traced through fault trees, which provide a detailed complement to the CRT.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Task Decomposition in Human Reliability Analysis

In the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question remains central as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PSAs tend to be top-down— defined as a subset of the PSA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) are more likely to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications.

error of commission↗

Human Reliability Considerations for Small Modular Reactors

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are a promising approach to meeting future energy needs. Although the electrical output of an individual SMR is relatively small compared to that of typical commercial nuclear plants, they can be grouped to produce as much energy as a utility demands. Furthermore, SMRs can be used for other purposes, such as producing hydrogen and generating process heat. The design characteristics of many SMRs differ from those of current conventional plants and may require a distinct concept of operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted research to examine the human factors engineering and the operational aspects of SMRs. The research identified thirty potential human-performance issues that should be considered in the NRC's reviews of SMR designs and in future research activities. The purpose of this report is to illustrate how the issues can support SMR probabilistic risk analyses and their review by identifying potential human failure events for a subset of the issues. As part of addressing the human contribution to plant risk, human reliability analysis practitioners identify and quantify the human failure events that can negatively impact normal or emergency plant operations. The results illustrated here can be generalized to identify additional human failure events for the issues discussed and can be applied to those issues not discussed in this report.

08 HYDROGEN↗

EPRI/NRC-RES fire human reliability analysis guidelines.

During the 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed methods for fire risk analysis to support its utility members in the preparation of responses to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, 'Individual Plant Examination - External Events' (IPEEE). This effort produced a Fire Risk Assessment methodology for operations at power that was used by the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) in support of the IPEEE program and several NPPs overseas. Although these methods were acceptable for accomplishing the objectives of the IPEEE, EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized that they required upgrades to support current requirements for risk-informed, performance-based (RI/PB) applications. In 2001, EPRI and the USNRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) embarked on a cooperative project to improve the state-of-the-art in fire risk assessment to support a new risk-informed environment in fire protection. This project produced a consensus document, NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989), entitled 'Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities' which addressed fire risk for at power operations. NUREG/CR-6850 developed high level guidance on the process for identification and inclusion of human failure events (HFEs) into the fire PRA (FPRA), and a methodology for assigning quantitative screening values to these HFEs. It outlined the initial considerations of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and related fire effects that may need to be addressed in developing best-estimate human error probabilities (HEPs). However, NUREG/CR-6850 did not describe a methodology to develop best-estimate HEPs given the PSFs and the fire-related effects. In 2007, EPRI and RES embarked on another cooperative project to develop explicit guidance for estimating HEPs for human failure events under fire generated conditions, building upon existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods. This document provides a methodology and guidance for conducting a fire HRA. This process includes identification and definition of post-fire human failure events, qualitative analysis, quantification, recovery, dependency, and uncertainty. This document provides three approaches to quantification: screening, scoping, and detailed HRA. Screening is based on the guidance in NUREG/CR-6850, with some additional guidance for scenarios with long time windows. Scoping is a new approach to quantification developed specifically to support the iterative nature of fire PRA quantification. Scoping is intended to provide less conservative HEPs than screening, but requires fewer resources than a detailed HRA analysis. For detailed HRA quantification, guidance has been developed on how to apply existing methods to assess post-fire fire HEPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Fifty Years of THERP and Human Reliability Analysis

In 1962 at a Human Factors Society symposium, Alan Swain presented a paper introducing a Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). This was followed in 1963 by a Sandia Laboratories monograph outlining basic human error quantification using THERP and, in 1964, by a special journal edition of Human Factors on quantification of human performance. Throughout the 1960s, Swain and his colleagues focused on collecting human performance data for the Sandia Human Error Rate Bank (SHERB), primarily in connection with supporting the reliability of nuclear weapons assembly in the US. In 1969, Swain met with Jens Rasmussen of Risø National Laboratory and discussed the applicability of THERP to nuclear power applications. By 1975, in WASH-1400, Swain had articulated the use of THERP for nuclear power applications, and the approach was finalized in the watershed publication of the NUREG/CR-1278 in 1983. THERP is now 50 years old, and remains the most well known and most widely used HRA method. In this paper, the author discusses the history of THERP, based on published reports and personal communication and interviews with Swain. The author also outlines the significance of THERP. The foundations of human reliability analysis are found in THERP: human failure events, task analysis, performance shaping factors, human error probabilities, dependence, event trees, recovery, and pre- and post-initiating events were all introduced in THERP. While THERP is not without its detractors, and it is showing signs of its age in the face of newer technological applications, the longevity of THERP is a testament of its tremendous significance. THERP started the field of human reliability analysis. This paper concludes with a discussion of THERP in the context of newer methods, which can be seen as extensions of or departures from Swain’s pioneering work.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Guidance on Dependence Assessment in SPAR-H

As part of the effort to develop the SPAR-H user guidance, particular attention was paid to the assessment of dependence in order to address user questions about proper application of dependence. This paper presents a discussion of dependence from a psychological perspective and provides guidance on applying this information during the qualitative analysis of dependence to ensure more realistic and appropriate dependence assessments with the SPAR-H method. While this guidance was developed with SPAR-H in mind, it may be informative to other human reliability analysis methods that also use a THERP-based dependence approach, particularly if applied at the human failure event level.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Qualitative and Quantitative Evaluation for Representative Human Reliability Analysis Methods

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) is the regulatory expert organization established by the Korean government to strengthen the nation’s technical capabilities relating to nuclear safety regulation. KINS oversees the technical aspects of nuclear safety regulation, including safety reviews, inspections, education, and safety research—all conducted based on technical knowledge and accumulated regulatory experience. In 2023, KINS requested that Idaho National Laboratory (INL) validates representative human reliability analysis (HRA) methods used throughout the world, thus affording KINS with a basis for determining an HRA method adequate for its domestic regulatory purposes. The present paper mainly examines INL’s efforts in this regard. The resulting INL study covered four representative HRA methods widely used by nuclear utilities and regulatory institutes. These methods were qualitatively evaluated by applying specific evaluation criteria and determining how well each method reflected critical HRA issues. For this assessment, INL benchmarked the Halden International HRA Empirical Study. Using the Halden empirical data, along with information on human failure events (HFEs), the present study employed the selected HRA methods to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) for the HFEs. It also performed statistical analyses to compare the HEPs predicted via the HRA methods against those from the Halden empirical data.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SPAR-H Step-by-Step Guidance

This guide provides step-by-step guidance on the use of the SPAR-H method for quantifying Human Failure Events (HFEs). This guide is intended to be used with the worksheets provided in: 'The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method,' NUREG/CR-6883, dated August 2005. Each step in the process of producing a Human Error Probability (HEP) is discussed. These steps are: Step-1, Categorizing the HFE as Diagnosis and/or Action; Step-2, Rate the Performance Shaping Factors; Step-3, Calculate PSF-Modified HEP; Step-4, Accounting for Dependence, and; Step-5, Minimum Value Cutoff. The discussions on dependence are extensive and include an appendix that describes insights obtained from the psychology literature.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