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DOE OSTI2021

Radiological Consequence Evaluation for Dragonfly Mission

The scoping calculations presented in this report were developed to provide a conservative estimate of radiological dose consequences associated with launch accidents involving one multi-mission radioisotope thermoelectric generator (MMRTG) and possibly up to 43 light-weight radioisotope heater units (LWRHUs) for the upcoming National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dragonfly mission. This report summarizes dose consequence analysis from SAND2019-11148, “Nuclear Risk Assessment 2019 Update for the Mars 2020 Mission Environmental Impact Statement,” referred to in this document as the Mars 2020 nuclear risk analysis (NRA) and compares those results to a parametric analysis used to analyze potential dose consequences for the Dragonfly mission.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of the MARVEL Reactor Inhalation Dose Consequences

A dose consequence analysis was performed to support the preliminary Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation Project (MARVEL) design effort. The purpose of the MARVEL project is to develop a nuclear microreactor applications test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform research and development on various operational features of microreactors to ultimately improve integration of microreactors to end-user applications. The MARVEL concept is a 100 kilowatt (kW) thermal (kWth) and approximately 20-kW electric (kWe) generating microreactor. The MARVEL system will be located in the INL TREAT facility in the north high-bay equipment pit. The analysis considers the bounding release fractions of the MARVEL reactor concept and documents the dose consequences to the public and collocated worker.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

ECAR-5127 Rev 1 Evaluation of the MARVEL Reactor Inhalation Dose Consequences

The following dose consequence analysis is performed to support the preliminary Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation Project (MARVEL) design effort. The purpose of the MARVEL project is to develop a nuclear microreactor applications test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform research and development on various operational features of microreactors to ultimately improve integration of microreactors to end-user applications. The MARVEL concept is a 100 kilowatt (kW) thermal (kWth) and approximately 20-kW electric (kWe) generating microreactor. The MARVEL system will be located in the INL TREAT facility in the north high-bay equipment pit. This ECAR considers the bounding release fractions of the MARVEL reactor concept and documents the dose consequences to the public and collocated worker.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Update for Gas-Cooled Experiments

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) supports neutron irradiation of several types of experiments. One such experiment type is referred to as a gas leadout. Gas leadout experiments actively flow gas through the experiment which allows for active temperature control. It also allows for in-situ data of the experiment. For example, fission gas migration through a fuel sample can be monitored via activity of the sweep gas. Historically, ex-pile equipment and fission product monitors were housed in shielded ATR cubicles. Due to other facility updates, cubicle space is no longer available for gas leadout experiment equipment. To support continued operation of gas leadout experiments, ATR completed a safety basis update that supports a new housing for leadout equipment that may process potentially contaminated gas. In addition to the structure and associated equipment, technical safety requirements regarding handling and storage of experiments needed to be revised to support fueled gas leadout experiments and associated outage configurations. The safety basis update addressed the full lifecycle of these experiments, including experiment movement and interim storage, and credible abnormal events such as failures or leaks in contaminated gas tubing in occupied areas. This paper discusses the completed analyses performed to support the safety basis update associated with gas leadout experiments, including thermal-hydraulic evaluation, probabilistic analysis, and dose consequence analyses.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

TCR Postulated Accident and MHA Dose Assessment

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is engaged in regulatory activities to gain US Department of Energy (DOE) approval to build and operate a small high-temperature gas reactor, the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR). ORNL uses advanced manufacturing techniques to produce select reactor components. The TCR is unique in its mission: the reactor’s at-power operating lifetime will be less than one effective full-power day to limit the radiological source term to very low values, thus facilitating approval to operate. The primary regulatory documents governing construction and operation of the facility are NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors” and DOE-STD-3009, “Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.” Although this document is not a safety basis document, it provides a conservative indication of the magnitude of onsite and offsite radiological doses for specific scenarios, thus informing future design and regulatory activities. As required by NUREG-1537, scenarios included in this analysis are (1) a worstcase depressurized loss-of-forced-circulation accident, and (2) a maximum hypothetical accident. Details on the analysis of dose consequences with various system configurations are also provided.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Dose Consequence and Probabilistic Risk Assessment Integration into Digital Documented Safety Analysis

