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At least 19 records

The fluorite related modulated structures of the Gd{sub 2}(Zr{sub 2-x}Ce{sub x})O{sub 7} solid solution: An analogue for Pu disposition

We present an overview of the Gd{sub 2}(Zr{sub 2-x}Ce{sub x})O{sub 7} phase diagram, of interest as a model system for ceramic disposition of Pu (with Ce as a Pu surrogate). The fluorite related structures of this solid solution were determined using a modulated structure approach, to identify the underlying cation and vacancy ordering mechanisms from analysis of key satellite reflections in selected zone axis electron diffraction patterns. This revealed the formation of four structure types: pyrochlore for x<0.25, defect fluorite for 0.5 1.50. X-ray absorption (XAS) and electron energy loss (EELS) spectra confirmed the presence of Ce{sup 4+} as the dominant species in compositions across this system, remaining analogous to Pu{sup 4+}. - Graphical abstract: Electron diffraction reveals the cation vacancy ordering mechanisms leading to fluorite related superstructures in the Gd{sub 2}(Zr{sub 2-x}Ce{sub x})O{sub 7} solid solution. Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer The fluorite related solid solution Gd{sub 2}(Zr{sub 1-x}Ce{sub x})O{sub 7} was prepared by solid state synthesis. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Ce L{sub 3} edge XAS and Ce M{sub 4,5} EELS measurements show Ce substitutes as Ce{sup 4+}. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Cation and oxygen vacancy ordering results in four fluorite related structures.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

End of FY10 report - used fuel disposition technical bases and lessons learned : legal and regulatory framework for high-level waste disposition in the United States.

This report examines the current policy, legal, and regulatory framework pertaining to used nuclear fuel and high level waste management in the United States. The goal is to identify potential changes that if made could add flexibility and possibly improve the chances of successfully implementing technical aspects of a nuclear waste policy. Experience suggests that the regulatory framework should be established prior to initiating future repository development. Concerning specifics of the regulatory framework, reasonable expectation as the standard of proof was successfully implemented and could be retained in the future; yet, the current classification system for radioactive waste, including hazardous constituents, warrants reexamination. Whether or not consideration of multiple sites are considered simultaneously in the future, inclusion of mechanisms such as deliberate use of performance assessment to manage site characterization would be wise. Because of experience gained here and abroad, diversity of geologic media is not particularly necessary as a criterion in site selection guidelines for multiple sites. Stepwise development of the repository program that includes flexibility also warrants serious consideration. Furthermore, integration of the waste management system from storage, transportation, and disposition, should be examined and would be facilitated by integration of the legal and regulatory framework. Finally, in order to enhance acceptability of future repository development, the national policy should be cognizant of those policy and technical attributes that enhance initial acceptance, and those policy and technical attributes that maintain and broaden credibility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Enhancing Reliability of the Weapons Material Waste Disposition Process in the Assembly/Disassembly Operations Facility

High quality weapons material waste dispositioning at Y-12 is crucial to the overall public perception of meeting the CNS government missions. Weapons material waste disposition requirements are an after-thought as perceived by Production personnel. Building waste dispositioning activities in the production system at the point of generation will increase the reliability of meeting requirements daily. The ultimate goal is to build in easy to understand processes at the point of generation in the production work without negatively impacting schedules. Measurements to evaluate sustainability of production processes and ensure reliable information will be suggested. Ultimately, this project is an effort to protect the environment by creating highly reliable weapons material waste dispositioning processes at the point of generation. Defining the process at the point of generation ultimately decreases variation and increases reliability of correctly dispositioning waste. Utilization of an effective and improved weapons material waste dispositioning process will ensure decrease in defective product dispositioning, decrease incorrect disposition of waste, increase set-up times for disposition work, decrease cost of production due to less down time and increase the percentage of waste dispositioning jobs completed in a timely manner.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

INFORMATION: Management Alert on Environmental Management's Select Strategy for Disposition of Savannah River Site Depleted Uranium Oxides

