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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity Governance

Cybersecurity governance helps an organization detect, prevent, and respond to cyber incidents by establishing cybersecurity policies and procedures for use across the enterprise. As modern energy systems become increasingly reliant on smaller and decentralized generation sources-equipped with complex, data-driven communications-governance will be of growing importance for the continued protection of the electric grid. This presentation sheds light on the important aspects of cybersecurity governance, best practices to ensure a culture of cybersecurity, and approaches to frequent monitoring and assessment of an organization's cybersecurity posture.

business requirements↗
DOE OSTI2022

Survey of Cybersecurity Governance, Threats, and Countermeasures for the Power Grid

The convergence of Information Technologies and Operational Technology systems in industrial networks presents many challenges related to availability, integrity, and confidentiality. In this paper, we evaluate the various cybersecurity risks in industrial control systems and how they may affect these areas of concern, with a particular focus on energy-sector Operational Technology systems. There are multiple threats and countermeasures that Operational Technology and Information Technology systems share. Since Information Technology cybersecurity is a relatively mature field, this paper emphasizes on threats with particular applicability to Operational Technology and their respective countermeasures. We identify regulations, standards, frameworks and typical system architectures associated with this domain. We review relevant challenges, threats, and countermeasures, as well as critical differences in priorities between Information and Operational Technology cybersecurity efforts and implications. These results are then examined against the recommended National Institute of Standards and Technology framework for gap analysis to provide a complete approach to energy sector cybersecurity. We provide analysis of countermeasure implementation to align with the continuous functions recommended for a sound cybersecurity framework.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Service Provider Technical Interchange

ATM-X subproject, DIP (Digital Information Platform) is hosting a Service Provider(SP) workshop to discuss Service Quality, Data Governance, Cybersecurity, and Interoperability. This workshop will provide an interactive forum for exchanging ideas with peers and experts. Service Providers have a chance to influence future developments and ensure that your services align with DIP’s vision of the future aviation ecosystem.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Ransomware and Today's Electric Grid

Cyberattacks come in many forms, including one of the newest and most threatening of attacks: ransomware. The rise in ransomware impacts businesses small and large -- and have the potential to significantly disrupt the operations of critical infrastructure. This presentation will explain what utilities can expect from a ransomware attack, sharing examples from specific events, provide guidance on how to prepare for the unknown, and offer possible ways to respond when an attack occurs. The presentation will also discuss cybersecurity governance as an effective method in taking preventative action to ransomware by identifying and addressing vulnerabilities through monitoring and assessment.

assessment↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity and Distributed Energy Resources

This fact sheet addresses cybersecurity for distributed energy resources (DERs) and identifies best practices in cybersecurity governance, technical management of cyber-physical systems, and physical security.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Assessment Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

This growing number of smart devices that support DERs can increase the number of access points outside a utility’s administrative domain, which can increase the potential for cyberattack. With the integration of DERs at federal sites, the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of DER systems must be understood and addressed. This presentation covers two NREL tools available. The Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) is a web-based holistic tool for evaluating cybersecurity posture including governance, physical security and technical management. The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) extends the DER-CF by applying it to the NIST risk management framework process. It will be downloadable application that runs locally and documents all the major requirements for achieving Authority to Operate the DER.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2023

Smart manufacturing maturity models and their applicability: a review

The purpose of this paper is to review existing smart manufacturing (SM) maturity models' dimensions and maturity levels to assess their applicability and drawbacks. There are many maturity models available but many of them have not been validated or do not provide a useful guide or tool for applications. This gap creates the need for a review of the existing maturity model's applicability. Nineteen peer-reviewed maturity models related to “Digital Transformation,” “Industry 4.0” or “Smart Manufacturing” were selected based on a systematic literature review and five consulting firm models were selected based on the author's industry knowledge. The chosen models were analyzed to determine 10 categories of dimensions. Then they are assessed on a 1–5 scale for how applicable they are in the 10 categories of dimensions. The five “consulting firm” models have a first-mover advantage, are more widely used in industry and are more applicable, but some require payment, and they lack published details and validation. The 19 “peer reviewed” models are not as widely used, lack awareness in the industry and are not as easy to apply because of no web tool for self-assessment, but they are improving. The categories defined to characterize the models and facilitate comparisons for users include “Information Technology (IT) and Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and Data,” “Strategy and Organization,” “Supply Chain and Logistics,” “Products and Services,” “Culture and Employees,” “Technology and Capabilities,” “Customer and Market,” “Cybersecurity and Risk,” “Leadership and Management” and “Governance and Compliance.” The analyzed maturity models were particularly weak in the areas of cybersecurity, leadership and governance. Researchers and practitioners can use this review with consideration of their specific needs to determine if a maturity model is applicable or if a new model needs to be developed. The review can also aid in the development of maturity models through the discussion of each of the dimension categories. Finally, compared to existing reviews of SM maturity models, this research determines comprehensive dimension categories and focuses on applicability and drawbacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Power Sector Cybersecurity Building Blocks