This is an intern poster presentation. The current reactor authorization process is complex and error prone. The development of a digital Documented Safety Analysis has been proposed to provide an automated and integrated solution to enhance the design and authorization process. The digital DSA will consist of interlinked models, analyses, and reports, all of which will be updated using automated workflows when design changes are made. This poster examines the integration of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) with the transient and dose consequence analyses. A PRA for a generic high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) has been constructed which will drive the input parameters for a transient analysis model currently being constructed. Dose consequence will be determined using the results of the transient analysis and the Radiation Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) code. Dose consequence data will then be input back into the PRA to drive design parameters.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Preliminary Radioisotope Screening for Off-site Consequence Assessment of Advanced Non-LWR Systems

Currently a set of 71 radionuclides are accounted for in off-site consequence analysis for LWRs. Radionuclides of dose consequence are expected to change for non-LWRs, with radionuclides of interest being type-specific. This document identifies an expanded set of radionuclides that may need to be accounted for in multiple non-LWR systems: high temperature gas reactors (HTGRs); fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs); thermal-spectrum fluoride-based molten salt reactors (MSRs); fast-spectrum chloride-based MSRs; and, liquid metal fast reactors with metallic fuel (LMRs) Specific considerations are provided for each reactor type in Chapter 2 through Chapter 5, and a summary of all recommendations is provided in Chapter 6. All identified radionuclides are already incorporated within the MACCS software, yet the development of tritium-specific and carbon-specific chemistry models are recommended.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Advanced Test Reactor Experiment Safety Analysis

This presentation contains general information about the Advanced Test Reactor experiment safety analysis program. Accidents and dose consequence are discussed in general terms. Pictures of ATR facilities and experiments are included. In cases where experiments are shown, identification numbers have been removed. Department of Energy limits on dose consequence are provided. These limits are found in many non-CUI documents and a derived from publicly available sources. A summary of the presentation content is as follows: -Define Experiment Safety Analysis -Discuss what we are protecting and the applicable limits -Show how safety analysis fits into the experiment process -Explore the scope of experiment activities and associated accidents -Present how we categorize accidents and establish accident frequencies -Identify how controls are implemented and process improvements

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC 7.2) Presentation

This presentation will be for the graduate seminar class for the University of New Mexico. We will discuss the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) version 7.2, a critical tool in radiological consequence analysis within the nuclear safety domain. We will begin with an introduction to radiological consequence analysis and the importance of dose modeling in nuclear safety, referencing key regulatory frameworks such as DOE-STD-3009 and 10 CFR 20. The presentation will provide an overview of RSAC, including its history, primary functions, and the inputs and outputs involved in its calculations. A detailed examination of RSAC's atmospheric dispersion model, based on the Gaussian plume methodology, will be presented, highlighting how meteorological factors influence the results. We will discuss the regulatory alignment of RSAC with DOE and NRC guidelines, emphasizing the assumptions required for compliance and the balance between conservative and realistic inputs. The presentation will also address the limitations and assumptions inherent in RSAC, comparing it with other consequence analysis codes like MACCS, HotSpot, and RASCAL. An example RSAC run will be demonstrated, showcasing a hypothetical accident scenario and interpreting the resulting dose calculations. Finally, we will introduce new ideas to enhance the current RSAC framework. This future work aims to provide multi-industry adaptability and integration with new dispersion models, addressing the evolving needs of DOE and NRC. The presentation will conclude with a discussion on RSAC's ongoing role in nuclear safety and the opportunities for future innovation.

