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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance: Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS), Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Modeling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system performance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example usecases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance, Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis (Version 3, July 2023)

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Mod eling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system per formance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example use cases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2017

Cyber Security Gap Analysis for Critical Energy Systems (CSGACES)

This study describes a cyber security research & development (R&D) gap analysis and research plan to address cyber security for industrial control system (ICS) supporting critical energy systems (CES). The Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) team addressed a long-term perspective for the R&D planning and gap analysis. Investment will posture CES for sustained and resilient energy operations well into the future.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Deep Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness for Energy Systems: A Secure Foundation for Next-Generation Energy Management

This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

The NREL Cyber Range

With the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) cyber range, researchers can replicate cybersecurity scenarios as they would occur on real, complex energy systems. With supercomputing and advanced emulation capabilities, the cyber range allows users to build digital twins of real systems and connect the emulated environment to actual physical devices throughout NREL's laboratories. The space offers unlimited potential to test the frontier of energy systems security.

cyber range↗
DOE OSTI2022

CPES-QSM: A Quantitative Method Towards the Secure Operation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems

Power systems are evolving into cyber-physical energy systems (CPES) mainly due to the integration of modern communication and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. CPES security evaluation is challenging since the physical and cyber layers are often not considered holistically. Existing literature focuses on only optimizing the operation of either the physical or cyber layer while ignoring the interactions between them. This paper proposes a metric, the Cyber-Physical Energy System Quantitative Security Metric (CPES-QSM), that quantifies the interaction between the cyber and physical layers across three domains: electrical, cyber-risk, and network topology. A method for incorporating the proposed cyber-metric into operational decisions is also proposed by formulating a cyber-constrained AC optimal power flow (C-ACOPF) that considers the status of all the CPES layers. The C-ACOPF considers the vulnerabilities of physical and cyber networks by incorporating factors such as voltage stability, contingencies, graph-theory, and IoT cyber risks, while using a multi-criteria decision-making technique. We note that simulation studies are conducted using standard IEEE test systems to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed metric and the C-ACOPF formulation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Edge Deployed Cyber Security Hardware Architecture for Energy Delivery Systems

At a time of accelerated cyber conflict, an “edge deployed” system will supply sensor based cyber ground truth to live grid models, and under secure command, take complete control of suspected rogue programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to maintain bulk power delivery to chosen critical sites. This hardware solution is purpose built to be agnostic to PLC vendor or protocol with the realization that a widely deployed solution must function with existing devices for rapid adoption by industry. An overview of the situation and how this developed system functions is provided.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Centralized Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment - (CRADA Final Report)

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

A Targeted Attack For Enhancing Resiliency of Intelligent Intrusion Detection Modules in Energy Cyber Physical Systems

Abstract— Secure high-speed communication is required to ensure proper operation of complex power grid systems and prevent malicious tampering activities. In this paper, artificial neural networks with temporal dependency are introduced for false data identification and mitigation for broadcasted IEC 61850 SMV messages. The fast responses of such intelligent modules in intrusion detection make them suitable for time- critical applications, such as protection. However, care must be taken in selecting the appropriate intelligence model and decision criteria. As such, this paper presents a customizable malware script to sniff and manipulate SMV messages and demonstrates the ability of the malware to trigger false positives in the neural network’s response. The malware developed is intended to be as a vaccine to harden the intrusion detection system against data manipulation attacks by enhancing the neural network’s ability to learn and adapt to these attacks.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Robust Method to Secure Multi-Inverter Grid Tied PV and Battery Energy Storage Systems Against Cyber Intrusions

This paper details a robust method to secure a multi-inverter grid tied system that interfaces photovoltaic (PV) and battery energy storage against potential cyber-attacks. The method can be applied to any third-party inverter systems without a need to modify their internal controls. A small random private excitation signal termed "watermark" is injected into the DC input voltage terminals (via a series transformer) connected to the PV/battery inverter system. An external robust cyber intrusion detector (CID) hardware consisting of a digital signal processor (DSP) generates the "watermark" and also receives the sensor signals that control the setpoints of the PV/battery grid tied system. The CID algorithm is shown to detect all possible cyber intrusions (such as false data injection(FDI)) on external sensor signals such as P and Q measured by a smart meter that control the overall system operation. The proposed CID computes online system ID and two variance tests in real time on each sensor signal and is able pinpoint intrusion location in a multi-inverter system. Results on a hardware in the loop (HIL) of a two-inverter grid connected system demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed CID system for FDI and unobservable FDI. Test results on a laboratory prototype will be discussed in the conference presentation.

