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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory in Cybersecurity: A Review of Applications, Models, and Challenges

There are no aspects of society left unchanged by the Internet. From commerce to communication, from entertainment to engineering, every industry and sphere of influence exists in a new state thanks to the advent of the information age. This convenience, rarely controverted, comes with capricious actors, who wish to gain access to these systems for myriad reasons, be it financial, political, or mere intellectual gain. This paper presents information that can help readers to better understand the fundamentals of cybersecurity from a game theory perspective, such as coalitional games, Colonel Blotto systems, or how to find Nash Equilibrium. This paper also reviews how game theory can enhance understanding of cybersecurity through cooperative and non-cooperative methods, such as information sharing, defense modeling, and attacker analysis. The authors use the analysis to serve as a bridge for those in either field who need a way to best comprehend the methodologies of their contrasting fields.

Egan, Matthew↗

DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

From Modular ADMS to Plug-and-Play Ops: Distribution Grid Operations with Platform-Level Orchestration to Enable Ambitious App Hosting

The core function of the distribution grid is to provide electricity to consumers affordably, reliably, and securely. In pursuing these core objectives, distribution utilities are accountable to customers, regulators, and in some cases, shareholders. Other third parties such as aggregators and microgrids can also have a stake in the smooth operation of the grid. Each of these stakeholders has economic, business, and/or governance objectives that inform their expectations of the distribution grid. This multi-objective, multi-stakeholder environment creates tension that must be reconciled to successfully design and operate the distribution grid. Innovative companies are competing to bring high-tech solutions to electric utilities and their customers that address each of these objectives. Many developers of advanced distribution management systems (ADMS) and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) have adopted a modular architecture that allows grid operators to select functions and features according to their individual system needs. A modular platform also allows the solution provider to develop and integrate specific new product modules; however, the need to pursue multiple objectives with a fixed set of controllable devices makes integration expensive whether it is done at the product development stage or the deployment stage. This cost creates a significant barrier to adoption and can lengthen the product to market time of new solutions. To fundamentally address the complexity of system integration for distribution grid operations, the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity has funded the GridAPPS-D project at PNNL, which streamlines integration by contributing to standards development, defining system architecture, applying advanced mathematics, and developing open-source software to demonstrate the concept of an open data-integration platform for distribution operations. The open data-integration platform concept enables system operators and solution providers to deploy ambitious, best-of-breed applications (or apps) without continually reengineering for integration. Ambitious apps developed by different solution providers will inevitably attempt to achieve different control objectives with the same set of controllable devices. If the open platform itself can resolve these conflicts in a way that achieves the best available outcomes for all apps, doesn’t restrict the ambitious design of apps, and ensures safe and secure operations, apps will be able to plug-and-play with the platform at the same time as other ambitious apps. In this paper, we describe a framework called App Deconfliction that empowers a platform to assign setpoints to controllable devices based on the values preferred by different apps (and even external stakeholder entities like customers or aggregators). The App Deconfliction framework is compatible with several methods for determining setpoint values. We present two methods based on game theory that provide a subtle built-in incentive structure for developers to adapt their apps to the fact that they will be operating in a moderated multi-app environment and to favor device setpoints that have the most effect on their objectives over those that have the least effect. Our simulation-based demonstrations have shown that game-theory-based deconfliction can lead to a 7% improvement in control space utilization compared to design-based methods.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

Optimizing Transportation Networks for E-Waste Reverse Logistics: A Multi-Modal Cost Allocation and Pricing Strategy

The exponential growth of electronic waste (e-waste) poses critical challenges for sustainable reverse logistics and transportation network optimization. This study develops a dual-channel transportation framework for e-waste logistics that integrates dynamic freight pricing, cost allocation mechanisms, and game-theoretic coordination. The model captures interactions between centralized hubs and distributed processing networks, accounting for freight rate elasticity, volume allocation, and capacity constraints. Using Stackelberg game theory and cost-sharing strategies, the framework optimizes transportation efficiency and profit distribution across logistics channels. Numerical simulations show that the dual-channel structure increases centralized hub profit by 226.8% compared to baseline single-channel operations, while boosting total transported volume by 1.2% and nearly doubling freight collector profit under cost-sharing. Scenario analyses across regional infrastructures reveal that network density, policy incentives, and logistics costs shape routing efficiency and profit allocation. These findings suggest that coordinated strategies combining dynamic pricing, targeted infrastructure investment, and strategic cost allocation are needed to design efficient, resilient, and regionally adaptable e-waste transportation systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Machine learning-guided design of direct methanol fuel cells with a platinum group metal-free cathode

