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An availability assessment process developed by the Space Station Freedom Program Office Operations Organization is reviewed. The process under consideration is aimed at highlighting design attributes which hamper operations for development of appropriate design alternatives.
The Change Request (CR) assessment process is essential in the display development cycle. The assessment process is performed to ensure that the changes stated in the description of the CR match the changes in the actual display requirements. If a discrepancy is found between the CR and the requirements, the CR must be returned to the originator for corrections. Data was gathered from each of the developers to determine the type of discrepancies and the amount of time spent assessing each CR. This study sought to determine the most common types of discrepancies, and the amount of time required to assessing those issues. The study found that even though removing discrepancy before an assessment would save half the time needed to assess an CR with a discrepancy, the number of CR's found to have a discrepancy was very small compared to the total number of CR's assessed during the data gathering period.
The Change Request (CR) assessment process is essential in the display development cycle. The assessment process is performed to ensure that the changes stated in the description of the CR match the changes in the actual display requirements. If a discrepancy is found between the CR and the requirements, the CR must be returned to the originator for corrections. Data will be gathered from each of the developers to determine the type of discrepancies and the amount of time spent assessing each CR. This study will determine the most common types of discrepancies and the amount of time spent assessing those issues. The results of the study will provide a foundation for future improvements as well as a baseline for future studies.
The NASA Dust Management Project (DMP) was established to provide technologies (to TRL 6 development level) required to address adverse effects of lunar dust to humans and to exploration systems and equipment, which will reduce life cycle cost and risk, and will increase the probability of sustainable and successful lunar missions. The technology portfolio of DMP consisted of different categories of technologies whose final product is either a technology solution in itself, or one that contributes toward a dust mitigation strategy for a particular application. A Decision Gate Process (DGP) was developed to assess and validate the achievement and priority of the dust mitigation technologies as the technologies progress through the development cycle. The DGP was part of continuous technology assessment and was a critical element of DMP risk management. At the core of the process were technology-specific criteria developed to measure the success of each DMP technology in attaining the technology readiness levels assigned to each decision gate. The DGP accounts for both categories of technologies and qualifies the technology progression from technology development tasks to application areas. The process provided opportunities to validate performance, as well as to identify non-performance in time to adjust resources and direction. This paper describes the overall philosophy of the DGP and the methodology for implementation for DMP, and describes the method for defining the technology evaluation criteria. The process is illustrated by example of an application to a specific DMP technology.
This paper will discuss the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) effort and its involvement with related activities during the development of the Mars Exploration Rover (MER). The Rovers were launched 2003.June.10 (Spirit) and 2003.July.7 (Opportunity), and both have proven very successful. Although designed for a 90-day mission, the Rovers have been operating for over two earth years. This paper will review aspects of how the MER project integrated PRA into the design and development process. A companion paper (Development of the Mars Exploration Rover PRA) will describe the MER PRA and design changes from those results.
The NASA Dust Management Project (DMP) was established to provide technologies (to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6) required to address adverse effects of lunar dust to humans and to exploration systems and equipment, to reduce life cycle cost and risk, and to increase the probability of sustainable and successful lunar missions. The technology portfolio of DMP consisted of different categories of technologies whose final product was either a technology solution in itself, or one that contributes toward a dust mitigation strategy for a particular application. A Decision Gate Process (DGP) was developed to assess and validate the achievement and priority of the dust mitigation technologies as the technologies progress through the development cycle. The DGP was part of continuous technology assessment and was a critical element of DMP risk management. At the core of the process were technology-specific criteria developed to measure the success of each DMP technology in attaining the technology readiness levels assigned to each decision gate. The DGP accounts for both categories of technologies and qualifies the technology progression from technology development tasks to application areas. The process provided opportunities to validate performance, as well as to identify non-performance in time to adjust resources and direction. This paper describes the overall philosophy of the DGP and the methodology for implementation for DMP, and describes the method for defining the technology evaluation criteria. The process is illustrated by example of an application to a specific DMP technology.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to provide space plasma instrumentation data analysis expertise in support of Floating Potential Measurement Unit (FPMU) data analysis and data processing algorithm development. Subject matter expertise was requested to support modification of FPMU data processing algorithms to account for aging of the FPMU instrument suite, improve the science quality of the FPMU data sets that are made available to the science community, and provide analysis of FPMU data for complex spacecraft orientation and geophysical situations. This document contains the results of the NESC assessment.
