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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

Anatomy of a Security Operations Center

Many agencies and corporations are either contemplating or in the process of building a cyber Security Operations Center (SOC). Those Agencies that have established SOCs are most likely working on major revisions or enhancements to existing capabilities. As principle developers of the NASA SOC; this Presenters' goals are to provide the GFIRST community with examples of some of the key building blocks of an Agency scale cyber Security Operations Center. This presentation viII include the inputs and outputs, the facilities or shell, as well as the internal components and the processes necessary to maintain the SOC's subsistence - in other words, the anatomy of a SOC. Details to be presented include the SOC architecture and its key components: Tier 1 Call Center, data entry, and incident triage; Tier 2 monitoring, incident handling and tracking; Tier 3 computer forensics, malware analysis, and reverse engineering; Incident Management System; Threat Management System; SOC Portal; Log Aggregation and Security Incident Management (SIM) systems; flow monitoring; IDS; etc. Specific processes and methodologies discussed include Incident States and associated Work Elements; the Incident Management Workflow Process; Cyber Threat Risk Assessment methodology; and Incident Taxonomy. The Evolution of the Cyber Security Operations Center viII be discussed; starting from reactive, to proactive, and finally to proactive. Finally, the resources necessary to establish an Agency scale SOC as well as the lessons learned in the process of standing up a SOC viII be presented.

Wang, John↗
NASA NTRS1990

Automatic recognition of intermittent failures - An experimental study of field data

A methodology is proposed for recognizing the symptoms of persistent problems in large systems. The system error rate is used to identify the error states among which relationships may exist. Statistical techniques are used to validate and quantify the strength of the relationship among these error states. As input, the approach takes the raw error logs containing a single entry for each error that is detected as an isolated event. As output, it produces a list of symptoms that characterize persistent errors. Thus, given a failure, it is determined whether the failure is an intermittent manifestation of a common fault or whether it is an isolated (transient) incident. The technique is shown to work on two CYBER systems and an IBM 3081 multiprocessor system. Comparisons to real failure/repair information obtained from field engineers show that, in about 85 percent of the cases, the error symptoms recognized by this approach correspond to real problems. The remaining 15 percent of the cases, although not directly supported by field data, are confirmed as being valid problems.

Iyer, Ravishankar K.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Three-dimensional flow over a conical afterbody containing a centered propulsive jet - A numerical simulation

The supersonic flow field over a body of revolution incident to the free stream is simulated numerically on a large, array processor (the CDC Cyber 205). The configuration is composed of a cone-cylinder forebody followed by a conical afterbody from which emanates a centered, supersonic propulsive jet. The free-stream Mach number is 2, the jet-exit Mach number is 2.5, and the jet-to-free-stream static pressure ratio is 3. Both the external flow and the exhaust are ideal air at a common total temperature. The thin-layer approximation to the time-dependent, compressible, Reynolds-averaged Navier-Stokes equations are solved using an implicit finite-difference algorithm. The data base, of 5 million words, is structured in a 'pencil' format so that efficient use of the array processor can be realized. The computer code is completely vectorized to take advantage of the data structure. Turbulence closure is achieved using an empirical algebraic eddy-viscosity model. The configuration and flow conditions correspond to published experimental tests and the computed solutions are consistent with the experimental data.

Deiwert, G. S.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Three-dimensional flow over a conical afterbody containing a centered propulsive jet: A numerical simulation

The supersonic flow field over a body of revolution incident to the free stream is simulated numerically on a large, array processor (the CDC CYBER 205). The configuration is composed of a cone-cylinder forebody followed by a conical afterbody from which emanates a centered, supersonic propulsive jet. The free-stream Mach number is 2, the jet-exist Mach number is 2.5, and the jet-to-free-stream static pressure ratio is 3. Both the external flow and the exhaust are ideal air at a common total temperature.

Deiwert, G. S.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗
NASA NTRS2020

Behavior modeling for cybersecurity

In this paper, we elaborate on the key actors within the context of the cyber world at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and use Bayesian Belief Networks to represent the causal and probabilistic relationships between the various elements that affect an actor and the likelihood of exploits and adverse consequences that can occur due to an exploit. We assess the effectiveness of each of the mitigative methods and the sensitivity of the system to each of the aggravating as well as mitigative factors. We use a combination of objective incident data and Subject Matter Expert knowledge as input to these models.

King, James↗