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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2023

Assessment and Commissioning of Electrical Substation Grid Testbed with a Real-Time Simulator and Protective Relays/Power Meters in the Loop

Electrical utility substations are wired with intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), such as protective relays, power meters, and communication switches. Substation engineers commission these IEDs to assess the appropriate measurements for monitoring, control, power system protection, and communication applications. Like real electrical utility substations, complex electrical substation grid testbeds (ESGTs) need to be assessed for measuring current and voltage signals in monitoring, power system protection, control (synchro check), and communication applications that are limited by small measurement percentage errors. In the process of setting an ESGT with real-time simulators and IEDs in the loop, protective relays, power meters, and communication devices must be commissioned before running experiments. In this study, an ESGT with IEDs and distributed ledger technology was developed. The ESGT with a real-time simulator and IEDs in the loop was satisfactorily assessed and commissioned. The commissioning and problem-solving tasks of the testbed are described to define a method with flowcharts to assess possible trouble-shooting in ESGTs. This method was based on comparing the simulations versus IED measurements for the phase current and voltage magnitudes, three-phase phasor diagrams, breaker states, protective relay times with selectivity coordination at electrical faults, communication data points, and time-stamp sources.

Piesciorovsky, Emilio↗

DOE OSTI2023

Electrical substation grid testbed for DLT applications of electrical fault detection, power quality monitoring, DERs use cases and cyber-events

Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substation, and are associated with customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs). The integrity and confidentiality of data from these IEDs, like power meters and protective relays, is crucial. Blockchain technology could improve the resilience of microgrids by improving the security of data sharing. The penetration of customer-owned DERs (renewable energy sources) and the increasing deployment of IEDs can lead to integrate power system applications with Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). In this study, we implemented the electrical faulted phase detection and power quality monitoring algorithms with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. In addition, the DERs (wind turbine farms) use case and protective relay cyber-event tests were assessed, by using the CGG system with DLT. In the experimental model, the testbed was created by using a real-time simulator and CGG system with power meters/ protective relays in-the-loop. The data collected from the CGG system and IEDs were compared with the same time stamp source. These results had shown the successful assessment of protection, control and monitoring applications using a CGG system with DLT. In the future, the ESGT with DERs and the CGG system will be used in other power system applications, based on implementing smart contracts between electrical utilities with customer-owned DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS2021

C-5 Electrical Substation (SWMU 066) Performance Monitoring Report

The C-5 Electrical Substation (C5ES) is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) operated electrical power substation located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. This facility has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 066 under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action program. This Performance Monitoring Report (PMR) presents the Interim Measure (IM) activities, including baseline sampling, air sparge system construction and operation, and performance monitoring, that were completed to remediate chlorinated volatile organic compounds (CVOC) in groundwater exceeding the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) natural attenuation default concentrations (NADC).

Andrew Scott Starr↗

DOE OSTI2022

Securing against malicious control of circuit breakers in electrical substations

An example method for detecting and mitigating attacks on electric power substations comprises detecting a command to open or close a circuit breaker in the electric power substation. A modified extended substation model for the electric power substation is generated, based on the detected command and based on measurements in substation, where the modified extended substation model is a power flow model for the substation and for one or more directly connected neighboring substations. A power flow analysis is performed, using the modified extended substation model, to generate a predicted voltage for each of a plurality of nodes in the substation and in the one or more directly connected neighboring substations. Each predicted voltage is compared to a corresponding allowable voltage range, and execution of the command is blocked in response to determining that one or more of the voltages is outside the corresponding allowable voltage range.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Electrical Substation Configuration Effect on Substation Reliability

The nation’s electrical grid must be reliable because of its critical role in the economy, defense, and security of the nation. Many common tasks and industrial operations rely on proper electrical power distribution. In the design of new bus systems or evaluation of existing bus systems, the type of bus configuration affects the risk, reliability, maintenance, and cost of the system. This work utilizes Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) to perform a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) based sensitivity study on the reliability of substations with differing bus configurations. This study examines single bus, main and transfer, breaker and a half, double bus/double breaker, and ring bus configurations applied to busses of varying number of lines. The case variances, methods, and rankings presented can provide a guide for bus configuration for future electrical grid design and analysis.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Electrical Substation Configuration Effect on Substation Reliability