The Administration and the Congress, through policy statements and passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), have signaled that they hope that proactive actions by agency Inspectors General will help ensure that Federal Recovery Act activities are transparent, effective and efficient. In that context, the purpose of this management alert is to share with you concerns that have been raised to the Office of Inspector General regarding the planned disposition of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) inventory of Depleted Uranium (DU) oxides. This inventory, generated as a by-product of the nuclear weapons production process and amounting to approximately 15,600 drums of DU oxides, has been stored at SRS for decades. A Department source we deem reliable and credible recently came to the Office of Inspector General expressing concern that imminent actions are planned that may not provide for the most cost effective disposition of these materials. During April 2009, the Department chose to use funds provided under the Recovery Act to accelerate final disposition of the SRS inventory of DU oxides. After coordination with State of Utah regulators, elected officials and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department initiated a campaign to ship the material to a facility operated by EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah. Although one shipment of a portion of the material has already been sent to the EnergySolutions facility, the majority of the product remains at SRS. As had been planned, both for the shipment already made and those planned in the near term, the EnergySolutions facility was to have been the final disposal location for the material. Recently, a member of Congress and various Utah State officials raised questions regarding the radioactive and other constituents present in the DU oxides to be disposed of at the Clive, Utah, facility. These concerns revolved around the characterization of the material and its acceptability under existing licensing criteria. As a consequence, the Governor of Utah met with Department officials to voice concerns regarding further shipments of the material and to seek return of the initial shipment of DU oxides to SRS. Utah's objections and the Department's agreement to accede to the State's demands effectively prohibit the transfer of the remaining material from South Carolina to Utah. In response, the Department evaluated its options and issued a draft decision paper on March 1, 2010, which outlined an alternative for temporary storage until the final disposition issue could be resolved. Under the terms of the proposed option, the remaining shipments from SRS are to be sent on an interim basis to a facility owned by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas. Clearly, this choice carries with it a number of significant logistical burdens, including substantial additional costs for, among several items, repackaging at SRS, transportation to Texas, storage at the interim site, and, repackaging and transportation to the yet-to-be-determined final disposition point. The Department source expressed the concern that the proposal to store the material on an interim basis in Texas was inefficient and unnecessary, asserting: (1) that the materials could remain at SRS until a final disposition path is identified, and that this could be done safely, securely and cost effectively; and, (2) that the nature of the material was not subject to existing compliance agreements with the State of South Carolina, suggesting the viability of keeping the material in storage at SRS until a permanent disposal site is definitively established. We noted that, while the Department's decision paper referred to 'numerous project and programmatic factors that make it impractical to retain the remaining inventory at Savannah River,' it did not outline the specific issues involved nor did it provide any substantive economic or environmental analysis supporting the need for the planned interim storage action. The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal established by the Department to accelerate the general disposition of the SRS material. We recognize that decisions such as the one proposed for the SRS inventory of DU oxides are often more complex and nuanced than might appear on the surface. Consideration of factors such as cost, state interest, posture of local regulators, etc., are important elements in this process. Although, we have not completed sufficient work to reach an independent judgment on the merits of this matter, we wanted to ensure that the Department was aware of the concerns that have been raised before imminent decisions and resource commitments were made regarding the path forward.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PF-4 actinide disposition strategy

The dwindling amount of Security Category I processing and storage space across the DOE Complex has driven the need for more effective storage of nuclear materials at LANL's Plutonium Facility's (PF-4's) vault. An effort was begun in 2009 to create a strategy, a roadmap, to identify all accountable nuclear material and determine their disposition paths, the PF-4 Actinide Disposition Strategy (PADS). Approximately seventy bins of nuclear materials with similar characteristics - in terms of isotope, chemical form, impurities, disposition location, etc. - were established in a database. The ultimate disposition paths include the material to remain at LANL, disposition to other DOE sites, and disposition to waste. If all the actions described in the document were taken, over half of the containers currently in the PF-4 vault would been eliminated. The actual amount of projected vault space will depend on budget and competing mission requirements, however, clearly a significant portion of the current LANL inventory can be either dispositioned or consolidated.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Initial Evaluation of Microreactor Disposition Options

