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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1998

Using Collective Intelligence to Route Internet Traffic

A Collective Intelligence (COIN) is a community of interacting reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms designed so that their collective behavior maximizes a global utility function. We introduce the theory of COINs, then present experiments using that theory to design COINs to control internet traffic routing. These experiments indicate that COINs outperform previous RL-based systems for such routing that have previously been investigated.

Wolpert, David H.↗
NASA NTRS1999

A Survey of Collective Intelligence

This chapter presents the science of "COllective INtelligence" (COIN). A COIN is a large multi-agent systems where: i) the agents each run reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms; ii) there is little to no centralized communication or control; iii) there is a provided world utility function that, rates the possible histories of tile full system. Tile conventional approach to designing large distributed systems to optimize a world utility does not use agents running RL algorithms. Rather that approach begins with explicit modeling of the overall system's dynamics, followed by detailed hand-tuning of the interactions between the components to ensure that they "cooperate" as far as the world utility is concerned. This approach is labor-intensive, often results in highly non-robust systems, and usually results in design techniques that, have limited applicability. In contrast, with COINs we wish to solve the system design problems implicitly, via the 'adaptive' character of the RL algorithms of each of the agents. This COIN approach introduces an entirely new, profound design problem: Assuming the RL algorithms are able to achieve high rewards, what reward functions for the individual agents will, when pursued by those agents, result in high world utility? In other words, what reward functions will best ensure that we do not have phenomena like the tragedy of the commons, or Braess's paradox? Although still very young, the science of COINs has already resulted in successes in artificial domains, in particular in packet-routing, the leader-follower problem, and in variants of Arthur's "El Farol bar problem". It is expected that as it matures not only will COIN science expand greatly the range of tasks addressable by human engineers, but it will also provide much insight into already established scientific fields, such as economics, game theory, or population biology.

Wolpert, David H.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Theory of Collective Intelligence

In this chapter an analysis of the behavior of an arbitrary (perhaps massive) collective of computational processes in terms of an associated "world" utility function is presented We concentrate on the situation where each process in the collective can be viewed as though it were striving to maximize its own private utility function. For such situations the central design issue is how to initialize/update the collective's structure, and in particular the private utility functions, so as to induce the overall collective to behave in a way that has large values of the world utility. Traditional "team game" approaches to this problem simply set each private utility function equal to the world utility function. The "Collective Intelligence" (COIN) framework is a semi-formal set of heuristics that recently have been used to construct private utility. functions that in many experiments have resulted in world utility values up to orders of magnitude superior to that ensuing from use of the team game utility. In this paper we introduce a formal mathematics for analyzing and designing collectives. We also use this mathematics to suggest new private utilities that should outperform the COIN heuristics in certain kinds of domains. In accompanying work we use that mathematics to explain previous experimental results concerning the superiority of COIN heuristics. In that accompanying work we also use the mathematics to make numerical predictions, some of which we then test. In this way these two papers establish the study of collectives as a proper science, involving theory, explanation of old experiments, prediction concerning new experiments, and engineering insights.

Nash equilibrium↗
NASA NTRS2010

Collective Intelligence and Three Aspects of Planning in Organizations: A NASA Example

For many complex sociotechnical systems, planning seems to require explicit coordination; certainly, in executing a plan the activities of different actors must be tightly coupled. However, distributing the needed planning information can be very burdensome and error prone, because different groups need different collections of information, updated or kept current on different time cycles. Further, the information needed to form successful plans is often highly distributed, and while feedback about the success of prior plans may exist, it may not be available to those in a position of using this to improve plans or to detect and resolve other problems in the system (Weick, 1995). Tools to support various aspects of planning have been developed, and can provide a huge benefit to the individuals working on that aspect. To be tractable, most solutions address a quite bounded slice of work, isolating it from the larger context. Prospective planning takes place over multiple, nested cycles of decision making. This builds a plan that specifies activities of different granularity. "Subplans" may specify multiple parallel activities by different groups and individuals, as well as sequential, nested actions by a single actor. Planning produces valuable, sharable, external, representations: in addition to prospective use, plans support retrospective assessment and also action in the present. Viewing planning in a larger context - both temporal and organizational -- enables noticing what one does not know and generating more systemic and effective solutions. Viewing a problem as one of collective intelligence invites thinking about the larger organizational context. Many approaches to supporting collective intelligence do not support execution of highly contingent actions, distributed across many players, and hence provide incomplete support for planning. However, CI technology maybe helpful in managing the processes of gathering information for decision making in planning and of distributing plan information to various actors, needed on various time cycles.

