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This presentation provides an overview of Explosives and Detonators for the NNSA NSTE 270 Course. It includes an overview of how detonators and high explosives are considered as part of Nuclear Explosives Safety. Several accidents involving High Explosives are also discussed. This presentation was adapted from LA-CP-16-20438 and LA-UR-21-20246.
Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
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Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Groups (NESSG) are convened to evaluate NEOs to determine if positive measures are adequate to meet the Standards as specified in DOE O 452.2E - Nuclear Explosive Safety, DOE O 452.4E – Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons, and NA SD 452.2.
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Small-scale safety testing, while successful in screening out extremely dangerous explosive compositions, does not fully characterize the explosive hazards associated with handling larger, consolidated or bare charges. It is proposed that intermediate-scale tests using consolidated charges in the range 25 mg – 1 kg are warranted to satisfactorily address the hazards. A standard for this intermediate-scale testing should be developed, proofed, peer-reviewed and adopted to assist in the development of safe new high explosive compositions across the complex. This whitepaper explains why current small-scale safety testing is insufficient to characterize the handling hazard, identifies the guiding aspects of explosive response that drive the handling hazards associated with larger consolidated charges, and proposes a suite of tests/experiments that can serve as a starting point for an intermediate-scale safety standard.
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We investigate and model the cook-off behavior of LX-17 to understand the response of explosive systems in abnormal thermal environments. Decomposition has been explored via conventional ODTX (One-Dimensional Time-to-eXplosion), PODTX (ODTX with pressure-measurement), TGA (Thermo-Gravimetric Analysis), and DSC (Differential Scanning Calorimetry) experiments under isothermal and ramped temperature profiles. The data were used to fit reaction rate parameters for proposed schemes in an ALE3D computational model. This model includes chemical reactions, thermo- and hydro-dynamics, and material properties, including thermal expansion, compressibility, and strength. These parameterizations were carried out utilizing a Python evolutionary optimization method on LLNL’s high-performance computing clusters. Additional experiments are being developed to further characterize and monitor decomposition intermediates to improve the model. Once experimentally validated, this model will be scalable to several applications involving LX-17. Furthermore, the optimization methodology developed herein should be applicable to other high explosive materials.
This presentation provides an overview of Nuclear Explosives Safety for a W/Q/E Division WebeX. It includes an overview of how detonators and high explosives are considered as part of Nuclear Explosives Safety. Several accidents involving High Explosives are also discussed. This presentation was adapted from LA-CP-16-20438.
A research effort was conducted to investigate the effects of an unintentional internal detonation of energetic materials on a small transportation container called the “Reinforced Ammo Can” (RAC), which is currently approved for the transport of energetic materials up to 2 grams net explosive weight (NEW) onsite at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The project used experimental testing of the containers based on simulated results conducted by a Missouri S & T explosives engineering graduate student while on an internship working in explosives safety at LLNL. The proposed experimental testing consisted of 20 central detonation tests in separate Reinforced Ammo Can containers to verify their high explosive (HE) containment capability. RAC containers are required for transporting secondary explosives on site at LLNL Site 200 in quantities between 300 mg and 2 grams of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent NEW. Currently, the LLNL Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) Manual states that the RAC containers are permissible for on-site transportation of secondary explosives up to 2 grams NEW by approved HE handlers with the approval of an Explosives Safety Expert (ESE). Simulated results indicated that tensile failure of the closure mechanism on the container is the most likely failure mode, and showed potential occurrence at the 2 gram NEW threshold. Experimental validation tests were conducted indicating failure/rupture of the containers lid with venting of the detonation products at the 2 gram NEW test threshold with an explosive mass safety factor of 1.3. Failure consisted of impact opening the container latch mechanism resulting in potential ejection of the lid depending on the orientation of the charge within the confinement. This analysis solely is an evaluation of the response of the containment if a detonation were to occur, it does NOT consider the probability of such an event.
