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At least 19 records

A Closed Network Queue Model of Underground Coal Mining Production, Failure, and Repair

Underground coal mining system production, failures, and repair cycles were mathematically modeled as a closed network of two queues in series. The model was designed to better understand the technological constraints on availability of current underground mining systems, and to develop guidelines for estimating the availability of advanced mining systems and their associated needs for spares as well as production and maintenance personnel. It was found that: mine performance is theoretically limited by the maintainability ratio, significant gains in availability appear possible by means of small improvements in the time between failures the number of crews and sections should be properly balanced for any given maintainability ratio, and main haulage systems closest to the mine mouth require the most attention to reliability.

Lohman, G. M.↗

Lower Level Repair Can Easily Fail Due to High Complexity

The International Space Station (ISS) uses Orbital Replacement Units (ORU’s) to repair failures on orbit. Using ORU’s reduces the crew time required to repair failures, but several copies of each ORU must be stored on ISS to ensure system availability. A typical ORU contains many components and has significant mass, but each ORU can repair only a single component failure. A full set of the ORU internal components could repair many different failures. Lower level assembly or component repair should reduce total spares mass. Successful electronics repair experiments were conducted on ISS. However, implementing component level repair would require a significant effort. The systems must be designed so they can be repaired during a mission, considering component layout and accessibility. The repair procedures must be developed and repair facilities, tools, and diagnostic and test instruments provided. Tracing a fault to a component is much more difficult than isolating it to an ORU. Replacing a component is much more difficult than replacing an ORU. Some problems with lower level repair are discussed. The mass savings of lower level repair will not save as much launch cost as before since launch cost has recently been reduced by an order of magnitude. Most system failures are not component failures that can be fixed by replacing a component but are due to system level problems. Repair and maintenance should be planned as part of an overall maintainability design. The risk that a lower level repair will fail is considerably greater than when using ORUs. With modern high reliability packaged systems, failure diagnosis and repair has become a lost art. However, diagnosis and repair data from the 1960’s show that increasing complexity often causes much longer diagnosis and repair times and may prevent successful repair. Increasing complexity by using lower level repair directly increases system cost, failure rate, crew time for repair, and the risk of an unrepairable system failure.

Harry W Jones↗

Simulation Of Failures And Repairs

Automated Reliability/Availability/Maintainability (ARAM) computer program one of software tools designed to assess candidate architectures of data-management system of the Space Station. Evaluates reliability, availability, and maintainability characteristcs of conceptual system. Uses data representing redundancy and maintainability characteristics of system, and reliability parameters of components of equipment. Design based upon simulation of failures and possible subsequent repairs of each unit of equipment included in system. Analyzes effects of failures and repairs on system and maintains statistics of behavior of system from which results of simulation obtained. Written for IBM PC XT/AT or compatible computer.

Vallone, Antonio↗

We Can't Count on Repairing All Failures Going to Mars

Reliability analysis often assumes that a complex system can be kept operating indefinitely with scheduled maintenance and emergency repair using a stock of spare parts, as long as the spare parts are not depleted. This assumption seems justified for well-tested, widely used, long operational systems with a multigenerational history of failure, redesign, and reliability growth. It seems doubtful that newer, relatively untried, high technology space systems can always be repaired. We cannot assume space systems will have a low rate of random failures that can all be repaired with a few identical spares. New untried systems usually have a high initial failure rate, called infant mortality, due to errors in requirements, design, parts, materials, and operations planning. These problems can cause groups of related failures called Common Cause Failures (CCFs). The practical definition of a CCF is any failure mode that cannot be cured using identical redundant systems or spare parts. Systems with CCFs may fail repeatedly for the same reason. Can a life support system be kept operating on the way to Mars using only redundant systems and spare parts? The failure history of International Space Station (ISS) life support systems suggests that CCFs are likely to occur and will probably require design changes rather than being reparable with spare parts.