Billman, Dorrit↗
NASA NTRS2004

Fleet Assignment Using Collective Intelligence

Product distribution theory is a new collective intelligence-based framework for analyzing and controlling distributed systems. Its usefulness in distributed stochastic optimization is illustrated here through an airline fleet assignment problem. This problem involves the allocation of aircraft to a set of flights legs in order to meet passenger demand, while satisfying a variety of linear and non-linear constraints. Over the course of the day, the routing of each aircraft is determined in order to minimize the number of required flights for a given fleet. The associated flow continuity and aircraft count constraints have led researchers to focus on obtaining quasi-optimal solutions, especially at larger scales. In this paper, the authors propose the application of this new stochastic optimization algorithm to a non-linear objective cold start fleet assignment problem. Results show that the optimizer can successfully solve such highly-constrained problems (130 variables, 184 constraints).

Antoine, Nicolas E.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Distributed Control with Collective Intelligence

We consider systems of interacting reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms that do not work at cross purposes , in that their collective behavior maximizes a global utility function. We call such systems COllective INtelligences (COINs). We present the theory of designing COINs. Then we present experiments validating that theory in the context of two distributed control problems: We show that COINs perform near-optimally in a difficult variant of Arthur's bar problem [Arthur] (and in particular avoid the tragedy of the commons for that problem), and we also illustrate optimal performance in the master-slave problem.

Wolpert, David H.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Avoiding Braess' Paradox Through Collective Intelligence

In an Ideal Shortest Path Algorithm (ISPA), at each moment each router in a network sends all of its traffic down the path that will incur the lowest cost to that traffic. In the limit of an infinitesimally small amount of traffic for a particular router, its routing that traffic via an ISPA is optimal, as far as cost incurred by that traffic is concerned. We demonstrate though that in many cases, due to the side-effects of one router's actions on another routers performance, having routers use ISPA's is suboptimal as far as global aggregate cost is concerned, even when only used to route infinitesimally small amounts of traffic. As a particular example of this we present an instance of Braess' paradox for ISPA'S, in which adding new links to a network decreases overall throughput. We also demonstrate that load-balancing, in which the routing decisions are made to optimize the global cost incurred by all traffic currently being routed, is suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across time is concerned. This is also due to "side-effects", in this case of current routing decision on future traffic. The theory of COllective INtelligence (COIN) is concerned precisely with the issue of avoiding such deleterious side-effects. We present key concepts from that theory and use them to derive an idealized algorithm whose performance is better than that of the ISPA, even in the infinitesimal limit. We present experiments verifying this, and also showing that a machine-learning-based version of this COIN algorithm in which costs are only imprecisely estimated (a version potentially applicable in the real world) also outperforms the ISPA, despite having access to less information than does the ISPA. In particular, this COIN algorithm avoids Braess' paradox.

Wolpert , David H.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Multipoint sensing by intelligent collectives

Many remote sensing applications require that multiple sensors collect data simultaneously at spatially distributed locations and their information combined in order to characterize the phenomena of interest. Several basic classes of such multipoint measurement systems may be identified. For each, centralized methods exist for combining the raw data from the various sensors. However, recent advancements have given rise to small, integrated nodes comprised of one or more miniaturized sensors, processor, wireless communications capability and power supplies. Collections of these may be deployed and self-organized into intelligent sensor networks capable of performing cooperative signal processing locally, thereby providing substantial benefits.

multipoint measurement sensor networks↗
NASA NTRS2003

Collective Intelligence

Many systems of self-interested agents have an associated performance criterion that rates the dynamic behavior of the overall system. This chapter presents an introduction to the science of such systems. Formally, collectives are defined as any system having the following two characteristics: First, the system must contain one or more agents each of which we view as trying to maximize an associated private utility; second, the system must have an associated world utility function that rates the possible behaviors of that overall system. In practice, collectives are often very large, distributed, and support little, if any, centralized communication and control, although those characteristics are not part of their formal definition. A naturally occurring example of a collective is a human economy. One can identify the agents and their private utilities as the human individuals in the economy and the associated personal rewards they are each trying to maximize. One could then identify the world utility as the time average of the gross domestic product. ("World utility" per se is not a construction internal to a human economy, but rather something defined from the outside.) To achieve high world utility it is necessary to avoid having the agents work at cross-purposes lest phenomena like liquidity traps or the Tragedy of the Commons (TOC) occur, in which agents' individually pursuing their private utilities lowers world utility. The obvious way to avoid such phenomena is by modifying the agents utility functions to be "aligned" with the world utility. This can be done via punitive legislation. A real-world example of an attempt to do this was the creation of antitrust regulations designed to prevent monopolistic practices.