It is crucial that the U.S. electrical grid be reliable, due to its critical role in the economy and our national defense/security. Many common tasks and industrial operations rely on proper electrical power distribution. In designing new bus systems or evaluating existing ones, the type of configuration employed affects the level of risk, reliability, maintenance, and cost involved. The present work utilizes Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) to perform a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-based sensitivity study on substation reliability in regard to different bus configurations. This study examines single bus, main and transfer, breaker and a half, double bus/double breaker, and ring bus configurations applied to busses with different numbers of lines. The case variances, methods, and rankings presented herein can help guide bus configurations for electrical grid design/analysis in the future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Assessment of the Electrical Substation-Grid Testbed with Inside/Outside Devices and Distributed Ledger Technology

The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to integrate the GOOSE and/or DNP (Distributed Network Protocol) messages with time synchronized sources and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). The objective was to study the impact of faults and cyber-events at an electrical substation with inside (protective relays) and outside (power meters) substation devices. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on the design of a 34.5/ 12.47 kV electrical substation (sectionalized bus configuration) with two power transformers, connected to radial power lines and load feeders. The electrical substation-grid testbed was installed at 252 lab space (Advanced Power System Protection), Grid Research Integration and Deployment Center (GRID-C), Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This testbed was created for Task 5, DarkNet project. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to simulate fault and/or cyber events that could potentially result in damage to the electrical infrastructure. In addition, tests were run that are usually not allowed to be performed in an operational electrical power grid, because these test scenarios could trip breakers and/or generate fault situations that could potentially damage equipment. The number of tests performed in the electrical substation-grid testbed were executed in a better way than in a real electrical substation and/or power grid, because multiple tests could be run in a short period of time, and complex permits, and safety/ schedule restrictions like in a real electrical substation environment were not needed. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that are used by electrical utilities, to have same conditions that we could observe in a real power grid or electrical substation. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on using a real time simulator and expansion box with amplifiers that were wired to electrical substation-grid devices. This hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) was provided by protective relays, power meters, ethernet switches, remote terminal units, synchronized timing network clock, DLT devices, workstations, and servers. This report includes the design, installation, and assessment of the electrical substation-grid testbed that was similar to an operational electrical substation, integrating the power system protection, communication, and control systems. The results for the electrical substation-grid testbed were based on:• verifying the analog signals for protective relays and power meters, • observing the synchronized time source frame at devices, • authenticating the GOOSE (IEC 61850) and DNP messages from power meters and protective relays, and • verifying the trip conditions of protective relays at fault tests with the power system fault event detection, using DLT devices. For future work, the electrical substation-grid testbed with protective relays and power meters, using DLT and synchronized time source from DarkNet, will be used to study the impact of cyber-events at inside and outside substation devices. Advanced algorithms for detecting cyber-events produced by non-desired protective relay settings will be studied, to improve the detection and reliability of protection, control, and communication systems at power grids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of IEC 62443 Standard Gaps for Electric Grid Substation Model Use Case

This report presents an evaluation of the IEC 62443 standards in the context of electric grid substations, as part of a collaborative effort among Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The primary objective is to assess the applicability of these standards to enhance cybersecurity measures for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) within the energy sector. The evaluation identifies strengths, such as the scalability of security levels and the structured lifecycle guidance provided by IEC 62443. However, it also highlights significant gaps, including limited integration of physical security, insufficient guidance for legacy systems, and challenges in addressing emerging threats like supply chain vulnerabilities. Recommendations for refining the standards are proposed, including the need for tailored guidance for securing legacy systems, integrating physical security with cybersecurity frameworks, and enhancing interoperability across multi-vendor environments. By addressing these gaps, the IEC 62443 standards can be strengthened to ensure comprehensive cybersecurity for electric grid substations, thereby supporting the resilience and reliability of critical energy infrastructure.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Detection of DoS Attacks Using ARFIMA Modeling of GOOSE Communication in IEC 61850 Substations

Integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in modern smart grids (SGs) offers many advantages including the use of renewables and an effective way to protect, control and monitor the energy transmission and distribution. To reach an optimal operation of future energy systems, availability, integrity and confidentiality of data should be guaranteed. Research on the cyber-physical security of electrical substations based on IEC 61850 is still at an early stage. In the present work, we first model the network traffic data in electrical substations, then, we present a statistical Anomaly Detection (AD) method to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) network communication. According to interpretations on the self-similarity and the Long-Range Dependency (LRD) of the data, an Auto-Regressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model was shown to describe well the GOOSE communication in the substation process network. Based on this ARFIMA-model and in view of cyber-physical security, an effective model-based AD method is developed and analyzed. Two variants of the statistical AD considering statistical hypothesis testing based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) are presented to detect flooding attacks that might affect the availability of the data. Our work presents a novel AD method, with two different variants, tailored to the specific features of the GOOSE traffic in IEC 61850 substations. The statistical AD is capable of detecting anomalies at unknown change times under the realistic assumption of unknown model parameters. The performance of both variants of the AD method is validated and assessed using data collected from a simulation case study. We perform several Monte-Carlo simulations under different noise variances. The detection delay is provided for each detector and it represents the number of discrete time samples after which an anomaly is detected. In fact, our statistical AD method with both variants (CUSUM and GLRT) has around half the false positive rate and a smaller detection delay when compared with two of the closest works found in the literature. Our AD approach based on the GLRT detector has the smallest false positive rate among all considered approaches. Whereas, our AD approach based on the CUSUM test has the lowest false negative rate thus the best detection rate. Depending on the requirements as well as the costs of false alarms or missed anomalies, both variants of our statistical detection method can be used and are further analyzed using composite detection metrics.