Space Act Agreements (SAAs) are contractual agreements that NASA utilizes to form partnerships with researchers, industry, and academia to stimulate cutting-edge innovation within the science and technology communities. center dot This study assessed the current SAA development and activation process at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to determine if improvements could be implemented to increase productivity, decrease time to activation, and improve the quality of deliverables.
A Space Act Agreement (SAA) is a contractual vehicle that NASA utilizes to form partnerships with non-NASA entities to stimulate cutting-edge innovation within the science and technology communities while concurrently supporting the NASA missions. SAAs are similar to traditional contracts in that they involve the commitment of Agency resources but allow more flexibility and are more cost effective to implement than traditional contracts. Consequently, the use of SAAs to develop partnerships has greatly increased over the past several years. To facilitate this influx of SAAs, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) developed a process during a kaizen event to streamline and improve the quality of SAAs developed at the Center level. This study assessed the current SAA process to determine if improvements could be implemented to increase productivity, decrease time to activation, and improve the quality of deliverables. Using a combination of direct procedural observation, personnel interviews, and statistical analysis, elements of the process in need of remediation were identified and potential solutions developed. The findings focus primarily on the difficulties surrounding tracking and enforcing process adherence and communication issues among stakeholders. Potential solutions include utilizing customer relationship management (CRM) software to facilitate process coordination and co-locating or potentially merging the two separate organizations involved in SAA development and activation at MSFC.
During the time period covered by this report, SAIC: 1) Continued to develop and assess processes and approaches that can be applied to Second Generation Reuseable Launch Vehicles (RLV) technologies prioritization. An approach based on the use of analytic Saaty scale functions has been defined and is being investigated. 2) Planned and facilitated technologies prioritization workshops, supported development of systems program algorithms based on the concept of influence diagramming, and assessment of analogies between aircraft and space systems developments. 3) Video interviews held with X-37 personnel at Dryden. The CD-ROM is being concluded and a near-final review disc is expected soon. 4) CD-ROMS were produced by Engineered Multimedia, Inc. (EMI) under subcontract to SAIC. These two CD-ROM products, "Microgravity" and "New Horizons", were delivered to MSFS technical representatives at a briefing at SAID on January 18, 2001. 5) Presentation brochure, "Aviation/Space Analog Team Interim Report" was provided to Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) members and to NASA personnel. Wrap-up of effort will be a mid-April briefing to both MSFC and the full SPST membership. Support to Phase 2 of CCPD ends 3/31/01. Phase 3 continuation effort planned with emphasis on technical info content. 6) Recommended that eliminating the B-52 flights of the X-37 in favor of alternate approached be evaluated. Discovered that a required change to the thruster valves of the X-37 had not been made. Repair work continues on the lower fuselage section of the X-37, in the areas that experienced core collapse. The currently catalogued potential weight increases and decreases are about equal, but this does not include the impact of the cable weight underestimate reported earlier. The CFD for RCS testing correlates well with the wind tunnel data. 7) The Level IV CCB approved SCN-4 to the MC-1 Engine SPecification. Approved changes have been incorporated into the specification, and Revision D has been released to the Repository. Billy Gonterman, SAIC, traveled to SSC to perform a five-day readiness assessment on the progress of facilities activation. Implemented modifications to the MC-1 Engine TPA Component Database. 8) Replaced 25 Combined-Cycle Propulsion Database (CCPD) documents; modified the low-on screen to include a direct email link for user contact; prepared a summary presentation of current and proposed tasks.