The United States Department of Energy is supporting the U.S advanced reactor industry through funding, legislation and regulatory development to actively pursue several microreactor design concepts. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is strategically positioned to support demonstration of microreactor technology in the next three to five years. This report provides and initial evaluation of the disposition options for microreactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated as part of the microreactor technology demonstration program. Currently available information constitutes the basis for the options identified and discussions thereof. In the absence of detailed microreactor design information, assumptions were made to facilitate the identification of disposition options Particulars pertaining to any component of an identified disposition pathway are naturally highly microreactor design specific and in general such details are not provided. The diverse nature of potential microreactor SNF is reflected in the diverse nature of DOE owned SNF stored at INL. Therefore, it is anticipated that DOE currently stores and manages fuels that can serve as analogs for most microreactor fuel concepts. As such disposition options for microreactor SNF are expected to be much the same as that for these existing fuels. Two generic microreactor concepts have been selected for the purposes of this options assessment. The selected reactor concepts are a tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fueled high temperature gas reactor concept and a sodium/potassium bonded heat pipe reactor with uranium oxide fuel. Both concepts are assumed to be using high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the initial fuel composition. Interim storage, treatment and neutralization, material recovery, packaging and extended dry storage options are identified these reactors. The disposition options include existing INL facilities and capabilities and new facilities and capabilities developed as part of the microreactor program or as part of DOE's overall strategy for the eventual transfer of all SNF at INL to a permanent repository.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Retrieval, Disposal, and Disposition of Legacy 252 Cf Sealed Sources

In this article, we describe work performed on behalf of the US Department of Energy (DOE) to disposition 467 government-owned, sealed californium-252 ( 252 Cf) sources located at 52 academic and government research sites. These sources are the legacy of the DOE 252 Cf Loan/Lease Program, which operated from the late 1960s until 2008, when the loan program closed abruptly. Although the DOE took decades to fabricate and distribute the sources, best safety and nuclear accountability practices demanded retrieval or disposition of all loaned sources as soon as achievable after the loan program was closed. An adaptable disposition approach was developed, and disposition of the sources was pursued. The approach involved a combination of source retrievals, disposal actions, and source ownership transfers. A new shielded shipping container was designed and deployed to aid in source retrievals. In a couple cases, incomplete source fabrication and shipping records prevented shipment, and those sources were left indefinitely with the customer in a safe configuration. Lastly, all the sources in the inventory were safely dispositioned in some way, and lessons learned from this effort are provided.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tritiated Water Disposition Strategies

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is typically confined within one or more confinement barriers. Tritium readily reacts with oxygen to form tritiated water or can exchange with protium or deuterium atoms in water to create tritiated water which is around 10,000 times more toxic than elemental tritium. Primary tritium confinement systems can create small volumes of highly tritiated water. Secondary confinement systems, like inert gloveboxes, will produce larger volumes of lower concentration tritiated water. Much larger volumes of tritiated water of very low tritium content are produced by tritium permeation/diffusion. Tritium from inside primary and secondary confinement barriers will diffuse from these systems into cooling water systems. Closed loop, recirculating cooling water systems will slowly accumulate tritium and create concentrations which exceed drinking water (or permitted discharge) concentrations. The cooling water systems designed as series of interconnected cooling loops that can slowly transfer tritium from one cooling loop to another cooling loop through heat exchangers. These large volumes of tritiated water may be above federal discharge limits and also lack convenient disposition pathways. This document will discuss tritiated water management strategies from the perspective of large volume, low tritium concentrations that exceed drinking water or permitted discharge limits. Applicable US regulatory requirements for a Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) production facility concerning tritiated water are also cited. Tritiated water disposition options, based on typical waste minimization strategies will guide dispositions options. A Case Study example is presented to illustrate the pros and cons of several disposition options. The report does not recommend any particular disposition pathway but discusses strategies to be explored by a producer to guide selection of processes which best fits the needs of a particular waste stream.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The relationship between certain characteristics of industrial research proposals and their subsequent disposition.