computer program↗

DOE OSTI2022

Constellation's best estimate alternate source term methodology overview

Safety analyses for a nuclear power plants need to consider postulated accidents that results in at risk of accidental release of radiation. The regulations require plant specific safety analysis reports to include an evaluation of the requirements of 10CFR50.67. Such a safety analysis report mandates limits such that calculated radiological consequences relative to certain dose locations do not exceed a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) limits following a postulated release of radioactivity. Calculations are performed to estimate the radiological consequences, in terms of dose, to people and equipment to ensure the estimated doses are within the prescribed limits. Analysis should demonstrate, with reasonable assurance, that these prescribed limits are complied with. Conventional methodologies utilize conservative approaches to address lack of uncertainty quantification in the utilized approaches, methods, and/or inputs. These built-in excess conservatisms often result in compounding effects and hence overly conservative results in the estimated radiological consequences, which leads to inaccurate margin evaluation for operation and accident mitigation. Therefore, evaluating accurate dose consequences is needed for both operational and safety reasons. The research documented in this paper provides an overview of Constellation's Best Estimate Alternate Source Term (BEAST) Methodology. BEAST methodology relies upon the use of realistic yet bounding input distributions for key analysis parameters, which replaces use of conservative deterministic singular inputs that bound overall analysis domain. This approach enables evaluating a more accurate accident analysis response, while enabling a bounding licensing basis envelope via more accurate quantification of uncertainty in the application. Therefore, built-in margin for a given scenario is more accurately evaluated.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Safety Considerations for Advanced Material Irradiation at the Advanced Test Reactor

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a light water reactor with aluminum-clad driver fuel. A primary mission of the ATR is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This support necessarily requires irradiation of advanced materials such as sodium, fuel salts, and metal eutectics. Irradiation of advanced materials in the ATR environment presents a challenge when completing accident analyses and demonstrating compliance to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Many advanced materials have the possibility to react with the ATR protective barriers such as the cladding or primary coolant system (PCS) boundary during postulated accident scenarios. Further, molten fuel experiments fall outside of the standard regulatory framework for dose consequence analyses. ATR is currently developing new safety analysis methods to support irradiation of advanced materials. The primary considerations for this development are 1) experiment containment design requirements, 2) primary coolant system response to an experiment containment failure, and 3) dose analyses for molten fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Safety Considerations for Advanced Material Irradiation at the ATR

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Microreactor Inhalation Dose Consequences

The new generation of microreactors are intended to provide useful, very reliable and safe safe energy for a variety of applications such as supplying to remote locations. Microreactors range from less than 1 MW th to more than 20 MW th . A range of technologies is being considered, including variations in neutron energy spectrum (fast or thermal), variations in primary and secondary coolant choices (e.g. metal cooled, gas cooled, and unique power cycle reactors. The reactors tend to use new fuel forms and types with unique benefits such as metal or TRISO fuel for higher fuel density and safety, respectively. The notional image of a microreactor is a reactor that fits in a seavan or intermodal shipping container. This would allow conventional shipping options, including aircraft, and match other mobile power sources. A development of a capability to test these reactors is needed, whether in a facility or in an open area. INL is in the process of determining acceptable test areas for these various reactors and an understanding of potential bounding consequences is important in informing siting and required infrastructure capability decisions. This ECAR considers the bounding release fractions of these types of reactors at 20 MW th and documents the dose consequences to the public and collocated worker. This is a scoping analysis for the generalized type of reactor, and the analysis will be refined based on the specific reactor design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Pathway-based analyses of gene expression profiles at low doses of ionizing radiation

Radiation exposure poses a significant threat to human health. Emerging research indicates that even low-dose radiation once believed to be safe, may have harmful effects. This perception has spurred a growing interest in investigating the potential risks associated with low-dose radiation exposure across various scenarios. To comprehensively explore the health consequences of low-dose radiation, our study employs a robust statistical framework that examines whether specific groups of genes, belonging to known pathways, exhibit coordinated expression patterns that align with the radiation levels. Notably, our findings reveal the existence of intricate yet consistent signatures that reflect the molecular response to radiation exposure, distinguishing between low-dose and high-dose radiation. Moreover, we leverage a pathway-constrained variational autoencoder to capture the nonlinear interactions within gene expression data. By comparing these two analytical approaches, our study aims to gain valuable insights into the impact of low-dose radiation on gene expression patterns, identify pathways that are differentially affected, and harness the potential of machine learning to uncover hidden activity within biological networks. This comparative analysis contributes to a deeper understanding of the molecular consequences of low-dose radiation exposure.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

DOE OSTI2020

Default Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Dose Conversion Factors (DCFs) and Weighting Factors and plutonium-239 equivalent Curie (PE-Ci) methodology for acceptance into the Waste Storage Facilities