The International Space Station (ISS) orbits near the F-peak of the ionosphere (approximately 400 km altitude). Generally, satellites orbiting at this altitude would have a floating potential (FP) of approximately -1 V due to the electron temperature (Te). However, the ISS has 8 large negatively grounded 160 V solar array wings (SAW) that collect a significant electron current from the ionosphere. This current drives the ISS FP much more negative during insolation and is highly dependent on the electron density (Ne). Also, due to the size of the ISS, magnetic inductance caused by the geomagnetic field produces a delta potential up to 40 V across the truss, possibly producing positive potentials. During Extravehicular Activity (EVA) the negative FP can lead to an arcing hazard when it exceeds -45.5 V, and the positive FP can produce a DC current high enough to stimulate the astronaut's muscles and also cause a hazard. Data collected from the Floating Potential Monitoring Unit (FPMU) have shown that the probability of either of these hazards occurring during times with quiet to moderately disturbed geomagnetic activity is low enough to no longer be considered a risk. However, a study of the ionosphere Ne during severe geomagnetic storm activity has shown that the Ne can be enhanced by a factor of 6 in the ISS orbit. As a result, the ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP) requires that ionospheric conditions be monitored using the FPMU in conjunction with the ISS Plasma Interaction Model (PIM) to determine if a severe geomagnetic storm could result in a plasma environment that could produce a hazard. A 'Real-Time' plasma hazard assessment process was developed to support ISS Program real-time decision making providing constraint relief information for EVAs planning and operations. This process incorporates 'real time' ionospheric conditions, ISS solar arrays' orientation, ISS flight attitude, and where the EVA will be performed on the ISS. This assessment requires real time data that is presently provided by the FPMU including ISS floating potential, along with ionospheric Ne and Te, in order to determine the present environment. Once the present environment conditions are known to be either above, below, or near the current IRI values, the IRI is used to forecast what the environment could become in the event of a severe geomagnetic storm. If the FPMU should fail, the Space Environments team needs another source of data which is utilized to support a short-term forecast for EVAs. The IRI Real-Time Assimilative Mapping (IRTAM) model is an ionospheric model that uses real time measurements from approximately 70 digisondes to produce foF2 and hmF2 global maps in 15 minute cadence. The Boeing Space Environments team has used the IRI coefficients produced in IRTAM to calculate the Ne along the ISS orbital track. The results of the IRTAM model have been compared to FPMU measurements and show excellent agreement (figure 1). IRTAM has been identified as a potential FPMU back-up system will be used as a backup for the FPMU to support the ISS Program following completion of an FPMU/IRTAM validation campaign.
The NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Systems Analysis & Concepts Directorate (SACD) began studying human exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) in the year 1999. This included participation in NASA s Decadal Planning Team (DPT), the NASA Exploration Team (NExT), Space Architect studies and Revolutionary Aerospace Systems Concepts (RASC) architecture studies that were used in formulating the new Vision for Space Exploration. In May of 2005, NASA initiated the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The primary outputs of the ESAS activity were concepts and functional requirements for the Crewed Exploration Vehicle (CEV), its supporting launch vehicle infrastructure and identification of supporting technology requirements and investments. An exploration systems analysis capability has evolved to support these functions in the past and continues to evolve to support anticipated future needs. SACD had significant roles in supporting the ESAS study team. SACD personnel performed the liaison function between the ESAS team and the Shuttle/Station Configuration Options Team (S/SCOT), an agency-wide team charged with using the Space Shuttle to complete the International Space Station (ISS) by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The most significant of the identified issues involved the ability of the Space Shuttle system to achieve the desired number of flights in the proposed time frame. SACD with support from the Kennedy Space Center performed analysis showing that, without significant investments in improving the shuttle processing flow, that there was almost no possibility of completing the 28-flight sequence by the end of 2010. SACD performed numerous Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) trades to define top level element requirements and establish architecture propellant needs. Configuration trades were conducted to determine the impact of varying degrees of segmentation of the living capabilities of the combined descent stage, ascent stage, and other elements. The technology assessment process was developed and implemented by SACD as the ESAS architecture was refined. SACD implemented a rigorous and objective process which included (a) establishing architectural functional needs, (b) collection, synthesis and mapping of technology data, and (c) performing an objective decision analysis resulting in technology development investment recommendations. The investment recommendation provided budget, schedule, and center/program allocations to develop required technologies for the exploration architecture, as well as the identification of other investment opportunities to maximize performance and flexibility while minimizing cost and risk. A summary of the trades performed and methods utilized by SACD for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESAS) activity is presented along with how SACD is currently supporting the implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration.
