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A computationally efficient algorithm for computing convex hull prices

Electricity markets worldwide allow participants to bid non-convex production offers. While non-convex offers can more accurately reflect a resource's capabilities, they create challenges for market clearing processes. For example, system operators may be required to execute side payments to participants whose costs are not covered through energy sales as determined via traditional locational marginal pricing schemes. Convex hull pricing minimizes this and other types of side payments while providing uniform (i.e., locationally and temporally consistent) prices. Computing convex hull prices involves solving either a large-scale linear program or the Lagrangian dual of the corresponding non-convex scheduling problem. Further, the former approach requires explicit descriptions of market participants' convex hulls. While linear programs for computing convex hull prices are large, their structure is naturally decomposable by generators. Here, in this work, we propose and empirically analyze a Benders decomposition approach to computing convex hull prices that leverages recent advances in convex hull formulations for thermal generating units. We demonstrate across a large set of test instances that our decomposition approach only requires modest computational effort, obtaining solutions at least an order of magnitude faster than the equivalent large-scale linear programming approach. Overall, we provide a computationally feasible method for computing convex hull prices for industrial scale market clearing problems, enabling the possibility of practical adoption of this advanced pricing mechanism.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Rethinking the Price Formation Problem–Part 2: Rewarding Flexibility and Managing Price Risk

In this study, part 1 of this two-part paper describes the impact that uncertainty has on the design and analysis of price formation policies in the non-convex auctions conducted by U.S. wholesale electricity market operators. Using first a toy model and then a large-scale test system, Part 2 demonstrates the difference in prices under the idealized benchmark of ex ante convex hull pricing defined in Part 1 versus existing methods, in particular documenting the potential for suppression of volatility and therefore under-compensation of flexibility by existing methods. The examples highlight that inefficient spot price formation can induce inefficient forward commitments of generators, necessitating out-of-market intervention to restore a reliable and efficient operating plan.Given the potential side effects of existing policies for investment and operation, we suggest two elements in a reoriented approach to the price formation problem: first ensuring that prices exhibit full-strength volatility, and second ensuring that risk-averse market participants have sufficient ability to manage this volatility.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Rethinking the Price Formation Problem–Part 1: Participant Incentives under Uncertainty

Operators of organized wholesale electricity markets attempt to form prices in such a way that the private incentives of market participants are consistent with a socially optimal commitment and dispatch schedule. In the U.S. context, several competing price formation schemes have been proposed to address the non-convex production cost functions characteristic of most generation technologies. Here, this paper considers how the design and analysis of price formation policies for non-convex markets are affected by the uncertainty inherent in electricity demand and supply. We argue that by excluding uncertainty, the analytical framework underlying existing policies mischaracterizes the incentives of market participants, leading to inefficient price formation and poor incentives for flexibility. We establish favorable theoretical properties of a new construct, ex ante convex hull pricing , and demonstrate the difference between this idealized benchmark and existing methods on a large-scale test system. Given increased operational uncertainty with a transition to wind and solar generation, distortions caused by poor incentives for flexibility are likely to grow without improved price formation in organized wholesale markets.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