IEC 61850 electrical substations↗

DOE OSTI2023

Electrical Fault Detection, Power Quality, Distributed Energy Resource Use Cases, and Cyber Event Applications with the Cyber Grid Guard System Using Distributed Ledger Technology

Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substation and are associated with distributed energy resources (DERs). The integrity and confidentiality of data from IEDs is crucial, and distributed ledger technology (DLT) could improve the resilience of microgrids by helping to make these data more secure. The most popular applications using blockchain technology for electrical utilities is in the field is based on energy trading. However, the dynamism of the penetration of customer owned DERs and the deployment of sensors with IEDs have led to the identification of new applications using DLT that are focused on other areas, such as monitoring, operation and management of the grid and its assets. In addition, the majority of studies on electrical grid applications with blockchain were validated with software simulations. Although general monitoring of power systems for using DLT could be evaluated in operational electric grids, other DLT research applications such as defense against cyber-attacks and/or electrical fault detection are not likely to be performed in a real infrastructure because of possible risks to the network/equipment security. This report summarizes the application of power system applications using distributed ledger technology (DLT), providing a secure DLT framework for collecting data from IEDs like power meters and protective relays inside and outside of an electrical substation and/or between two different electrical utilities. In this study, the use case scenarios were created and assessed for different power system application by using DLT. The electrical fault detection for faulted phases (1), power quality monitoring of phase voltage magnitudes, frequency levels and load power factor (2), DERs use case monitoring (3), and cyber-event applications (4) were performed in a test bed with a Cyber-Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. It had a real-time simulator with power meters and protective relays in-the-loop. The first section of this report presents a literature review of power system applications using blockchain at research level. The second section shows the theory and equations used on this report. The third section shows the description of the test bed, equipment, architecture, and electrical grid diagrams. The fourth section shows the experimental models and use case scenarios that were performed for the electrical fault detection, power quality, DERs use case, and cyber event applications with the CGG system using DLT. The fifth section shows the results collected from the tests based on comparing the time stamped events of the analog signals from the IEDs, DLT computer and real time simulator. The sixth section performed the discussion of the results for the use case scenarios. Finally, section seven presents the conclusions for this report were presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Coordinated Optimization and Control of Residential Solid State Power Substations in Electrical Distribution Network

This paper proposes a computationally efficient mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model for the coordinated optimization of solid-state power substations (SSPSs) in a feeder considering the full unbalanced three-phase structure of the distribution grid and its characteristics. The proposed model determines the optimal real and reactive power of each SSPS at the point of common coupling (PCC) that minimizes the operating cost and maximizes the system performance, e.g., voltage regulation and phase balancing. To improve the computational efficiency, an inscribed octagon is introduced to approximate the quadratic capacity constraints of components. Numerical simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed model and significant improvements in voltage profiles and power imbalance between phases.

Liu, Guodong↗

DOE OSTI2021

Satellite based Substation Communications

Experiments were conducted at an electrical substation to ascertain if a low-earth-orbiting (LEO) satellite communications network could be used for measurement and control in such a setting. Results are presented.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Substation Cable Layouts for EMP Coupling Analysis

Direct coupling of early-time high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) to substation control cables is simulated for cable layouts based on surveys of seven electrical substations in the United States. An analytic transmission line modeling code is used to estimate worst-case coupled current at the terminations of cable segments in or near the control shack. Where applicable, an induced voltage due to cable shield grounding is also estimated. Various configurations are simulated, including cables with different elevations, lengths, radii, and terminations. Plots of the coupled HEMP effects are given, and general relationships between these effects and the substations geometric and material parameters are highlighted and discussed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Enhancement in Digital Substations: Hidden Markov Model-Based Smart Cyber Switching and Threat Response