Development is underway of the J -2X engine, a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen rocket engine for use on the Space Launch System. The Engine E10001 began hot fire testing in June 2011 and testing will continue with subsequent engines. The J -2X engine main combustion chamber contains both acoustic cavities and baffles. These stability aids are intended to dampen the acoustics in the main combustion chamber. Verification of the engine thrust chamber stability is determined primarily by examining experimental data using a dynamic stability rating technique; however, additional requirements were included to guard against any spontaneous instability or rough combustion. Startup and shutdown chug oscillations are also characterized for this engine. This paper details the stability requirements and verification including low and high frequency dynamics, a discussion on sensor selection and sensor port dynamics, and the process developed to assess combustion stability. A status on the stability results is also provided and discussed.
A wind tunnel test was conducted at the Ames Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel to characterize the transonic buffet environment of a generic launch vehicle forebody. The test examined a highly instrumented version of the Coe and Nute Model 11 test article first tested in the 1960s. One of the measurement techniques used during this test was unsteady pressure sensitive paint (uPSP) developed at the Arnold Engineering Development Complex. This optical measurement technique measured fluctuating pressures at over 300,000 locations on the surface of the model. The high spatial density of these measurements provided an opportunity to examine in depth the assumptions underpinning the development of buffet forcing functions (BFFs) used in the development of the Space Launch System vehicle. The comparison of discrete-measurement-based BFFs to BFFs developed by continuous surface pressure integration indicates that the current BFF development approach under predicts low frequency content of the BFFs while over predicting high frequency content. Coherence-based adjustments employed to reduce over prediction in the surface integration of discrete pressure measurements contribute to the inaccuracy of the BFFs and their implementation should be reevaluated.
The Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 began an unprecedented level of effort within the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community to support the Space Shuttle Program. During the approximately six month time frame of the primary Columbia Accident Investigation Board activity, many technical disciplines were involved in a concerted effort to reconstruct the last moments of the Columbia and her crew, and understand the critical events that led to that loss. Significant contributions to the CAIB activity were made by the hypersonic aerothermodynamic community(REF CAIB) in understanding the re-entry environments that led to the propagation of an ascent foam induced wing leading edge damage to a subsequent breech of the wing spar of Columbia, and the subsequent breakup of the vehicle. A core of the NASA hypersonic aerothermodynamics team that was involved in the CAIB investigation has been combined with the United Space Alliance and Boeing Orbiter engineering team in order to position the Space Shuttle Program with a process to perform in-flight Thermal Protection System damage assessments. This damage assessment process is now part of the baselined plan for Shuttle support, and is a direct out-growth of the Columbia accident and NASAs response. Multiple re-entry aeroheating tools are involved in this damage assessment process, many of which have been developed during the Return To Flight activity. In addition, because these aeroheating tools are part of an overall damage assessment process that also involves the thermal and stress analyses community, in addition to a much broader mission support team, an integrated process for performing the damage assessment activities has been developed by the Space Shuttle Program and the Orbiter engineering community. Several subsets of activity in the Orbiter aeroheating communities support to the Return To Flight effort have been described in previous publications (CFD?, Cavity Heating? Any BLT? Grid Generation?). This work will provide a description of the integrated process utilized to perform Orbiter tile damage assessment, and in particular will seek to provide a description of the integrated aeroheating tools utilized to perform these assessments. Individual aeroheating tools will be described which provide the nominal re-entry heating environment characterization for the Orbiter, the heating environments for tile damage, heating effects due to exposed Thermal Protection System substrates, the application of Computational Fluid Dynamics for the description of tile cavity heating, and boundary layer transition prediction. This paper is meant to provide an overall view of the integrated aeroheating assessment process for tile damage assessment as one of a sequence of papers on the development of the boundary layer transition prediction capability in support of Space Shuttle Return To Flight efforts.