This comprehensive analysis aimed to evaluate the measurement capability of the AMPTEC 630ES Explosive Safety Igniter Tester, a critical tool for organizations engaged in the measurement of High Explosive components and related Electro-Explosive devices. With a history of notable calibration issues involving specific model numbers, the Metrology Program and Calibration Laboratory (MPCL) initiated an extensive Measurement System Analysis. The analysis's primary focus was to thoroughly quantify the various sources of measurement variability intrinsic to the calibration process. It centered on two pivotal aspects: repeatability (the variation observed when the same operator uses the same instrument) and reproducibility (the variation seen when different operators perform measurements). A secondary objective was to determine whether equipment usage and age had any impact on the instrument's performance.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has conservatively reduced the explosive safety standards suggested by the Small Quantities in Research Laboratories (SQRL) program testing by 60%. For this reason, further research into the detailed effects of small amounts of explosives in typically constructed rooms is needed in order to improve their factor of safety. The team was tasked with designing an experiment to investigate the effect of different variables on drywall under explosive blasts. In order to meet this objective, the team conducted a comprehensive literature review to gain an understanding of industry-standard construction practices and review previous tests conducted by the Army corp of engineers. Since the team used PBXN-5 rather than C4, as in SQRL, an initial shot was conducted to compare damage levels. From those results and the physical constraints of the testing chamber, the team redesigned multiple single-panel drywall frames to capture the entirety of the incurred damage. Proposed designs were narrowed down using a decision matrix. From the study of previous tests and literature review, variables were chosen that the team hypothesized to have an impact on drywall strength. The variables that were tested were chosen from the results of that work and specific variables the sponsor was interested in, and they were paint, humidity/moisture content, and explosive positioning relative to the studs. Detailed plans were made for each variable according to what conditions the team wanted to investigate. For humidity, this involved testing low, ambient, and high conditions by treating the panels in a chamber. Preliminary shots were performed to test the structural integrity of the frame and streamline the test diagnostics which involved a high-speed camera placed behind the drywall, outside of the chamber, and a pressure probe placed behind the drywall, inside the chamber. Once the instrumentation, diagnostics, and frame design were finalized, a quantitative damage criteria matrix was created to categorize the results of the main shot series. In conjunction with evidence from the high-speed video, the achieved damage levels indicate that high moisture content drywall is better able to withstand explosive blasts. Larger stud damage and lower drywall damage occurred when the explosive was located directly in front of a stud. Paint had no noticeable impact on strength. Ultimately, the team conducted a total of 17 tests, leaving the door open for future in-depth research into the impact of humidity.
Requirements for explosive safety are often given in terms of a “K-Factor”, correlating incident blast effects with the distance and TNT equivalent weight of an explosion. Traditionally, this is conducted using empirical correlations to experimental measurements (e.g., the Kingery–Bulmash equations). In the far-field, empirical verification of incident overpressure and impulse magnitudes can be difficult; extrapolations from data give expected values at reasonable standoff distances that sometimes are too small to measure on available equipment but are larger than some regulations require. The present paper describes the results of numerical hydrocode analysis to verify the expected incident overpressure and impulse from small hemispherical ground charges of TNT at these relatively large distances. Furthermore, the dynamic effect of incident blast waves on lightweight, modular mitigation barriers is studied to gauge their effectiveness at providing safety standard compliance.
While numerous studies have focused on the ignition of explosives occurring in high velocity impact and the associated shock-to-detonation transition, there has been growing interest in developing computational models focused on low-velocity impact regimes. A predictive low-velocity impact ignition model will be important for analyzing high explosive safety and potential accident scenarios. This work introduces a novel ignition model based on the concept of thermally interacting hot spots to simulate low velocity impacted heterogeneous explosives where observed ignition times are on the order of milliseconds. The model asserts that relevant hot spots are micron-sized, the typical separation between neighboring hot spots is on the order of a hundred microns, and that neighbors interact thermally through heat conduction across the interstitial region between them. To achieve tractable numerical solutions, hot spots are assumed to form a periodic array as opposed to the highly irregular positioning in an actual explosive. This idealization allows a single two hotspot system to characterize the ignition process. Consequently, the model is referred to as the two hot spot Frank-Kamenetskii ignition model. In the present study, hot spots are modeled as constant heat sources terms, but this can be extended to include grain-scale phenomena like frictional heating of micron-sized growing cracks that are confined under high pressure. Because the micron-sized features are below the scale that can be efficiently resolved at a systems level, an efficient subscale scheme based on the Method of Weighted Residuals (MWR) is used to efficiently solve the equations. In conclusion, we carry out numerical examples and analytic predictions illustrating the accuracy and the functioning of the model.