Ibrahim, Hasan↗
DOE OSTI2024

RESCue Model (RESCue Experiment and Model) [SWR-24-84]

The Renewable Energy and Storage Cybersecurity Research (RESCue) project is a collaborative effort aimed at securing the rapidly growing deployment of transmission-connected hybrid renewable energy systems, consisting of a combination of wind, solar, and/or energy storage equipment, against escalating cyber threats. This project brings together major original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of wind, solar, and energy storage, along with major asset owners and DOE National Laboratories, to collectively identify cyber threats, assess risks, and develop robust cybersecurity strategies and solutions. The development of hybrid reference architectures has provided comprehensive blueprints for the secure design and integration of hybrid renewable energy systems, accounting for their unique characteristics and interdependencies. Additionally, NREL has created a cyber-resilient design framework that integrates cybersecurity considerations from the start of the system lifecycle, ensuring security is "baked in" from the initial design phase. The research thrusts for the project included (i) development of hybrid reference architectures and (ii) a cyber-resilient design framework for hybrid energy systems. The reference architectures has provided comprehensive blueprints for the secure design and integration of hybrid renewable energy systems, accounting for their unique characteristics and interdependencies. Additionally, NREL has created a cyber-resilient design framework that integrates cybersecurity considerations from the start of the system lifecycle, ensuring security is "baked in" from the initial design phase. A demonstration experiment was developed for one of the architectures using NREL's Cyber Range resources. This experiment configuration, deployable using open-source tools, is provided here in this repository. Additional models were developed for the wind and solar architectures as well, however the configurations for only the Energy Storage scenario are provided here: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy24osti/89921.pdf

Hasandka, Adarsh↗
DOE OSTI2018

Secure Policy-Based Configuration Framework (PBCONF)

In 2013, EPRI and a project team comprised of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Ameren, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories began a multi-year effort under an award from the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Cyber Security or Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) to develop a framework for secure remote configuration of modern and legacy devices. A goal of this Secure Policy-Based Configuration Framework (PBCONF) is to develop an extensible, open source, policy-based configuration framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

PV Cyber Security Research (Final Report)

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. This project was split into two phases. The first provided a survey and roadmap of the cybersecurity for the solar industry. The second investigated multiple PV cybersecurity research and development (R&D) concepts identified in the first phase. In the first year, the team created a roadmap for improving cybersecurity for distributed solar energy resources. This roadmap was intended to provide direction for the nation over the next five years and focused on the intersection of industry and government and recommends activities in four related areas: stakeholder engagement, cyber security research and development, standards development, and industry best practices. At the same time, the team produced a primer for DER vendors, aggregators, and grid operators to establish a common taxonomy and describe basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This material was motivated by the need to assist the broader PV industry with cybersecurity resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. Lastly, an adversary-based assessment of multiple PV devices was completed at the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory at Sandia National Laboratories to determine the status of industry cybersecurity practices. The team found multiple deficiencies in the security features of the assessed devices. In the second year, a set of recommendations was created for DER communication protocols— especially with respect to the state-of-the-art requirements in IEEE 2030.5. Additionally, several cybersecurity R&D technologies related to communications-enabled photovoltaic systems were studied to harden DER communication networks. Specifically, the team investigated (a) using software defined networking to create a moving target defense system for DER communications, and (b) engineering controls that prevent misprogramming or adversary action on DER devices/networks by disallowing setpoints that will generate unstable power system operations.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Secure and Safe Operation of Solar Photovoltaic Power Distribution Systems

Solar photovoltaic (PV)-rich power distribution systems are networked Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). These are control systems where multiple computing nodes and diverse intelligent agents interact with the physical world in real-time. However, the presence of networked components renders them vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks, cyber-intrusions, and other malicious events. This is because these systems depend on the measurements reported from their heterogeneous sensors. This makes them vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks where malicious agents can compromise the sensors or the communication networks carrying the sensor measurements. This paper proposes a novel methodology for enhancing the cyber-security and cyber-resilient post-attack safe operation of solar PV-rich power distribution systems against potential cyber-attacks through the Dynamic Watermarking (DW), using online system identification. The resiliency of the proposed technique is tested and validated with several attack scenarios on both a lab-scale 3kW grid-connected PV inverter and a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HiL) system. The proposed approach can be applied to other types of power distribution systems to enhance their cyber-secure and cyber-resilient safe operation. This paper thereby contributes to the field of cyber-security of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (CPES).

Kim, Jaewon↗
DOE OSTI2018

Cyber-Securing Facility Related Control Systems

Fact sheet describes cyber security strategies applicable to federal facilities, which were gleaned from the experiences at several U.S. Department of Energy national laboratories.

control system↗