The Integrated Technology Assessment Center (ITAC) has developed a flexible systems analysis framework to identify long-term technology needs, quantify payoffs for technology investments, and assess the progress of ASTP-sponsored technology programs in the hypersonics area. For this, ITAC has assembled an experienced team representing a broad sector of the aerospace community and developed a systematic assessment process complete with supporting tools. Concepts for transportation systems are selected based on relevance to the ASTP and integrated concept models (ICM) of these concepts are developed. Key technologies of interest are identified and projections are made of their characteristics with respect to their impacts on key aspects of the specific concepts of interest. Both the models and technology projections are then fed into the ITAC's probabilistic systems analysis framework in ModelCenter. This framework permits rapid sensitivity analysis, single point design assessment, and a full probabilistic assessment of each concept with respect to both embedded and enhancing technologies. Probabilistic outputs are weighed against metrics of interest to ASTP using a multivariate decision making process to provide inputs for technology prioritization within the ASTP. ITAC program is currently finishing the assessment of a two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO), rocket-based combined cycle (RBCC) concept and a TSTO turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) concept developed by the team with inputs from NASA. A baseline all rocket TSTO concept is also being developed for comparison. Boeing has recently submitted a performance model for their Flexible Aerospace System Solution for Tomorrow (FASST) concept and the ISAT program will provide inputs for a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) TBCC based concept in the near-term. Both of these latter concepts will be analyzed within the ITAC framework over the summer. This paper provides a status update of the ITAC program.
In early 1991, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Office of Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy of the current process by which NASA develops and verifies changes and updates to the Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software Processes was convened in Jan. 1992 to accomplish the following tasks: (1) review the entire flight software development process from the initial requirements definition phase to final implementation, including object code build and final machine loading; (2) review and critique NASA's independent verification and validation process and mechanisms, including NASA's established software development and testing standards; (3) determine the acceptability and adequacy of the complete flight software development process, including the embedded validation and verification processes through comparison with (1) generally accepted industry practices, and (2) generally accepted Department of Defense and/or other government practices (comparing NASA's program with organizations and projects having similar volumes of software development, software maturity, complexity, criticality, lines of code, and national standards); (4) consider whether independent verification and validation should continue. An overview of the study, independent verification and validation of critical software, and the Space Shuttle flight software development process are addressed. Findings and recommendations are presented.
A functional fault model (FFM) is an abstract representation of the failure space of a givensystem. As such, it simulates the propagation of failure effects along paths between the origin ofthe system failure modes and points within the system capable of observing the failure effects. Asa result, FFMs may be used to diagnose the presence of failures in the modeled system. FFMsnecessarily contain a significant amount of information about the design, operations, and failuremodes and effects. One of the important benefits of FFMs is that they may be qualitative, ratherthan quantitative and, as a result, may be implemented early in the design process when there ismore potential to positively impact the system design. FFMs may therefore be developed andmatured throughout the monitored system's design process and may subsequently be used toprovide real-time diagnostic assessments that support system operations. This paper provides anoverview of a generalized NASA process that is being used to develop and apply FFMs. FFMtechnology has been evolving for more than 25 years. The FFM development process presented inthis paper was refined during NASA's Ares I, Space Launch System, and Ground SystemsDevelopment and Operations programs (i.e., from about 2007 to the present). Process refinementtook place as new modeling, analysis, and verification tools were created to enhance FFMcapabilities. In this paper, standard elements of a model development process (i.e., knowledgeacquisition, conceptual design, implementation & verification, and application) are describedwithin the context of FFMs. Further, newer tools and analytical capabilities that may benefit thebroader systems engineering process are identified and briefly described. The discussion isintended as a high-level guide for future FFM modelers.