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This chart set describes data and analysis underlying the risk of reduced ground support for long duration, deep space missions, starting with Lunar surface stays and progressing to a crewed mission to Mars. The functional impacts for different comm delay regimes are described, along with a specific and generalized anomaly scenario to demonstrate the impact of reduced ground support to onboard operations.
NASA’s mission-operations paradigm, established during Project Mercury and minimally evolving through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions, has primarily depended on real-time support from a ground team of experts. This ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years, managing the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. However, this operational paradigm, which has seen little change in its Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), will face challenges during long-duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. Lunar missions may experience one-way communication latencies ranging from 3 to 14 seconds, while Mars missions will encounter up to a 44-minute round-trip latency at a maximum distance from Earth. Communication delays negatively impact the behavioral health and performance of individuals and crews operating across the multi-team space-to-ground system. Previous research indicates that increased isolation and the challenges posed by delayed communication lead to heightened stress, frustration, adverse behavioral symptoms, and reduced individual performance. NASA has investigated the nature and effectiveness of managing this shift in complex operations since early 2000, but additional research is necessary to assess the issues associated with communication latencies and identify effective countermeasures. This work aimed to examine the evidence from 20 years of research on comm delays. We systematically reviewed the past 20 years of communication delay literature, focusing on how this research aligns with relevant, high-priority needs in the HSIA, Team, and BMed Risks. This type of panoramic review has not been done since 2013; a current, aggregated picture of what has been studied and how is needed to inform additional studies and mitigation development. Additional perspectives were gained from interviews with the research participants, operations experts, and communication delay researchers. Results from this effort will help characterize the risk posed by communication latency for upcoming Artemis missions and point toward potential mitigations. The final results will be presented. For the literature review, we formed a search term seed set drawing from languages used in two papers representative of the previous state of knowledge and supplemented it with additional search terms. We conducted literature searches on Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science and searched NASA project archives for output from NASA-sponsored research. This search yielded 150 papers, of which 48 were relevant. SME interviews provided perspective on key communication delay issues and concerns and what is being worked on to mitigate those issues. Preliminary results of the literature review have been presented. Final results to be presented include the results of the literature review and findings from the interviews.
The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.
Mission operations will have to adapt for long duration, long distance human spaceflight missions. This change is driven mainly by the significantly different communication availability between Earth and space. As astronauts travel farther from Earth, the one-way communication latency increases; the amount of bandwidth will be limited; and there will be period of long and/or no communication. Currently, ground flight controllers collaborate and cooperate with astronauts in space to accomplish essential operational functions. Astronaut autonomy, i.e., the crew’s ability to work more independently from mission control, will be a key enabler in future exploration missions. Over the last several years, the NASA Ames Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) Group has investigated various ways to promote and support astronaut autonomy in human spaceflight missions. Software prototypes are researched, designed, implemented, and assessed for their ability to enable astronaut autonomy. From integrated Internet of Thing for Space, advanced procedures interfaces, comm-delayed chats, and self-scheduling tools, the HCI Group has explored different aspects of astronaut autonomy. Specifically, the self-scheduling tool Playbook has been evaluated in analog extreme environments and onboard the International Space Station, successfully paving the way for future autonomous astronauts.
The approach of 1992 SK to within 0.056 AU of Earth on 1999 March 26 provided an excellent opportunity for radar observations. We observed it daily between March 22-26 at Goldstone at a transmitter frequency of 8560 MHz (3.50 cm). Weighted, optimally smoothed sums of cw (Doppler-only) echoes achieve a signal-to-noise ratio of about 300. Our highest resolution cw setup places up to approx. 30 0.5-Hz Doppler cells on the target at echo powers exceeding two standard deviations of the noise. Our highest resolution imaging setup places about 20 0.25-us (37.5 m) x 2.0 Hz pixels on 1992 SK at echo powers above the same threshold. We completed nearly 300 runs with each setup and obtained thorough rotational phase coverage (period = 7.320 h, P. Pravec, pers. comm.). The dispersion of the echoes in time delay indicates a lower bound on 1992 SK's maximum pole-on breadth of approx. 0.4 km that is consistent with the echo bandwidth and rotation period. Variations in the cw spectral bandwidths and shapes and in the delay-Doppler images as a function of rotation phase are evident on each day, are consistent in bandwidth with each other and with the rotation period, and indicate that the asteroid is asymmetric and modesty elongated.
The aviation users of the National Airspace System (NAS) - the airlines, General Aviation (GA), the military and, most recently, operators of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) - are constrained in their operations by the design of the current paradigm for air traffic control (ATC). Some of these constraints include ATC preferred routes, departure fix restrictions and airspace ground delay programs. As a result, most flights cannot operate on their most efficient business trajectories and a great many flights are delayed even getting into the air, which imposes a significant challenge to maintaining efficient flight and network operations. Rather than accepting ever more sophisticated scheduling solutions to accommodate the existing constraints in the airspace, a series of increasingly capable airborne technologies, integrated with planned improvements in the ground system through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Next Generation Air Traffic Management System (NextGen) programs, could produce much greater operational flexibility for flight path optimization by the aviation system users. These capabilities, described in research coming out of NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, can maintain or improve operational safety while taking advantage of air and ground NextGen technologies in novel ways. The underlying premise is that the nation's physical airspace is still abundant and underused, and that the delays and inefficient flight operations resulting from artificial structure in airspace use and procedural constraints on those operations may not be necessary for safe and efficient flight. This article is not an indictment of today's NAS or the people who run it. Indeed, it is an exceptional achievement that Air Traffic Management (ATM) - the complex human/machine conglomeration of communications, navigation and surveillance equipment and the rules and procedures for controlling traffic in the airspace - has both the capacity and enables the degree of efficiency in air travel that it does. But it is also true that sixty years of the "radar religion" (i.e., reliance on radar-based command and control) has produced several generations of ATM system operators and researchers who believe that introducing automation within the existing functional structure of ATM is the only way to "modernize" the system. Even NextGen, which began as a proposal for "transformational" change in the way ATC is performed, has morphed over the last decade and a half to become just the inclusion of Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation, Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) for surveillance, and Data Communications (Data Comm) for communications, while still operating in rigidly structured airspace with human controllers being responsible for separation and traffic flow management (TFM) within defined sectors of airspace, using the same horizontal separation standards that have been in use since raw primary radar was introduced in the 1950s. No system as massive as the current NAS ATM can be replaced with a better system while simultaneously meeting the transportation and other aviation needs of the nation. A new generation of more flexible operations must emerge and yet coexist in harmony with the current operation (i.e., share the same airspace without segregation), thereby enabling a long-term transformation to take place in the way increasing numbers of flights are handled. Market forces will be the ultimate driver of this transformation, and investment realities mandate that real benefits must accrue to the first operators to adopt these new capabilities. In fact, the kinds of missions envisioned in the emerging world of UAS operations, unachievable under conventional ATM, demand that this transformation take place. Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) is proposed as a series of transformational steps leading to vastly increased flexibility in flight operations and capacity in the airspace to accommodate many varied airspace uses while improving safety. As will be described, ABTM enables the gradual emergence of a new paradigm for user-based trajectory management in ATM that brings tangible benefits to equipped operators at every step while leveraging the air and ground investments of NextGen. There are five steps in this ABTM transformation.1 NASA has extensively studied the first and last of these steps, and a roadmap of increasing capabilities and benefits is proposed for bridging between these operational concepts.