Direct methanol fuel cells (DMFCs) offer a promising solution for clean electricity generation, particularly in small electronics and remote auxiliary power units. However, optimizing their efficiency and performance is challenging due to the complex interactions between various factors. Here, we present a novel approach that integrates experiments with machine learning to model and predict the performance of these fuel cells using atomically dispersed platinum group metal (PGM)-free catalysts at the cathode. Further, our machine learning models, trained on diverse input parameters, allow for the comprehensive optimization of DMFC performance prior to fabrication and testing. Through extensive experimental validation, we demonstrate that this data-driven approach accurately predicts key performance metrics, such as maximum power output and polarization curves. By combining our models with interpretable game-theory methods, we provide deep insights into the factors governing fuel cell performance, ultimately paving the way for the design of scalable and efficient DMFC technologies.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Impacts and emerging research opportunities in Vehicle-Grid Integration for transportation: A review

This review provides a comprehensive examination of Vehicle-Grid Integration (VGI) technologies and their impacts on transportation systems, with a particular emphasis on the transportation-energy nexus. It systematically explores how VGI affects key transportation applications such as charging infrastructure planning, electric vehicle (EV) routing, smart charging coordination, shared mobility, and dynamic pricing. By synthesizing recent literature from both transportation and energy systems perspectives, this study highlights how advanced methodologies, such as reinforcement learning, game theory, and optimization techniques, are used to model the complex interactions between EVs, mobility patterns, and distributed energy systems. Furthermore, the review also identifies critical challenges, including behavioral factors, data limitations, and system scalability. Drawing on these insights, the paper outlines emerging research opportunities to support the design of integrated, resilient, and user-centric VGI solutions that advance sustainable mobility and energy system efficiency.

Charging coordination↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Delicate Balance Redux: The Role of Nuclear Forces, Damage Limitation and Uncertainty in Future U.S.-China Crises

What is the impact of damage limitation capabilities like counterforce and missile defenses on deterrence, when their efficacy in stopping an adversary nuclear attack is uncertain? This is a key unanswered question to understand “how much is enough” for the United States to deter China and Russia in future nuclear crises. In this paper we extend an established, single move game theory model to capture the dynamics of two players in a nuclear crisis having varying damage limitation capabilities with uncertain effectiveness. Our model formalizes the logic of the “delicate balance” school of deterrence, which states that leverage in a crisis is driven by the risk each player can take with their combined strategic forces, and that those risks carry uncertainty as nuclear forces are hard to deliver against technologically advanced adversaries. Our model shows that damage limitation capabilities—even those with significant uncertainty around them like cyber or electronic warfare—can drive bargaining outcomes in an array of nuclear crises. We then apply these bargaining outcomes to the expected U.S.-China strategic balance as China builds out its nuclear force through 2035. We apply published force exchange models to determine the expected damage each side will be able to deliver, and we use these values to determine the likelihood that the U.S. can prevail in crises of varying stakes. Last, we show that U.S. policymakers have an array of options to improve future bargaining outcomes, evaluating how additional nuclear forces trade against improvements in damage limitation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2025

Game theoretic modeling and optimization of competition and collaboration in dual channel electronic waste supply chains

The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Constrained Turret Defense with Fixed Final Time

In this paper, we extend existing turret defense differential game formulations involving a turn-constrained turret and mobile agent to include specified final time and a constraint. For the purposes of this analysis, the specified final time may represent some exogenous input, perhaps representing the time at which some other event will take place. As for the constraint, it represents a no-fly zone for the mobile agent. The scenario is formulated as a two-player, zero-sum differential game and solved via the method of characteristics (i.e., back-propagation of equilibrium trajectories). Three different trajectory types make up the solution: trajectories that end with the turret aligned with the mobile agent, trajectories that end with the mobile agent on the constraint boundary, and regular trajectories.

differential game, game theory↗

DOE OSTI2025

Multi-scale, Multi-disciplinary, and Multi-agent Explainable AI with Koopman-Undergirded Learning, Prediction, and Analysis (M3EA KULPA) (Project Closeout Report)