Wolpert, David H.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Fleet Assignment Using Collective Intelligence

Airline fleet assignment involves the allocation of aircraft to a set of flights legs in order to meet passenger demand, while satisfying a variety of constraints. Over the course of the day, the routing of each aircraft is determined in order to minimize the number of required flights for a given fleet. The associated flow continuity and aircraft count constraints have led researchers to focus on obtaining quasi-optimal solutions, especially at larger scales. In this paper, the authors propose the application of an agent-based integer optimization algorithm to a "cold start" fleet assignment problem. Results show that the optimizer can successfully solve such highly- constrained problems (129 variables, 184 constraints).

Antoine, Nicolas E.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Pods: a Powder Delivery System for Mars In-situ Organic, Mineralogic and Isotopic Analysis Instruments

Many Mars in situ instruments require fine-grained high-fidelity samples of rocks or soil. Included are instruments for the determination of mineralogy as well as organic and isotopic chemistry. Powder can be obtained as a primary objective of a sample collection system (e.g., by collecting powder as a surface is abraded by a rotary abrasion tool (RAT)), or as a secondary objective (e.g, by collecting drill powder as a core is drilled). In the latter case, a properly designed system could be used to monitor drilling in real time as well as to deliver powder to analytical instruments which would perform complementary analyses to those later performed on the intact core. In addition, once a core or other sample is collected, a system that could transfer intelligently collected subsamples of power from the intact core to a suite of analytical instruments would be highly desirable. We have conceptualized, developed and tested a breadboard Powder Delivery System (PoDS) intended to satisfy the collection, processing and distribution requirements of powder samples for Mars in-situ mineralogic, organic and isotopic measurement instruments.

Saha, C. P.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Designing Agent Collectives For Systems With Markovian Dynamics

The "Collective Intelligence" (COIN) framework concerns the design of collectives of agents so that as those agents strive to maximize their individual utility functions, their interaction causes a provided "world" utility function concerning the entire collective to be also maximized. Here we show how to extend that framework to scenarios having Markovian dynamics when no re-evolution of the system from counter-factual initial conditions (an often expensive calculation) is permitted. Our approach transforms the (time-extended) argument of each agent's utility function before evaluating that function. This transformation has benefits in scenarios not involving Markovian dynamics, in particular scenarios where not all of the arguments of an agent's utility function are observable. We investigate this transformation in simulations involving both linear and quadratic (nonlinear) dynamics. In addition, we find that a certain subset of these transformations, which result in utilities that have low "opacity (analogous to having high signal to noise) but are not "factored" (analogous to not being incentive compatible), reliably improve performance over that arising with factored utilities. We also present a Taylor Series method for the fully general nonlinear case.

Wolpert, David H.↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Design of Collectives of Agents to Control Non-Markovian Systems

The 'Collective Intelligence' (COIN) framework concerns the design of collectives of reinforcement-learning agents such that their interaction causes a provided 'world' utility function concerning the entire collective to be maximized. Previously, we applied that framework to scenarios involving Markovian dynamics where no re-evolution of the system from counter-factual initial conditions (an often expensive calculation) is permitted. This approach sets the individual utility function of each agent to be both aligned with the world utility, and at the same time, easy for the associated agents to optimize. Here we extend that approach to systems involving non-Markovian dynamics. In computer simulations, we compare our techniques with each other and with conventional-'team games'. We show whereas in team games performance often degrades badly with time, it steadily improves when our techniques are used. We also investigate situations where the system's dimensionality is effectively reduced. We show that this leads to difficulties in the agents' ability to learn. The implication is that 'learning' is a property only of high-enough dimensional systems.

Lawson, John W.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Designing Agent Collectives For Systems With Markovian Dynamics

The Collective Intelligence (COIN) framework concerns the design of collectives of agents so that as those agents strive to maximize their individual utility functions, their interaction causes a provided world utility function concerning the entire collective to be also maximized. Here we show how to extend that framework to scenarios having Markovian dynamics when no re-evolution of the system from counter-factual initial conditions (an often expensive calculation) is permitted. Our approach transforms the (time-extended) argument of each agent's utility function before evaluating that function. This transformation has benefits in scenarios not involving Markovian dynamics of an agent's utility function are observable. We investigate this transformation in simulations involving both hear and quadratic (nonlinear) dynamics. In addition, we find that a certain subset of these transformations, which result in utilities that have low opacity (analogous to having high signal to noise) but are not factored (analogous to not being incentive compatible), reliably improve performance over that arising with factored utilities. We also present a Taylor Series method for the fully general nonlinear case.