Mars↗

Comprehension and retrieval of failure cases in airborne observatories

This paper describes research dealing with the computational problem of analyzing and repairing failures of electronic and mechanical systems of telescopes in NASA's airborne observatories, such as KAO (Kuiper Airborne Observatory) and SOFIA (Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy). The research has resulted in the development of an experimental system that acquires knowledge of failure analysis from input text, and answers questions regarding failure detection and correction. The system's design builds upon previous work on text comprehension and question answering, including: knowledge representation for conceptual analysis of failure descriptions, strategies for mapping natural language into conceptual representations, case-based reasoning strategies for memory organization and indexing, and strategies for memory search and retrieval. These techniques have been combined into a model that accounts for: (a) how to build a knowledge base of system failures and repair procedures from descriptions that appear in telescope-operators' logbooks and FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis) manuals; and (b) how to use that knowledge base to search and retrieve answers to questions about causes and effects of failures, as well as diagnosis and repair procedures. This model has been implemented in FANSYS (Failure ANalysis SYStem), a prototype text comprehension and question answering program for failure analysis.

Alvarado, Sergio J.↗

Fault Tree Based Diagnosis with Optimal Test Sequencing for Field Service Engineers

When field service engineers go to customer sites to service equipment, they want to diagnose and repair failures quickly and cost effectively. Symptoms exhibited by failed equipment frequently suggest several possible causes which require different approaches to diagnosis. This can lead the engineer to follow several fruitless paths in the diagnostic process before they find the actual failure. To assist in this situation, we have developed the Fault Tree Diagnosis and Optimal Test Sequence (FTDOTS) software system that performs automated diagnosis and ranks diagnostic hypotheses based on failure probability and the time or cost required to isolate and repair each failure. FTDOTS first finds a set of possible failures that explain exhibited symptoms by using a fault tree reliability model as a diagnostic knowledge to rank the hypothesized failures based on how likely they are and how long it would take or how much it would cost to isolate and repair them. This ordering suggests an optimal sequence for the field service engineer to investigate the hypothesized failures in order to minimize the time or cost required to accomplish the repair task. Previously, field service personnel would arrive at the customer site and choose which components to investigate based on past experience and service manuals. Using FTDOTS running on a portable computer, they can now enter a set of symptoms and get a list of possible failures ordered in an optimal test sequence to help them in their decisions. If facilities are available, the field engineer can connect the portable computer to the malfunctioning device for automated data gathering. FTDOTS is currently being applied to field service of medical test equipment. The techniques are flexible enough to use for many different types of devices. If a fault tree model of the equipment and information about component failure probabilities and isolation times or costs are available, a diagnostic knowledge base for that device can be developed easily.

Iverson, David L.↗

Repair of major system elements on Skylab

In-flight maintenance, as conceived and pre-planned for the Skylab Mission, was limited to simple scheduled and unscheduled replacement tasks and minor contingency repairs. Failures during the mission dictated complicated and sophisticated repairs to major systems so that the mission could continue. These repairs include the release of a large structure that failed to deploy, the assembly and deployment of large mechanical devices, the installation and checkout of precision electronic equipment, troubleshooting and repair of precision electromechanical equipment and tapping into and recharging a cooling system. The Skylab experience proves conclusively that crewmen can, with adequate training, make major system repairs in space using standard or special tools.

Pace, R. E., Jr.↗

Estimating a Service-Life Distribution Based on Production Counts and a Failure Database

A manufacturer wanted to compare the service-life distributions of two similar products. These concern product lifetimes after installation (not manufacture). For each product, there were available production counts and an imperfect database providing information on failing units. In the real case, these units were expensive repairable units warrantied against repairs. Failure (of interest here) was relatively rare and driven by a different mode/mechanism than ordinary repair events (not of interest here). Approach: Data models for the service life based on a standard parametric lifetime distribution and a related limited failure population were developed. These models were used to develop expressions for the likelihood of the available data that properly accounts for information missing in the failure database. Results: A Bayesian approach was employed to obtain estimates of model parameters (with associated uncertainty) in order to investigate characteristics of the service-life distribution. Custom software was developed and is included as Supplemental Material to this case study. One part of a responsible approach to the original case was a simulation experiment used to validate the correctness of the software and the behavior of the statistical methodology before using its results in the application, and an example of such an experiment is included here. Because of confidentiality issues that prevent use of the original data, simulated data with characteristics like the manufacturer’s proprietary data are used to illustrate some aspects of our real analyses. Lastly, we also note that, although this case focuses on rare and complete product failure, the statistical methodology provided is directly applicable to more standard warranty data problems involving typically much larger warranty databases where entries are warranty claims (often for repairs) rather than reports of complete failures.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Vapor Compression Distillation Subsystem (VCDS) Component Enhancement, Testing and Expert Fault Diagnostics Development, Volume 2