The goal of this project was to develop and use domain-aware machine learning formulations, based on the Koopman Operator (KO), for modelling multi-scale, multi-disciplinary (e.g., multi-physics), and/or multi-agent systems. The project developed these formulations for the following cases: • Systems with dynamics at two separate time scales, • Systems with a bi-level hierarchical control structure, • Systems with bi-level hierarchical control and dynamics at two separate time scales (the lower level controls operating at the faster time scale), and • Systems with n separate but interacting agents/disciplines (with/without control, respectively); the controls for each agent could include bi-level hierarchical control and dynamics at two separate time scales as described above. The project then defined a set of dynamical systems consisting of different nonlinear oscillators that could be used to test these different formulations and then subsequently learned the KO models for those systems. With the KO models, we were able to do the following: • Quantify system stability, including both long-term and transient behavior, • Quantify the effects of feedbacks between the different time scales and agents/disciplines in terms of those feedbacks’ effects on system stability, • Replace a standard Proportional-Integral (PI) control in the hierarchical control structure with a KO-based Linear-Quadratic Regular (LQR), a form of optimal control, • Calculate optimal supervisory control policies a) with and without time scale separated dynamics at the lower level control levels and b) with both PI and KO-based LQR lower level control policies, and • Calculate dynamic Nash equilibria for multi-agent systems where each agent makes its own control decisions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Learning with Adaptive Conservativeness for Distributionally Robust Optimization: Incentive Design for Voltage Regulation: Preprint

Information asymmetry between the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators (DERAs) obstructs designing effective incentives for voltage regulation. To capture this effect, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, where the DSO seeks to overcome the information asymmetry and refine its incentive strategies by learning from DERA behavior over multiple iterations. We introduce a model-based online learning algorithm for the DSO, aimed at inferring the relationship between incentives and DERA responses. Given the uncertain nature of these responses, we also propose a distributionally robust incentive design model to control the probability of voltage regulation failure and then reformulate it into a convex problem. This model allows the DSO to periodically revise distribution assumptions on uncertain parameters in the decision model of the DERA. Finally, we present a gradient-based method that permits the DSO to adaptively modify its conservativeness level, measured by the size of a Wasserstein metric-based ambiguity set, according to historical voltage regulation performance. The effectiveness of our proposed method is demonstrated through numerical experiments.

distribution system operator↗

DOE OSTI2026

Commuting embeddings for parallel strategies in non-local games

Non-local games provide a versatile framework for probing quantum correlations and for benchmarking the power of entanglement. In finite dimensions, the standard method for playing several games in parallel requires a tensor product of the local Hilbert spaces, which scales additively in the number of qubits. In this work, we show that this additive cost can be reduced by exploiting algebraic embeddings. We introduce two forms of compressions. First, when a referee selects one game from a finite collection of games at random, the game quantum strategy can be implemented using a maximally entangled state of dimension equal to the largest individual game, thereby eliminating the need for repeated state preparations. Second, we establish conditions under which several games can be played simultaneously in parallel on fewer qubits than the tensor product baseline. These conditions are expressed in terms of commuting embeddings of the game algebras. Moreover, we provide a constructive framework for building such embeddings. Using tools from Lie theory, we show that aligning the various game algebras into a common Cartan decomposition enables such a qubit reduction. Beyond the theoretical contribution, our framework casts NLGs as algebraic primitives for distributed and resource-constrained quantum computations and suggested NLGs as a comparable device-independent dimension witness.

Commuting embeddings↗

DOE OSTI2025

Ca X ML: Chemistry‐informed machine learning explains mutual changes between protein conformations and calcium ions in calcium‐binding proteins using structural and topological features

Proteins' flexibility is a feature in communicating changes in cell signaling instigated by binding with secondary messengers, such as calcium ions, associated with the coordination of muscle contraction, neurotransmitter release, and gene expression. When binding with the disordered parts of a protein, calcium ions must balance their charge states with the shape of calcium-binding proteins and their versatile pool of partners depending on the circumstances they transmit. Accurately determining the ionic charges of those ions is essential for understanding their role in such processes. However, it is unclear whether the limited experimental data available can be effectively used to train models to accurately predict the charges of calcium-binding protein variants. Here, we developed a chemistry-informed, machine-learning algorithm that implements a game theoretic approach to explain the output of a machine-learning model without the prerequisite of an excessively large database for high-performance prediction of atomic charges. We used the ab initio electronic structure data representing calcium ions and the structures of the disordered segments of calcium-binding peptides with surrounding water molecules to train several explainable models. Network theory was used to extract the topological features of atomic interactions in the structurally complex data dictated by the coordination chemistry of a calcium ion, a potent indicator of its charge state in protein. Our design created a computational tool of Ca X ML, which provided a framework of explainable machine learning model to annotate ionic charges of calcium ions in calcium-binding proteins in response to the chemical changes in an environment. Our framework will provide new insights into protein design for engineering functionality based on the limited size of scientific data in a genome space.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