DOE-STD-5506-2007 (Ref. 1) is the standard that provides the methodology for preparing hazard analysis and accident analysis for transuranic (TRU) waste facilities. The Waste Storage Facilities hazard and accident analysis for the DSA is developed in accordance with DOE-STD- 5506-2007. Two related issues need to be addressed when implementing DOE-STD-5506-2007 regarding the calculation of consequences from TRU waste releases in accident analysis: Consequences determined in accident analysis must be modeled using inhalation Dose Conversion Factors (DCFs) that are consistent with those from the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 72 (ICRP-72, Ref. 2).; The use of a statistical Material at Risk (MAR) representing the distribution of radiological loading of TRU waste containers based on the use of a plutonium-239 equivalent Curie (PE-Ci) methodology. The PE-Ci methodology simplifies accident analysis by allowing one to model releases based on the Curie value of one standard nuclide (e.g., Pu-239) instead of needing to model releases for every potential nuclide of interest. This is accomplished by normalizing the Curie value of all nuclides to a single Curie value of a standard nuclide by using a Weighting Factor that is a ratio of the DCFs associated with the nuclides and that of the standard nuclide. By using the ICRP-72 DCFs to calculate PE-Ci values used in the statistical MAR, the accident analysis that uses that statistical MAR will be consistent with the consequence methodology identified in DOE-STD- 5506-2007.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Pressurization Analysis for Heating of a Screw Top Utility Can Loaded With Plutonium Oxide Powder by a 1273 K Fire

The documented safety analysis for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) evaluates the consequences of a postulated 1273 K fire in a glovebox. The radiological dose consequences for a pressurized release of plutonium oxide powder during such a fire depend on the maximum pressure that is attained inside the oxide storage containers. The oxide storage configuration selected for analysis is can/bag/can, comprised of oxide powder inside an 8.38 × 10 -6 m 3 stainless steel B vial inside 0.006 kg of polyethylene bagging inside a one-quart screw top utility can of the type commonly used to package solvents or rubber cements. To enable evaluation of the dose consequences, temperature and pressure transients have been calculated for exposure of a typical set of storage containers to the fire. The pressurization analysis credits venting to and from the B vial but does not credit venting or leakage from the can. Due to the low rate of venting from the B vial into the can gas space, the can pressure is nearly independent of the B vial pressure. Calculated maximum pressures are compared to the utility can burst pressure. In lieu of a structural analysis of the utility cans, burst pressures and leakage rates were measured using compressed nitrogen gas. The measured gauge burst pressure was 0.250 ± 0.043 MPa. The measured burst pressures are lower than the calculated maximum pressure due to fire exposure, indicating that the utility cans could burst during exposure to a 1273 K fire.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Worst Case Sabotage Consequence Modeling for Advanced Reactors

Under proposed rulemaking by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, advanced reactor licensees may qualify for a reduction in onsite responders if the consequences from a sabotage attack do not exceed 25 rem at the reactor site boundary 2 hours after a release occurs. This work presents a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of meeting the 25 rem at the site boundary criteria. Using advanced reactor radionuclide inventories radiological release estimates created by collaborators at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the MACCS consequence analysis code was used to investigate the distance at the dose from hypothetical sabotage events reaches 25 rem for different advanced reactor technologies. It was found that the distance to 25 rem depended heavily on sampled weather conditions and sabotage release fractions, and further refinement of release fractions and MACCS modeling parameters is recommended.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Risk Analysis of Radiological Release from Pu-238 Targets During Manual Handling

Pu-238 Isotope Production Targets are routinely installed in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) core, transferred, and stored in the spent fuel canal. These evolutions involve manual handling and manipulation of the targets underwater using long handled tools. The ATR Safety Analysis Report (SAR) postulates a design basis accident which results in damage from manual manipulation of targets, and radiological consequences must be determined for receptors inside the reactor facility, as well as public receptors. This presentation presents the analysis used to determine the radiological consequences due to potential target damage in the ATR canal. The analysis considered radionuclide release fractions, damage ratios for handling evolutions, and entrainment of radionuclides in the canal water.

Advanced Test Reactor↗