The Power Sector Cybersecurity Building Blocks, developed through the USAID-NREL Partnership and the Resilient Energy Platform, are designed to help a variety of stakeholders improve security for the electrical grid. This effort grows out of USAID and NREL's discussions with utilities around the world, as well as past cybersecurity assessments performed by NREL on dozens of utilities and government agencies, with a focus on the cybersecurity challenges faced by small and under-resourced utilities. This document outlines eleven building blocks for power sector cyber security. It functions as a guide to help organizations develop a robust, balanced cybersecurity defense program. Individually, each building block represents a cluster of related activities within cybersecurity on which an organization should focus. Using the building blocks, organizations can effectively prioritize their cybersecurity efforts to best thwart a wide range of potential cyberattacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Resilient Energy Platform. Fact Sheet: Power Sector Cybersecurity Building Blocks

The Power Sector Cybersecurity Building Blocks, developed through the USAID-NREL Partnership and the Resilient Energy Platform, are designed to help a variety of stakeholders improve security for the electrical grid. This effort grows out of USAID and NREL's discussions with utilities around the world, as well as past cybersecurity assessments performed by NREL on dozens of utilities and government agencies, with a focus on the cybersecurity challenges faced by small and under-resourced utilities. This document outlines eleven building blocks for power sector cyber security. It functions as a guide to help organizations develop a robust, balanced cybersecurity defense program. Individually, each building block represents a cluster of related activities within cybersecurity on which an organization should focus. Using the building blocks, organizations can effectively prioritize their cybersecurity efforts to best thwart a wide range of potential cyberattacks.

building blocks↗
DOE OSTI2024

CARILEC Resilient Energy Community CoP for Cybersecurity Workshop Series: Cybersecurity Assessment Tools [Slides]

For the last several years and in collaboration with CARILEC, USAID and NREL have been working to support cyber resilience at power sector utilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Direct technical assistance with regional utilities has been a key component of USAID-NREL Partnership activities, and technical assistance has typically included a foundational cybersecurity assessment using NREL's Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) tool. The DER-CF allows organizations to benchmark and evaluate their cybersecurity posture across the areas of Governance, Technical Management, and Physical Security. To complement the activities of the newly created CAREC IT/OT and Cybersecurity Team, this webinar on cybersecurity assessment tools includes an overview of the DER-CF tool and a discussion with regional stakeholders and NREL experts on the DER-CF assessment process and other resources for cybersecurity assessments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

User Guide to the Facility Cybersecurity Framework Internet of Things (IoT) Self-Assessment

The FEMP Facility Cybersecurity Framework (FCF) Internet of Things (IoT) Self-Assessment is a comprehensive tool aimed at illuminating the foggy domains of IoT and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) security. The assessment was developed using insights from recognized standards and guidelines to identify, address, and mitigate the challenges posed by the massive surge of interconnected devices. The FCF IoT Self-Assessment was created using the knowledge from established National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publications such as NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-213, and NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). Additionally, integrating NIST SP 800-213A IoT Device Cybersecurity Guidance for the Federal Government ensures federal agencies are equipped with specific IoT security insights. This user guide has been developed to facilitate a thorough understanding of the tool. As users delve into the assessment, the guide offers a clear navigation walkthrough, report generation, and interpretation of the report.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment for electric grid cybersecurity

Electric grid cybersecurity risk has become a significant concern of industries and governments. This paper proposes a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment method for electric grid cybersecurity risk analysis. The proposed method helps reduce the reliance on expert judgment, capture a broad range of components and system dynamics, and model the interactions between various contributing entities (e.g., attacker, operator). In addition, the scenarios with multiple events, such as the occurrence of both cyberattacks and failures of physical components, the occurrence of both cyberattacks and operators’ (in)correct reactions, are considered and analyzed. Further, for each cyberattack scenario, Monte Carlo simulations are used to obtain possible sequences of the system's evolution under study and then derive risk estimates. As an application of the proposed method, the risk assessment method serves as the basis of risk-informed defense resource allocation to improve electric grid cybersecurity. The proposed method is verified using the IEEE 14-bus system by evaluating different security resource allocations for selected cyberattack scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Managing Cyber Supply Chain Risk for Renewable Energy Technologies

On July 1, 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) hosted a virtual workshop facilitated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Cybersecurity supply chain experts, researchers, and leaders in government and industry came together to share information on current and future challenges in securing emerging technologies and technical architecture. From a cybersecurity perspective, we need to move from a cybersecurity approach that focuses principally on legacy asset owners to one that incorporates more emphasis on end-point device manufacturers and third-party integrators. Cybersecurity for the global digital supply chain for manufacturers of consumer end-point devices—such as smart solar inverters and smart electric vehicle (EV) chargers—will be critical to the future cyber health of the grid.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Informed Engineering Cie Analysis Tool

Main Benefits: • Collaborate on assessment via the web and access and share assessments on your mobile device. • Helps you maximize your cybersecurity investment and resources • Saves you significant time and money by eliminating the requirement to research each government and industry standard in order to understand your cybersecurity posture • Contains easy to follow, step by step instructions to guide you through the process of identifying the cybersecurity posture of your organization • Provides a place to begin with cybersecurity improvement and a way to prioritize your tasks and budgets. • Covers all major cyber relevant topic areas for a comprehensive assessment of your organization’s cybersecurity posture. • Dives deep into the details of each topic area. • Contributes to the organization's risk management and decision-making process • Highlights vulnerabilities and gaps in your organization's IT and control systems. • Raises awareness and facilitates discussion on cybersecurity within your organization • Educates the controls system community on cyber security.

Hansen, Barry [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Id↗
DOE OSTI2020

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