The rising incidence of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and power grids poses significant threats to the stability and reliability of electrical substations, with potentially devastating consequences such as extended blackouts. This paper introduces an advanced cybersecurity framework aimed at safeguarding IEC 61850-based substations through the integration of software-defined networking (SDN) and digital twin (DT) technologies. The proposed DT-based framework employs smart cyber switching (SCS) for proactive threat mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for swift system restoration, thereby maintaining continuous operational integrity and robust cybersecurity defenses. Central to this framework is the adaptive port controller (APC), which enables dynamic port management to adapt to evolving threats, and an intrusion detection system (IDS) designed to detect and neutralize malicious attacks on IEC 61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. Further, novel predictive intrusion detection and response (PIDR) algorithm is implemented on a digital substation (DS) to predict the best route to be taken by the attacker. The efficacy of these comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks is validated through rigorous simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, showcasing the system’s ability to sustain substation operations amidst cyber-attacks.

Digital substation↗

DOE OSTI2025

Package Data for CERF-Data Centers

This dataset contains sample input 100m resolution raster files for running the CERF-DC python package (see https://github.com/IMMM-SFA/cerf_data_centers) at the state level across the CONUS. Due to data availability constraints, some of the items included in this dataset are proxies or assumptions for siting factors used in the model. These are individually noted in the item descriptions and can be exchanged with more detailed information upon availability. Data Descriptions The following raster files are included in the data download: state_siting_region.tif — State areas identified by state FIPS code composite_siting_suitability.tif — Value of 1 indicates suitable siting location, 0 otherwise. The following areas are excluded from siting: Areas within 300m of a federal airport runway Waterbodies Areas with slope >16% Areas susceptible to sinkholes High coastal or inland flood risk areas Local, state, and federal parks, leisure areas, and cemeteries Areas >2 km away from electric substations Areas >5 km away from a municipal water supplier service area Areas >2 km away from high-speed fiber provider service territory Protected Areas Database of the United States (PAD-US) areas Railroads, major roadways, and minor roadways Military areas and training grounds Developed lands Areas >0.8 km (0.5 miles) from developed lands land_value_dollar_per_sqft.tif — USD per square foot (sqft) derived from USDA $/acre land cost personal_property_tax_rate.tif — Personal property tax rate by state. Uses an assumed 0.0125 personal property tax rate for states with personal property tax, 0 for states without personal property tax. real_property_tax_rate.tif — Real property tax rate. Based on county level residential real estate property tax rates. sales_tax_rate.tif — Sales tax rate by state. mechanical_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through mechanical processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. water_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through evaporative (water cooled) processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. distance_to_substation.tif — Distance to nearest substation in hundreds of meters (i.e., value of 1 equals a distance of 100m). Offshore areas have a value of 0. industrial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh industrial electricity rates. Represents the average industrial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. commercial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh commercial electricity rates. Represents the average commercial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. data_center_market_locations.tif — Grid cells with positive values represent the centroid of existing data center market clusters. The value of non-zero grid cells represents the number of data centers in the market cluster. All other grid cells have a value of 0. Geospatial Metadata CRS: Albers Equal Area Conic (ESRI:102003) Extent: -2415585.0000000023283064,-1441981.2605773280374706 : 2384414.9999999976716936,1708018.7394226719625294 Dimensions: X: 48000 Y: 31500 Bands: 1 Origin: -2415585.0000000023283064,1708018.7394226719625294 Pixel Size: 100,-100 Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License This data is made available under a CCBY4.0 License Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall↗