A wide variety of Space Station functions will be managed via computerized controls. Many of these functions are at the same time very complex and very critical to the operation of the Space Station. The Environmental Control and Life Support System is one group of very complex and critical subsystems which directly affects the ability of the crew to perform their mission. Failure of the Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystems are to be avoided and, in the event of failure, repair must be effected as rapidly as possible. Due to the complex and diverse nature of the subsystems, it is not possible to train the Space Station crew to be experts in the operation of all of the subsystems. By applying the concepts of computer-based expert systems, it may be possible to provide the necessary expertise for these subsystems in dedicated controllers. In this way, an expert system could avoid failures and extend the operating time of the subsystems even in the event of failure of some components, and could reduce the time to repair by being able to pinpoint the cause of a failure when one cannot be avoided.

Mallinak, E. S.↗

Going beyond reliability to robustness and resilience in space systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience, are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environments is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes are usually unanticipated. They often invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging events. These three are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems, the ability to perform after unanticipated events, would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness can be done by dealing with known sources of problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. Two contrasting approaches are reducing system complexity and adding supervisory control. The need for resilience has been claimed for decades but little has been accomplished. Systems designers assume that they understand requirements, technologies, designs, architectures, integration, testing, operations, and environments. The potential problems of changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns are ignored. Systems designers are typically overconfident and ignore the need for robustness and resilience.

Harry W Jones↗

Going Beyond Reliability to Robustness and Resilience in Space Life Support Systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environment is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to unanticipated damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes can invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging conditions. These three qualities are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from unanticipated disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness requires dealing with known problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. The need for robustness and resilience has been stated for decades but little has been done. Systems designers often assume that they understand everything they need to know. The potential failures caused by changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns can be ignored. Such overconfidence can lead to neglect of reliability, robustness, and resilience.

Harry W. Jones↗

Going Beyond Reliability to Robustness and Resilience in Space Life Support Systems

The words reliability, robustness, and resilience are often used interchangeably to describe tough and dependable systems but the distinctions between them suggest how to design more serviceable space systems. Reliability is simply the quality of consistently performing well. A system that dependably meets its design requirements in the specified environment is reliable. The designers may not consider themselves responsible for failures under unanticipated conditions. Robustness is the capability of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions, which can go beyond the expected range to include possible off-nominal conditions. Resilience is the ability to recover from or adapt to unanticipated damaging events, such as failures, accidents, external disruptions, and repurposing. Such changes can invalidate the usual operating assumptions and cause system failure. Reliability, robustness, and resilience describe dependable performance under increasingly difficult conditions, first the specified environment, then a wider possible environment, and finally unanticipated damaging conditions. These three qualities are increasingly desirable and increasingly difficult to achieve. Engineering for resilience would design systems that can ignore or repair failures, survive accidents, and recover from unanticipated disruptions. Increasing the resilience of space systems would greatly increase space crew safety. Improving reliability and robustness requires dealing with known problems, but improving resilience requires implementing a general approach to reducing the impact of unknown future events. The need for robustness and resilience has been stated for decades but little has been done. Systems designers often assume that they understand everything they need to know. The potential failures caused by changes, failures, accidents, unknown environments, and unknown unknowns can be ignored. Such overconfidence can lead to neglect of reliability, robustness, and resilience.

Harry W. Jones↗

Integrating static PRA information with risk informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) simulation methods

The overall objective of the project was to develop a computationally feasible and user-friendly mechanized process to integrate traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and dynamic PRA (DPRA) results. Starting with the systematic identification of items in an existing PRA that need dynamic augmentation, the project used a generic 4-loop pressurized reactor (PWR) and 3-loop PWR as example plants. Station blackout (SBO) and large break loss of coolant accident SBLOCA) were selected as the example initiating events. Using the traditional event-tree (ET)/fault-tree (FT) methodology augmented by dynamic evet tree approach, the potential consequences of the initiating events were simulated with RELAP-3D and MELCOR/RASCAL codes to cover Level 1 through Level 3 of PRA. RAVEN and ADAPT software were used to generate Level 1 simulations with RELAP-3D and Level 2/3 simulations with MELCOR (Level 2)/RASCAL (Level 3), respectively. Example branching conditions (BCs) for SBO included AC power recovery time, valve repair failure time, reactor coolant pump leak time/break size and emergency power supply duration to a total of 9. Example BCs for LOCA included off-site power recovery time, diesel generator power recovery time, auxiliary feed water system operation time, safety relief valve failure to open upon demand, reactor coolant pump seal break time and size to a total of 21. Each RELAP-3D simulation (9,587 scenarios) was labelled OK or Core Damage based on the maximum allowed peak clad temperature (2,100oF). Each MELCOR simulation (4610 scenarios) was labeled as Bin over 10rem or Bin 0-10rem based on the dose at the site boundary. The scenarios were clustered based on the criteria above using the mean shift methodology. Classical PRA (CPRA) and DPRA results were compared to identify the ET sequences that need DPRA augmentation. Several approaches were proposed for the incorporation of these sequences into CPRA using clustering with the mean shift methodology, restructuring the CPRA ETs by adding new BCs/sequences, and using the concept of a limit surface. Procedures for decision making regarding the possible consequences of an initiating event (e.g. core damage or not, site evacuation or not) were developed using a convolutional neural network (CNN), a recurrent neural network (RNN) and a transformer neural network (TNN). The project has led to two PhD degrees, three archival journal papers and five refereed conference proceedings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Data Acquisition Systems