The ideas produced by three idea generation groups operating within a large industrial R & D laboratory were studied over a period of two years. Data were collected in order to relate idea dispositions by management to subjective evaluations provided by respondents representing the technical staff and to study the roles of urgency, predictability, and expected time horizon in the disposition decision. The findings are (1) a significant positive correlation was found between idea dispositions and associated subjective evaluations despite the fact that management did not know the subjective evaluations at the time the disposition decisions were made; (2) urgency was the dominant consideration in the disposition decisions, but predictability and expected time horizon were dominant in the subjective evaluations; (3) predictability and time horizon are covariants; and (4) management hedges by shelving marginal ideas. Implications for R & D management are drawn.

Baker, N. R.↗

Disposition of fuel elements from the Aberdeen and Sandia pulse reactor (SPR-II) assemblies

We describe the disposition of fuel from the Aberdeen (APR) and the Sandia Pulse Reactors (SPR-II) which were used to provide intense neutron bursts for radiation effects testing. The enriched Uranium - 10% Molybdenum fuel from these reactors was shipped to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for size reduction prior to shipment to the Savannah River Site (SRS) for final disposition in the H Canyon facility. The Shipper/Receiver Agreements (SRA), intra-DOE interfaces, criticality safety evaluations, safety and quality requirements and key materials management issues required for the successful completion of this project will be presented. This work is in support of the DOE Consolidation and Disposition program. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has operated pulse nuclear reactor research facilities for the Department of Energy since 1961. The Sandia Pulse Reactor (SPR-II) was a bare metal Godiva-type reactor. The reactor facilities have been used for research and development of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems, advanced nuclear reactors, reactor safety, simulation sources and energy related programs. The SPR-II was a fast burst reactor, designed and constructed by SNL that became operational in 1967. The SPR-ll core was a solid-metal fuel enriched to 93% {sup 235}U. The uranium was alloyed with 10 weight percent molybdenum to ensure the phase stabilization of the fuel. The core consisted of six fuel plates divided into two assemblies of three plates each. Figure 1 shows a cutaway diagram of the SPR-II Reactor with its decoupling shroud. NNSA charged Sandia with removing its category 1 and 2 special nuclear material by the end of 2008. The main impetus for this activity was based on NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino's six focus areas to reenergize NNSA's nuclear material consolidation and disposition efforts. For example, the removal of SPR-II from SNL to DAF was part of this undertaking. This project was in support of NNSA's efforts to consolidate the locations of special nuclear material (SNM) to reduce the cost of securing many SNM facilities. The removal of SPR-II from SNL was a significant accomplishment in SNL's de-inventory efforts and played a key role in reducing the number of locations requiring the expensive security measures required for category 1 and 2 SNM facilities. A similar pulse reactor was fabricated at the Y-12 National Security Complex beginning in the late 1960's. This Aberdeen Pulse Reactor (APR) was operated at the Army Pulse Radiation Facility (APRF) located at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) in Maryland. When the APRF was shut down in 2003, a portion of the DOE-owned Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was shipped to an interim facility for storage. Subsequently, the DOE determined that the material from both the SPR-II and the APR would be processed in the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Because of the SRS receipt requirements some of the material was sent to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for size-reduction prior to shipment to the SRS for final disposition.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Disposition of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Currently Located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 12232

Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded SEC Federal Services Corporation (SEC) a 34-building demolition and disposal (D and D) project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that included the disposition of six Strontium (Sr-90) powered Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) stored outside of ORNL Building 3517. Disposition of the RTGs is very complex both in terms of complying with disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for packaging and transportation in commerce. Two of the RTGs contain elemental mercury which requires them to be Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) compliant prior to disposal. In addition, all of the RTGs exceed the Class C waste concentration limits under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Waste Classification Guidelines. In order to meet the LDR requirements and Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) WAC, a site specific treatability variance for mercury was submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to allow macro-encapsulation to be an acceptable treatment standard for elemental mercury. By identifying and confirming the design configuration of the mercury containing RTGs, the SEC team proved that the current configuration met the macro-encapsulation standard of 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.45. The SEC Team also worked with NNSS to demonstrate that all radioisotope considerations are compliant with the NNSS low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility performance assessment and WAC. Lastly, the SEC team determined that the GE2000 Type B cask met the necessary size, weight, and thermal loading requirements for five of the six RTGs. The sixth RTG (BUP-500) required a one-time DOT shipment exemption request due to the RTG's large size. The DOT exemption justification for the BUP-500 relies on the inherent robust construction and material make-up of the BUP- 500 RTG. DOE-ORO, SEC, and the entire SEC RTG team are nearing the conclusion of the Sr-90 RTG disposition challenge - a legacy now 50 years in the making. Over 600,000 Ci of Sr-90 waste await disposal and its removal from ORNL will mark an historical moment in the clean-up of the cold-war legacy in the ORNL central industrial area. Elimination (i.e., removal) of the RTGs will reduce security risks at ORNL and disposal will permanently eliminate security risks. The RTGs will eventually decay to benign levels within a reasonable timeframe relative to radiological risks posed by long-lived isotopes. The safety authorization basis at ORNL Building 3517 will be reduced enabling greater operational flexibility in future clean-out and D and D campaigns. Upon disposition the Department of Energy will realize reduced direct and indirect surveillance and maintenance costs that can be reapplied to accelerated and enhanced clean-up of the Oak Ridge Reservation. At present, waste profiles for the RTGs are developed and under review by NNSS RWAP staff and approval authorities. Disposition schedule is driven by the availability of compliant shipping casks necessary to safely transport the RTGs from ORNL to NNSS. The first disposal of the RCA RTG is expected in April 2012 and the remaining RTGs disposed in 2012 and 2013. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sustainable disposition of unneeded materials and chemicals at Y-12 national security complex - 15181

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) strives to integrate sustainability into all aspects of operations. In 2006, Y-12 conducted a site inventory to identify Unneeded Materials and Chemicals (UMC). The final inventory included over 9,400 materials and equipment and over 9,000 chemicals. A cross-functional UMC Project Team (Team) was established to manage and facilitate disposition of inventory items. A Site Plan was developed to outline the strategy to methodically disposition UMC's with the commitment to put sustainability practices first. The Team works to overcome challenges and find new lives for inventory items prior to dispositioning the materials as waste. Cost-effective strategies are used to transfer UMC items to a new owner. The Team utilizes a systematic disposition evaluation process, which does not simply manage UMC's as waste but focuses on reuse with waste disposal as last resort. The dedicated efforts of the Team to divert items from disposal as waste are reflected in the results. Through Fiscal Year 2013, 35 percent of all chemicals and 55 percent of equipment and materials have been reused or recycled. Through Fiscal Year 2013, the Team has dispositioned over 9.62 million pounds of materials (11,600 items) and down-posted over 97,000 square feet of radiological areas. In Fiscal Year 2014, a UMC Phase II inventory was developed to address UMCs that have accumulated since the original inventory was finalized. Lessons learned from the original UMC scope are being applied to phase II activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Retrieval and Disposition Techniques for Remote Handled Mixed Low-Level Waste - 20319