DOE OSTI2026

Package Data for CERF-Data Centers

This dataset contains sample input 100m resolution raster files for running the CERF-DC python package (see https://github.com/IMMM-SFA/cerf_data_centers) at the state level across the CONUS. Due to data availability constraints, some of the items included in this dataset are proxies or assumptions for siting factors used in the model. These are individually noted in the item descriptions and can be exchanged with more detailed information upon availability. Data Descriptions The following raster files are included in the data download: state_siting_region.tif — State areas identified by state FIPS code composite_siting_suitability.tif — Value of 1 indicates suitable siting location, 0 otherwise. The following areas are excluded from siting: Areas within 300 m of a federal airport runway or within an airport area boundary Waterbodies Areas with slope >16% Areas susceptible to sinkholes High coastal or inland flood risk areas Local, state, and federal parks, leisure areas, and cemeteries Areas >2 km away from electric substations Areas >5 km away from a municipal water supplier service area Areas >2 km away from high-speed fiber provider service territory USGS Protected Areas Database of the United States (PAD-US) GAP status 1, 2, or 3 areas US National Parks Wetlands USFWS critical habitats BIA land areas Railroads, major roadways, and minor roadways Military areas and training grounds NLCD developed lands Areas >0.8 km (0.5 miles) from NLCD developed lands land_value_dollar_per_sqft.tif — USD per square foot (sqft) derived from USDA $/acre land cost personal_property_tax_rate.tif — Personal property tax rate by state. Uses an assumed 0.0125 personal property tax rate for states with personal property tax, 0 for states without personal property tax. real_property_tax_rate.tif — Real property tax rate. Based on county level residential real estate property tax rates. sales_tax_rate.tif — Sales tax rate by state. mechanical_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through mechanical processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. water_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through evaporative (water cooled) processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. distance_to_substation.tif — Distance to nearest substation in hundreds of meters (i.e., value of 1 equals a distance of 100m). Offshore areas have a value of 0. industrial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh industrial electricity rates. Represents the average industrial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. commercial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh commercial electricity rates. Represents the average commercial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. data_center_market_locations.tif — Grid cells with positive values represent the centroid of existing data center market clusters. The value of non-zero grid cells represents the number of data centers in the market cluster. All other grid cells have a value of 0. Geospatial Metadata CRS: Albers Equal Area Conic (ESRI:102003) Extent: -2415585.0000000023283064,-1441981.2605773280374706 : 2384414.9999999976716936,1708018.7394226719625294 Dimensions: X: 48000 Y: 31500 Bands: 1 Origin: -2415585.0000000023283064,1708018.7394226719625294 Pixel Size: 100,-100 Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License This data is made available under a CCBY4.0 License Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall↗

DOE OSTI2026

Offshore Wind Farm Turbine and Energy Storage Optimization

Abstract This paper evaluates the technical and economic feasibility of repurposing decommissioned offshore oil and gas platforms as electrical substations for offshore wind projects in the U.S. Gulf of America, a region characterized by relatively low and highly variable wind speeds, extensive legacy offshore infrastructure, and exposure to merchant electricity markets. A unified techno-economic framework is developed using the Repurposing Offshore Infrastructure for Continued Energy (ROICE) Economic Model (REM) to integrate Gulfspecific wind resource assessment, commercial wind turbine performance, offshore infrastructure cost modeling, and wholesale electricity market exposure. Gulf wind speed data are vertically extrapolated to turbine hub height and combined with manufacturer power curves to compute annual energy production and capacity factors across a broad portfolio of commercial turbines, enabling identification of turbine designs best suited for low-wind offshore environments. Hourly electricity price data from the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) day-ahead market are incorporated to characterize revenue potential, price volatility, and the temporal alignment between wind generation and market conditions. In addition, a conceptual framework for offshore battery energy storage system (BESS) integration is developed to support future investigation of market-responsive energy shifting at repurposed platforms. Results from the turbine evaluation demonstrate that machines with lower cut-in wind speeds and earlier ‘rated-power’ characteristics significantly outperform larger, industry-standard offshore turbines for the same net power under Gulf wind conditions, underscoring the need for region-specific technology selection. Market analysis further reveals substantial price variability and limited intrinsic alignment between wind production and high-price periods, motivating consideration of operational flexibility mechanisms. While storage optimization is not implemented in this study, the REM framework establishes a transparent and replicable foundation for co-evaluating turbine selection, infrastructure constraints, and market exposure, providing a practical pathway for assessing the potential role of repurposed offshore platforms in enabling economically viable offshore wind development in the Gulf of America.

02 PETROLEUM↗

DOE OSTI2024

Electrical Fault and Power Quality Detection Algorithms and Customer-Owned DERs Monitoring with a Cyber Grid Guard System and DLT

In this study, the electrical fault and power quality detection algorithms and customer-owned DERs monitoring use cases were implemented, with a Cyber Grid Guard system and DLT. Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substations, and are associated with customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs). Data from these IEDs, such as power meters and protection relays, must be kept confidential and of high integrity. Blockchain technology has the potential to increase microgrid resilience by enhancing data sharing security. The growing use of IEDs and customer-owned renewable energy sources (DERs) may make it necessary to connect Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) with power system applications. We implemented the electrical faulted phase detection and power quality monitoring algorithms with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. In addition, the DERs (wind turbine farms) use case and protective relay cyber-event tests were assessed, by using the CGG system with DLT. In the experimental model, the testbed was created by using a real-time simulator and CGG system with power meters/ protective relays in the loop. The data collected from the CGG system and IEDs were compared with the same time stamp source. These results showed the successful assessment of protection, control and monitoring applications using a CGG system with DLT. In the future, power system applications for the ESGT with DERs and the CGG system will be based on executing smart contracts between electrical utilities and customer-owned DERs.

Piesciorovsky, Emilio↗