Current and future requirements of the aerospace sensors and transducers field make it necessary for the design and development of new data acquisition devices and instrumentation systems. New designs are sought to incorporate self-health, self-calibrating, self-repair capabilities, allowing greater measurement reliability and extended calibration cycles. With the addition of power management schemes, state-of-the-art data acquisition systems allow data to be processed and presented to the users with increased efficiency and accuracy. The design architecture presented in this paper displays an innovative approach to data acquisition systems. The design incorporates: electronic health self-check, device/system self-calibration, electronics and function self-repair, failure detection and prediction, and power management (reduced power consumption). These requirements are driven by the aerospace industry need to reduce operations and maintenance costs, to accelerate processing time and to provide reliable hardware with minimum costs. The project's design architecture incorporates some commercially available components identified during the market research investigation like: Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) Programmable Analog Integrated Circuits (PAC IC) and Field Programmable Analog Arrays (FPAA); Digital Signal Processing (DSP) electronic/system control and investigation of specific characteristics found in technologies like: Electronic Component Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF); and Radiation Hardened Component Availability. There are three main sections discussed in the design architecture presented in this document. They are the following: (a) Analog Signal Module Section, (b) Digital Signal/Control Module Section and (c) Power Management Module Section. These sections are discussed in detail in the following pages. This approach to data acquisition systems has resulted in the assignment of patent rights to Kennedy Space Center under U.S. patent # 6,462,684. Furthermore, NASA KSC commercialization office has issued licensing rights to Circuit Avenue Netrepreneurs, LLC , a minority-owned business founded in 1999 located in Camden, NJ.

Perotti, J.↗

Methods for Decontamination of a Bipropellant Propulsion System

Most propulsion systems are designed to be filled and flown, draining can be done but decontamination may be difficult. Transport of these systems may be difficult as well because flight weight vessels are not designed around DOT or UN shipping requirements. Repairs, failure analysis work or post firing inspections may be difficult or impossible to perform due to the hazards of residual propellants being present.

McClure, Mark B.↗

Virtual/Augmented Reality (VR/AR):Tools for Nuclear Training, Operations and Design

Introduction: Problems: Mistakes in the field due to a lack of information (Ex: Pump repair failure rate 50%); Avoidable exposure due to multiple employees for procedure adherence and monitoring; Debates over 2D drawings can be more easily resolved. Purpose: Training: Employees can be trained more effectively. Operating: Operations can be carried out more efficiently with fewer workers required with AR. Design Review: Pull the designers and designs into VR. Design: VR: Unreal Engine, Unity, Custom. AR: HoloLens: Unity, Custom - DirectX 12.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Validation of PV-RPM Code in the System Advisor Model.

This paper describes efforts made by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to validate the SNL developed PV Reliability Performance Model (PV - RPM) algorithm as implemented in the NREL System Advisor Model (SAM). The PV - RPM model is a library of functions that estimates component failure and repair in a photovoltaic system over a desired simulation period. The failure and repair distributions in this paper are probabilistic representations of component failure and repair based on data collected by SNL for a PV power plant operating in Arizona. The validation effort focuses on whether the failure and repair dist ributions used in the SAM implementation result in estimated failures that match the expected failures developed in the proof - of - concept implementation. Results indicate that the SAM implementation of PV - RPM provides the same results as the proof - of - concep t implementation, indicating the algorithms were reproduced successfully.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