Legacy waste generated by the sodium-cooled fast reactor, EBR-II, program at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) is challenging to treat and disposition using conventional methods. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions is under contract with the Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate an integrated retrieval and disposition solution for Remote-Handled Mixed Low-Level Waste currently stored in underground liners at INL. Delivery of the integrated solution builds on the expertise and successes of Veolia Nuclear Solutions under its Problematic Waste Treatment Initiative with INL. This initiative focuses solely on the treatment of problematic (reactive metal containing) waste streams using the Veolia Nuclear Solutions GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) technology. Under the contract, Veolia Nuclear Solutions will provide a fully commissioned prototype remote retrieval system to semi-remotely retrieve and size-reduce problematic waste liners into a safe and consolidated package for transport. The consolidated package will be shipped to Richland, Washington for demonstration treatment using the robust GeoMelt Richland system at Perma-Fix Northwest. The treated waste will ultimately be disposed of as a vitrified Low-Level Waste glass monolith. Veolia Nuclear Solutions has delivered countless remotely operated systems globally to solve some of the industry's most challenging problems. To ensure risk is mitigated in the best possible manner, a methodical phased approach is being utilized to validate the integrated solution. This contract focuses on the delivery and deployment of the prototype retrieval system onsite and the treatment of a single liner. Following successful demonstration treatment using GeoMelt ICV, the project is planning to make prototype enhancements before retrieving and treating another liner. Establishing a new integrated approach for retrieval and disposition of waste offers many benefits to INL and the U.S. Department of Energy. It is anticipated that the integrated solution will provide significant cost and schedule savings by increasing the number of liners dispositioned per year. In addition, the complexity of the overall waste disposition process will be reduced. Remotely retrieving and size-reducing waste in the field will provide additional safety to operational personnel and allow critical resources, such as hot cells, to focus on the primary missions at hand. Vitrification (using the GeoMelt ICV technology) allows for the direct processing of metal clad waste thereby significantly reducing pretreatment steps while providing a robust waste form for long-term disposal. The results from this ongoing contract are presented in this paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Alternative Analysis and Prioritization of Department of Energy “TBD” Materials with No Identified Disposition Pathway

The Department of Energy (DOE) complex manages a significant inventory of excess nuclear materials for which disposition pathways have not been identified, commonly referred to as "To Be Determined" (TBD) items. The Disposition Pathways Program, initiated in FY2018, provides a standardized framework for identifying viable disposition pathways for these materials. In 2023, the program undertook a comprehensive review and systematic analysis of the remaining TBD material groups, updating the assessment from the 2020 TBD Study using the 2022 fiscal year-end Nuclear Material Inventory Assessment (NMIA) as the primary data source. This effort aimed to utilize quantitative analysis to down-select from a wide range of potential disposition options and prioritize the remaining pathways to facilitate informed, risk-based decision-making for future programmatic funding and execution. This paper details the alternative analysis methodology used for screening and prioritization, highlighting the key criteria, ranking process, and resultant recommendations. The study successfully narrowed fifty-two potential disposition options down to nineteen, providing a focused path forward for addressing a longstanding challenge within the DOE complex.

Ramsey, Catherine [Savannah River National Laborat↗

DEVELOPMENT OF GLASS AND CRYSTALLINE CERAMIC FORMS FOR DISPOSITION OF EXCESS PLUTONIUM

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) has identified up to 50 metric tons of excess plutonium that needs to be dispositioned. The bulk of the material is slated to be blended with uranium and fabricated into a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for subsequent burning in commercial nuclear reactors. Excess plutonium-containing impurity materials making it unsuitable for fabrication into MOX fuel will need to be dispositioned via other means. Glass and crystalline ceramics have been developed and studied as candidate forms to immobilize these impure plutonium feeds. A titanate-based ceramic was identified as an excellent actinide material host. This composition was based on Synroc compositions previously developed for nuclear waste immobilization. These titanate ceramics were found to be able to accommodate extremely high quantities of fissile material and exhibit excellent aqueous durability. A lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass was developed to accommodate high concentrations of plutonium and to be very tolerant of impurities yet still maintain good aqueous durability. Recent testing of alkali borosilicate compositions showed promise of using these compositions to disposition lower concentrations of plutonium using existing high level waste vitrification processes. The developed waste forms all appear to be suitable for Pu disposition. Depending on the actual types and concentrations of the Pu residue streams slated for disposition, each waste form offers unique advantages.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dispositional logic

The applicability of conventional mathematical analysis (based on the combination of two-valued logic and probability theory) to problems in which human judgment, perception, or emotions play significant roles is considered theoretically. It is shown that dispositional logic, a branch of fuzzy logic, has particular relevance to the common-sense reasoning typical of human decision-making. The concepts of dispositionality and usuality are defined analytically, and a dispositional conjunctive rule and dispositional modus ponens are derived.

Le Balleur, J. C.↗