The ability to predict post-ignition explosive response is relevant to explosives safety, particularly weapons assembly/disassembly operations that must operate under a sufficiently conservative safety basis to meet risk mitigation criteria for inadvertent nuclear detonation (IND). In particular, hazard determinations hinge on whether the PBX 9501 main charge can ultimately attain detonation from an initial, non-shock, ignition stimulus. The CISME experiment uses a spherical explosive charge, which is thermally ignited in the center using a fiber-delivered infrared laser pulse. This ignition mechanism - i.e. a localized thermal hotspot - is representative of the ignition-causing insults typical in accident scenarios, including low-velocity impact, drop, skid, and punch events. In fiscal year 2018 CISME experiments were conducted with pristine PBX 9501 spheres, confined and unconfined. Sub-detonative, low-violence reactions were observed. Here we report experiments conducted since 2018. The explosive charge was varied: experiments were conducted with room temperature pour-density HMX powder and prills of PBX 9501, and heated, thermally damaged PBX 9501. Experiments were conducted in a confined configuration, with two 4 mm-thick stainless-steel hemispherical shells bolted around the sphere. Detonation, via DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition) was observed in the 3-inch diameter powdered HMX and the 6-inch diameter heated and thermally-damaged PBX 9501 tests. No transition to DDT was observed in smaller diameters for those configurations, and no DDT was observed for pour-density prills of PBX 9501 of any diameter. The original test series demonstrated that the response of pristine, undamaged PBX 9501 to a central ignition is relatively benign. This new test series shows that increased porosity, lack of polymer binders and thermal damage can greatly increase the violence of the post-ignition response, up to and including detonation. These results bridge the explosive response of PBX 9501 from sub-detonative through detonation as a function of diameter and provide valuable test cases for modeling efforts that strive to capture the DDT threshold. By exploring explosive response in a more representative 3D geometry, we can also benchmark these new results to more plentiful DDT datasets generated from testing in 1D tube confinement (the historical test configuration)–the configuration upon which almost all DDT models were developed.
Ignition of a flammable tritium-air mixture is the most probable means to produce the water form (T 2 O or HTO), which is more easily absorbed by living tissue and is hence ~10,000 times more hazardous to human health when uptake occurs compared to the gaseous form (T 2 or HT; per Mishima and Steele, 2002). Tritium-air mixtures with T 2 concentrations below 4 mol% are considered sub-flammable and will not readily convert to the more hazardous water form. It is therefore desirable from a safety perspective to understand the dispersion behavior of tritium under different release conditions, especially since tritium is often stored in quantities and pressures much lower than is typical for normal hydrogen. The formation of a flammable layer at the ceiling is a scenario of particular concern because the rate of dispersion to nonflammable conditions is slowest in this configuration, which maximizes the time window over which the flammable tritium may encounter an ignition source. This report describes the processes of buoyant rise and dispersion of tritium. Accumulation of flammable concentrations of tritium next to the ceiling is a common safety concern for hydrogen, but this situation can only occur if dispersion rates are slow with respect to rates of release and rise. Theory and simulations demonstrate that buoyancy does not cause regions with flammable concentrations to form within buildings from sources that have previously been mixed to sub-flammable concentrations. A simulated series of tritium release events with their associated dispersion behavior are reported herein; these simulations apply computational fluid dynamics to rooms with three different ceiling heights and a variety of tritium release rates. Safety related quantities from these simulations are reported, including the mass and volume of tritium occurring in a flammable mixture, the presence or absence of a flammable layer at the ceiling, and the time required for dispersion to nonflammable conditions after the end of the tritium release event. These safety metrics are influenced by the magnitude and rate of the tritium release with respect to the air volume in the room and also the momentum of the plume or jet with respect to the ceiling height. Several screening criteria are recommended to assess whether a specific tritium release scenario is likely to form a flammable layer at the ceiling. The methods and results in this modeling study have applicability to explosion safety analysis for other buoyant flammable gases, including the lighter isotopes of hydrogen.