Wolpert, David H.↗
NASA NTRS2004

The Design of Collectives of Agents to Control Non-Markovian Systems

The Collective Intelligence (COIN) framework concerns the design of collectives of reinforcement-learning agents such that their interaction causes a provided "world" utility function concerning the entire collective to be maximized. Previously, we applied that framework to scenarios involving Markovian dynamics where no re-evolution of the system from counter-factual initial conditions (an often expensive calculation) is permitted. This approach sets the individual utility function of each agent to be both aligned with the world utility, and at the same time, easy for the associated agents to optimize. Here we extend that approach to systems involving non-Markovian dynamics. In computer simulations, we compare our techniques with each other and with conventional "team games". We show whereas in team games performance often degrades badly with time, it steadily improves when our techniques are used. We also investigate situations where the system's dimensionality is effectively reduced. We show that this leads to difficulties in the agents ability to learn. The implication is that learning is a property only of high-enough dimensional systems.

Lawson, John W.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Complex Oxides for Brain–Inspired Computing: A Review

The fields of brain-inspired computing, robotics, and, more broadly, artificial intelligence (AI) seek to implement knowledge gleaned from the natural world into human-designed electronics and machines. In this review, the opportunities presented by complex oxides, a class of electronic ceramic materials whose properties can be elegantly tuned by doping, electron interactions, and a variety of external stimuli near room temperature, are discussed. The review begins with a discussion of natural intelligence at the elementary level in the nervous system, followed by collective intelligence and learning at the animal colony level mediated by social interactions. An important aspect highlighted is the vast spatial and temporal scales involved in learning and memory. The focus then turns to collective phenomena, such as metal-to-insulator transitions (MITs), ferroelectricity, and related examples, to highlight recent demonstrations of artificial neurons, synapses, and circuits and their learning. First-principles theoretical treatments of the electronic structure, and in situ synchrotron spectroscopy of operating devices are then discussed. The implementation of the experimental characteristics into neural networks and algorithm design is then revewed. Finally, outstanding materials challenges that require a microscopic understanding of the physical mechanisms, which will be essential for advancing the frontiers of neuromorphic computing, are highlighted.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Survey of Collectives

Due to the increasing sophistication and miniaturization of computational components, complex, distributed systems of interacting agents are becoming ubiquitous. Such systems, where each agent aims to optimize its own performance, but where there is a well-defined set of system-level performance criteria, are called collectives. The fundamental problem in analyzing/designing such systems is in determining how the combined actions of self-interested agents leads to 'coordinated' behavior on a iarge scale. Examples of artificial systems which exhibit such behavior include packet routing across a data network, control of an array of communication satellites, coordination of multiple deployables, and dynamic job scheduling across a distributed computer grid. Examples of natural systems include ecosystems, economies, and the organelles within a living cell. No current scientific discipline provides a thorough understanding of the relation between the structure of collectives and how well they meet their overall performance criteria. Although still very young, research on collectives has resulted in successes both in understanding and designing such systems. It is eqected that as it matures and draws upon other disciplines related to collectives, this field will greatly expand the range of computationally addressable tasks. Moreover, in addition to drawing on them, such a fully developed field of collective intelligence may provide insight into already established scientific fields, such as mechanism design, economics, game theory, and population biology. This chapter provides a survey to the emerging science of collectives.

Tumer, Kagan↗
NASA NTRS2001

Improving Simulated Annealing by Replacing Its Variables with Game-Theoretic Utility Maximizers

The game-theory field of Collective INtelligence (COIN) concerns the design of computer-based players engaged in a non-cooperative game so that as those players pursue their self-interests, a pre-specified global goal for the collective computational system is achieved as a side-effect. Previous implementations of COIN algorithms have outperformed conventional techniques by up to several orders of magnitude, on domains ranging from telecommunications control to optimization in congestion problems. Recent mathematical developments have revealed that these previously developed algorithms were based on only two of the three factors determining performance. Consideration of only the third factor would instead lead to conventional optimization techniques like simulated annealing that have little to do with non-cooperative games. In this paper we present an algorithm based on all three terms at once. This algorithm can be viewed as a way to modify simulated annealing by recasting it as a non-cooperative game, with each variable replaced by a player. This recasting allows us to leverage the intelligent behavior of the individual players to substantially improve the exploration step of the simulated annealing. Experiments are presented demonstrating that this recasting significantly improves simulated annealing for a model of an economic process run over an underlying small-worlds topology. Furthermore, these experiments reveal novel small-worlds phenomena, and highlight the shortcomings of conventional mechanism design in bounded rationality domains.

Wolpert, David H.↗